Walzer v. Osborne

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Walzer v. Osborne, No. 20, September Term, 2006 HEADNOTE: TORTS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTIONS EXPERT REPORTS DISMISSAL The Health Care Malpractice Claims Statute, Md. Code (1974, 2002 Repl. Vol., 2006 Cum. Supp.), § 3-2A-04(b) of the Courts & Judicial Proceed ings Article, mandates that medical malpractice claimants attach to their certificate of qualified expe rt an attesting expert report. Based on the clear language of the statute, the court must dismiss the claim, without prejudice, when a medical malpractice claimant fa ils to attach the re quired repo rt in a timely manner, because the certificate of qualified expert is rendered incomplete when filed without the attesting ex pert report. In the Circu it Court for A nne Aru ndel Cou nty Civil No. 02-C-04-098086 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 20 September Term, 2006 ____________________________________ CLIFFORD S. WALZER, ET AL. v. KEITH J. OSBORNE ____________________________________ Bell Raker Wilner Cathell Harrell Battaglia Greene, JJ. ____________________________________ Opinion by Greene, J. ____________________________________ Filed: November 17, 2006 In this ca se, we m ust dete rmine w hether, u nder M d. Cod e (1974 , 2002 R epl. Vo l., 2006 Cum. S upp.), § 3-2 A-04(b) of the Co urts & Judicial Proceedings Article, known commo nly as the Health Care Malpractice Claims Statute ( Statute ), a court must dismiss a medical malpractice claim when a medical malpractice claimant files a certificate of qualified expert without an attesting ex pert report attached thereto. In dispute is whether the attesting expert report must be attached to the certificate of qualified ex pert, or wheth er it is merely suggestive that the report be attached. In addition, there is a dispute as to the sanction for failure to attach the report: specifically, whether § 3-2A-04(b) requires dismissal of the claim. We shall hold that the lang uage of § 3-2A -04(b) mandates that the certificate of qualified expert be complete, with an attesting expert report attached, and that dismissal of the claim without prejudice is the appropriate remedy when the claimant fails to attach the report in a time ly manne r. Thus, the trial court s interpretation of the Statute was correct and, accordingly, we shall reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals. FACTUAL BACKGROUND Keith J. Osborne ( Respondent ) sought treatment from Clifford S. Wa lzer, D.M .D., of Walze r & Su llivan, D .D.S., P.C. ( Petitioners ), 1 for a brok en jaw an d related injur ies in August and September of 2000.2 On August 27, 2003, Respondent initiated proceedings against Petitioners by filing a Statement of C laim with the Health C are Alternative Dispute 1 Respondent filed suit against Dr. Walzer, individually, and his professional corporation, Walzer & Sullivan, D.D.S., P.C. 2 On or about August 31, 2000, Respondent broke his jaw in a fight with one James Samuel Wellsc hlager, w hom R espon dent als o sued . That action was reso lved in favor of M r. Wellsc hlager. Resolution Office ( Health Care Office )3 of Maryland, alleging that Dr. Walzer was negligent in his treatme nt of Res ponden t. Respondent claimed that Dr. Walzer s treatment fell below the standard of care and, as a result of the treatment, Respondent s jaw was left permane ntly disfigured. On November 25, 2003, Respondent filed a certificate of qualified expert, exec uted by Jame s S. Elmor e, D.M.D ., which pro vided that: I HER EBY CERT IFY that I am a doctor of dentistry, currently licensed to practice in the State of Pennsylvania, and that I do not devote annually more than twenty percent (20%) of my professional activities to the activities that directly involve testimony in personal injury claims. Further, I am a Board Certified Diplomat of the American Board of Oral-Maxillofacial Surg ery. *** Based on my training, expertise and review of the records, it is my opinion that there were deviations from the standards of care and said deviations were the proximate result of Claimant Keith Osb ourn e s in jury. Respondent failed to attach to the certificate of qualified expert, an attesting exp ert report, as is required by § 3-2A-04(b)(3). After some discovery, Petitioners filed a waiver of arbitration. On May 26, 2004, Respondent filed a com plaint in the C ircuit Court for Anne Arundel Cou nty. On June 17, 2004, the Petitioners filed an answer. On September 22, 2004, 3 At the time that Respondent filed his claim, the office was known officially as the Health Claims Arbitra tion Of fice. See Md. C ode (197 4, 2002 R epl. Vol., 2006 Cum . Supp.), § 3-2A-03 of the Co urts and Judicial Proceed ings Article. The main statuto ry provisions in this case have not otherwise changed, but we shall refer to the office by its current name. -2- Petitioners filed a Motion to Strike Respondent s Certificate and to Dismiss, or, in the alternative, for Su mmar y Judgm ent. Respondent filed a response to the motion on October 29, 2004, to which h e then attached an attesting ex pert report. The Circuit Co urt heard the case on December 15, 2004, and granted Petitioners motion on the grounds that the attesting expert report was not attached to the certificate of qualified expert as required by Maryland law. The Circuit Court thereafter signed an Order of Dismissal without prejudice. Respondent filed a Notice of Appeal in the Court of Special Appeals on January 10, 2005. On March 1, 2006, the Court of Special A ppeals filed its re ported opinio n, Osborne v. Walzer, 167 Md. App. 460, 893 A.2 d 654 (20 06), holding that the langu age of the Statute does not require a court to dism iss a case w hen a claim ant fails to attach an attesting expert report to the certificate o f qualified e xpert. Tha t court held th at dismissal is a ppropriate only upon a showing that Petitioners suffered some prejudice, which it decided was not the case here. Petitioners filed a petition for writ of certiorari 4 in this Court, which we granted. Walzer v. Osborne, 393 Md. 242, 900 A.2d 749 (2006). For the reason s stated in this opinion, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals and direct that the intermediate appellate court reinstate the judgment of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel 4 Petitioners pr esented the following issue in their p etition for w rit of certiorari: When a medical malpractice claimant s C ertificate of Qualified Expert is filed without an attesting expert report, does Section 3-2A-04(b) of the Maryland Courts and Judicial Proceedings Code Annotated (2002 Repl. Vol.) require dismissal of the medical malpractice claim? -3- Cou nty. DISCUSSION The parties dispute whether, under § 3-2A-04(b) of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article, the Statute requires a court to dismiss a medical malpractice action when a claimant fails to attach, in a timely manner, the required attestin g expert report to the certificate of qualified ex pert. Section 3-2A-04 (b) provide s, in relevant p art: (b) Filing and service of certificate of qualified expert. Unless the sole issue in th e claim is lack of inform ed conse nt: (1)(i) 1. Except as provided in subparagraph (ii) of this paragraph, a claim or ac tion filed afte r July 1, 1986, sh all be dismiss ed, withou t prejudice, if the claimant or plaintiff fails to file a certificate of a qualified expert with the Director5 attesting to departure from standards of care, and that the departure from standards of care is the proximate cause of th e alleged inju ry, within 90 da ys from the d ate of the co mplaint; *** (3)(i) The attorney representing each party, or the party proceeding pro se, shall file the appropriate certificate with a report of the attesting expert attached. (Emp hasis ad ded.) In addition, the parties dispute whether § 3-2A-04(b) requires a claimant to attach an attesting expert report to a certificate of qualified expert in a medical malpractice action, or whether that section merely suggests that claimants do so. The parties, the trial court, and the intermediate appellate court disagree, as to the sanction imposed for failure to attach an 5 The statute intends Director to connote the Director of the Health Claims Alternative Dispute Resolution Office. Md. Code (1974, 2002 Repl. Vol., 2006 Cum. Supp.), § 3-2A-01(d) of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article. -4- attesting expert report to a certificate of qualified expert. Respondent argues that the attachment requirement is not mandatory. Respondent and the intermed iate appellate court s position is that the language of § 3-2A-04(b) does not mandate dismissal of a medical malpractice action for failure to attach the attesting expert report, but that, instead, the sanction is left to the discretion of the court and sh ould be less harsh than dismissal. Petitioners and the Circuit Court disagree, contending that the language of the statute clearly mandates attachment of the attesting expert report and dismissal of the claim when the claimant fails to attach the attesting expert report as Respondent failed to do so in this case. A. Statutory Construction We must first de termine w hether the L egislature inte nded dis missal of a complaint where the certificate of qualified expert did not include an attached expert report of the attesting physician. The cardinal rule of statutory con struction is to ascertain an d effectu ate the intent of the Legislature. Mayor of Oakland v. Ma yor of Mt. Lake Park, 392 Md. 301, 316, 896 A.2 d 1036, 1 045 (200 6); Chow v. State, 393 Md. 431, 443, 903 A.2d 388, 395 (2006) (citations om itted); see also Johnson v. Mayo r of Balt. City, 387 Md. 1, 11, 874 A.2d 439, 445 (200 5); Moo re v. Sta te, 388 Md. 446, 452, 879 A.2d 1111, 1114 (2005); O Connor v. Balt. County , 382 M d. 102, 113 , 854 A.2d 1191, 11 98 (2004 ); Mayor of Balt. v. Chase, 360 Md. 12 1, 128, 756 A.2d 987, 991 (2000 ). As this Court has explained, [t]o determine that purpose or policy, we look first to -5- the language of the statute, giving it its natural and ordinary meaning. State Dept. of Assessments and Taxation v. M aryland-Nat l Cap ital Park & Planning C omm n , 348 Md. 2, 13, 702 A.2d 6 90, 696 (1997); Montgomery County v. Buckman, 333 Md. 516, 523, 636 A.2d 448, 452 (1994); see also Chow, 393 Md. at 443, 903 A.2d at 395 (stating that [s]tatutory construction begins with the plain language of the statute, and ordinary, popular understanding of the English language dictates interpretation of its terminology ) (citations omitted). We do so on the tacit theory that the Legislature is presumed to have meant what it said and said what it meant. Witte v. Aza rian, 369 Md. 518, 525, 801 A.2d 160, 165 (2002). When the statutory language is clear, we need no t look beyond the statutory language to determine the Legislature s intent. Marriott Employees Fed. Credit Union v. MVA ., 346 Md. 437, 445, 697 A.2d 455, 458 (1997). If the words of the statute, construed according to their common and everyday meaning, are clear and unambiguous and express a plain me aning, we will give effe ct to the statute a s it is written. Jones v. Sta te, 336 Md. 255, 261, 647 A.2d 1204, 1206-07 (1994). In addition, [w ]e neither add nor delete words to a clear and unambiguous statute to give it a meaning not reflected by the words the Legislature used or engage in forced or s ubtle interpre tation in an atte mpt to extend or lim it the statute s meaning. Taylor v. NationsBank, N.A., 365 Md. 166, 181, 776 A.2d 645, 654 (2001); see Chow, 393 Md. at 443, 903 A.2d at 395. If there is no ambiguity in th[e] language, either inherently or by reference to other relevant laws or circumstances, the inquiry as to legislative intent ends . . . . Chow, 393 Md. at 443-44, 903 A.2d at 395. -6- If the langua ge of the sta tute is ambig uous, how ever, then c ourts consid er not only the literal or usual meaning of the words, but their meaning and effect in light of the setting, the objectives and purpose of [the] enactment [under consideration]. Fraternal Order of Police v. Mehrling, 343 Md. 155, 174, 680 A.2d 1052, 1062 (1996) (quoting Tucker v. Fireman s Fund Ins. Co., 308 Md. 69, 75, 517 A.2d 730, 732 (1986)). We have said that there is an ambigu ity within [a] statu te when there exist tw o or more reasonab le alternative interpretations of the statute. Chow, 393 Md. at 444, 903 A.2d at 395 (citations omitted). When a statute can b e interpreted in more tha n one w ay, the job of th is Court is to resolve that ambiguity in light of the legislative in tent, using all the resources and tools of statutory construction at our disposal. Id. If the tr ue le gisla tive i nten t can not readi ly be determined from the statutory language alone, however, we may, and of ten must, resort to other recognized indicia among other things, the structure of the statute, including its title; how the statute relates to other laws; the legislative history, including the derivation of the statute, comments and explanations regarding it by authoritative sources du ring the legisla tive process, and amendm ents proposed or added to it; the general purpose behind the statute; and the relative rationality and legal effect of various comp eting co nstructio ns. Witte, 369 Md. at 525-26, 801 A.2d at 165. In construing a statute, [w]e avoid a construction of the statute that is unreasonable, illogical, or inconsistent with common sense. Blake v. Sta te, ____Md. ____, __ __ A.2d ___ (slip op. at 12) (filed October 24, 2006) (citing Gwin v. MVA, 385 Md. 440, 462 , 869 A.2d 822 , 835 (2005)); see Frost v . State, 336 Md. 12 5, 137, 647 A.2d 106, 112 (1994 ). -7- In addition, the meaning of the plainest language is controlled by the co ntext in which it appears. State v. Pagano, 341 Md. 129, 133, 669 A.2d 1339, 1341 (1996) (citation s omitte d). As th is Cou rt has sta ted, [b]ecause it is part of the context, related statutes or a statutory scheme that fairly bears on the fundamental issue of legislative purpose or goal mu st also be co nsidered. T hus, not on ly are we required to interpret the statute as a whole, but, if appropriate, in the context of the entire statuto ry scheme of which it is a part. Gordon Family P ship v. Gar On Jer, 348 Md. 129, 138, 702 A.2d 753, 757 (1997) (citations omitted). Lastly, [s]tatutes in derogation of the common law are strictly construed, and it is not to be presumed that the legislature by creating statut ory assaults intended to make any alteration in the common law other than what has been specified and plainly prono unced . Gleaton v . State, 235 Md. 2 71, 277, 20 1 A.2d 3 53, 356 (1 964); See generally Robinso n v. State, 353 Md. 683, 728 A.2d 698 (1994)(discussing the proposition that statutes in dero gation of th e comm on law ar e to be co nstru ed narro wly, so as to not make any change in the comm on law b eyond that w hich is expressly stated and necessary). [B]ecause statutes in derogation of the common law are disf avored, the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius[6] has been extensively em ployed to avo id repeal of the common law, and refuted in order to make the statute cumulative with it. Waters v. State, 220 Md. 337, 356-57, 152 A.2d 811, 821 (1959) (citations omitted). Most statutes, of course, change 6 This maxim is [a] canon of constru ction holdin g that to express or include one thing implies the exclusion of the other, or of the alternative. BLACK S L AW D ICTIONARY 620 (8 th ed. 1999). -8- the commo n law, so th at principle [o f narrow construction ] necessarily ben ds when there is a clear legislative intent to make a change. Witte, 369 M d. at 533 , 801 A .2d at 16 9. B. The Hea lth Care M alpractice Claim s Statute Before beginning our analysis, we provide some basic background information about the Health Care Malpractice Claims Statute and the medical malpractice claims process. The General Assembly enacted the Statute in 1976 [for] the purpose of pro viding . . . a mandatory arbitration system for all medical malpractice claims . . . [and] the creation of a Health Claims Arbitration Office under the Executive Department . . . . 1976 Md. Laws, Chap . 235. Essentially, the Sta tute requires th e submissio n of certain medical malpractice claims7 to an arbitration panel for an initial assessment before the matter can be submitted to a court of law for a fin al determ ination. See generally McCready Mem l Hosp. v. Hauser, 330 Md. 49 7, 624 A .2d 1249 (1993); Newm an v. Reilly, 314 Md. 364, 377, 550 A.2d 959, 965-66 (1988). Th e arbitration p anel is either a three-pe rson panel co nsisting of an attor ney, a health c are pro vider an d a lay per son, or, u pon agreement of the pa rties, an arbitrator, in place of the three-person pan el. §§ 3-2A-03(c), 3-2A -04(f); see also Witte, 369 Md. at 527, 801 A.2d at 166. The parties can c hoose to waive the arbitration requirement and take the case to court, as the y did here. § 3-2A-06A. As we articulated in McC ready M em l H osp., 7 The Statute requires claims against health care providers, first, to be subm itted to arbitration if the potential claim exceeds the limit of the District Court s concurrent jurisdiction, which is currently $25,000. § 3-2 A-02(a). -9- 330 M d. at 500-01 , 624 A.2d at 1251: [T]he General Assembly enacted the [Statute] in respo nse to explosive growth in medical malpractice claims and the resulting effect on health c are provide rs ability to obtain malpractice insurance. 1976 Md. Laws, Chap. 235; see generally K. Qu inn, The Health Care Malpractice Claims Statute: Maryla nd's Respo nse to the M edical M alpractice Crisis, 10 U. Balt. L. Rev. 74 (1980) (describing evolution of Statute and assessing its early effectiveness). The general thrust of the Act is that medical malpractice claims be submitted to arbitration as a precondition to court action where the potential claim exceeds the district court s concurrent jurisdiction. Attorney General v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 278-79, 385 A.2d 57, 60 (1978); see also Oxtoby v. McGowan, 294 Md. 83, 91, 447 A.2d 860, 865 (1982); Md. Code (1974, 1989 Repl.V ol.), Courts & Jud icial Pro ceedin gs Artic le, § 3-2A-02(a). The basic procedures for initiating and maintaining a claim under the Statute are clear a nd simple. T he Statute requires that a person with a medical m alpractice claim first file that claim with the Director of the [Health Care Of fice]. § 3-2A-04(a). Thereafter, the plaintiff must file a certificate of qualified expert . . . attesting to a defendant s departure from the relevant standards of care which proximately caused the plaintiff s injury. § 3-2A-04(b)(1)(i). In general, the Statute mandates that the [Health Care Office] dismiss, without prejudice, any claim where the plaintiff fails to file an expert s certificate within 90 days, § 3-2A-04(b)(1)(i), unless the plaintiff obtains one of three statutory extensions of the time to file an expert s certificate: § 3-2A -04(b)(5), § 3-2A-05(j), and § 3-2A-04(b)(1)(ii). [8] 8 Section 3-2A-04(b)(5) states that [a]n extension of the time allowed for filing a certificate of a qualified expert under this subsection shall be granted for good cause s hown . Section 3-2A-05(j) provides that [e]xcept for time limitations pertaining to the filing of a claim or response, the Director or the panel chairman, for good cause shown, may lengthen or shorten the time limitations prescribed in subsections (b) and (g) of this section and § 3-2A-04 of this article. Subsections (b) and (g) outline the time limits for discovery and delivery of aw ards, respec tively. Lastly, § 3-2A -04(b)(1)(ii) state s that, (continued...) -10- In addition to filing a certificate of qualified expert, the Statute also requires that the medical malpractice claimant file a n attesting ex pert report. 9 We focus ou r attention on the language of the Statute and apply the principles of statutory construction to discern the Le gislature s inten ded sanc tion for thos e situations in which a medical m alpractice claim ant fails to attac h the attesting expert report to the (...continued) [i]n lieu of dismissing the claim or action, the panel chairman or the court sh all grant an extension of no more than 90 days for filing the certificate required by this paragraph, if: 1. The limitations period applicable to the claim or action has expired; and 2. The failure to file the certificate was neither willful nor the result of gross negligence. We have interpreted this last provision to require that a medical malpractice claimant file a completed certificate, if the panel chairman or court grants him or her an extension, within 180 days from th e initial filing of th e claim with th e Hea lth Care Offic e. McCready Mem l Hosp., 330 Md. at 513, 624 A.2d at 1256-57. In the present case, Respondent did not request an extension from the panel chairman or the court for good cause shown, as § 3-2A05(j) proscribes, nor did he request an extension after the limitations period had expired on the grounds that his failure to file the certificate was neither willful nor the result of gross negligence, in accordance w ith § 3-2A-04(b )(1)(ii). Respondent did not file an attesting expert report within 180 days of the initial filing of his claim because he filed his claim with the Health Care Office on August 27, 2003 an d did not file the attesting ex pert report un til October 29, 200 4. On that da te, Respon dent filed in th e Circuit C ourt, among other things, a response to Petitioners m otion to strike th e certificate of qualified ex pert, with an attesting expert report from Dr. Elm ore attached. Because Respondent waited fourteen months, from the date of his initial claim, to file the attesting expert report, he failed to file a completed certificate of qualif ied e xpert within 90 days of filing his in itial claim with the Health Care Office and failed to request an e xtension under any of the applicable provisions, such that his comp letio n of the c ertif icate of qualif ied e xpert wa s not time ly. 9 Odyniec v. Schneider, 322 Md. 520, 531-35, 588 A.2d 786, 792-93 (1991), provides a more in-dep th discu ssion o f the m edical m alpractic e claim s proce dure. -11- certificate of qualified expert. Respondent argues that the Statute is ambiguous and must be construed strictly because it is in derogation of the common law. Petitioners concede that the Statute is in derogation of the common law but counter that the principle of a strict construction must bend in this instance b ecause th e legislative pu rpose in this c ase is clear. We acknow ledge that, at comm on law, prio r to the General Assembly s enactment of the Health Care Malpractice Claims Statute, a claimant was not required to file a certificate of qualified ex pert in a medical m alpractice ca se. In that sens e, the certificatio n requirem ent, added to §3-2A -04(b)(1)(i)1 . of the He alth Care M alpractice Claims Statute in 1986, is in derogation of the common law, as both parties suggest. Nonetheless, we agree with Petitioners that the principle of strict construction must bend in this instance because the statutory language is clear and e vidences th e Legislatu re s intent to change the common law. Marriott Emplo yees Fed . Credit Union , 346 Md. at 445, 697 A.2d at 45 8; see Jones, 336 Md. at 261, 6 47 A.2d at 1206-07. As we stated supra, [m]ost statutes, of course, change the common law, so that principle necessarily bends when there is a clear legislative intent to make a change. Witte, 369 Md. at 533, 801 A.2d a t 169. Therefore, we need not look beyond the Statute s plain language. Section 3-2A-04(b)(1)(i)1. states that a claim shall be dismissed, without prejudice, if the claimant or plaintiff fails to file a certificate of a qualified expert with the Director attesting to departure from standards of care, and that the departure from stan dards of care -12- is the proxim ate cause of the alleged injury, with in 90 da ys from th e date o f the co mplain t. We see no ambiguity in the language of this provision. T he Gen eral Assem bly, when it enacted this provision, clearly intended for claims to be dismis sed if the claim ant failed to file the certifica te of qualifie d expert w ithin 90 days of filing the complain t. We stated, in McCready Mem l Hosp., that the Statute mandates that claimants arbitrate their claims before the [Health Care Office] as a condition prece dent to ma intaining a su it in a circuit court. The Statute defines the proc edure u nder w hich su ch claim s must b e arbitra ted. A claimant s filing of an expert s certif icate is an indispensable step in the [Health Care Office] arbitration process. 330 Md. at 512, 624 A.2d at 1257. In accordance with our analysis in that case, and the clear language of the statute, we hold that the Statute clearly mandates dismissal, without p rejudice, of a medical m alpractice claim in which a claimant fa ils to file the required certificate of qualified ex pert within 9 0 days of filing the comp laint. Respondent argues, and the Court of Special Appea ls agreed, tha t while the S tatute clearly mandate s dismissal fo r failing to file the certificate within 90 days of the filing of the complain t, it fails to impose such a penalty for failure to attach an attesting expert report. They contend that th e maxim expressio unius est exclusion alterius is dispositive; that because the Legisla ture mentio ned manda tory dismissal in su bsection (b )(1)(i) and no t in subsection (b)(3), it intended for manda tory dismissal on ly when a cla imant fails to file the certificate, and not when he or she fails to attach the expert report. The Petitioners disagree and contend that because the Statute requires the attachment of the expert report to the -13- certificate of qualified ex pert, the attach ment repre sents a mandatory step in the ce rtificate filing process, without which the certificate is incomplete, and the complaint must therefore be dismissed. We have said that [i]n dealing with statu tory comma nds, includin g time provisions, courts often speak in terms of whethe r they are mandatory or merely directory. The suggestion implicit from such an analysis is that, if the command is mandatory, some fairly drastic sanction must be imposed upon a finding of noncompliance, whereas if the comm and is director y, noncompliance will result in some lesser penalty, or perhaps no penalty at all. That, indeed, is really the issue. Woodfield v. West River Improvement Ass n, ___ M d. ___, ___ A.2d ___, (slip op. at 13) (filed November 6, 2006) (quoting Tucker v . State, 89 Md. App. 295, 297-98, 598 A.2d 479, 481 (1 991)). Again, we agree with Petitioners and hold that the General Assembly intended for the certificate of qualified expert to co nsist of both the certificate a nd the attestin g expert rep ort, rendering incomplete, and therefore insufficient, a certificate of qualified expert filed without the report attached. We reject the contention of Respondent and the intermed iate appellate court, that the maxim controls, as we have cautioned that the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius . . . meaning that the expression of one thing implies the exclusion of another thing not mentio ned, is not a rule of law, but merely an aux iliary rule of statutory construction applied to assist in determining the intention of the Legislature where such intention is not manifest from the language used. It should be used with caution, and should never be applied to override the manifest intention of the Legisla ture or a provisio n of the Cons titution . . . . -14- Hylton v. Mayor and City Council of Ba lt., 268 Md. 266, 282, 300 A.2d 656, 664 (1972) (quoting Kirkwo od v. Prov ident Savin gs Bank of Balt., 205 Md. 48, 55, 106 A.2d 103, 107 (1954)). Section 3-2A -04( b)(3 )(i), p rovides that [t]he atto rney r epre senting e ach p arty, or the party proc eeding pro se, shall file the appropriate certificate with a report of the attesting expert attached (emphasis added). Because the plain language of § 3-2A-04(b)(3)(i) is clear, there exists no need to adhere to this maxim or evaluate other sources. It is the Legislature s use of the words shall and attach that are dispositive, and demonstrate that the Legislature intended that the certificate of qualified expert consist of both the ce rtificate and the attesting ex pert report. Black s Law Dictionary defines attach as [t]o annex, bind or fasten, BLACK S L AW D ICTIONARY 136 (8th ed. 1999), making clear that the General Assemb ly intended fo r the attesting ex pert report to be a part of the certificate of qualified expert and not for the report and certificate to constitute two separate and distinct documents. There exists no ambiguity as to the meaning of the word attach. The term shall is also unambiguous. It remains a well-settled principle of this Court that [w]hen a legislative body commands that something be done, using words such as shall or mu st, rather than m ay or sho uld, we must assume, absent some evidence to the contrary, that it was serio us and tha t it meant for th e thing to be do ne in the m anner it directed . Thanos v. State, 332 Md. 511, 522, 632 A.2d 768, 773 (1993) (quoting Tucker v. State, 89 Md .App. 295 , 298, 598 A .2d 479 (1 991)); Mayor of Oakland, 392 Md. at 328, 896 A.2d at1052; Gorge v . State, 386 Md. 600, 613 , 873 A.2d 1171, 11 79 (2005 ); See also S tate -15- v. Green, 367 Md. 61, 82, 785 A.2d 1275, 1287 (2001 ) (determining that the statute s use of the word shall rend ered its s entenc ing pro visions unam biguou sly mand atory ). W e have even promulgated this principle into Maryland Rule 1-201(a), which provides that [w]hen a rule, by the word shall or otherwise, mandates or prohibits conduct, the consequences of noncompliance are those prescribed by these rules or b y statute. 10 In this case, we find no evidence to suggest that the Legislature intended for the attachment to be suggestive and hold, accordingly, based on the Legislature s chosen language, that a certificate of qualified expert must have an attached attesting expert report in order to complete the certification. Finding guidance in these prior opinions, we are confident that the Legislature did not intend this attachment as a mere suggestion as Respondent asserts, but rather that the Legislature intended to mandate the attachm ent of an e xpert repor t to render com plete the certif icate of qu alified expe rt. Because the langua ge of the S tatute is clear and its meaning unambiguous, we need not, and shou ld not, look b eyond the Sta tute. Jones v. State, 336 Md. at 261, 647 A.2d at 1206-07. Even if Respondent is correct that the language of the Statute is ambiguous, we remain convinced that the Legislature intended a mandatory sanction of dismissal when a claimant fails to attach the expert report, based on the context of the Statute and its stated purpo se. 10 See also Maryland R ule 6-104(a) e spousing the same p rinciple, to all m atters in the orphans courts and before the registers of wills relating to the settlement of the decedents estates. -16- For purposes of finishing the analysis, we will evaluate the lang uage of th e Statute with regard s to the c ontext in which it appea rs. Pagano, 341 Md. at 133, 669 A.2d at 1341. That the applicable subsection, § 3 -2A-04(b), is entitled Filing and service of certificate of qualified expert, implies further that the General Assembly intended the word certificate to include both the certificate of qualified expert and the attesting expert report, and not just the certification. H ad the Ge neral Asse mbly intended f or the certifica te and report to stand apart from eac h other, it certain ly could have inclu ded a sep arate section that contained the word report in the title, instead of listing the report requirement under the section entitled Filing and service of certificate of qualified expert. Instead, the Legislature designated the certificate section, section (b), and then listed the report requireme nts under section (b), as subsection (3)(i) of that section.11 The Le gislature did n ot write the Statute in such a way as to list the certificate requirements in section (b) and the report requirem ents in section (c), 11 (b) Filing and service of certificate of qualified expert. Unless the sole issue in th e claim is lack of inform ed conse nt: (1)(i) 1. Except as provided in subparagraph (ii) of this paragraph, a claim or action filed after July 1, 1986, shall be dismissed, without prejudice, if the claimant or plaintiff fails to file a certificate of a qualified expert w ith the Direc tor attesting to departure from standards of care, and that the departure from standards of care is the proximate cause of the alleged injury, within 90 days from the date of the com plaint; *** (3)(i) The attorney representing each party, or the party proceeding pro se, shall file the appropriate certificate with a report of the attesting expert attached. (Emp hasis ad ded.) -17- which we believ e is additiona l evidence o f the legislative intent that the certificate of qualified ex pert consist o f both the c ertificate and the attesting ex pert report. Because the Legislature mandated that the expert report be attached to th e certificate of qualified expert, we reject Respondent s argument that the mandatory dismissal applies only to situations in which a c laimant fails to file a certificate , and not to instances where a claimant files a certificate but fails to attach the rep ort. We see no reason to differen tiate these two situations. In as much as the expert report must be attached to th e certificate, it is part of the certificate. As we stated above, the certificate of qualified expert is an indispens able step in the arbitration process. McCready M em l Hosp., 330 Md. at 512, 624 A.2d 1257. While based on somewhat different facts,12 we agree with the Court of Special Appeals general statement in D Angelo v. St. Agnes Healthcare Inc., 157 M d. App. 631, 645, 853 A.2d 813, 822, cert. den d 384 Md. 158, 862 A.2d 993 (2004), that failure to file a proper certificate is tantamount to not having filed a certificate at all. 12 In D Angelo v. St. Agnes Healthcare Inc., 157 M d. App . 631, 85 3 A.2d 813, cert. den d 384 Md. 158, 862 A.2d 993 (2004), the Court of Special Appeals examined whether a certificate of qualified expert fulfilled the requirements of § 3-2A-04(b). Like in this case, the certificates in D Ang elo did not have attesting expert reports attached. The main focus of the case, however, was whether the certificates were complete despite that the certificates failed to mention that any of the thirty-one defendants either departed from the standard of care or that the departure from the standard of care by any of the defendants was the proximate cause of the injuries alleged. 157 Md. App. at 635, 853 A.2d at 816. That the certificates did not have reports attached was an additional issue that exacerbated the deficiency of the certificates, but did not constitute the basis for the court s analysis. T he Court of Special Appeals held that because the plaintiff f ailed to fulfill the requirements of the Health Care Malpractice Claims Statute, the motions judge was correct to dismiss the claims. 157 Md. App. at 652, 853 A.2d at 826. -18- Furthermore, the General Assembly enacted the Statute for purposes of weeding out non-meritorious claims and to reduce the costs of litigation. While it is arguably unclear from the Statute exactly what the expert repo rt should contain, common sense dictates that the Legislature would not require two do cume nts that a ssert the same in forma tion. Furthermore, it is clear from the language of the Statute that the certificate required of the plaintiff is merely an assertion that the physician failed to meet the standard of care and that such failure wa s the proxim ate cause o f the patient-p laintiff s com plaints. The c ertificate required of the defendant is simply that the defendant either did meet the required stan dard of care or, if no t, that the failure was not the proximate ca use of the plaintiff s injury. It therefore follows that the attesting expert report must explain how or why the physician failed or did not fail to meet the standard of care and include some details supporting the certificate of qualified expert. Of add itional suppo rt is that the ordin ary meaning of report is [a] de tailed ac count, W EBSTER S II NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY 962 (3rd ed. 2005), and its ordinary legal definition is [a] formal oral or w ritten presentation of facts or a recommendation for actio n. B LACK S L AW D ICTIONARY 1326 (8th ed. 199 9). Acc ordingly, the expert report should contain at least some additional information and should supplement the certificate. Requiring an attesting expert to provide details, explaining how or why the defendant doctor allegedly departed from the standards of care, will help weed out nonmeritorious claims and assist the plaintiff or defendant in evaluating the merit of the health claim o r defen se, depe nding o n the circ umstan ces. -19- Respondent argues that the expert report is not n ecessary beca use § 3-2A -04(b)(3)(ii) states that [d]iscovery is available as to the basis of the certificate. Petitioners counter that [h]aving this information early in the litigation would foster the efficient and expeditious retention of defen se experts a nd cond uct of disco very. The info rmation contain ed in an expert s report may also impact a defendant s decision to waive arbitration, or may foster early settlement discussions. Even if Petitioners could have conducted discov ery in lieu of Respondent s filing of an attesting expert report, that fact does not modify the clear legislative policy of weeding out non-meritorious claims and reducing the cost of litigation. Filing a meritorious, complete certificate of qualified expert, bearing the attesting expert s report, fosters the leg islative policy referenced above, w hereas filing an incom plete certificate, without the expert s report, detracts from that legislative po licy. We therefore adopt Petitioners propositions that requiring an expert to file a combination of a certificate of merit and an attesting report, will help further the Legislature s purpose, uphold the meaning and intention of the Le gislature, and aid the efficient processing of health claims. See McCready Mem l Hosp., 330 Md. at 511, 624 A.2d at 1256 (concluding that the Legislature intended for the Health Care Malpractice Claims Statute to assur[e] the prompt and ef ficient a rbitration of hea lth claim s ). Lastly, the Court of Special Appeals concluded that mandatory dismissal as a sanction was too harsh and could be imposed, if at all, only in cases where the opposing party was prejudiced by the lack of an attesting expert report. We do not agree with the Court of -20- Special Appeals standard for application of the Statute s sanction. It is not the task of the Judiciary to re-write the Statute and devise a statutory procedure for the imposition of a statutory remedy. Even if the legislatively-imposed sanction were harsh, it is not for the courts to read into the Statu te the eleme nt of prejud ice. We c annot assu me autho rity to read into the [Sta tute] what th e Legislature apparently deliberately left out. Judicial construction should on ly be resorted to w hen an am biguity exists. Therefore, the strong ly preferred norm of statutory interpretation is to effectuate the plain language of the statutory text. Chow, 393 Md. at 444, 903 A.2d at 395 (citations omitted). Moreover, we do not believe that the sanction is too harsh bec ause the req uirements of the filing process are clear, and, in cases where the claimants fail to adhere to the Statute, the claim will be dism issed witho ut prejudice , allowing c laimants, sub ject to the statute of limitations or other applicable defen ses, an opportunit y to begin the process anew. Furthermore, we hav e stated prev iously that we w ill dismiss actions w hen a party fa ils to follow a statutorily prescribed procedure: While an arbitration panel operating under the Act is not an administrative agency, the legislative mandate that the arbitration procedure under the Act be followed as a precond ition to invoking the genera l jurisdiction of a court is analogous to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Where the General Assembly has provided a special form of remedy and has established a statutory procedure before an administrative agency for a special kind of case, a litigant must ordinarily pursue that form of remedy and not bypass the administrative official. So strong is this public policy that this Court will, sua spon te, vacate judg ment and order an action dismissed where th e litigants hav e not follow ed the special -21- statutory procedure. Oxtoby, 294 Md. at 91, 447 A.2d at 865 (citations omitted). Furthermore, there is no language in the statute to suggest that a case should be dismissed only upon a showing of prejudice to a party. The c ourt s charg e in interpreting a statute is to determine the intent of the Legislature , not to insert lan guage to chang e the m eaning of a stat ute. Taylor, 365 Md. at 181, 776 A.2d at 654. Based on the clear and ordinary meaning of the language in the Statute, we hold that the attesting expert report must be attached to the certificate and that the certificate of qualified expert is not complete unless, and until, the expert report is filed as an attachment thereto. CONCLUSION We conclude that the trial court s interpretation of § 3-2A-04(b) was correct and therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals. Because Respondent failed to attach the expert repo rt to the certificate of qualified expert in a timely manner, the trial court was requ ired to dismis s Respon dent s me dical malpra ctice claim. B ased on th e plain language of the statute, it is clear that the General Asse mbly intended that the attesting expert report be a part of the c ertificate . Without an attesting expert report, a certificate of qualified expert is incom plete. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APP EAL S RE VER SED . CASE R E M A N D E D TO T H AT COURT WITH DIRECTIONS TO AFFIRM THE JUDGMENT OF THE -22- CIRCU IT COURT FOR AN NE ARUNDEL COUNTY. RESPONDENT TO PAY THE COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS. -23-

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