Greenstreet v. State

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Robert E. Greenstreet v. State of Maryland, No. 55, Sept. Term, 2005. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - FOURTH AMENDMENT - SEARCH AND SEIZURE WARRANT - PROBABLE CAUSE - STALENESS - SUPPRE SSION OF EVIDENCE TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR IN AFFIDAVIT TO WAR RANT- FOUR CORNERS DOCT RINE - PR ESENT ATION OF TES TIMON Y TO C ONTR OVER T FACT S IN AFFIDAVIT - GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE Pursuant to a warrant, police officers seized a quantity of suspected marijuana from Petitioner s residence. Petitioner was charged with possession with the intent to distribute. Petitioner moved to suppress the evidence seized, arguing that the issuing judge lacked a substantial basis to issue the warrant because probable cause, based upon the date of a trash seizure and search that revealed drug traffick ing, wa s stale. The affidavit indicated that the trash seizure occurred one year and one day prior to the application for the warrant. No ongoing activities of like kind in the interim were recited. Petitioner contended that the hearing court neither could assume that the date of the trash seizure was a typographical error, nor consider facts or testimony beyond the four corn ers of the af fidavit to allow the affiant to supple ment th e affid avit by testif ying to a typo graphi cal erro r, if a mis take ha d occu rred. The Court determined tha t the State w as preclude d from p resenting testim ony to controvert the date contained in the affidavit to prove that it was a typographical error at the suppression hearing because to do so would be an unsanctioned v iolation of the four corners doctrine. The Court also concluded that it could not infer that the issuing judge recognized the purported typographical error in the affidavit, ignored it, and found a substantial ba sis to support her finding of probable cause based on the trash seizure. The affidavit in this case did not present enough internal, specific, and direct evidence from which to infer a clear mistake of a material date upon which the affiant police officer depended for probable cause. The Court also resolved that the good faith exception to the exclusio nary rule did no t apply in the present case because probable cause was based on a single event of illegal activity eleven months before the warrant application and the affidavit failed to describe a continuing criminal enterprise, ongoing at the time of the application. Circuit Co urt for Anne A rundel Co unty Case # 02-K-04-001108 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 55 September Term, 2005 ROBERT E. GREENSTREET v. STATE OF MARYLAND Bell, C.J. Raker Wilner Cathell Harrell Battaglia Greene, JJ. Opinion by Harrell, J. Filed: May 11, 2006 We granted the petition for writ of certiorari filed by Petitioner, Robert Earl Greenstreet, to consider: 1. Whether the Court of Special A ppeals [in State v. Greenstreet, 162 Md. App. 418, 875 A.2d 177 (2005 ),] erred in holding that a reviewing court could infer that the issuing judge could have concluded that the date on a warrant affidavit was a typographical error, creating probable cause where none otherwise existed? 2. Whether the Court of Special Appeals erred in suggesting that, consistent with the four corners doctrine, the State may present testimony to controvert facts contained in a warrant affidavit to p rove that a trash seizure was conducted at a different time than that reflected in the warrant application? Greenstr eet v. State, 388 Md. 404 , 879 A.2d 108 6 (2005). I. On 15 April 2 004, Of ficer Greg ory P. Huck of the An ne Arun del Coun ty Police Department applied for a search warrant to search the premises, persons, or things of Petitioner at a Pasad ena, M aryland, a ddress . On the same d ate, a judge of the District Co urt of Maryland, sitting in Anne Arundel County, issued the warrant as requested. P ursuant to the warrant, police officers, seized a quantity of suspected marijuana from the residence. Greenstreet was charged with possession with the intent to distribute and related offenses. Petitioner moved to suppress the evidence seized. A hearing was held on 4 October 2004 in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County. The warrant and application for the warrant were p laced in to evide nce. No live testimony or additional documentary evidence was offered. Regarding the existence of probable cause for issuance of the warrant, the affidavit stated: Within the past month, your Affiant, Officer Greg Huck #1067, received inform ation from se veral citizens c omplaints regarding possible C DS activity oc curring at th e residence of 8472 Meadow Lane, Pasa dena, Anne Aru ndel County, Maryland. The complaints ad vised that there is a large amount of vehicle and foot traffic visiting the residence and that the vehicles sometimes stay for short periods and the[n] leave the area. I am aware that this type of activity is often indicative of CDS sales activity. The complaints also advised that the house often hosts disorderly parties, which disturb the neighborhood. On 04-14-03 Cpl. Thomas Newman #728 and I conducted a trash seizure of 8472 Meadow Lane, Anne Arundel County, Maryland 21122 . I was aware that trash collection days for the residence are Wednesday and Saturday. We successfully seized 6 bags of trash from the residence. The bags were located on the ground and in a trashcan placed at the edge of the roadway in front of the residence. T he trash w as placed in such a manner that would in dicate that it was left for the trash removal com pany. All the other residences in the area had their trash placed out in a similar manner that would indicate that it was abandoned property. We placed the trash in the back of a department vehicle and transported the refuse back to Eastern District Station. Upon opening the trash bags I recovered the following items from inside the trash bags. 1. Seven (gallon size) Ziploc freezer bags containing greenishbrown plant residue. 2. Five (sandwich size) plastic bags containing greenish-brown plant substance. 3. Large Rival heat seal bag containing greenish-brown plant residue. 4. Loose greenish-brown plant substance (approx. 1.55g) 5. Cellophane wrapper containing white powder residue. 6. Millennium cable bill for Robert Greenstreet 8472 Meadow Lane, Pasadena, Md. 21122 2 7. Finance statement for Robert E. Greenstreet 8472 Meadow Lane, Pasadena, Md. 21122 8. Househ old Bank statement for Robert E. Greenstreet 8472 Meadow Lane, Pasadena, Md. 21122 9. Envelo pe with H appy Birthda y Jay written on it. 10. Piece of p aper with notation s T H Seeds , S.A.G.E. (160 for 10) , THE HOG (235 for 10) Through my training, knowledge, and experience I recognized the greenish-brown plant residue and greenish-brown plant substance in Items 1-4 to be marihu ana. I cond ucted field te sts on Items 1 and 4. Both Items tested positiv e for m arihuan a. I recognized the large gallon size Ziploc bags (Item 1) and large Rival heat seal bag (Item3) to be indicative of packaging large amounts of marihu ana cons istent for distribu tion/sales. Through my training, knowledge and experience I recognized the white powder residue contained in Item 5 to be cocaine. Item 5 fieldtested positive for cocaine. I recognized the term T H Seeds , on Item 10, to be an Internet site where m arihuana seeds are sold. The terms S.A.G.E. and HOG refer to variations of marihuana. I have conducted surveillance to the residence and have observed the following cars parked consistently at the residence: 1988 Mitsubishi 2 door (MD tag 393BKM) 1999 Ford 4 door (MD tag GPS274) A check through MVA revealed the owner of the 1998 Mitsubishi is listed as Sharlie Green street, d.o .b. 3/29/ 33. A check through police department computers revealed that the vehicle was stopped within the past 6 months and at that time the driver was identified as Robert Greenstreet. A check through MVA revealed the owner of 1999 Ford is listed as Mary Watkins, d.o.b. 6/6/32. A check through police department computers revealed th at the vehicle was stopped within the past year and at that time the driver of the vehicle was identified as Robert Jay Watkins. Additional checks through police department computers revealed that Robert Jay Watkins has a prior CDS arrest. He was arrested by the B altimore City Police Department on 9/1/96 for Possession of CD S. Watkins also has 3 prior arrests for Obstructing and Hindering, Battery, and 3 prior Disorderly Conducts. A check through police department computers revealed that Robert Greenstreet has prior arrests for Rob bery, 1 st Degree A ssault, False S tatement to a State Official. Through investigation it was learne d that there ar e two pit bull dogs at the residence of 8472 Meadow Lane. There is a Beware of Dogs sign posted in the front window of the residence to warn others of the dangerous dogs. Due to the fact that Robert Jay Watkins has prior arrests for crimes of violence (Battery) and for Obstructing and Hindering and that Robert Earl Greenstreet has prior arrests for Robbery and 1 st Degree Assault and that there are dangerous dogs on the prop erty, your Affiant requests that based on this information, and all other information contained in this affidavit, that executing officers need not knock and announce their presence before entering. Based on the merits of this affidavit, your affiant believes that violations of the Maryland Controlled Dangerous Substance Act are occurring with 8472 Meadow Lane, Pasadena, Anne Arundel County, Maryland. Your Affiant prays a search and seizure warrant be issued for the same. (Em phasis added). Petitioner argued at the hearing on the motion to suppress, and the State conceded, that the warran t was stale o n its face because the affidavit indicated that the trash seizure was executed (14 April 2003) m ore than one year be fore the w arrant s issuan ce (on 15 April 2004) . THE COURT: Well any time [the State] wants to concede something I certainly wou ld accept it. [PROSECUT OR]: Your Honor, I agree. [DEFENSE CO UNSEL]: It s conceding with an asterisk. 4 [PROS ECUT OR]: That on it s face the date of April 14, 2003, one trash rip a year and a day before the w arrant is signed, it s stale. I am not go ing to, I wo uld not argue th at a trash rip a year ago m akes th eir marij uana in the hou se. So on that particular po int I conced e that the w arrant is stale. *** And I am not even pa rticularly going to argue that it s freshened enough by the first parag raph. I could n t do it. Greenstreet, therefore, argued before the Circuit Co urt that the District Court judge lacked a substantial basis to issue the warrant because probable cause, based on the affidavit, was stale. Petitioner contended that the hearing court neither could assume that the date of 14 April 2003 was a typographical error, nor go beyond the four c orners of the affidavit to allow the affiant to supplement the affidavit by testifying to a typographical error if a mistake had occurred. Greenstreet continued that the good faith exception does not apply here because (1) the warran t was stale on its face , (2) the issuing judge ab andoned her judicial ro le nonetheless by issuing a warrant, and (3) Officer Huck, as a well-trained, experienced officer, should have known that the warrant application that he was about to execute was unsupported by probable cause. In response, the State asserted that the date listed for the trash seizure was a typographical error. Additionally, it proffered that Offic er Huck , if allowed to testify, would state that he intended to type or write 04/14/04" instead in the affidavit. The State noted that, although the date for the trash seizure given in a related police report also was listed as 5 04/14 /03, as in the affidavit, it attributed the companion error in the report to the cut and paste f unction of the d epartm ental co mpute r. The State also contended that, in the alternative, even if the warrant ap plication did not demonstrate probable cause, the evidence seized under the warran t would b e admissib le under the good faith excep tion to the exclusionary rule because Officer Huck exercised his professional judgment when he applied for the warrant on the 15th knowing that he ha[d] found drugs in the trash on the 14th because the 2003 [wa]s a typo and not a true fact where he held this [ reason fo r probable c ause] for a year. At the he aring, the Sta te elaborated that, while the court cannot go beyond the four corners of the warrant in deciding the staleness issue, it may consider matters beyond the four corners to discern whether the affiant committed a typographical error, but neither the State nor the court may supplement the facts of the affidav it: [PROS ECUT OR]: Well, there is no testimony or contradiction to say that it ha ppene d in 200 3. The Court, I agree that on its face the Court has to accept 2003. A nd that is why I can see that on the face the warrant is stale. But to then go to the second inquiry, which is good faith , that is more, tha t is not just, okay, you know it s either this or tha t. That is when the Court has to look at the test of whether the Officer was objectively reasonable. COURT: Right. But you are basing that on the fact that you know that the Officer told you that it s a typo. If that evidence wasn t there then would you still make the good faith argumen t? [PROSECUTOR]: No. I think that the Co urt would have to determine that that com es into eviden ce. I mean all I ca n do is 6 say it to bolster my argument. B ut the Cou rt would h ave to make the determination that comes into evidence. And the reason I thin k it does is be cause you h ave to app ly the test. COU RT: Rig ht. [PROSECUTOR ]: And how you apply the test if you don t know what the objectively reasonable basis for it is. COURT: I understand. [PROS ECUT OR]: I guess that is where I am going with that. For good faith, I agree that you can t supplement the facts. The Officer can t say, oh, yeah, well if you don t like th at trash rip I did another one the 13th of A pril, 2004. I understand you can t put more f acts into it. But to get to the good faith to decide whether there is behavior to punish one must look at the conduct of the police officer in q uestion. A nd that is w hy I think that is rele vant. The Circuit Court concluded that the State was not entitled to have Officer Huck testify as to his belief in the existen ce of prob able cause or his good faith in completing the search warra nt affid avit and execu ting the w arrant. The hea ring judge ob served that o nly upon a showing by a defend ant that a governmental affiant has perjured himself on a material matter, when litigating the proprietary of the issuance of a warrant, will witnesses ever be called or extraneous evidence produced, relying on Frank s v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978) and Fitzgerald v . State, 153 Md. App. 601, 837 A.2d 989, aff d, 384 Md. 484, 864 A.2d 1006 (2003). Because the circumstances in the present case did not implicate this rare exception, the judge explained, the court s consideration of the showing of proba ble cause was limited to the warrant and its application documents ( The 7 State has no right to ask for a Franks hearing to explain its failure to inclu de accura te material facts in a warrant application. ). The Circuit Court, therefore, granted Greenstreet s motion to suppress. In reaching th at result, the Circuit Court determined that the good f aith exceptio n to the exclusionary rule was not applicable because the police officer lacked an objective, reasonab le good faith basis to believe that the warrant was issued properly by the District Court judge due to the facial staleness of probable cause. In addition, the hearing judge found that Officer Huck was reckless in preparing the application. The State appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, arguing that the issuing judge could have concluded from the information presented w ithin the fou r corners of the affidav it that the date of the trash seizure and search was actually 14 A pril 2004; he nce, proba ble cause existed and w as not sta le. Alternatively, the State pressed the notion th at the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule should be applied. G reenstreet reto rted that: (1) the State conceded that the warrant was stale and not supported by probable cause; (2) the State waived the argument that the typographical error could be shown within the four corners of the affidavit because that arg ument w as not adv anced in th e Circuit C ourt; (3) the C ircuit Court correctly applied the four corn ers rule; and, (4 ) the good faith excep tion did not a pply. The Court of Spe cial Ap peals re versed the judg ment o f the C ircuit Co urt. State v. Greenstreet, 162 Md. App. 418, 875 A.2d 177 (2005) . The intermediate appellate cou rt resolved the preservation issues in favor of the State. The State was permitted to argue that 8 the typographical error could be shown within the four corners of the affidavit because the Circuit Court recognized the issue to be how it was to proceed when the State contended that the affidav it contained a typographical error, characterizing the appellate change in the State s trial court argument as merely advanc[ing] an argument for the resolution of that issue that differs f rom the arg ument m ade b y the prosecutor. Greenstreet, 162 Md. App. at 426, 875 A.2d at 182. (citing Md . Rule 8-13 1(a) ( Ord inarily, the appellate court will not decide any other issue [than a jurisdictional one] unless it plainly appea rs by the record to have been raise d in o r dec ided by the trial court[.] ) and Crown Oil & Wax Company of Delaware, Inc. v. Glen Construction Company of Virginia, Inc., 320 Md. 546, 560-63, 578 A.2d 1184, 1190-92 (199 0)).1 The Court of Special App eals characterized the prosecu tor s statement to the trial court, I agree that on its face the Court has to accept 2003, as a concession on a point of law that did not bind th e appe llate cou rt. Greenstreet, 162 Md. App. at 427, 875 A.2d at 182. Turning to the merits, the Court of Special Appeals determined that, like the circumstances in Valdez v. S tate, 300 Md. 160 , 476 A.2d 116 2 (1984), testimony to clarify or explain the asserted typographical error could be allowed and yet remain con sistent with the four corn ers rule that prohibits c ourts from go ing beyond th e text of a w arrant and its 1 The Court of Special Appeals determined that Rule 8-131(a) vests discretion in an appellate court to consider a new issue, which discretion it chose to exercise here because neither party, at either level of court, has presented any authority directly bearing on the issue on which the circuit court urged counsel to inform it and the issue is one that sh ould be resolved. State v. Greenstreet, 162 Md. A pp. 418, 427, 875 A .2d 177, 182 (200 5). 9 supporting application when reviewing the issuing judge s determination of probable cause. Greenstreet, 162 Md. App. at 429, 875 A.2d at 183. The court looked to a number of cases from foreign jurisdictions to support the proposition that if the affidavit contained an identifiable and certain clerical error, such a s a date ma terial to the prob able cause finding, the warrant should not be v itiated. Greenstreet, 162 Md. App. at 430-34, 875 A.2d at 184-86. Despite this conclusion, the court determined that it did not need to decide whether the reasoning employed in those cases should be adopted as Maryland law or to order testimony be taken in the present case by the C ircuit Court because, from information within the four corners of the affidavit, the District Cou rt judge reaso nably could have concluded that that date was a clerical error, and was intended to be 4-14-04. Greenstreet, 162 Md. App. at 435, 875 A.2d at 186-87. The intermediate appellate court explained: The logical and commonsense way to read the a ffidavit is that the affiant is presenting the progress of the investigation in chronological order. The initial paragraph explains how the activities of Greenstreet were brought to the attention of the police. That was within the past mon th, or within thirty d ays of 4-15-04. These complaints of neighbors induced the trash trip, mistakenly stated to be on 4-14-03. For 4-14-03" to be considered accurate in this contex t, one has to accept as logical that the police conducted a trash trip for some unexplained reason and then, f or eleven m onths, sat on the highly incriminating evidence thereby obtained u ntil neighbors complained about possible CDS activity. One must further assume that the police then took an additional thirty da ys to apply for a search warrant based on the year-old evidence. More compelling of a finding of typographical error is that the affidavit was presented to the issuing judge on Thursday, 415-04. The affidavit states that the trash collection days for the 10 neighborhood of 8472 Meadow Lane are Wednesday and Saturd ay, indicatin g tha t the t rash trip w as the pre cedi ng day, 4-14-04. By use of the present te nse, the aff iant is describing a trash collection day that is relatively contemporaneous with the making of the affidavit, and certainly not as far in the past as one year. See State v. Edwards, 266 Md. 515, 518-24, 295 A.2d 465, 466-69 (1972) (discussing presen t tense rule in interpreting search warrant applications). On the other hand, if 4-14-03" must be accepted uncritically, the information about the trash pickup days, which obviously is intended to demons trate the abandonment of the items recovered, becomes irrelevant. Greenstreet, 162 Md. App. at 435-36, 875 A.2d at 187. Because the appellate court determined that the Circuit Court erred when it found that the issuing judge did not have a substantial basis for concluding that the warrant was supported by probable cause, it reversed the suppression order; thus, it became unnecessary to address the arguments regarding the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. II. We first need to clarify a preservation question. Although the State made confounding statements about its intent to argue the good faith exception at the suppression hearing, the Circuit Court decided that issue by finding that the good faith exception did not apply. Md. Rule 8-131(a) ( Ordinarily, the appellate court will not decide any [issue other than jurisdiction] unless it plainly appears by the record to have been raised in or decided by the trial cou rt . . . . ). Thus, the good faith exception properly is before us. In addition, we agree with the Court of Special Appeals when it stated that a party may not concede a point of law to th e exclu sion of appella te review , as necessary and proper to decide the case. 11 Greenstreet, 162 Md. App. at 427, 875 A.2d at 18 2; see also Crown Oil, 320 Md. at 567, 578 A.2d at 1193 (sta ting that the Court of Appeals is not bound by stipulations on matters of law.) A reviewing court will determine whether evidence in an affidavit is stale by applying a factors test to circumstances of the case before it, see, infra, Section III(C ) (discussing stale probable cause). The question of staleness is a question of law requiring the application of facts. Hence, we are not bound by the concession made by the prosecutor at the suppression hearing . III. A. We determine first whether the issuing judge had a substantial basis to conclude that the warrant was su pporte d by prob able ca use. State v. Amerman, 84 Md. App. 461, 463-64, 581 A.2d 19, 20 (1990). We do so not by applying a de novo standard of review, but rather a deferential one. The task of the issuing judge is to reach a practical and common-sense decision, giv en all of the c ircumstanc es set forth in the affidav it, as to wheth er there exists a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular search. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-39, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2332, 76 L.Ed.2d 527, 548 (1983 ). The duty of a reviewing court is to ensure that the issuing judge had a substantial basis for . . . conclud[ing] that probable cause existed. Id. (Quotation and citations o mitted); Birchead v. State, 317 Md 691, 701, 566 A.2d 488, 492-93 (1 989); Potts v. State , 300 Md. 567, 572, 479 A.2d 1335, 1338 (1984) (Quo tation an d citation omitted ). The U.S. Supreme 12 Court explained in Gates that the purpose of this standard of review is to encourage the police to subm it to the w arrant p rocess. Gates, 462 U.S. at 237 n. 10, 103 S.Ct. at 2331 n.10, 76 L.Ed.2d at 547 n.10. In United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984) the Court explained the deference due an issuing judge s probable cause determination: Because a search warrant provides the detached scrutiny of a neutral magistrate, w hich is a more reliable safeguard against improper searches than the hurried judgment of a law enforcement officer en gaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime, we have expressed a strong preference for warrants and declared that in a doubtful or marginal case a search under a warrant may be sustaina ble wher e without o ne it would fall. Reasonable minds frequently may differ on the question whether a pa rticular affida vit establishes p robable cause, and we have thus concluded that the preference for warrants is most appropriately effectuated by according great deference to a magistrate s determination. (Quotations and citations omitted). Leon, 468 U.S. at 913-14, 104 S.Ct. at 3415-16, 82 L.Ed.2d 677, 692-93. Although a reviewing court grants deference to the issuing judge s probable cause determination, that deference is not boundless because the reviewing court must require that (1) the affidav it supporting the warrant application not be based on re ckle ss fa lsity, (2) the issuing judge not serve merely as a rubber stamp for the police, and (3) the affidavit provide the issuing judge with a substan tial basis f or caus e. Leon, 468 U.S. at 14, 104 S.Ct. at 3416, 82 L.Ed.2d at 693. (Quotations and citations o mitted). 13 B. When reviewing the basis of the issuing judge s probable cause finding, we ordin arily confine our consid eration of p robable ca use solely to the information provided in the warrant and its accom panying applica tion do cume nts. Valdez v. S tate, 300 Md. 160, 168, 476 A.2d 1162, 1166 (19 84); Smith v. State, 191 Md. 329, 335-36, 62 A.2d 287, 289-90 (1948). We do not consid er evidenc e that seeks to supplement or controvert the truth of the grounds advan ced in th e affid avit. Valdez, 300 Md. at 168, 476 A.2d at 1166; Carter v. S tate, 274 Md. 411, 439, 33 7 A.2d 415, 43 1 (197 5), Smith, 191 Md. at 335-36, 62 A.2d at 289-90. This principle is known as the fou r corners rule . We co nclude that the C ircuit Court in the present case was correct to preclude testimony on the issue of whether a date material to the finding of pro bable c ause w as a typog raphica l error. There are some occasions where deviations from the four corners rule are appropriate. One instance where evidence outside of the wa rrant and its af fidavit may be considered is where a defendant makes a required showing for a Franks hearing. The c ase before us is not such a c ase. A Franks hearing is permitted where testimony or other proof is proffered by a defendant that the police officer who sought the warrant provided deliberately false material evidence to support th e warran t or held a reckless disregard for the truth. Franks, v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171-72, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 2684-85, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978). At the best, the hearing judge in the present case found that the affiant was sloppy in preparing the affidavit fo r the applicatio n for the w arrant. 14 A second instance where supplemental testimony or other evidence may be considered, without v iolating the four corners rule, is where the affidavit supporting the warrant is undecipherable, as in Valdez. This exce ption also do es not apply to the circumstances of the present ca se. In Valdez, we approved o f the use of a District Co urt judge s testimony at the suppression hearing for the very limited purpose of translating her contemp oraneou s notes, wh ich served a s the accom panying aff idavit to the application for the warra nt. Valdez, 300 Md. at 169, 476 A.2d at 1166 ( [N]othing prohibits considering evidence that aids in de ciphering w hat is within the four corners of the affidavit itself. ). The issuing judge had scribbled n otes quickly as she listened to oral statements attested to by police officers du ring a midd le of the nig ht telephon e call to her res idence, relaying their reasons for believing that a search of a suspect s residence would reveal evidence of a robb ery. Valdez, 300 Md. at 163-65, 476 A.2d at 1164. After the telephone conversation, the police off icers traveled to the residence of the judg e, swore to the truth of th e statemen ts made to her previously, and signed the judge s written notes of the earlier telephone conversation. Valdez, 300 Md. at 163-65, 476 A.2d at 1164. The defense later argued, among other points, that the notes were unreadable and, pursuant to the four corners doctrine, should not have been translated by the issu ing jud ge at the suppre ssion h earing. Valdez, 300 Md. a t 168, 47 6 A.2d at 1166 . At the suppression hearing in Valdez, the Circuit Court allowed th e issuing jud ge to testify to the facts assertedly contained in the notes, but she was not permitted to supplement 15 the words used in her original notes, or controvert her notes with new inform ation. Valdez, 300 Md. at 169, 476 A.2d at 1166-67. We concluded that the testimony taken was consistent with the four corners precept because (1) no new informatio n outside o f the warrant and application was proffered to support the issuing judge s finding of probable cause and (2) no information from the testimony controverted the statements contained in the notes that served as an af fidavit s uppor ting the w arrant. Valdez, 300 M d. at 169 -70, 47 6 A.2d at 1166 -67. Because the Court o f Special A ppeals believed that the circumstanc es here were analogous to those presented in Valdez, it determined that the circumstances of the present case would allow testimony as to whether the 14 April 2003 date given in the affidavit was a typographical error. We disagree. To permit Officer Huck to testify to a different date of the trash seizure and search than contained in the affid avit would be to allow him to controvert his statement in the affida vit an unsa nctioned v iolation of the four corn ers rule and the purpose for its existence. C. Nor do we agree with the Court of Special Appeals s conclusion that it may be inferred that the issuing judge recognized the purported typographica l error in the af fidavit, ignored it, and found a substantial basis to support her finding of probable cause based upon a trash search conducted on 14 April 2004, rather than 14 April 2003. To be sure, issuing judges or magistrates are permitted to grasp suc h errors, interro gate the affiant about the true facts, and correct the affidavit w ith the sig nature o r initials o f the af fiant. United States v. 16 Servance, 394 F.3d 222 (4th Ci r.), rev d on other grounds, 125 S.Ct. 2308, 161 L.Ed.2d 1086 (2005); see also P eople v. Royse, 477 P.2d 380 (Colo. 19 70) ( Sin ce on ly a judicial officer may issue a search war rant, it necessarily follows that only a judicial officer may alter, mod ify, or correct a warrant. ). Close review of the affidavit supporting the warrant is the purpose of the warrant process itself. To countenance otherwise is to degrade the purpose of requiring a magistrate or judge to review and issue warrants. A reviewing court does not rewrite deficient or inaccurate warrants after the search has been executed, esp ecially where there is no evidence the issuing judge noticed the problem and, in any event, failed to correct it when appropriate to do so. Thus, in reviewing the issuing authority s probable cause finding in this case, we examine the warrant and its supporting affidavit as written.2 The Co urt of Spe cial Appea ls cited nume rous cases f rom fore ign jurisdiction s in support of the pos ition that the four corners rule does not require issuing authorities to be bound by that which is literally, but erroneou sly, stated in the app lication f or a wa rrant. See 2 We note , as our attention is drawn to it by the Court of Special Appeals, that the warrant application contains a reference to the regular trash days in Petitioner s neighborhood as being Wednesday and Saturday and that the trash examined by the officers was appropriated on a day when other households had put out their trash for coll ection. The Court of Special Appeals took judicial notice of the facts that 14 April 2004 was a Wednesday and that 14 April 2 003 wa s a Mon day. This informatio n is not a suf ficient basis from which the issuing judge or a reviewing court could infer that the date 14 April 2003 given in the warrant application clearly was a typographical error because the correspondence of stated trash days is not the caliber of direct information that should be accepted as a contradiction of a precise material date giving rise to probable cause, such as, for example, a statement that yesterday affiant collected the said trash bags, or that the trash collected contained a financial statement dated in 2004, both of which statements would contradict the 14 Ap ril 2003 date. 17 Greenstreet, 162 Md. at 431-34, 875 A.2d at 184-86 (citing State v. Ros ario, 680 A.2d 237 (Conn. 1996) , State v. Gomez, 813 P.2d 567 (O r. App . 1991) , State v. Wh ite, 368 So.2d 1000 (La. 1979) , People v. Lubben, 739 P.2d 833 (Colo. 1987), State v. Sup erior Ct., 629 P.2d 992 (Ariz. 1981), and Baker v. Comm onwea lth, 264 S.W. 1091 (Ky. 1924)). These cases stand for the proposition that where a factual date in the affidavit material to the probable cause finding is an apparent typographica l error becau se it is contradicted by another factual time or date more likely to be true, also contained within the four corners of the affidavit, then a reviewing court may infer that a typographical error was made by the affiant and treat it as something other than what was written in the affidavit. We distinguish the present case from the facts of the aforementioned cases because, in the affidavit at issue here, the 14 April 2003 date of the trash seizure was not contradicted by any other date or precise and specific direct fact in th e affid avit. The Court of Special Appeals also looked to State v. Marquardt, 603 P.2d 1198 (Or. App. 1979), to support the proposition that a reviewing court may infer error even where it is not shown to be an error by contradiction or impossibility by some other fact in the affidavit. In Marquardt, the court reas oned: It hardl y seems likely that the affiant would wait exactly one year from the date he obtained his information and then seek a warrant at 11 p.m. Based on this circumstance, the magistrate, if he noticed the error at all, could properly conclude that it was a clerical error a nd that the d ate referred to was [the same date as when he so ught the warrant]. 18 Marquardt, 603 P.2d at 1199. The Court of Special Appeals highlighted several reasons why it was able to infer that the date in the affidavit in the present case, 4-1 4-03," was error: (1) the narrative in the affida vit probably w as construc ted in chron ological order; (2) reasonab le police off icers wou ld not wait o ne year to get a w arrant after a revealing trash seizure; and (3) the days of the w eek for normal trash p ick-up given in the affid avit are consistent with 14 April 2004, but not 14 Ap ril 2003 . Greenstreet, 162 Md. at 435, 875 A.2d at 186- 87. We are not persuaded that the affidavit in this case presents enough internal, specific, and direct evidence from which to infer a clear mistake of a material date upon which the affiant police o fficer d epend ed for p robabl e cause . See, e.g., Strou d v. Com monw ealth, 175 S.W.2d 368, 369 (Ky. 1943) (explaining that where the affiant police officer sought a warrant on 23 January 1942 and indicated that, on 23 January 1941, an informant had told affiant about alleged illegal alcoholic beverages, it was probable that the police officer committed a clerical error, [b]ut, courts cannot go behind such an affidavit for the purpose of testing its sufficienc y, and wheth er or not the affidavit is sufficient must be determined by what appears on its face. ). Our conclusion is not, we believe, the result of reading the warrant in a hyper technic al man ner. Valdez, 300 Md. at 169, 476 A.2d at 11 66-67 (statin g that a reviewing court should not invalidate the warrant by interpreting the affidavit in a hypertechnic al, rather than a commonsense manner, citing United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108, 85 S.C t. 741, 74 6, 13 L .Ed.2d 684, 68 9 (196 5)). Rather, the w arrant and its 19 application do not pro vide enou gh inheren t contradiction from w hich to con clude with certainty that the date was in fact simply an error. It is not the legitimate role of a reviewing court to rewrite material portions of a deficient, bu t issued, search warrant. T o do so w ould abrogate the responsibilities of the issuing authority whom the law entrusts to be a detached and neutral judge of whether the Constitution authorizes search of a person s property in a given case. C. As stated previously, the Circuit Court concluded that the affidavit failed to provide a substantial basis to support the issuing judge s probable cause finding because the evidence gathered from the 14 April 2003 trash seizure constituted a stale basis for probable cause. We agree with the Circuit Court s conclusion. There is no bright-line rule for determining the staleness of probable cause; rather, it depends upon the circumstances of each case, as related in the affidavit for the warra nt. Conne lly v. State, 322 Md. 719, 733, 589 A.2d 958, 965-66 (1991) (Citations omitted). Factors used to determine staleness include: passage of time, the particular kind of criminal activity involved, the length of the activity, and the nature of the property to be seized. Peterson v. Sta te, 281 Md. 309, 317-18, 379 A.2d 164, 168-69 (1977) (Citations omitted). The Co urt of Spe cial Appe als explained the genera l rule of stale probable cause in Andrese n v. State, 24 Md. App. 128, 331 A.2d 78 (1975), w hich we a dopted in Peterson: The ultimate criterion in determining the degree of evaporation of probable cause, however, is not case law but 20 reason. The likeliho od that the e vidence so ught is still in place is a function not simply of watch and calendar but of variables that do not pu nch a clock: the character of the crime (chance encounter in the night or regenerating conspiracy? ), of the criminal (nomadic or entrenched?), of the thing to be seized (perishable and easily transf erable or of enduring utility to its holder?), of the place to be search ed (mere criminal forum of convenience or secure operational base? ), etc. The observation of a half-smoked marijuana cigarette in an ashtray at a cock tail party may well be stale the day after the cleaning lady has been in; the observation of the burial of a corpse in a cellar may w ell not be stale three decades later. The hare and the tortoise do not disapp ear at the same ra te of sp eed. Andresen, 24 Md. App. at 172, 331 A.2d at 106. Where the affidavit in a case recites facts indicating activity of a protracted and continuous nature, or a course of conduct, the passage of time becomes less significant, so as not to vitiate the warrant. Peterson, 281 Md. at 318, 379 A.2d at 16 8-69 (Citatio ns omitted); see also Le e v. State, 47 Md. App. 213, 219, 422 A.2d 62, 65 (1980) (finding probable cause stale when based upon a drug sale from defendant s apartment eleven months b efore application for a warrant); Conne lly, 322 Md. at 734, 589 A.2d at 966 (concluding that probable cause co uld be found to b e stale where the probable cause finding w as based on evide nce of an alleged illegal lottery operation from observations taken over a few months, beginning nine months p rior to application for the warrant); Amerman, 84 Md . App. at 47 5, 581 A .2d at 26 (fin ding prob able cause not stale when based on evidence of alleged illegal drug sales from surveillance and investigation conducted one month prior to wa rrant application). 21 In Peterson, the question presented was whether an affidavit supporting the warrant to search defendant s residence, an apartment, for evidence of illegal drug distribution provided stale probable cause when it described evidence of drug sales from the apartment over a period of app roxima tely three m onths. Peterson, 281 Md. at 320, 379 A.2d at 170. Noting that, [b]y its na ture, traf fic in illeg al drugs i s ord inarily a re generati ng activi ty, and there was clear indication here that the activity was continual [based upon observances of multiple drug sales at the apartment home by police officers a month prior to the application of the warrant], a course of conduct regular ly follow ed ove r a protra cted tim e. Peterson, 281 Md. at 321, 379 A.2d at 170. In addition, we considered that, even though narcotics are easily transferable, [ ] the repeated distributions evident from the facts showed that they were readily replaceable and that Peterson had an available source of supply. Id. Thus, we concluded, the affidavit indicated that Peterson s apartment probably would contain the contraband at the time of the search and, hence, probable cause was not stale. In Lee v. State , supra, a police off icer applied f or and ob tained a sea rch warra nt in December 1978 to search defenda nt Lee s ap artment. Lee, 47 Md. App. at 214, 422 A.2d at 63. At the execution of the warrant, police arrested Lee and seized large quantities of illicit drugs, cash, and drug distribution paraph ernalia. Id. The Co urt of Spe cial Appe als concluded that the trial court erred in not suppressing the evidence because the application for the warrant showed on its face that the information relied upon by the issuing judge was stale and did not establish probable cause. Lee, 47 Md. App. at 215, 422 A.2d at 63. The 22 supporting affidavit contained 24 numbered averments, most of which the Court of Special Appea ls found to be mere ly conclusory, an d properly estab lished as a relia ble source only one of the s everal in forma nts relied upon b y the affia nt. Lee, 47 Md. App. at 217, 422 A.2d at 64. As to that one informant, the affidavit state d that, on 26 January 197 8, the reliable informant told the affiant that he had been in Lee s apa rtment during the w eek of 12 Janu ary 1978 (eleven months prior to the application for the warrant) and had observed approxim ately three ounces of cocaine, in addition to other narcotics, including marijuana. Lee, 47 Md. App. at 217-218, 422 A.2d at 64-65. The intermediate appellate court concluded that probable cause was stale because the affidavit did not indicate illegal activity of a continual nature: The warrant was issued on December 19, 1978, eleven months later. There are no facts asserted to indicate any continuing activity between January and December of 1978 whic h would link the appellant to illeg al drugs. It has been held that where the affidavit recites facts indicating activity of a protracted and continuous nature, or a course of conduct, the passage of time becomes less sign ificant, s o as no t to vitiate the wa rrant . . . . (Citations omitted .) See Peter son v. State , supra[, 281 Md.] at 317-18, 379 A.2d at 168-69. No such facts are presented in the affidavit utilized in the m atter now b efore us. (A lteration in original). 47 M d. App . at 219, 4 22 A.2 d at 65. In the present c ase, the affid avit sugges ts the crimina l activity of illegal drug distribution from Pe titioner s residence, but provides evidence of that activity on only one occasion the trash seizure and search on 14 April 2003. In co ntrast to the af fidavit in 23 Peterson, but similar to th e affidav it in Lee, the affidav it in the presen t case does n ot contain multiple dates of observed drug buys at Greenstreet s home or surveillance over a period of time. The single date furnished supporting probable cause occurred one year prior to the date that the warrant was sought and issued. No sales were observed or purchases made, or other indication of on-going drug sales were described in the affidavit that might provide for the issuing judge a substantial ba sis to conclu de that it wa s probable that eviden ce of narc otic sales would be found in Petitioner s home one year later. Because the sale of illicit drugs has been recognized as creating easily transferable, perishable, and incriminating evidence, such considerations suppo rt the con clusion that, one year later, it is less likely that evidence of drug use and distribution would be found in a susp ect s res idence . On the other hand, drug distribution from one s residence has been identified as an entrenched activity a consideration supporting a contrary conclusion. The affidav it here states that neighbors complained of noise and foot traffic and that officers observed a car parked by the Petitioner s house, which vehicle assertedly was registered in the name of a convicted drug dealer. Such averments alone, however, are insufficient to provide probable cause, or support a finding that th e easily transferable narcotics would probably be in the home a year later. The affidavit does not recite facts indicating activity of a protracted or continuous nature, or a course of conduct. We believe that the evidence providing probable cause was stale under the circumstances of this case because it facially existed at a time so remote from 24 the date of the affidavit as to render it improbable that the alleged violation of the law authorizing the search warrant was extant at the time application was made. IV. Having concluded that the issuing judge did not have a substantial basis to conclude that the warrant application was supported by probable cause, we next consider whether the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies in this case. The good faith exception is described in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S . 897, 104 S .Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed .2d 677 (1984). Noting that one purpose of the exclusionary rule is to alter the behavior of individual law enforcement officers and their departments to deter them from willful or negligent conduct depriving a defendant of some right, the Court observed that this deterrent policy cannot be expecte d, and should not be applied, to deter objectively reasonable law enforcement activity. Leon, 468 U.S. at 919, 104 S.Ct. at 3418, 82 L.Ed.2d at 696. This is particularly true, we believe, when a n officer a cting with objective good faith has obtained a search warrant from a judge or magistrate a nd acted w ithin its scope.[ ] In most such cases, there is no police illegality and thus nothing to deter. It is the magistrate s responsibility to determine whether the o fficer s allegations establish probable cause and, if so, to issue a warrant comporting in form with the requirem ents of the F ourth Amen dment. In the ordinary case, an officer cannot be expected to question the magistrate s probable-case determination or his judgment that the form of the warrant is technically sufficient. [O]nce the warrant issues, there is literally nothing more the policeman can do in seek ing to co mply wi th the law . [Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 698, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 3054, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976)] (BURGER, C.J., concurring). Penalizing the officer for the magistrate s error, rather than his own, cannot 25 logically contribute to the deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations.[ ] (Some alteration in original). Leon, 468 U.S. at 920-21, 104 S.Ct. at 3419, 82 L.Ed.2d at 697. In delineating this exception to the exclusionary rule, the Court identified four instances where good faith will not apply: (1) where the issuing authority is misled by information in an affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would have known was false except for his reckless disregard for the truth; (2) where the issuing magistrate wh olly abandoned his judicial role in the manner condemned in Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 60 L.Ed.2d 920, 99 S.Ct. 2319 (1979); (3) where no reasonably well-trained officer should rely on the warran t . . . [such as] an affidavit so lacking in in dicia of pro bable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable; and, (4) where a warrant is so facially deficient . . . that the executing officers cannot reasonab ly presume it to be valid. Leon, 468 U.S . at 923, 104 S.Ct. at 3421, 82 L.Ed.2d at 698-99 (Citations omitted); see also B raxton v. Sta te, 123 Md. App. 599, 636, 720 A.2d 27, 45 (1998) (stating that a police officer ultimately is responsible for his or her own actions, regardless of the error of a magistrate in appro ving the warrant requ est ).3 Where the defect in the warrant is not readily apparent to a well-trained officer, or, where the warrant is based on evidence sufficient to create disagreement among thoughtful and competent judges as to the existence 3 Petitioner argues that it is through the third circumstan ce that the fa cts of the present case should be viewed, which was the finding of the Circuit Court below. 26 of probable c ause, then the good f aith exceptio n will apply. Leon, 468 U.S. at 926, 104 S.Ct. at 3422, 82 L.Ed.2d at 701. The Court cautioned that in some circumstances the officer[ ] will have n o reasona ble grounds for believing that the warrant was properly issued, such as where a warran t is facially deficient (i.e., failing to particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized). Leon, 468 U.S. at 922-23, 104 S.Ct. at 3420-21, 82 L.Ed.2d at 698-99. In such case, suppression of the eviden ce proc ured w ould re main a n appro priate re medy. Leon, 468 U.S. at 926, 104 S.Ct. at 342 2, 82 L.Ed .2d 677. A well-trained police off icer is required to be aware of well-established current law and to have a reasonable knowledge of what the law prohibits. Leon, 468 U.S. at 920 n.20, 104 S.Ct. at 3419 n.20, 82 L.Ed.2d 677; Braxton, 123 Md. at 638, 720 A.2d at 46. When officers have acted pursua nt to a warra nt, the prosec ution shou ld ordinarily be able to establish objective good faith withou t a substa ntial exp enditur e of jud icial time . Leon, 468 U.S. at 924, 104 S.Ct. at 3421, 82 L.Ed.2d at 699. A reviewing court confines its good-fa ith inquiry to the o bjectively ascerta inable question w hether a rea sonably we lltrained officer would have known that the search was illegal despite the ma gistrate s author ization. 4 Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 n.23, 104 S.Ct. at 3420 n.23, 82 L.Ed.2d at 698 n.23. 4 In Leon, the Court eschew[ed] inquiries into the subjective beliefs of law enforcement officers who seize evidence pursuant to a subsequently invalidated search warra nt. The Co urt believe[ d] that send ing state and federal co urts on an e xpedition in to the minds of police officers would produce a grave and fruitless misallocation of judicial (contin ued...) 27 To determine whether the officer held an objective reasonable belief that the search conducted was auth orized, we review the warrant an d its application. Connelly, 322 Md. at 735, 589 A.2d at 96 6; Behrel v. S tate, 151 Md. App. 64, 99, 823 A.2d 6 96, 716 , cert. denied, 376 M d. 546, 831 A.2d 5 (2 003); State v. Jacobs, 87 Md. App. 640, 650-55, 591 A.2d 252, 257 -59 (1991). We applied the good faith exception in Connelly v. State, 322 Md. 719, 589 A.2d 958 (1991). At issue in Conne lly was w hether the o fficers reaso nably believed that the search they conducte d was au thorized by a v alid warra nt. Conne lly, 322 Md. at 729, 589 A.2d at 958 (citing Mass achus etts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 104 S.Ct. 3424, 82 L.Ed.2d 737 (1984)). To determ ine wheth er the office r held an objective reasonable belief, we reviewed the wa rrant an d its app lication. Conne lly, 322 M d. at 735 , 589 A .2d at 96 6-67. (...continued) resources. Id. (quoting Massachusetts v. Painten, 389 U.S. 560, 565, 88 S.Ct. 660, 663, 19 L.Ed.2 d 770 ( 1968) (White , J., dissen ting)). The Court confines the good- faith inquiry to the objectively ascertainable question whether a reasonably well-trained officer would have known that the search was illegal despite the magistrate s authorization. In making this determin ation, all of the circumstances including whethe r the warrant application had previously been rejected by a different magistrate may be considered. Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 n.23, 104 S.Ct. at 3420 n.23, 82 L.Ed.2d at 698 n.23. To determine whether the officer held an objective reasonable belief that the search con ducted was au thorized , we rev iew the warra nt and its applica tion. Conne lly, 322 M d. at 735, 58 9 A.2d a t 966 ( A s Conne lly did not request a hearing pursuant to the p roce dure auth orized by Franks v. Delaware, supra, and thereby create an evidentiary record with respect to the claimed misrepresentation of the affiants, we are limited to the affidavit itself in determining the applicability of the Leon good faith exception ); State v. Jacobs, 87 Md. App. 640, 650-55, 591 A.2d 252, 257-59 (1991) (stating that testimony of the officer s subjective good faith reliance on a warrant is not appropriate to consider when determining wh ether the good faith exc eption applies to a given ca se). 28 In Conne lly, police, pursuant to a search warrant, seized evidence of illegal lottery and gambling activities . Conne lly, 322 Md. at 723, 589 A.2d at 961. The State conceded the warrant was n ot issued upon p robabl e cause . Conne lly, 322 Md. at 721, 589 A.2d at 959. The affidavit outlined in great detail the daily activities of the defendant and another suspected person. Conne lly, 322 Md. at 721-23, 589 A.2d at 959-60. It stated that surveillance was conducted over several months, Monday through F riday, from 4:0 0 p.m. to 7:30 p.m ., of a su spect b elieved to be or ganizin g illegal g amblin g activitie s. Id. Conne lly argued that pr obable cause was stale because the affidavit and application for the search warrant, made in November 1988, w as based o n surveillanc e conduc ted in February 1988, some nine months earlier. Connelly, 322 M d. at 724 , 589 A .2d at 96 1. Connelly also contended that the times and occasions described in the warrant as on-going activities did not specify dates and thus could have been in March, April, or May, months before the application for the warrant was m ade. Id. Conne lly asserted that the g ood faith exception to the exclusionary rule was inappropriate for application because the warrant was facially deficient. See id. (arguing stale probable cause apparent from the warrant application). We accepted the Cou rt of Specia l Appeals s determina tion that, due to staleness, the warrant was not issued upon probable cause. We noted, however, that it was also possib le to determine that the affiants, in prep aring the affidavit, and relating their investigato ry observations, were describing a continuing criminal enterprise, ongoing at the time of their 29 application, and thus the probable cause relied upon was not stale. Conne lly, 322 Md. at 734, 589 A.2d at 966 (citing Peterson, which rec ognized th at the langu age of the affidavit, despite failing to specify specific dates, may be indicative of a present violation when the affidavit is considered in its entirety). We concluded that, based upon a review of the warrant and its application, the officers could have believed reasonably that the averm ents of the affidavit related a present and continuing violation of law, not too remote fro m the date of the affidav it to be stale, and that they likely would find evidence of illegal activity sought at Con nelly s stor e and re sidenc e. Conne lly, 322 Md. at 735, 589 A.2d at 966-67.5 We conclude that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule does not apply in the present cas e. Unlike th e warran t applications in Peterson and Conne lly, supra, the affidavit here outlined only two events separated by eleven months, rather than explicating a series of ev ents and surveillance of illegal activities over three months (as in Peterson) or even nine months (as in Conne lly) before the warrant was sought. Within the m onth before Officer Huck sought the warrant, anonymous and unestablished informants had complained of noise and increased vehicular traffic at Petitioner s residence providing reason to believe that drug sales possibly were occurring. According to the affidavit, a year before the warrant was applied fo r, a single trash seizure revealed evidence of illegal drug use and/or 5 In Conne lly, we found error when the Court of Special Appeals remanded the case to the trial court to decide, as a question o f fact, wh ether the aff iants acted in go od faith in believing that probab le cause existed because that objective ascertainable question is for the appella te court t o decid e. Conne lly, 322 Md. at 735-36, 589 A.2d at 966-67. 30 distribution. The affidavit did not describe additional surveillance or reports of present criminal activity. The po lice officer, in p reparing an d relating his investigatory observations in the affidavit, was not describing a continuing criminal enterprise, ongoing at the time of [his] application. Conne lly, 322 Md. at 734, 589 A.2d at 966. Add ition ally, we do n ot conclud e that a reasonable, well-trained police officer executing the warrant would believe that the warrant authorized the search because the lack of probable c ause is apparent o n the face o f the affida vit when th e evidenc e giving rise to a belief in probable cause is a year old and does not indicate continuing criminal activity. We have long recognized the legal concept of the staleness of probable cause. See, e.g., id.; Peterson, 281 Md. at 318, 379 A.2d at 167-69; Behrel, 151 Md. App. at 88, 823 A.2d at 710. [I]f the facts set o ut in the affid avit are stale, the affian t would n ot have rea sonable grounds at the time of his affidavit and the issuance of the warrant for the belief that the law was being violated on the premises to be searched. Peterson, 281 Md. at 314, 379 A.2d at 166-67; see also Behrel, 151 Md. App. at 88, 823 A.2d at 710; West v. State , 137 Md. App. 314, 346, 768 A .2d 169 150, 168 (2001). The typographical error, if one, evaded notice by the issuing judge. It is a known police practice sometimes to wait to act on evidence of illegal activity for an extended period of time before seekin g a wa rrant. See, e.g., Conne lly, 332 M d. 719, 589 A.2d 55 8 (nine month investigation of illegal lottery operatio n); Lee, 47 Md. App. 213, 422 A.2d 62 (eleven month investigation of illegal narcotic sales). The error committed by the issuing judge, 31 authorizing a warrant with stale probable cause on the basis of the affidavit as written, is not a mere technical deficiency of the warrant or an immaterial error that should escape the notice of a reasonab le well-trained officer as affian t either. As the Supreme C ourt noted in Leon, the suppression of evidence obtained pursuant to a warran t should only be ordered on a case-by-case basis and only in those unusual cases in which ex clusion w ill further the purposes of the exclusionary rule. Leon, 468 U.S. at 918, 104 S.Ct. at 3418, 82 L.Ed .2d at 695. H ere, the purp oses of the exclusiona ry rule are served by suppressing the evidence because no police officer reasonably would rely on the warrant due to stale probable cause. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS REVERSED; CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO AFFIRM THE JUDGMENT OF THE C IRCUIT COURT FOR ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY; COSTS IN THIS COURT AND THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY. 32

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