MD Overpak v. Mayor

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Maryland O verpak C orporation v. Mayor an d City Coun cil of Baltim ore, No. 76 , Sept. Term 2005. Opinion by Harrell, J. ZONING LAW - JUDICIAL REVIEW - ZONING ACTION BY BALTIMORE CITY COUN CIL - AMENDMENT OF A PLANNED UNIT DEVELOPMENT BY ORDINANCE - QUA SI-JUDIC IAL AC T BY T HE CO UNCIL - FACT-F INDING HEAR ING SPE CIFIC TO THE CIRCUMSTANCES AND USE OF THE AFFECTED PARCEL OR ASSEMBLAGE INQUIRY The Baltimore City Council approved, via ordinance, an amendment to an Industrial Planned Unit Development (PUD) located in the Canton area of Baltimore. Appellant, an abutting landowner, filed a petition for judicial review alleging that the PUD amendment interfered with its leasehold interest in a street apparently included in the approved and amende d develop ment plan . Judicial review of zonin g actions b y the Mayor & City Council of Baltimore is authorized by Art. 66B, § 2.09(a)(1)(ii), but the statute does not define what constitutes a zoning action. Precedent of this Court and the Court of Special Appeals has construed the term as encompassing only piecemeal zoning reclassification s based on an inferen ce from th e legislative histo ry of the statute tha t only a stylistic change occurred when the operative language of § 2.09 was changed from reclassificatio n to zon ing action. T he Cou rt of Specia l Appeals has recently reevaluated this understa nding of § 2.09 and proposed an analysis that lo oks, first, to whether the process of any zonin g act partak es of a qu asi-judicial natu re, and seco nd, if the subject of the petition for review is the quasi-judicial act. We adopt certain aspects of this approa ch, particularly the emphas is on agen cy fact-finding directed at a s pecific parcel or assemblage of land as to its unique circumstances. The process undertaken by the Mayor and City Council leading up to and including the approval of the PUD amendment was of sufficient quasi-judicial character to then be subjected to the inquiry of whether it qualified as a zoning action. The bill proposing the PUD amendment was the subject of review and report by eight city agencies and a public hearing addressing various statutory factors related specifically to the PUD. The City Council ultimately approved the PUD amendment after consideration of myriad criteria directed at the particular characteristics and effects of the PUD on the actual situs of the development and surrounding properties and uses. Because the petition for judicial review challenged the amendment of the PUD generally, it could be viewed fairly as attacking the quasi-judicial process observed by the Mayor and City Council. Therefore, Appellan t is entitled to ma intain a petition for judicial rev iew of the PUD amendm ent. Circuit Co urt for Baltim ore City Case # 24-C-04-009648 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 76 September Term, 2005 MARYLAND OVERPAK CORPORATION v. MAY OR AN D CITY COUN CIL OF BALTIMORE Bell, C.J. Wilner Cathell Harrell Battaglia Greene Eldridge, John C. (retired, specially assigned) JJ. Opinion by Harrell, J. Filed: October 16, 2006 This case requires us to explore once again what constitutes a zoning action, as that term is used in Md. Code (1951, 2003 Repl. V ol., 2005 Suppl.), Art. 66B , § 2.09 (a)(1)(ii),1 taken by the Mayor a nd City Cou ncil of Ba ltimore. A zoning action is subject to judicial review by the Circuit C ourt for Baltim ore City and, if f urther review is sought in tim ely fashion, by the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.2 Judicial review proceeds as directed by Title 7, Chapter 200 of the Maryland Rules.3 If the action ta ken in the p resent case is determined not to be a zoning action, we alternatively are asked to consider whether other modalities of legal process are available for judicial scrutiny of the action taken in this case. Engaging in this inquiry, we do not write on an entire ly clean ap pellate s late. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Mayor & City Cou ncil of Baltimore, 390 Md. 469, 889 A.2d 399 (2005) (Armstrong II) (holding that the Court of Special Appeals possessed jurisdiction to consider an appeal from the Circuit Court s dismissal of a petition for ju dicial review , filed under Art. 1 Art. 66B. Land Use [Zo ning in Baltim ore C ity] § 2.09. Appeals to courts. (a) Who may appeal; procedure. (1) An appeal to the Circuit Court of Baltimore City may be filed jointly or severally by any person, taxpayer, or officer, department, board, or bureau of the City a ggrieved by: * * (ii) A zonin g action by the City Counc il. 2 Art. 66B, § 2.09 (e). 3 Art. 66B, § 2.09 (a)(2). * 66B, § 2.09, complaining a bout an ordinance permitting an accessory park ing lot in Baltimore); Wesley Chapel Bluemount Ass n v. Ba ltimore C ounty, 347 Md. 125, 699 A.2d 434 (1997) (reviewing the holding of Stephans II, infra, in determining the scope of any other zoning matter under Md. Cod e (1974, 1995 R epl. Vol.), State Gov t Art.§ 10 -503(b)); Bd. of County Comm rs of Carroll County v. Stephans, 286 Md. 384, 408 A.2d 1017 (1979) (Stephans II) (holding that the legislative history of § 2.09 contemplates that a zoning action mean s zoni ng recla ssificatio n and not legis lative-type actions ), rev g, 41 Md. App. 494, 397 A.2d 289 (Stephans I); Armstrong v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, ___ Md. App. ___, ___ A.2d ___ (2006) (Armstrong III) (No. 1704, September Term, 2004) (filed 1 September 2006) (holding that a parking lot ordinance qualified as a con ditional use o r its equivalent such that its issuance was a quasi-judicial act subject to judicial review under § 2.09 and disapproving contrary language in MBC Realty, infra); Cremins v. County Comm rs of Washing ton Cou nty, 164 Md. App. 426, 883 A.2d 966 (2005) (holding that a planned unit development granted in Washington County under its zoning regulations amounts to a zoning reclassification for purposes of judicial review under Art. 66B, § 4.08, the companion section to § 2.09 for non-c harter coun ties); MBC Realty, LL C v. Ma yor & City Counc il of Baltimore, 160 Md. App. 376, 864 A.2d 218 (2004) (holding that local ordinance permitting specific conditional uses and making text amendments to zoning ordinance were not zoning actions under § 2 .09); Gregory v. Bd. of Co unty Com m rs of Fr ederick C ounty, 89 Md. App. 635, 599 A.2 d 469 (19 91) (holdin g that a piece meal zon ing action is a ppealable 2 under § 4.08, but adoption of an amendment to county s comprehensive water and sewage plan was not a zoning action ). These decisions are instructive in that they delineate general analytical contours for determining whether a governmental action concerning a type of land use decision amounts to a zoning action and thus is e ligible for jud icial review in accordance with Title 7, Chapter 200 of the Maryland Rules. These precedents, however, leave some portion of tabula rasa open on the narrow question presented by this case, given the somewhat unique character of zoning pr ocesses in B altimore C ity and the particu lar facts of the controversy before us. We must dec ide here whether an amen dment of a previous ly approved planned unit development ( PUD ) 4 granted to Canton Crossing, LLC, by the Mayor an d City Coun cil, via City Ordinance 04-873, amounted to a zoning action under Md. Code, Art. 66B, § 2.09 (a)(1)(ii), thus bestowing upon the Circuit Court for Baltimore City jurisdiction to consider on their merits neigh boring landow ners petitions for judicial review o f that amen dment ap proval. 4 A PUD is a relatively modern zoning concept created to provide a degree of flexibility in uses and design not available under strict Euclidian zoning. Essentially, a PUD, when approved by a governmental bod y, grants a variety of uses within a development that would otherwise not be permitted under the pre-existing o r, in the case of Baltimore City s zoning regulations, underlying Euclidian zoning of the pertinent parcel or assemblage of land. A distinguishing feature of PUDs is the incorporation of a form of site planning requirement at its inception and/or in the latter stages of th e overall ap proval pro cess, if that process is multi-tie red. For a more extensive discussion of PUDs, see Rouse-Fairwood Dev. Ltd. P ship v. Su pervisor of A ssessmen ts for Prince George s County , 138 Md. App. 589, 623-24, 773 A .2d 535, 555-56 (2 001). 3 I. The operative facts in this case are largely undisputed. On 21 June 2001, the City Counc il passed, and the Mayor signed into law, Ordinance 01-192 granting Appellee, Canton Crossing, LLC , inter alia, an industrial PUD and approving a development plan for a 67 and one-half acre 5 parcel of lan d in the Ca nton area o f Baltimo re City. The pro perty previous ly was placed solely within a Euclidian 6 3 I ndustria l District, which is designed for industrial, manufacturing, and related activities generally known and described as heavy industry. Baltimore, Md., Zoning Code § 7-401. A PUD was nec essary to accom modate the various residential and commercial uses, not permitted ordinarily in the M-3 zone, proposed in Canton Crossing s development plan.7 5 For reasons not apparent on the record, Ordinance 01-192 re fers to the parcel as consisting of 51.25 acres, more or less, while Ordinance 04-873, the enactment at issue in the present controversy, notes that the parcel consist[s] of 67.52 acres, more or less. Because the latest amendment to the PUD is the subject of consideration here and the parties have referred in their briefs to the parcel as being approximately 67 acre s in size, we s hall use this figure. 6 The term E uclidian , when used in a land use context, derives from the case Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Company, 272 U.S. 365 (1926), where it was first elucidated. The Court of Special Appeals, in Rouse -Fairw ood, explained this concep t: Generally, by means of Euclidean zoning, a municipality divides an area geographically into particular use districts, specifying certain uses for each district. Each district or zone is dedicated to a particular purpose, either residen tial, com mercia l, or indu strial, and the zones appear on the municipality s official zoning map. 138 Md. App. at 623-24, 773 A.2d at 555-56 (quoting 5 Z IEGLER, R ATHKOPF'S: T HE L AW OF Z ONING AND P LANNING (4th ed. rev. 1994), §§ 63.01, at 63-1-2). 7 Ordinance 01-192 alluded to an array of uses in the development plan including: offices, retail, hotel, residences, marina, warehouse/storage, and public space. 4 The PUD, thereafter, was amended by City ordinances on three subsequent occasions as a result of c hange s in the d evelop ment p lan initiat ed by Ca nton C rossing . The first amendment occurred on 1 July 2002, via Ordinance 02-369, permitting C anton Cro ssing to increase parking and square footage use on each parc el [designa ted for dev elopmen t within the 67 acres encompassed by the development plan], to increase the size of the proposed hotel, and to change the location of certain proposed structures. T he secon d amend ment, approved on 22 December 2003 by Ordinance 03-641, allowed an increase [in] the number of hotel rooms permitted, to change the location of certain proposed structures, and to modify the uses permitted and off-street parking requirements. The last amendment, the one at issue in this case, approved by Ordinance 04-873 on 2 December 2004, authorized an increase [in] the number of residential dwelling units permitted and [a] modif[ication] [of] the use s and b uilding s perm itted and their loc ations a nd size . 8 It was upon the approval of this last amendment that Appellant here, Maryland Overpak Corporation, filed on 28 Decembe r 2004 in the Circuit Co urt for Baltim ore City its petition for judicial review. The petition alleged that Maryland Overpak was aggrieved by the PUD amendment approval because it interfered with Appellant s leasehold interest in and 8 Canton Crossing stated, specifically, that it sought to increase the number of residential dwelling u nits from 1 00 to 504 ; to decrease the amou nt of of fice spa ce from 1.7 million to 1.5 million s quare fee t; to decrease the amou nt of retail space from 450,000 to 150,000 square fee t; and to increase the amount of restaurant space from 50,000 to 120,000 square feet. 5 use of Danville Avenue as a staging area for its operations.9 Within two weeks of Maryland Overpak filing its p etition, two other landowners adjoining the PUD, South Highland Avenue LLC and Canton Railroad Company, joined Appellant in praying for judicial review of Ordinance 04-873. Neither of these latter entities, however, are parties to the present app eal. Maryland Overpak and the other abutting land owners believed that the City s action in approving the amendment to the PUD encroached on their inter est in the roadway. Specific ally, Maryland Overpak and South Highland Avenue LLC each pled in their one paragraph petitions that the y maintain a lea sehold interest in Da nville Ave nue as w ell as in property abutting the PUD which would be adversely affected by the approved PUD. Canton Railroad Comp any, for its part, averred in its petition that it own s and ope rates Dan ville Avenue and that the ordinance constituted a violation of the Railroad s procedural and substantive due process rights, as well as interstate commerce clause principles. 9 Maryland Overpak apparently engages in the packing and shipping overseas of industrial equipment, primarily by ocean freighters. The developm ent plan filed by Canton C rossing in the present amendment application shows the entirety of Danville Aven ue along the southern periphery of the site co nceptually as a tree-lined avenue that serves, and is part of, the PUD. This is depicted on Exhibit B-1 (the development plan) of Ordinance 04-873. Exhibit B-2 (the existing conditions plat) of the same ordinance c ontains the phrase no t part of this PUD in parentheses for a major portion of Danville Avenue from its intersection with South Haven Stre et, as it abuts the subject proper ty of the P UD. A small portion of Danville Avenue, along which Maryland Overpak s property apparently abuts on its south side, is depicted as being included in the PUD. Counsel for Appellant, when asked by the Court at oral argument, could not say who owned the street bed of either the included or excluded portions of Danville Avenue. Nonetheless, we pro ceed, arguendo, with the understanding that Appellant asserts a colorable interest in at least the included portion. 6 The City Counc il filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal and Request for Hearing, which was joined by Ca nton Cro ssing, LLC . Both argu ed that judicia l review of the latest amendment to the PUD, under Art. 66B, § 2.09, was not proper and that the Circuit Court lacked jurisdiction over the case. After a hearing on the motion, the Circuit Court dismissed the petition s on 16 Marc h 2005 . The motions judge relied on MBC Realty in reasoning that the PUD granted to C anton Cro ssing did not qualify as a zo ning ac tion un der Ar t. 66B, § 2.09(a)(1)(ii) because it did not amount to a reclassification of the zoning district of the subject proper ty. Maryland Overpak filed a timely appeal in the Court of Special Appeals. We, acting on our initiative, issued a writ of certiora ri before the intermediate ap pellate court could consider the m atter. 389 Md. 398 , 885 A.2d 823 (2005). II. Baltimore City is governed by a unique p rocedure a nd body of law in ma ny respects regarding its zoning procedures. The potential for uniqueness is facilitated not m erely because of the statutory grant under Art. 66B, Boitnott v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 356 Md. 226, 238-39, 738 A.2d 881, 888 (1 999) ( [A]rt. 6 6B, § 2.01(a) provides the general authority for the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore to adopt zoning regulations as necessary . . . . ), but also beca use of the g eneral princ iple that zoning is an exercise of governmental authority that generally falls squarely within the province of the political subdivisions of the S tate. Superior Outdoor Signs, Inc. v. Eller Media Co., 150 Md. App. 479, 494, 822 A .2d 478 , 506 (2 003) (c iting A rt. 23A , § 2(b)(36)(ii)) ( It is fundamental that 7 zoning concerns the regulation of land us e; and it is the p olicy of this State that such regulation w ill occur at the lo cal level. ); see also Mayor & Council of Rockville v. Rylyns Enters., Inc., 372 Md. 514 , 542, 814 A.2d 4 69, 486 (2002). 10 Each jurisdiction in the State owes its zoning authority to delegations found in various provisions of the Maryland Code. We observed in Rylyns that [t]racing the entire panoply of related enabling statutes in Maryland is a tad complex. The provisions em powering m unicipal corporations in Maryland are contained in Maryland Code (1957, 1998 Repl.Vol.), Article 23A, an d with regard to hom e rule po wers sp ecifica lly, Art. 23A, § 9. Similar provisions detailing the powers for non-charter counties are found in Maryland Code (1957, 1998 R epl.Vol., 2002 Supp.), Article 25. Further complicating the matter, the authority of the counties of Montgomery and Prince George's are controlled by Maryland Cod e (1957, 1998 R epl.Vol., 2002 Supp .), Article 28. The land use provisions of Maryland Code (1957, 1998 Repl.Vol., 2002 Supp .), Article 66B pertain primarily to Art. 23A municipalities and Art. 25 non-charter counties, altho ugh certain provisions a pply to Maryland Code (1957, 1998 Repl.Vol.), Art. 25A charter counties, as well as to Mon tgomery and Prince George's Counties, Art. 66B, §§ 1.02 and 7.03, and a lso to the City of Baltimore, Art. 66B, §§ 2.01-2.13 and 14.02. 372 Md. at 528, 814 A.2d at 476-77. Of course, in this case we are concern ed only with Article 66B, which provides for judicial review of zoning actions taken by the Mayor and City Cou ncil of B altimore . Md. C ode, A rt. 66B, § 2.09(a) (1)(ii). A. 10 There are, however, a few instances where regional or Statewide considerations have inspired the Legislature to broaden , directly or indirectly, the purely local considerations and processes inherent in most land use decisions, e.g., the Chesapeake Bay Critical Area Protection Program scheme (Md. Code (1974, Repl. Vol. 2000), Natural Resources §§ 81801 to 8-1817) and the requirements for comprehensive water and sewerage plans (Md. Code (1974 , Repl. Vol. 1996), En vironment §§ 9-5 01 to 9-521). 8 Baltimore City, in Title 9 of the Baltimore City Zoning Code, has developed a scheme for evalua ting, app roving , and administerin g PUD s. The proc ess of obta ining a PU D is initiated by a mandato ry conferenc e betwee n the deve loper and th e Planning Comm ission to discuss the scope and nature of the PUD. Baltimore, Md., Zoning Code § 9-105(a). The developer is requir ed to cre ate a de tailed de velopm ent plan , id. § 9-105(b), which must include, at a m inim um: a ma p ind icating accur ate b oundary lines and the pro ject area in relation to surrounding properties; the placement of roadways and parking facilities; the use, size, and location of existing and proposed buildings and landscaping; architectural drawings of proposed structures; the location of existing and proposed sewer and water facilities; the existing storm drainage pattern along with proposed drainage system; the location of recreation and open spaces; statistic al data on size, density, and proposed number of residential units; a copy of property owners association documents and protective covenants; and a detailed time schedule for start a nd com pletion o f the PU D. Id. § 9-107. The application is then submitted to the Coun cil in the form of a prop osed ordin ance (a bill, in legislativ e verna cular) f or appr oval of the dev elopm ent plan . Id. § 9-106. Once a bill propos ing a PU D has be en subm itted to the Co uncil, it must be reviewed by the Board of Municipal and Zoning Appeals, the Planning Commission, and any other agencies deem ed relev ant by the Preside nt of the City Cou ncil. Id. §§ 9-111, 16-301. These reviewing entities apply a multitude of governing standards that essentially ensure that the proposed PUD w ill conform with the surrounding area in terms of contemplated 9 developm ent; topo grap hy; value of surrounding areas; availability of light, air, open space, and street access; and risk s of pu blic and health h azards . Id. § 9-112. If the Coun cil is satisfied with the development plan and reports from the reviewing agencies, it may approve the PUD in the form of an o rdinan ce. Id. § 9-113. U pon app roval, the ap proved P UD is designated on official zoning maps for informational and reference purposes and a copy of the development plan is kept on file by the Zonin g Adm inistrator . Id. § 9-116. Frequently, the approval expressed in the ordinance contains conditions. The PUD designation , acting as an overlay for a sp ecific parcel or assemblage of properties, is placed on top of the underlying zone or zones, in the present case a Euclidian zone. The underlying zone remains and is retained on the official Zoning Map for the City even after the PUD is appro ved. With the exception of minor changes to the interior features of buildings and the time schedu le of co mpletin g the PU D, id. § 9-118(c ), (d), amend ments to an approved PUD are achieved only through an application process as in the case of a new PUD applica tion. Id. § 9-118(a). Because the development plan and its auth orizing ordinance serve as a binding agreement between the developer and the City for the development of the a ffecte d prop erty, id. § 9-117, deviation from that plan or the requirements of Title 9 may result in revocation of the PUD.11 Id. § 9-119(a). 11 Where cancellation of the PU D is sought, the develop er must b e giv en 15 days notice to answe r to the City s Zo ning Ad ministrator fo r the nonco mpliance. The Zoning Administrator may, if no satisfactory explanation is given, order the PUD to be cancelled. Id. § 9-119(b), (c). 10 There exist additional standards for Industrial PUDs, such as the one at issue sub judice. The first set o f standard s concern the effects o f: noise; vibra tion; smoke and particulate matter; toxic matter; o dorou s matter ; and gla re. Id. §§ 9-216; 12-10 2. There are also additional sections of Title 9 governing the permissible uses and acreage required for Industrial PUD s. Id. §9-501 et seq. Notably, an Industrial PUD may carry out the uses permitted in the underlying zoning district, as well as whatever conditional uses that are designated for that district as specified in the dev elopm ent plan . Id. § 9-502. The provisions of Title 3, which set out the generally applicable zoning rules fo r use and bulk, also gov ern Industr ial PUD s. Id. § 9-501. B. Just as Baltimore City has a distinct scheme for PUDs, it so too has one for conditional uses,12 a concept that deserves a proper introduction. The conditional use, which is not to be confused with conditional zoning , see Rylyns, 372 Md. 514, 541 n.16, 814 A.2d 469, 485 n.16, is a zoning mechanism which provides a greater degree of flexibility to land owners and developers who wish to utilize their property in ways that ordinarily and inherently would conf lict with the zon ing distr ict in wh ich their proper ty is placed . See 12 As we have noted in previous decisions, a conditional use has an alias by which it is sometime s know n elsewh ere in Maryland, a special exception, although the two terms are largely syno nymous . Rylyns, 372 M d. at 541 n.1 6, 814 A .2d at 485 n.16. While there may be a highly-nuanced distinction between the two terms, see Lucas v. People s Counsel for Baltimor e Coun ty,147 Md. App. 209, 227 n.20, 807 A.2d 1176, 1186 n.20 (2002), we shall use the term conditional use here as encompassing both concepts. 11 Rylyns, 372 Md. at 541-43, 814 A.2d at 485-86. The universe of allowable conditional uses for a given zoning district is designated by the legislative body at the time it establishes in the text of the zoning regulations the various zoning classifications and uses permitted in that zoning district. Rylyns, 372 Md. at 541, 814 A.2d at 485. If a land owner w ishes to establish a conditional use he, she, or it must petition the relevant local governm ental body, w hich, in turn, makes a determination of the acceptability of the proposed use, weighing, among other things, its putative unique adverse effects on the surroun ding com munity and z oning district. Mossburg v. Montgomery County, 107 Md. A pp. 1, 5-6, 666 A.2d 1253, 1257 (19 95). The regulations governing the consideration of conditional uses in Ba ltimore City is found in Title 14 of the Baltimo re City Zoning Code. The Zoning Code provides that the Mayor and City Council may approve a request for a conditional use by ordinance and, addition ally, may impose conditions on its approval. §§ 14-102, 1 03. Bills that w ould create conditional uses by ordinance must satisfy the requireme nts of Title 16. Id. §§ 14-208; 16101(b)(2). These requirements mandate that the conditional use applica nt present to th e City Counc il and the pu blic a stateme nt of intent w ith respect to the property, which must be posted on the property in question in a spe cified manner and for a specifi ed time . Id. §§ 16202, 203. The bill is then refer red to the B oard of M unicipal and Zoning Appeals and the Planning Com mission and als o may be referre d to oth er relev ant age ncies. Id. § 16-301. Following a bill s second reading, it is sub ject to a pub lic hearing b efore the c ommittee to which the bill was o riginally referred w ith 15 days prior no tice there of. Id. §§ 16-401, 402. 12 The intersecting standards and characteristics of conditional uses and PUDs in the Baltimore City zoning regulations informs the conclusion that, by an alogy, a PUD partakes more of the characteristics of a conditional use than any other zoning construct or mechanism recognized in Baltimore City. One particularly telling similarity is that PUDs in the City are first evaluated under the very same gove rning sta ndards applie d to con ditional uses. Only after that are additional criteria c onside red. Id. § 9-112(a ). Also, the zo ning regu lations state that changes to a PUD seeking a use that is designated alr eady by regulation as a possible conditional use for the underlying zoning district does no t require a new app lication, but are reviewed under a more deferential proces s. Id. § 9-118(b). A similar prov ision elsewhere in Title 9 of the zoning regulations provides that an Industrial PUD may carry out the uses permitted in the underlying industrial district classification, as well as whatever conditional uses are des ignated for that district. Id. § 9-502. Although the Baltimore City zoning regulations undeniably set PUDs and conditional uses apart as distinct branches of the land use array, see id. tits. 9, 14, the regulations consistently employ the conditional use as a means of both understanding and administering the PUD. Also, as we have discussed previously, PUD proposals arise as a result of an individual owner or developer petitioning the City to provide for uses not yet permitted as of right in the und erlying dis trict. Id. § 9-105. The hallmarks examined for their approval generally are compatibility with a Master Plan, conformance to regulatory criteria, and an examination of potential deleterious effects vÃs-a-vÃs adjacent property and uses. Proposed 13 conditional uses call f or a s imila r ana lysis, but are designated by the text of the zoning regulations, and require an individual to seek permission to use his or her parcel in accord with a particu lar cond itional u se. Rylyns, 372 Md. at 541, 814 A.2d at 485. A PUD allows for additional uses on a property not provided for by the permitted or conditional uses designated in that underlying district, but which are adjudged, on a case-by-case basis, not to be incompatible or deleterious at a given location and within the contem plation gen erally of the applicable Master Plan (or other planning document) and the general purposes of the underlying zone, much like a conditional use. III. Implicit in the grant o f authority to jurisdictions in the State to adopt their own particular zoning regulations consistent with that statutory grant is the reality that each jurisdiction likely will vary, to some degree, one from another, in its zoning regulations. Nonetheless, no matter how a loca l regulation is couched, an act constituting a zoning action for those jurisdictions governed by Art. 66B is subject to judicial review. Until the Court of Special Appeals filed its recent opinion in Armstrong III, the prevailing rule was that only zoning reclassifications constituted zo ning actions under § 2.09(a)(1)(ii). Compare Armstrong III, slip op. at 20, 25 ( [T]he final question before reaching a conclusion, is whether zoning ac tion is limited to r eclassification s. We con clude it is not . . . . ), with MBC Realty, 160 M d. App. at 3 87, 389, 864 A.2d at 224, 225 (including reclassifications within zoning action, but excluding comprehensive zonings, 14 comprehensive rezonings , text amendments to zoning ordinances, and con ditional uses). Because, as previously discussed, conditional use s and PUD s in Baltimore share strong ties, we consider the reasoning and holding in Armstrong III before pro ceeding w ith our analysis in the present case. A. In Armstrong III, the Court o f Special A ppeals retreated fro m its broad holding in MBC Realty that a cond itional use granted in Baltimore City was not a zoning reclassification, and thus n ot a zonin g action eligible for jud icial revie w und er § 2.09 . Slip op. at 25. The court also modified its approach to ascertaining the scope of review under § 2.09,13 by first inquiring as to whether the governmental action in question was legislative or quasi-judicial14 in nature. Slip op. at 12-18. The intermediate appellate court noted that legislative actions are subjected to a more limited review by the courts than are quasi-judicial actions, slip op. at 12 (citing Dep t of Natural Res. v. Linchester Sand & Gravel Corp., 274 Md. 211, 224, 334 A .2d 514, 523 (197 5) (indicating that the scope of review regarding legislative actions is whether the body was acting within its legal authority)), thus leaving only quasi-judicia l actions sub ject to § 2.09 review . See slip op. at 12 ( [T]he first question we must resolve is whether . . . the City Council was acting in a quasi-judicial, or 13 Statutory judicial review must be authorized expressly by some form of legislative action, s uch as a statute o r ordina nce. Armstrong II, 390 Md. at 474, 889 A.2d at 402. 14 In the interests of clarity and consistency, we use the term quasi-judicial in lieu of a synonym: administrative adjudication. 15 administrative capacity, rather tha n in a legislative one. ); see also Gisriel v. Ocean City Bd. of Superviso rs of Elections, 345 Md. 477, 490 n.12, 693 A.2d 757, 763 n.12 (1997) ( Legislative or quasi-legislative decisions of local legislative bodies or administrative agencies are, of cou rse, not subje ct to ordinary jud icial review; in stead, they are su bject to very limited review by the courts. ). The outcome of the analysis of w hether a giv en act is qua si-judicial in nature is guided by two criteria: (1) the act or decision is reached on individual, as opposed to general, grounds, and scr utinizes a single proper ty, slip op. at 12-14; an d (2) there is a deliberative fact-finding process with testimony an d the w eighing of evid ence. Slip op . at 14-15. The Armstrong III court em phasiz ed the f act-find ing pro cess as th e most w eighty crite rion, id. at 13 (quoting Montgomery County v. Woodward & Lothrop, Inc., 280 Md. 686, 712, 376 A.2d 483, 497 (1977 ). The Armstrong III court also relied on our discussion in Mayor and Co uncil of Rockville v. Woodmont Country Club regarding the Rockville City Council s quasi-judicial process in considerin g the amo unt to be lev ied for a sp ecial assessm ent, 348 Md. 572, 585, 705 A.2d 301, 307 (1998), in concluding that the parking lot ordinance at issue in Armstrong III was also the product of quasi-judicial proces ses. Slip op. at 14-1 5. In Woodmont Cou ntry Club, the City of Roc kville ha d constru cted a pla nned roa d named Wooten Park way, together with a water m ain. 348 Md. at 576, 705 A.2d at 303. The country club, along whose property part of the ro ad and w ater main p roject ran, cha llenged the benefit assessment 16 amount to be levied against it by the City for the construction project and requested on three occasions, all to no ava il, that the City produce for cross-examination the appraisers who had generated the figures used by the City in determining the am ount. Woodmont Country Club, 348 Md. at 579, 705 A.2d at 304. At the hearing before the City Council for the proposed assessments, Wood mont pres ented its ow n witnesse s: a traffic consultant, a land planner, and a land appraiser; all who disputed the City s asse ssmen t. Woodmont Country Club, 348 Md. at 580, 705 A.2d at 304. Subsequent to the hearing, the City Attorney had its appraisers evaluate the appraisal offered by Woodmont at the hearing and sent correspondence to the City in defe nse of the asse ssmen t propo sed by the City. Id. With the City s permission, Woodmont responded to the new information presented by the City Attorn ey. Id. Despite the country club s efforts , the asse ssmen ts were levied a s propo sed. Wood mont ultim ately appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, which reversed the trial court on the rationale that Woodmont was entitled to an oppo rtunity to cross-e xamin e the C ity apprais ers. Woodmont Country Club, 348 M d. at 580-81 , 705 A.2d at 304-05 . In affirmin g the intermed iate appellate court s judgment, we found that, because the City Council had h[eld] a hearing, receiv[ed] written and oral testimony, and consider[ed] evidence to determine the specific amount of special be nefit to a particular piece of pro perty being assessed by the City, the Counc il had, in those acts, performed in a quasi-judicial capacity, thereby entitling Woodmont to an op portun ity for cros s-exam ination. Woodmont Country Club, 348 Md. at 585, 582, 705 A .2d at 307, 305 (emp hasis added). 17 The Armstrong III court drew a favorable comparison between the fact-finding process in Woodmont Country Club and that which occurred in the hearing before the Land Use and Planning C ommittee of the B altimore City Cou ncil in th e cond itional u se case . Slip op. at 15. The court found that the testimony of several concerned community members, the questions of several Committee members directed to the developer regarding the parking lot s economic impact, and the Council s consideration of several fact-intensive, sitespecific factors distinguished the proceedings as quasi-judicial in nature, sim ilar to those in Woodmont Country Club. Id. Once the proceeding was determined to be quasi-judicial in nature, the court looked next to whether the a ction or dec ision comp lained of w as a zonin g action as that term is used in § 2.09. In this inquiry, the court examined precisely what decision or act by the governmental entity is the subject of the petition for judicial review . Id. at 25. This step was nece ssary, in the court s view, to distinguish between cases where the thrust of th e attack is directed at a legislative act not fitting within the term of zoning action and cases where the thrust of the attack is directed at a quasi-judicial act imputing a zoning action. Id. Thus, Armstrong III conclude d that a piecem eal app lication, initiated by the property owner for a specific conditional use for a specific property, is a zoning action, while zoning text amen dmen ts or com prehen sive rez onings initiated b y govern ment a re not. Id. at 19-20. 18 B. The approach taken in Armstrong III reflects an analysis recognized in our zoning law preceden t. In Stephans II, we opined that the word action in the phrase zoning action was meant to be understood more in the sense of an adversarial proceeding involving a controversy between two or more parties, rather than a legislative action such as a comprehensive zoning plan or a text amendment to a zoning ordinance or regulation. 286 Md. at 390, 408 A.2d at 1019. The essential point of this observation may be understood to distinguish an act by a legislative body that focuses on an individual property or assemblage of properties requiring particularized findings as to the circumstances of that property (or assemblage of properties) from acts that primarily have broader, community-wide implications which encompass considerations affecting an entire planning area or zoning district. Thus, when a legislative body considers a comprehensive area zoning or rezoning, the focus of its deliberations is not on a single parcel of land in a district or planning area, but rather on the entire district or area because it is the characteristics of the entire district that will inform the body s ultimate decision. By the same token, when a governmental body or agency undertakes the consideration of a proposal for a conditional use or a PUD, the body or agency nec essarily concen trates its review and analysis on the parcel in question and the consequences of the proposed use of that parcel relative to the a rea more im mediately surrounding the subje ct property. 19 In this way, the po tentially adversa rial type proceeding alluded to in Stephans II partakes of the cha racteristics prev iously discussed as indicative o f a quasi-jud icial, factfinding pro cess: the rece ption and w eighing of facts to arrive at a conclusion, expressed as findings required by regulatory criteria, as to a specific land use proposal, initiated by the property owner or its representative, for a specific property or assemblage of properties.15 The appellation of quasi-judicial, howeve r, when assigned to governmental processes and acts, is not talismanic for declaration of a zoning action, obviating the need for further inquiry into whether the act in question is eligible for sta tuto ry judicial review . Rather, it simply denotes ce rtain process es involved in a n actio n as un derstoo d in Ar t. 66B, § 2.09(a)(1)(ii). Although many relevant appellate cases refer to quasi-judicial decisions derived from pure admin istrative a gencie s, see Consumer Prot. Div. v. Morgan, 387 Md. 125, 160, 874 15 An individualized, quasi-judicial proceeding may be adversarial in the sense that members of the surrounding community, as well as adv isory governmental departm ents, are most likely to, and do, dispute the fitness for approval of these individualized land use proposals, usually in terms of how the proposal will affect adversely the use, value, and enjoyment of their land. See, e.g., Armstrong II, 390 Md. at 470, 889 A.2d at 400 (discussing a dispute between n eighbor residents and a d eveloper seeking a p arking lot ordinance); Sugarloaf Citizens Ass n v. Dep t of the Env t, 344 Md. 271, 297-99, 686 A.2d 605, 618-20 (1996) (cataloguing cases where adjoining land owners properly have been aggrieved, and holding specifically that a farm owner whose property was located approximately 2,000 feet from a proposed in cinerator had standing to co ntest the permit to operate the incinera tor); Superior Outdoor Signs, Inc. v. Eller Media Co., 150 Md. App. 479, 490-91, 822 A.2d 478, 500-01 (2003) (involving an complaint raised by one billboard company that a zoning act was giving a co mpetitor w ith land abutting theirs a competitive advantage that harmed their business). 20 A.2d 919, 939 (2005), fundamentally legislative bodies, such as the Baltimore City Counc il, similarly may act in a qu asi-judicial cap acity. Prince George s County v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 358 Md. 166, 175, 747 A.2d 647, 652 (200 0). The prin cipal charac teristic of a qu asijudicial proceeding is that of fact-finding by the undertaking body, even if the relevant fac ts are undispute d. Bucktail, 352 Md. at 543, 723 A.2d at 446; Bd. of License Comm'rs for Prince George's County v. Global Express Money Orders, Inc.,168 Md. App. 339, 345, 896 A.2d 432, 435 (2006). A determ ination of w hether a pa rticular gove rnmental b ody is conducting a quasi-judicial inquiry must address the nature of the particular act in which [the body] is engag ed. Woodmont Country Club, 348 Md. at 585, 705 A.2d at 307. In the land use and zoning context, the essential questions to be asked are: what property or properties are being examined, for what reason, and at whose behest? As we h ave previo usly noted, proceedings or acts that scrutinize individual parcels or assemblages for the consideration of property-specific proposed uses, at the owner s or developer s initiative, ordinarily sugg est a quasi-jud icial process o r act. The case law of this State provides many exemplars of what have been found to be quasi-judicial proceedings. In general terms, we have said that quasi-judicial proceedings and acts are carried out largely by the exercise of discretio n by a go vernm ental bo dy. City of Bowie v. Prince George s County, 384 M d. 413, 4 40, 863 A.2d 976, 991 (2004). That discretion is exercised through the holding of hearings by the body, Union Investors, Inc. v. Montgomery County, 244 Md. 58 5, 588, 224 A.2d 453, 454 (1966 ), which the n is tasked w ith 21 rendering findings of fact and making conclusions of law . . . . Chestnut Real Estate P ship v. Huber, 148 Md. App. 190, 199, 811 A.2d 389, 394 (2002). Th e mode o f factfinding and particular formalities observed in the process can vary depending on the nature of the matter b eing co nsidere d by the h earing b ody. See Hyson v. Montgomery County Counc il, 242 Md. 55, 67, 217 A.2d 578, 586 (1966) (holding that at least some right to crossexamination exists in Montgom ery County zoning reclassification pub lic hearings). But see Woodward & Lothrop, Inc., 280 Md. at 713, 376 A.2d at 498 (holding that no right to crossexamination exists for sectional ma p amend ments invo lving com prehensiv e rezoning in Montgom ery Coun ty, a legislativ e in natu re proc ess). See also Gorin v. Board of Co. Comm'rs for Anne Arundel County, 244 Md. 106, 110, 223 A.2d 23 7, 239 (19 66) ( W hile proceedings before an administrative board are informal and the strict rules of evidence do not apply, when the board is functioning in an adversary proce eding, the fu ndamen tals applicable to the decision of adjudicative facts by any tribunal must be p reserved. ). We note that the fact-finding process for piecemeal land use and zon ing matters usually entails at least the holding of a hearing, the receipt of factual and opinion testimony and forms of documentary evidence, and a particularized conclusion as to the development proposal for the parcel in ques tion. See Woodmont Country Club, 348 Md. at 585, 705 A.2d at 307; see also Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Comm n. v. Friendship Heights, 57 Md. App. 69, 82, 468 A.2d 13 53,1359 (1984) ( Where . . . the administrative tribunal is under a duty to consider evidence and apply law to the facts as found, thereby 22 exercising some discretion, the function is quasi-judicial. ). It is primarily the emphasis that the hear ing p laces on a particula r pro perty and the unique considerations of its proposed development that tender to render it quasi-judicial in nature. This emp hasis is only natu ral. Zoning matters . . . depend upon the unique facts and circumstances of a particular location and must be analyzed individually. Red Roof Inns, Inc. v. People s Counsel for Baltimore County , 96 Md. Ap p. 219, 227-28, 624 A.2d 1281, 12 85 (1993). In Woodmont Country Club, we referred on multiple occasions to the focusing of a proceeding on an individualized parcel of land as important in finding that the process was a quasi-judicial one. 348 Md. 572, 583-84, 705 A.2d 301, 306. The Woodmont Coun try Club Court also noted its opin ion in Hyson, where w e found th at the Mo ntgomery C ounty Counc il, in considering and determining [] adjudicative facts concerning particular parties [in a zoning reclassification ma tter], [] necessarily was performing a quasi-judicial function, even though its final action, in granting or denying the reclassification which was required to be based upon its findings of adjudicative facts, was quasi-legislative in character. 242 Md. at 65, 217 A.2d a t 584, cited in Woodmont Country Club, 348 Md. at 584, 705 A.2d at 306-07. We later clarified in Bucktail that it is not a hearing s mere focus on one parcel that is dispositive of its quasi-judicial nature, but rather that the matter taken up at the hearing is disposed of based on the unique characteristics that inhere to that parcel when considering the proposed use. 352 Md. at 545, 723 A.2d at 447 ( This determination is not based on 23 whether the zoning decision adversely affects an individual piece of property, but whether the decision itself is made on individual or general grounds. ) (emphasis added). Yet another of our cases d emonstra tes the relations hip between an individualized determination and a quasi-judicia l process or a ct. Mossburg v. Montgomery County, decided in 1993, involved a petition for a special exc eption (con ditional use) to build a solid w aste transfer station in Montgomery County. The County Board of Appeals denied the application for the exception after a hearing at which extensive testimony was offered by concerned citizens opposed to it. 329 Md. at 496-98, 620 A.2d at 887-88. We held, in part, that the Board of Appeals s proceeding was quasi-judicial in the sense that it evaluated [a]n application for a special exception involv[ing] a particular applicant's request for administrative authorization to engage in a specific activity a t a specific location. Mossburg, 329 Md. at 506 , 620 A.2d at 892 (emphasis added ). It is only by looking to the particula r circumstan ces of an a ffected p arcel and its immedia te environs that a body can make the necessary findings and conclusions called for by statute, ordinance, or regulation. These site-specific findings of fact are necessary not only to inform p roperly the interes ted parties of the groun ds for the body s decision, Mehrling v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 371 Md. 40, 64, 806 A.2d 662, 676 (2002) (citing Blue Bird Cab Co. v. Md. D ep't of Employ ment S ec., 251 Md. 458, 466, 248 A.2d 331, 335 (1968) (noting that a fun damenta l requireme nt of the due process of law in a quasi-judicial proceeding is the right of the parties to be apprised of the facts relied upon by the trib unal in 24 its decision. ), b ut also to pro vide a basis upon w hich judicial re view may be rendered. Pattey v. Bd. of Co unty Com m rs for W orcester C ounty, 271 Md. 352, 359-60, 317 A.2d 142, 146 (1974) (restraining judicial review of a legislative body s zoning decision to the re cord); Bd. of County Comm rs for Prince George s County v. Zeigler, 244 Md. 224, 229, 223 A.2d 255, 257 (1966) ( [I]t is clear that without a record of the facts on which the zoning authority acted or a statement of the reasons for its action, the reviewing court cou ld not prop erly perform the duty it had of determining whether the action of the zoning authority was arbitrary or capricious. ). C. The Baltimore City Council s consideration of the PUD amendment proposal advanced by Canto n Cros sing, w hich late r becam e the su bject of Ordin ance 0 4-873 , was evaluated on both in dividual and general grounds. It is clear from the record that the Council s decisions to grant both Canton Crossing s original request to designate its 67 and one-half acre plot of land as an Industrial PUD and each of the three subsequent substantive amendm ents to the approved PU D were made upon grounds focused on a development plan for that plot of lan d only, and thu s was con sidered on an individu alized basis. T his property alone was singled out for proposed amendment of its zoning, rather than the entire zoning district or planning area in wh ich it is located. T his individu alized action was prec isely the kind of change, focusing on the particulars involved with a specific property and its unique circumstances, contemplated by our pre vious c ases as q uasi-jud icial in na ture. See Buc ktail, 25 352 Md. at 54 5, 723 A .2d at 447; Woodmont Country Club, 348 Md. at 583-84, 705 A.2d at 306; Mossburg, 329 M d. at 506, 62 0 A.2d a t 892; Hyson, 242 Md. at 65, 217 A.2d at 584. We turn to the quality of the proceeding employed to examine the PUD amendment proposal. The Maryland Code and the Baltimore City Zoning Code both set forth a requirement that some form of hearing be held in conjunction with zoning acts carried out by the City Council. Md. Code, Art. 66B, §§ 2.05(d), 2.04(b) (providing for public hearings designed to grant parties in interest and citizens [] an opp ortunity to be heard. ); Baltimore, Md., Zoning Code §§ 16-402(a)(1); 16-101(d)16 (mandating that a committee of the Coun cil considering a bill that would change the zoning classification of a property, create a conditional use, or grant a PUD permit interested parties and the pu blic an op portunity to be heard ). Both codes also require certain findings of fact be made and governing standards be applied to those fac ts. The M aryland Cod e generally requ ires the Cou ncil 17 to make findings of fact regarding the zoning proposal that include: population changes , availability of public facilities, present and future transportation patterns, compatibility with existing and proposed development for the area, the recomm endations of the Plan ning Comm ission and the Board 16 There appears to be a typographical error in the ordering of the subsections of § 16101. This error, created by the addition of a new subsection (c) in the past year, has produced two subsections designated as (c). The second (c), which should be a (d), is the subsection to which we refer here. 17 The Council has the option, by virtue of § 2.06(a) of Art. 66B, to appoint a hearing examiner to fulfill this fact-finding role. 26 of Municipal and Zoning Appeals, and the relation of the act to the C ity s plan. Md. Code Art. 66B, § 2.05(a)(2). The Baltimore City Zoning Code is much more specific in the findings and criteria applicable to the grant of a PU D pro posal. In addition to the standards set for the grant of a conditional use, Baltimore, Md., Zoning Code § 14-205(a) (listing 14 separate criteria), a PUD is subject to scrutiny on ten additional points of consideration respecting the physical features of the land, health and safety of residents, as well as use and bulk regulations.18 The council bill that called for the amen dment of Ca nton Crossing s 18 § 9-112. Governing standards In reviewing the proposal, the agencies to which a bill is referred must consider: * * * (b) in addition, whether: (i) the plans for the Planned Unit Development are in general conformance with: (A) all elements of the Master Plan; and (B) the character and nature of existing and contemplate d development in the vicinity of the proposed Planned Unit Develop ment; (ii) the Planned Unit Development will preserve unusual topographic or natural features of the land; (iii) the design of the Planned Unit Development will best utilize and be compatible with the topography of the land; (contin ued...) 27 18 (...continued) (iv) the physical characteristics of the Planned Unit De velopme nt will adve rsely affect: (A) future dev elopmen t or the value of undeveloped neighboring areas; or (B) the use, maintenance, or value of neighboring areas already developed; (v) with respect to availability of light, air, open space, and street ac cess, the Plan ned Un it Development will secure for its residents and neighboring residents substantially the same benefits as would be provid ed by application of the basic district regulations; (vi) with respect to fire, health hazards, and other dangers, the Planned Unit Develop ment will secure for its residents an d neighbo ring residen ts substantially the same protection as would be provided by application of the basic district regulations; and (vii) the Planned Unit Develop ment will p ermit design features that would not be possible by application of the basic district regulations. (b) Use regulations. The uses that would be allowed under this title but not under the basic regulations governing the underlying district in which they are located: (1) must be necessary or desirable for and appropriate to the primary purpose of the Planned Unit Development; and (2) may not be of a nature, or so located, as to adversely affect the surrounding neighborhood. (c) Bulk regulations. The application o f bulk regu lations unde r this title, which are (contin ued...) 28 development plan was subject to analysis in reports by the City Solicitor, Board of Municipal and Zoning A ppeals, Plan ning Co mmission, Departmen t of Hou sing and C ommu nity Develop ment, Department of Public Works, Fire Department, Parking Authority Board, and Transportation Department, which served as the source for many of the conditions attached ultimately to approval of the amendment. Following that, the Land Use and Planning Committee of the City Council scheduled and held a duly advertised public hearing on the bill on 3 November 2004 , which was reported as favorable with amendments by the Committee. At that audio-taped hearing, the Committee heard testimony from the developer and members of the public regarding a number of topics concerning the PUD and its putative effects on the community. The Hearing Notes indicate that the focus of the hearing was on the potential problems of increased noise, traffic, encroach ment into th e industrial distric t, and obstruction of water views from a nearby park. Canton Crossing and the City also apparently agreed to negotiate the massing for a cruise ship terminal should one be approved by the State. It should also be noted th at concurre nt with this h earing and referral process, the Counc il examined, and ultimately approved, the developm ent plan, w hich is requ ired to 18 (...continued) expressed in terms of overall density for the entire Plan ned Un it Development rather than o n a lot-by-lot basis, s hould resu lt in overall development that is no le ss benefic ial to the residen ts than would be obtained by application of the basic regulations for the und erlying district. 29 address thirteen separate considerations affecting the site of the proposed PUD or any substantive amendment to an approved PUD. Baltimore, Md., Zoning Code §§ 9-107, 9-110; see also slip op., supra at 10. The gravamen of these standards and the inquiry surrounding them is a detailed and thorough examination of the unique circumstances of a specific PUD proposal for a specific parcel, including the potential for adverse impacts on adjacent properties. This proc ess of rece iving evide nce and c reating a reco rd upon w hich the C ity Counc il then must re ly in deciding the ultimate question of whether the development plan, or amended plan, should be granted is quite analogous to the quasi-judicial processes analyzed in Woodmont Country Club and Mossburg. In both of those cases, as was done here, findings of fact were made based on reports from governmental agencies and departments and a public hearing, wherefrom the final governmental decision-maker drew its findings as to the pending matter affecting a particular piece of pro perty. City of Bo wie, 384 Md. at 440, 863 A.2d at 991. We are satisfied that the process for the approval of PUDs, and substantive amendments thereto, in Baltimore City is of sufficient quasi-judicial character, rather than le gislative in na ture, to examine the ultimate question of whether the Council s approval of the PUD amend ment embodied by Ordinance 04-873 qualifies as a zoning action and therefore is subject to a petition for judicial review. 30 IV. To understand the scope of § 2.09(a)(1)(ii) and its key phrase zoning action, we remind ou rselves of w hat was sa id in Stephans II. The crucial legislative history of § 2.09 and Stephans II are well explicated in MBC Realty: Article 66B was enacted in 1933. The statute provided for judicial r evie w on ly from de cisio ns by a Board and then only on writ of certio rari. Board of County C ommis sioners of C arroll County v. Stephans, 286 Md. 384, 391 , 408 A.2d 101 7 (1979). In 1962, the statute was amended to provide for judicial review of a decision by a Board, without the certio rari requ iremen t. Id. at 392, 408 A.2d 1017. Consequently, after the 1962 amendment, there was a statutory right of judicial review, as an administrative appea l, from a decision by a Board. There was no such right with respect to a decision by the local legislative body. With respect to deci sion s by a legislativ e body, a p arty had to file an action invoking the general jurisdiction of a court, arguing whatever theories were available under separation of powers principles, essentially that the legislation was unconstitutional or ultra vires. The test of invalidity of a zo ning ordin ance is w hether it is arbitrary, unreasonable and discriminatory, and has no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or genera l welfa re. In 1970, §§ 2.09 and 4.0819 were amended to permit an administrative appeal from a reclassification by the local legislative body, in addition to an administrative appeal from a decision by a B oard. Stephans, 286 Md. at 392, 408 A.2d 1017. The right of review was pursuant to chapter 11 00, subtitle B of the Maryland Rules. Id. (forerunner to title 7, chapter 200). The amendment was recommended by the Maryland Planning 19 Section 4.08 applies to appeals in non-ch arter countie s and mu nicipalities, wh ile section 2.09 ap plies to a ppeals in Baltim ore City. Bucktail, 352 Md. at 549, 723 A.2d at 449; Cmte. for Responsible Dev. on 25th Street, 137 Md. App. at 81-82, 767 A.2d at 917. 31 and Zon ing L aw S tudy C ommission. The Commission explained, This section is unchanged except for the inclusion of an appeal process from reclassification decisions of the lo cal legis lative bo dy. It can be argued that under the present system appeals from reclassification decisions m ay be launch ed in equity at any time. This has proven to be a detrimental factor to most persons concerned with such an action. The appeal process to be used, Chapter 1100, Subtitle B, Maryland Rules, requires noting of an appeal within thirty days and filing of the appeal w ithin another ten days. This is ample time to bring an appeal for review (i.e. if a pers on is aggrieved by a decision it is incumbent upon him to react within a reasonable period of time). Id. at 393, 408 A.2d 1017. In 1975, the statute was amende d and, in rele vant part, in sections 2.09 an d 4.08, s ubstituted zoning action for reclassification by the local legislative body. Id. The Court of Appeals, after review ing the legisla tive history of the judicial review provisions in section 4.08 and relying specifically on language in the title to the am endmen t, concluded that the change to zoning action was stylistic and not sub stantive . Id. at 397, 408 A.2d 1017. In Stephans, the County Commissioners of Carroll County approved the following matters as recommended by the Carroll County Planning and Zoning Commission: (1) adopted a comprehensive mini plan for the Freed om area o f Carroll Cou nty; (2) added a new section to the county zoning ordinance providing for a R-40,000 Residence District[;] (3) changed the standards for approval of subdivisions; (4) provided for schoo ls and colleges as a principal permitted use in a conservation zone; (5) specified that department stores be a permitted u se in a local business district; and (6) comp rehensively rezoned the Freedom area. Stephans, 286 Md. at 386, 408 A.2d 1017. 32 Landown ers objected to the actions and sought judicial review pursuant to the provisions of section 4.08. The Court held that neither the adoption of the plan nor the amendment of the zoning text was a zoning action. The Court stated that zoning action in section 4.08 meant a reclassification by the local legislative body, referring to piecemeal or spot zoning, not to comprehensive zoning or rezoning. Id. The Court further explained that [c]hallenges in the courts to the adoption of comprehensive plans, zoning texts, and zoning text amendments must come in proceed ings other than adm inistrative appeals. Id. As we have observed previously, to the extent relevant here, sections 2.09 and 4.08 are the same. Consequently, the holding in Stephans applies to sec tion 2.09, as well as section 4.08. 160 Md. A pp. 376, 383-85, 86 4 A.2d 218, 22 2-23 (certain citations omitted). In MBC Rea lty, the Court of Special Appeals was confronted with determining the propriety of a petition for judicial review, filed under § 2.09, in response to the passage of three ordinances by the Baltimore City Council which, taken together, allowed for the placement of new billboards, as c onditional u ses subject to certain express conditions, on the exterior of the 1 st Mariner Arena in downtown Baltimore. 160 Md. App. at 381, 864 A.2d at 221. The intermediate appellate court affirmed the Circuit Court s dismissal of the petition on the rationale that the granting of the conditional use was not a zoning action. MBC Realty, 160 Md. App. at 380, 864 A.2d at 220. In addition, the court held that the two ordinances that preceded the ordinance granting the actual conditional use for the signs on the Arena were text amendments to the zoning regulations, ineligible under Stephans II for judicial review as zoni ng actio ns. MBC Realty, 160 Md. App. at 389, 864 A.2d at 225. Whether, in light of its new analytical approach advanced in Armstrong III, the Court of 33 Special Appea ls would re ach the sam e result today as it did in MBC Realty, at least as to the ordinance granting the specific co nditional use , seems do ubtful. A closer review of the legislative history behind § 2.09 than was undertaken in Stephans II, a disciplined application of the principles of statutory construction, and certain relevant policy considerations counsel us to gainsay here Stephans II s narrow interpretation of the phrase zoning ac tion. We s tart, as our w ell-established rules of statutory construction direct us, w ith the plain language of the statute where the ordinary, popular understanding of the English language dictates interpretation of its terminology. Kushell v. Dep t of Natural Res., 385 M d. 563, 5 76, 870 A.2d 186, 193 (2005) (citing Deville v. State, 383 Md. 217, 223, 858 A.2d 484, 487 (2004)). O ur construc tion of that lan guage is guided also by a number of other established canons of interpretation: [a] court may ne ither add no r delete language so as to reflect an intent not evidenced in the plain and unambiguous language of the statute; no r may it construe the statute w ith forced o r subtle interpretations that limit or exte nd its applica tion. Statutory text should be read so that no word, clause, sentence or phra se is r endered supe rfluous o r nug atory. The plain language of a provision is not interpreted in isolation. Rather, we an alyze the statutory scheme as a whole an d attempt to h armonize provisions d ealing with the same subject so th at each ma y be given ef fect. If statutory langu age is unam biguous w hen cons trued acco rding to its ordinary and everyday meaning, then w e give eff ect to the statute as it is written. If there is no ambiguity in that language, either inherently or by reference to other relevant laws or circumstances, the inquiry as to legislative intent ends; we do not need to resort to the various, and sometimes inconsisten t, external rules of constru ction, for the Legislature is presume d to have meant w hat it said and said what it me ant. Kushell, 385 Md. at 576 -77, 870 A.2d at 19 4 (internal citations omitted). 34 The meaning of the word zoning, as discussed in Stephans II, as far as it we nt, retains som e vita lity tod ay. In general terms, the term zoning is used to describe the process of setting aside disconnected tracts of land varying in shape and dimensions, and dedicating them to particular uses designed in some degree to serve the in terests of the w hole territory affected by the plan. Stephans II, 286 Md. at 388-89, 408 A.2d at 1019 (quoting Applestein v. Osborne, 156 Md. 40, 51, 143 A. 666, 671 (1928)). In as much as the types of zoning mechanisms principally relied on in 1979 and earlier to eff ect land developm ent were largely Euclidean in nature, that this understanding prevailed at that time is understandable. Our decision in Rylyns, however, provides a somewhat more inclusive explanation of the nature of zoning, taking into account more modern and flexible types of zoning tools, and which distinguishes the more short-term regulation of land from the forward-looking concept known as planning: Zoning, in theory, is the process whereby the comprehensive plan is put into effect. The local legislative body that makes zoning decisions divides districts within the locality into zones, a nd the le gislative body de fines, inter alia, the height, building size, lot size, population density, location, and use of buildings that are permissible in the particular zone. 572 Md. at 529-30 & n.5, 814 A.2d at 477-78 & n.5. The more difficult inquiry is divining the meaning of action as it is used in § 2.09(a)(1)(ii). As previously discussed, the Stephans II Court view ed this term in its legal sense as indicative of an adversarial proceeding wherein opposing parties settle a controversy in some form of tribunal. 286 Md. at 390, 408 A.2d at 10 19. We sugge st here 35 that such a conception of action is too cramped. The plain meaning of the term should be considered in its ordinary, popular understanding in the English language, rather than in a strictly legal sense. Id. As such, we view action in a slightly broader sense than Stephans II did; one tha t embodie s a less techn ical meanin g tied exclu sively to legal jargon. One respected d ictionary extant a t the time the G eneral As sembly ame nded § 2 .09(a)(1)(ii) to replace reclassification with zoning action, first defines action as a deliberative or authorized procedure. Webster s Third New International Dictionary 21 (1966). It, and another dictionary contemporaneous with the adoption of the statute in question,20 then provide more generic definitions which allude to action as the act of doing something or performing a deed . Id. ( [A] thing done; deed ); Black s Law Dictionary 26 (5th ed. 1979) ( [C]ond uct; behavior; something done; the condition of acting . . . ). More recent dictionaries have concurred in this more general understanding of the word action. See, e.g., Black s L aw Dic tionary 21 (8th ed. 1999) ( [T]he process of doing something; conduct or behavior; an act or thing done; act . . . . ); The Compact Oxford English Dictionary 15 (2d ed. 1991) ( [A] doing; performance ); Webster s New Universal Unabridged Dictionary 20 (2d ed. 1983) ( [T ]he doing of som ething; . . . an act or thing done ). 20 We have pointed out that when courts find it prudent, in defining terms in the quest for understanding of statutory intent, to resort to dictionaries, it is advisable to make reference first to those dictionaries that were contemporane ous at the time the statutory language at issue was created. Harvey v. Marsh all, 389 Md. 243, 260, n.11, 884 A.2d 1171, 1181 n.11 (200 5). 36 Taken together, these more com monly held understandings of the constituent parts of the phrase zoning action point to a meaning that has a broader sens e tha n me rely a reclas sificatio n. Instead, we view zoning action in § 2.09 as any act by the Mayor and City Council that (1) decides the use of a specific parcel or assemblage of parcels of land, (2) was initiated by an individual application by a property owner or its representative, (3) was based on fact-fin ding (from a record co ntaining ev idence, usu ally both pro and con) adduced through governmental agency analysis of the proposal and through a public hearing, and (4) either creates or modifies substantively the governing zoning classification or defines the permissible uses, building and lot sizes, population density, topographical and physical features, and other characteristics of a specific parcel or assemblage of parcels of land by exercising some discretionary judgment after the consideration of the unique circumstances of the affected parcels and buildings.21 This fram ework f urther expla ins why am endmen ts 21 This definition is ve ry similar to that cra fted by the C ourt of Sp ecial App eals in Stephans I: [G]iving the particular w ords involv ed here zo ning action their natural and ordinary signification, the Legislature intended the phrase to encompass any act or deed of the local legislative body that controls or directs the use of land and buildings by dividing the governmental area into use districts according to present and planned future conditions. We find no ambiguity or obscu rity in this languag e and there fore need not look else where to ascertain the intent of the Legislature. 41 Md. App. 494, 500, 397 A.2d 289, 292 (1979) (citation omitted ), rev d, 286 Md. 384, 408 A.2d 1017. The intermediate appellate court later referred to this conception of the term zoning action as a valid one and construed the term as primarily dealing with use (contin ued...) 37 to the text of zoning regulations, c ompreh ensive zon ings, and o ther acts that are legislative in nature do not qualify for judicial review under § 2.09. B. Because of the more commonly held understanding of the term zoning action adopted in this opinion, we must re-visit the conclusion reached by the Stephans II Court that the General Assembly s change of the language of § 2.09 from reclassification to zoning action was merely stylistic. 286 Md. at 396, 408 A.2d at 1022-23. The Stephans II Court inferred from the fact that the two main purposes of the 197 5 enactm ent delineate d in the title of the act argu ably did not mention or con cern the change from reclassification to zoning action that the change in language must have been one of the purely stylistic changes alluded to gene rally in the titl e. Id. Modern cases look beyond the facial statements in Revisor s notes or inferential reasoning concluding that changes in statutory language were merely stylistic. Those cases apply plain meaning analysis to determine if the change, nonetheless, effe cted a clearly substantive chang e. Md. Div. of Labor and Indus. v. Triangle Gen l Contractors, 366 Md. 407, 419-20, 784 A.2d 534, 541 (2001) (holding the addition of certain language to be substantive despite num erous legislativ e referenc es to chang es occurrin g in a re-codification as being pur ely stylistic); Abramson v. Montgomery County, 328 Md. 737, 721, 616 A.2d 21 (...continued) regulation, focus ing on s pecific proper ties. Gregory, 89 Md. A pp. at 639-41 599 A.2d at 471-7 2. 38 894, 901-02 (1992) (finding that, contrary to the Revisor s note, the substitution of person for party work ed a substa ntive chan ge in determ ining wh ether a gov ernmenta l entity is considered a person for purposes of the exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement for an appea l to Tax C ourt); In re Taylor, 312 Md. 58, 68-70, 537 A.2d 1179, 1184-85 (1988) (concluding that the deletio n of certain language from the tools-of-the-trade bankruptcy exemption statute, although as a result of a recodification, must have been substantive although such cha nges durin g recodific ation are pre sumed to be stylistic); Bd. of Supervisors of Elections of Baltimore City v. Weiss, 217 Md. 133, 138, 141 A.2d 734, 737 (1958) (finding a substantive change in lan guage be cause the la w was u nder five yea rs of study and could not reasonab ly have uninte nded cha nges); see also Mid-Atlantic Power Supply Ass n v. Public Serv. Comm n of Md., 361 Md. 196 , 760 A.2d 108 7 (2000). Thus, even if we were to accept the logical inference made by the Stephans II Court that the change from reclassification to zoning action, in fa ct, was intended facially as a stylistic change, the inquiry does not end if the change in fact or law worked a substantive change. Thus, our application of the plain meaning rule here resolves differently than Stephans II the meaning of zoning action. Arundel Corp. v. Marie, 383 Md. 489, 502, 860 A.2d 886, 894 (2004) ( If there is no am biguity in that language, e ither inherently or by reference to other relevant laws or circumstances, the inquiry as to legislative intent ends; we do not need to resort to the various, and sometimes inconsistent, external rules of construction, for the Legislature is presumed to have meant w hat it said and said wha t it 39 mean t. (quoting Witte v. Azarian, 369 Md. 518, 525, 801 A.2d 160, 165 (2002))); Triangle Gen l Contractors, 366 Md. at 423, 784 A.2d at 543 ( When a statute's language is clear and unambiguous, however, w e need look no f urther for some hidd en legislative intent. (quoting Abramson, 328 M d. at 736, 61 6 A.2d a t 901)); Tidewater/Havre de Grace, Inc. v. Mayor & City Council of Havre de Grace, 337 Md. 338, 344, 653 A.2d 468, 472 (1995) ( It is wellsettled that when the meaning of a statute its legislative i nten t is a t issu e, the court's inquiry begins with the word s of the statute, a nd ord inarily, also ends th ere. ). Our reading of zoning action does not produce any absurdities or defeat the purpose of the 1975 statute. See Tidewater/Havre de Grace, Inc., 337 Md. at 345, 653 A.2d at 472. Rather, it gives effect to the law by providing judicial review of specific reclassifications, which was the case prior to the language change, in addition to other acts by the City Council affecting the zoning of in dividual parcels of prope rty. Moreover, the grant of authority in the 1975 law to the City Council to provide for appeal to the Baltimore City Court of any matter arising under the planning and zo ning law s of the City of B altimore , 22 is not rendered mere surplusage by our broader reading of zoning action. Moore v. State, 388 Md. 446, 453, 879 A.2d 11 11, 1115 (2005 ). C. To summarize, the pertinent criteria for determining whether a particular action by the Mayor and City Council is a zoning action are: first, there must be a determination that the 22 Laws of M aryland of 1975, ch. 267 , § 3 (codified as Art. 66B , § 2.09(f)). 40 process observed by the govern mental bo dy in affecting a n alleged zo ning action was qua sijudicial in nature, rather than legislative. A quasi-judicial proceeding in the zoning context is found w here, at a min imum, the re is a fact-fin ding proc ess that entails th e holding of a hearing, the receipt of factual and opinion testimony and/or forms of documentary evidence, and a particu larized c onclus ion, bas ed upo n deline ated stat utory stan dards, for the unique development proposal for the specific parcel or assem blage o f land in questio n. Second , if the governmental act in question involves a quasi-judicial process, the inquiry moves to the question of whether it qualifies as a zo ning ac tion. Where th e City Coun cil exercises its discretion in deciding the permissible uses and other characteristics of a specific parcel or assemblage of land upon a deliberation of the unique circumstances of the affected land and its surround ing environ s, a zoning action is the r esult. In the case at hand, Ordinance 04-873 was enacted as the result of a quasi-judicial process. It approved the increase [of] the number of residential dwelling units permitted and [modified] the uses and buildings permitted and their locations and size. See slip op., supra at 6. The prevailing purpose of the Ordinance, then, was to define the permissible uses, if not also to modify to some degre e the zonin g classification , of the spec ific parcel. The amendment sought by the property owner proposed to increase the number of residential dwelling units from 100 to 504; to decrease the amount of office space from 1.7 million to 1.5 million s quare fee t; to decrease the amou nt of retail space from 450,000 to 150,000 square fee t; and to increase the amount of restaurant space from 50,000 to 120,000 41 square feet. Id. & n.8. Th e City Coun cil s deliberative consideration, after receiving evidence at a required hearing, and approval of these specific uses for this specific parcel after making required statutory findings falls within the realm of a zoning action. We, therefore, hold that Maryland Overpak was entitled to seek judicial review of the adoption of Ordinance 0 4-873 as a zonin g action under § 2 .09(a)(1)(ii). V. Because our holding is that Ordinance 04-873 granting an amendment to a PUD qualifies as a zoning action capable of judicial scrutiny in a petition for judicial review process, we need not consid er Appe llant s argum ent that its proc eeding bro ught in the C ircuit Court was prop er if viewed as a legal modality of judicial process other than a petition for judicial review. JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY REVERSED; CASE REMANDED TO TH E CIRC UIT COURT FOR PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION; COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLEE. 42

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