Application of Kimmer
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In the Matter of the Application of Robert J. Kimmer for Admission to the Bar of Maryland, M isc. Docke t No. 12, S eptembe r Term, 20 05. Opin ion by Bell. BAR ADMISSIONS JURISDICTION As the Court of Appeals has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all bar admission matters, a claim for Americans with Disabilities Act accommodations during the bar examina tion may be h eard by and ru led upon o nly by that Court. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND Misc. Docket No. 12 September Term, 2005 __________________________________ IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICA TION OF ROBER T J. KIMMER FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR OF MARYLAND __________________________________ Bell, C.J. Wilner Cathell Harrell Battaglia Greene, Eldridg e, John C. (Re tired, Specially assigned) JJ. __________________________________ Opinion by Bell, C.J. __________________________________ Filed: April 17, 2006 The issue presented by the application of Robert Kimmer, the applicant, for admission to the bar of Maryland and the exceptions thereto, filed by the Board of Law Examiners, the Board, is whethe r a circuit cou rt has jurisdiction1 over bar ad mission m atters such tha t, 1 In analyzing the Circuit Court s jurisdiction over bar admission matters, we use the term jurisdiction fundamentally, to indicate the actual power, rather than the propriety, of the Circuit Court acting in such matters. We discu ssed this issue in Maryland Bd. of Nursing v. Nechay, 347 M d. 396, 4 05-40 6, 701 A .2d 405 , 410 (1 997). There, we observed, as we previously had done in Moore v. McAllister, 216 Md. 497, 507, 141 A.2d 176, 182 (1958), and long had recognized, that [j]uridically, jurisdiction refers to two quite distinct concepts: (i) the power of a court to render a valid decree, and (ii) the propriety of granting the relief sought. (Citing 1 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (5th ed .1941) , §§ 129 -31). See First Federated Commodity Trust Corp. v. Commissioner of Securities for Maryland, 272 Md. 329, 334, 322 A.2d 539, 543 (1974). Noting that the forme r conce pt invo lves juris diction i n its fun dame ntal sen se, Nechay, 347 Md. at 405406, 701 A.2d at 410, citing McAllister, 216 Md. at 507, 141 A.2d at 182, we offered the explication of the concept set out in Kaouris v . Kaouris, 324 Md. 687, 708-709, 598 A.2d 1193, 12 03 (1991 ): Whether a court has fundamental jurisdiction, i.e., the power, to decide a matter, must be determined by looking to the applicable constitutional and statutory pronouncemen ts, First Federated Com . Tr., 272 Md. at 335, 322 A.2d at 543, because fundamental jurisdiction involves the power, or author ity, of a cou rt to rend er a valid final jud gmen t. Stewart v . State, 287 Md. 52 4, 526, 413 A.2d 13 37, 1338 (1980). It is a co urt's power to act with regard to a subject matter ... conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes th e court, and is to be soug ht for in the g eneral natu re of its powers, or in authorities specially conferred . Pulley v. State, 287 Md. 406, 416, 412 A.2d 1244, 1249 (1980), quoting Cooper v. Reynolds' Lessee, 77 U.S. (1 0 Wal l), 308, 3 16, 19 L . Ed. 93 1 (187 0). See First Federated Com. Tr., 272 Md. at 335, 322 A.2d at 543 ( If by that law which defines the authority of the court, a judicial body is given the po wer to render a judgment over that class of cases within which a particular one falls, then its action cannot be assailed for w ant of subject matter jurisdiction. ); Medical Exa miners v. Steward , 207 Md. 108, 111, 113 A.2d 426, 427 (1955) (Fundamental jurisdiction exists when the court has jurisdiction over the subject m atter and the p arties.); Moore v. McAllister, 216 Md. at 50708, 141 A.2d at 182 ( [J]urisdiction over the person and the subject matter goes to the very basic power of the equity court. (Emphasis in the original) ). having determined that an applicant to take the bar examination is entitled, when taking the examination, to accommodation, pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act ( ADA ), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101 et. seq., it may order the B oard to provide such accommodation. The Circuit Court for Anne Arunde l County, ruling on the applicant s Petition for Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order, determined that the ADA applied and that the applica nt was entitled to the acc omm odation he sou ght. Accordingly, it granted the applicant s request for a temporary restraining order and o rdered the Board to provide ADA accom moda tions, as specified.2 We shall hold that authority over the bar admission process Nechay, 347 M d. at 405 -406, 7 01 A. 2 d at 410 . See also New York Min. Co. v. Midland Min. Co., 99 Md . 506, 58 A . 217, 220 (1 904); Vonop penfeld v . State, 53 Md. App. 462, 469-470, 454 A .2d 402, 406-407 (1983). 2 The court s Order was as follows: It is hereby O RDE RED , in the abov e-referenc ed case [K immer v. S tate Board of Law Examiners], on this 25 th day of July, 2005 , that: (1) Plaintiff s request fo r a Temp orary Restrainin g Order is GRANTE D; and it is further ORDERED that (2) Defendant shall provide Plaintiff with ADA accommodations for the July 2005 Maryland essay exam and multistate multiple-choice exam in the same manner that Defendant accommodates other bar candidates granted ADA accomm odations re lated to time a nd/or equ ipment, w hich, in Plaintiff s case, is (a) double time for both portions of the exam, and (b) the use of a computer for the essay portion of the exam, with Plaintiff s b ar exam to be adm inistered over a four-day period, commencing on July 25, 2005, and concluding on July 29, 2005, with two days for the Maryland essay portion and two days for the multistate multiple-choice portion; and it is further ORDERED that (3) Plaintiff shall cooperate with Defendant in terms of times, location, and equipment in the same manner as other bar candidates with ADA accomm odations. -2- is solely within the jurisdiction of this Court. I. The applicant was not diag nosed with, and ap pears not to have sought evaluation for, a learning disa bility until just prior to entering law school in 2002, after he had taken the Law School Aptitude T est ( LSA T ). He h ad previou sly taken the Scholastic Aptitude Test ( SAT ), entered Emory University, completed his Bachelor s Degree at that Un iversity with a 3.7 Grade Point Average, and taken the LSAT, all without disability accom modation . His dissatisfaction with his L SAT sc ore prom pted him to obtain an e valuation to determine if he had learning disabilities. The psychologist he consulted, Dr. Anne Wake, after testing the applicant over four days, concluded that he has a specific processing learning disability, diagnosis 315.9 in the Diagno stic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition ( DSM-IV ). On the strength of that d iagnos is and c onsisten t with D r. Wak e s reco mmen dation, he was given (4) This Order will expire in ten (10) days from the date of this Ord er. The petition was not accompanied by a complaint. Moreover, after obtaining the temporary restraining order, the applicant did not pursue obtaining a permanent injunction or seek adjudication on the merits. In fact, the applicant took no further action in the case after the order was issued until after expiration of the temporary restraining order, even though h e was pla ced on no tice, prior to its exp iration, that the B oard did n ot intend to recommend the applicant s admission to the bar even if he passed the examination, without adjudication of the merits of the applicant s entitlement to the accommodations he received. Thus, other than a subsequent order setting for hearing his later filed Petition for Declaratory Relief, this is the final and only order in the case. -3- accommodation, typically amounting to double time and the use of a com puter, 3 throughout law school, at both the University of Baltimore Law School and the George Washington University School of Law.4 On May 15, 20 05, the app licant wrote to the Board of Law Examiners requesting ADA accommodation when he sat for the July 2005 Maryland bar examination.5 He included in his letter reports from his psychologist, as well as letters from both of the law schools he had attended, the latter of which indicated that he had received such accommodations througho ut his law school career. The applicant specifically asked that he be given double time to c omplete the exam ination and that he be pe rmitted to use a word processing computer in doing so. The Bo ard, consisten t with its custom ary practice and its 3 Dr. Wake recommended that the computer be equipped with grammar check and spell ch eck. 4 The applicant attended the University of Baltimore School of Law for his first year of law school and then he transferred to the George Washington School of Law, from w hich he obtaine d his Ju ris Doc tor deg ree. 5 Rule 3 of the Maryland Rules of the State Board of Law Examiners addresses Accommodations Pursuant to the Americans With Disability Act. Subsection b prescribes the procedure for making a request for accommodation. It requires a submission on the A pplicant's Accomm odations Reque st Form, contained in the bar application form, along with the specified supporting documentation. No issue is raised as to the failure of the applicant to comply with the Rule, although in clarifying its ruling in response to the applicant s inquiry, the Board brought to the applicant s attention the need to complete the prescribed form and the manner in which its prior submission was deficient. T he applican t s expert there after supp lemented her reports, p resumab ly with the required documentation. -4- Rules, see Rule 3 d. of the Rules of the Maryland State Board of Law Examiners, 6 forwarded the reports and the letters to its expert psychologist for review. On this occasion, the material was se nt to Dr . Lawr ence L ewan dows ki, The Board s psychologist concluded, on the documentary record,7 that the applicant had not demonstrated a disability covered by the AD A and, the refore, wa s not entitled to accommodation.8 He c onse quently recommended that the applicant not be given accommodation. Based on that recommendation, on June 20, 2005, the Board denied the applicant s request for ADA accommodation. The reasons for the decision were amplified 6 As relevant, that Rule provides: d. Board Determination. If there is uncertainty about whether the requested test a ccom mod ation s are war ranted pursu ant to the A DA , the a pplicant 's request and all supporting documentation shall be referred to a qualified expert retained by the Board to review and analyze whether the applicant has do cume nted a d isability and reques ted reas onable accom moda tions. ... 7 Dr. Lewandowski was asked to review the documentation submitted by the applicant in support of his application for ADA accommodation. That documentation included his request form, his personal statement, letters of prior accommodation from the law schools he attend ed and the psychological rep ort and letter from the applican t s psychologist, Dr. Wake. 8 Noting th e applicant s education al backgro und and after a review of his performance on the tests administered by Dr. Wake, Dr. Lewandowski concluded: Analysis of the limited docum entation in this case suggests that M r. Kimmer does not meet criteria for a DSM IV diagnosis of Learning Disord er, nor d oes he m eet criter ia as a qu alified in dividu al unde r the AD A. Mr. Kimmer s history and test scores indicate that he performs well above the averag e person o n virtually every dim ension of cognitive a nd acade mic functioning. There is no evidence of significan t impairment or a substantial limitation in learning. Just because every test score is not as high as his superior IQ score does not mean that those scores (i.e., 120) should be con sidered as impa ired or d eficits. -5- by its subsequent letter, dated June 21, 2005, responding to a further inquiry from the applicant for a fuller explanation of its decision. In that letter, the Board advised the applicant, as it had been informed by Dr. Lewandowski, that he did not meet the criteria for either a DSM -IV diagnosis of a learn ing disorder or as a qualified person under the ADA, explaining that he had demonstrated above average performance in virtually every dimension of cognitive and academic functioning and that [b]ecause a test score is not as high as a superio r IQ score, d oes not m ean it is a deficit o r impair ment. 9 In addition, the Board invited the submission of additional documentation, by way of an appeal, to be filed with its Chair, within ten days. On July 1, 2005, the applicant, through counsel, filed, by letter, Appeal of Denial of Request for Bar Exam Accommodation for Robert Kimmer,10 with the Board s C hair. 9 The Bo ard also adv ised the app licant that [t]h e report sen t was def icient in that it did not follow the General Guidelines for All Evaluation Reports, not having included the qualifications of the diagnostician, an explanation of how the examination performance is impaired, an explanation for why there were no accommodations given before the date of the re port and why they are necessa ry now. The guidelines w ere attached to the letter. Dr. Wake responded to this letter, providing the required information, by letter dated June 27, 2005. 10 Rule 3 e. of the Rules of the Maryland State Board of Law Examiners provides for appeal of an adverse ruling. It provides: e. Appeal. An a pplicant shall file any ap peal with the B oard with in 10 days of the date of the Board's letter denying test accommodations. The appeal shall be in the f orm of a l etter addressed to the B oard at the Boa rd's administrative office and shall contain any additional information or documentation the applicant wishes to have considered. The Chairman of the State Board of Law Examiners is delegated the authority to decide appeals on behalf of the Board. The Board's staff will advise the applicant by letter of the results of the appeal. -6- Arguing that he was evaluated by a highly-credentialed expert in learning disabilities, that he has a learning disability, as demonstrated by the professional testing performed by that expert, and that his disability substantially limits the major life activities of reading, writing... [and] working, and [that he] ha s the proficie ncy and intellec t required to practice law, the applicant concluded that he thus required and was entitled to accommodation. Moreover, the applicant asserted, professional examinations, such as bar exam inations, fall under t he purv iew of the AD A. This appeal, along with a supplemental letter from Dr. Wake addressing the deficiencies the Board identified in the applicant s submission seeking accommodation, were referred to Dr. Lewandowski for review. Finding that nothing new h ad been presented , Dr. Lewando wski s recommendation did not change. Based on that assessment and the Chair s review of all documentation, the Board, on July 21, 2005,11 denied the appeal, concluding that there is no justification for granting the accommodations requested and they are therefore denied. On July 22, 2005, four days befo re the bar exa mination h e intended to sit for wa s to be administered, the applicant filed, in the C ircuit Co urt for A nne A rundel Coun ty, a Petition for Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order to enjoin the State Board of 11 On July 13, 2005, when the Board had not yet made a determination regarding the appeal, the applicant s attorney called the Board and asked when an answer was anticipated, as the bar exam the applicant planned to take was scheduled for July 26 and 27. -7- Law Examiners from denying ADA accommodations to [the applicant] on the July 2005 Maryland and multistate bar exam in the form of double time and the use of a computer on the essay exam. He argued in the petition, as he had similarly argued to the Board, that he suffers from a learning disab ility which substantially limits major life activities, namely reading, writing, and working, that he is thus impaired in his ability to compete w ith his peers on time restricted examinations, and that the failure of the Board to give him ADA accommodations as requeste d deprives him of his right to work in his chosen profession. Further, he urged that, because he was planning to take the July 26 and 27 bar examination, it was imperative that the Court quickly order that such accommodations be given. Following a hea ring held on th e sam e day, 12 the trial court ordered the requested injunctive relief, na mely, a temporary restraining order requiring that the applicant have the use of a computer for the essay portion of the examination and double time in which to take it and the multistate examin ation. It concluded that the applicant would likely be successful on the merits of the case, that the likelihood of prejudice regarding other exam ination takers was outweighed by the applican t s hardship, th at the applica nt would likely suffer irrep arable harm if he was not accommodated and failed the examination, that the accommodations would be easy for the Board to make, and that public policy favored giving accommodations 12 July 22, 2005 was a Friday. The Board was offered the opportunity to postpone the hearing until July 25, 2005, but opted to go forward on the 22nd , inasmuch as nothing was to be gained by the postpone ment. -8- to those with ADA recognized disabilities.13 The Board fully complied with the court s order and provided the ordered accommodation for the applicant during the July 2005 e xamination. Subseq uently, however, by letter dated August 2, 20 05, lo ng befor e the exam inati on had been g rade d and two days before the expiration of the temporary restraining order, it informed the applicant, through counsel, that it was maintain[ing] its position that [he] has not established that he is entitled, under the Ame ricans with Disabilities A ct, to the acco mmod ations he rec eived for th e July 2005 Maryland bar examination. The Board also advised the ap plicant that, altho ugh it would grade his examination anonymously with the other examinees, it would not recommend his admission to the bar of Maryland, even if he passed the examination, prior to an adjudication on the merits of his entitlement to accommodations for taking the Maryland bar examination. 13 In determining whether to issue a temporary restraining order, the trial court must examine and find four factors: (1) the likelihood that the plaintiff will succeed on the merits; (2) the balance of convenience determined by whether greater injury would be done to the defendant by granting the injunction than would result from its refusal; (3) whether the plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury unless the injunction is granted; and (4) the public interest. LeJeune v. Coin Acceptors, Inc,. 381 Md. 288, 300-301, 849 A.2d 451,458 -59 (2004 ); Fogle v. H & G Restaurant, Inc., 337 Md. 44 1, 654 A.2d 44 9 (1995): Lerner v. Lerner, 306 M d. 771, 776 , 511 A.2d 501, 504 (1986); State Dep't of Health and Mental H ygiene v. Baltim ore Cou nty, 281 Md. 548, 554, 383 A.2d 51, 55 (1977). Md. Rule 15-501 (b) defines preliminary injunction as an injunction granted after opportunity for a full adversary hearing on the propriety of its issuance but before a final determination of the merits of the action. -9- In response, on September 29, 2005,14 the applicant filed a Motion for D eclaratory Relief. Filed in the same case from which the temporary restraining order was issued, he, in effect, asked the Circuit Court to make the temporary restraining order it had issued on July 22 permanent and, further, for a ruling that the applicant be admitted to the Maryland Bar. In that regard, the applicant argued that the granting of the temporary restraining order would have bee n otherw ise meanin gless; in issuing the order, the court also must have intended that the Board recommend the applicant s admission upon his successful passing of the b ar exam ination. The Board tim ely opposed this motion. Noting that the motion was filed two months after both the expiration of the temporary restraining order and receipt of the Board s letter informin g the applicant of its intention not to recommend the applicant s admission and, thus, characterizing it as improperly seek[ing] to revive and extend the parameters of a longexpired temporary restraining order, contrary to the Rules, and to transmute it into permanent injunctive relief, the Board submitted that, [a]s the filing is unsupported by a proper complain t, it is plainly defective and [the Circuit] Co urt lacks jurisd iction to act on it. It must be strick en. On November 4, 2005, as required by Rule 10 (a) of the Rules Governing Admission 14 In its brief, the Board says that the Motion was filed October 3. The certificate of service con tains the date S eptembe r 29 and th at is the date tha t the docke t entries indicate that the M otion w as filed . -10- to the Bar of Maryland,15 the Board of Law E xaminers reported the results of the July 2005 bar examination to the Court of Appeals, along with its recommendations for admission. The applicant was listed as having passed the ex amination . On the sam e date, pursu ant to Rule 10 (b), 16 this Court passed an order setting December 5, 2005 as the date on w hich, in the absence of the filing of exceptions to any applicant, the B oard s recommendation would be ratified, and, pursuant to Rule 10 (c), 17 the Board filed its excep tions to the applicant s 15 Rule 10 (a) of the Rules Governing Adm ission to the Bar of Maryland provides: (a) Report and recommendations as to candidates. As soon as practicab le after each examination, the Board shall file with the Court a report of the names of the successful candidates and the Board s recommendation for admission. If proceedings as to the character of a candidate are pending, the Board s recommendation of that candidate shall be conditioned on the outcom e of the procee dings. 16 (b) Order of ratification. On receipt of the Board s report, the Court shall enter an order fixing a date at least 30 days after the filing of the report for ratification of the Board s recommendations. The order shall include the names and addresses of all persons who are recomm ended fo r admission , including th ose who are conditio nally recommended. The order shall state generally that all recommendations are conditioned on character approv al, but shall not identify those persons as to w hom proceed ings are still pending. The order shall be p ublished in the Ma ryland Register at least once before ratificatio n of the Board s recom mend ations. Ratification of board s report occurred [o]n expiration of the time fixed in the order ... subject to the conditions state in the recommendations and to any exceptions noted u nder se ction (c) of this R ule. R ule 10 ( d). 17 (c) Exceptions. Before ra tification of th e Board s report, any pers on may file with the Court exc eptions relating to any relevant matter. For go od cause show n the Court may permit the filing of exceptions after ratification of the Board s report and before the candidate s admission to the Bar. T he Cou rt shall give no tice of the filin g of exce ptions to the candidate, the Board , and the Character C ommittee that passed o n the candidate s application. A hearing on the exceptions shall be held to allow the exceptant and candidate to present evidence in support of or in opposition to the exceptions and the Board and Character Committee to be heard. The Court may hold the hearing or may refer -11- admiss ion. Thereafter, by letter to the Court, dated November 17, 2005, the Board asked the Court to set the matter of its exception to the admission of the applicant in for a hearing, pursuant to Rule 10 (c). It perceived the discrete issue before the C ourt [to be] whether [the applicant] is entitled to admission when he has not sought, nor obtained, an adjudication on the merits o f his A DA c laim. Accordingly, the Board offered in support of its request that [t]he qualification of an applicant fo r admission to the Bar is a matter wh ich rests peculiarly within the jurisdiction of this Court. On December 2, 2005, this Court ordered that any proceedings in the Circuit Court for A nne Arunde l County regarding the app licant s bar examination and admission be stayed, and scheduled the case for a hearing on the B oard s exceptions and on the issue of the Circuit Court s jurisdiction over bar admission matters. II. The regulation of the practice of law, including th e regulation of the adm issions to the bar, long ha s been, see Act of April, 1715, ch. 48, §§ 12, 13 (Maxcy ed., vol. 1, p. 132 (1811)), 18 and is n ow, a ju dicial fu nction. Post v. Bregman 349 Md. 142, 162-63, 707 A.2d the exceptions to the Board, the Character Committee, or an examiner for hearing. The Board, C haracter C ommittee, o r examine r hearing the exception s shall file with the Court, as soon as practicable after the hearing, a report of the proceedings. The Court may decide the exc eptions withou t furthe r hearin g. 18 That Act provided: A ND BE IT FURTHER ENACTED, by the authority advice and consent aforesaid , Tha t from an d aft er the end of th is pre sent session o f ass emb ly, no attorney, or other person whatsoever, shall practise the law in any of the courts of this province, without being admitted thereto by the justices of the -12- 806, 816 (199 8); Attorney General v. Waldron, 289 Md. 683, 692, 426 A.2d 929, 935 (1981 ); Maryland State Bar Ass'n v. Boone, 255 M d. 420, 258 A.2d 43 8 (1969); Pub. Service Comm n of Maryland v. Hahn Transportation, 253 Md. 571, 583, 253 A.2d 845, 852 (1969) ( Under our constitutional system of separation of powers, the determination of what constitutes the practice of law and the regulation of the practice and of its practitioners is, and essentially and appropriately should be a function of the judicial branch of the go vernment. ). This point was made most forcefully and completely in Waldron, where we explained: Cognizant of the constitutionally imposed responsibility with respect to the administration of justice in this State, this Court has heretofore recognized and held that the regulation of the practice of law, the admittance of n ew mem bers to the bar, and the discipline of attorneys w ho fail to co nform to the established standards governing their professional conduct are essentially judicia l in nature and, accordingly, are encompassed in the constitutional grant of judicial authority to the courts of this State.... Thus, in [Public Serv. Comm n v.] Hahn [Tran sp., Inc.], 253 Md. [571,] 583, 253 A.2d [845,] 852 [1969], Chief Judge Hammond stated for this Court that (u)nder our constitutional system of separation of powers, the determination of what constitutes the practice of law and the regulation of the practice an d of its practitioners is, and essentially and appropriate ly should be, a function of the judicial branch of government. A short time later, this C ourt de termine d, inter alia, that the following words of the Supreme Ju dicial Court of M assachusetts are highly persuasive : It is a necessary implication from the exclusive jurisdiction of the judicial department of control of m embersh ip in the bar that the judicial department is not restricted in the (manner) of review in such proceeding s to methods prescribed by statute. If this were not true the judicial department would be restricted by several courts, who are hereby empowered to admit and suspend them (salvo jure coronae) until his majesty s pleasure shall be known therein...P ROVIDED ALWAYS, That nothing in this act shall extend, or be construed to extend, to give right to any courts of this province to admit any attorney, or other person practising the law, to practise in any court that has been already refused so to d o by his excellency, and his majesty s honourable council.... -13- legislative action in the performance of its duties with r espect to membe rship in the bar of which it has exclusive cognizanc e. (Maryland State Bar Ass'n v. Boone, 255 Md. at 431, 258 A.2d at 443.) The principle that the admission of attorneys to the b ar as well as their supervision once admitted are by nature functions and concerns of the judicial branch of government is far from a novel con cept. The h istory of the cou rts in the formative years of this natio n, and indeed, the history of our ancestral English courts supp ort the conc lusion that this u niquely judicial re sponsibility is of ancient vintage. Even though the doctrine of separation of powers is not an integral part of the British system of governm ent and is one whose fruition occurred on the western shores of the Atlantic, the English courts common law, chancery, admiralty and ecclesiastical have always exclusively admitted attorneys, solicitors and proctors to practice before them. Insofar as the other class of English legal practitioners is concerned, barristers traditionally were regulated by the educa tional societies k nown a s the Inns of Court, w hich, in turn, generally are thought to have submitted to the control of judges as visitors to those bodies. All of this oversight and supervision of the English practitioners was accomplished independent of any authorization or predomination by any other department of govern ment. See State v. Cannon, 206 Wis. 589, 240 N.W. 441, 445-48 (1932), and In re Day, 181 Ill. 73, 54 N.E. 646, 648-50 (18 99), and citations therein, for discussions of the history of the adm ission an d regul ation of lawyers in Engla nd. See also Note, Admission to the Bar and the Separation of Powers, 7 Utah L.Rev. 82, 82-86 (1960). Similarly, there are early statements in opinions of courts o f this country that declare the admission to practice to be an exercise of judicial power. See, e. g., Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 18 L.Ed. 366 (1867); Ex parte Secombe, 60 U.S. (1 9 How .) 9, 15 L.Ed . 565 (185 7); In re Mosness, 39 Wis. 509, 20 Am .Rep. 5 5, 56-5 7 (187 6). See also 1 E. Thornton, Atto rneys at Law §§ 756-61 (1914). As has been recognized by a distinguished scholar of these matters: It is undoub tedly true that the power to admit one to practice as an attorney at law is a jud icial function . It is a power inherent in the court, which is to be exercised by a sound judicial discretio n.... Early in the national jurisprudence it was held that the power to admit and remove was the exclusive province of a federal court. And this ruling has been consistently maintained. Where a state constitu tion lodges th e judicial pow er exclusive ly -14- in the courts, as a coordinate departme nt of government, (as does Maryland's by Art. IV, §1,) the legislature will not be permitted to encroach upon the judicial powers by assuming to make admission to the bar a leg islative func tion. (Id., § 28, p. 31-32.) Moreove r, in more recent decades, various courts from many of our sister jurisdictions have pronounced that such authority, and the pow er generally to regulate matters regarding the profession and its practitioners, are reposed inheren tly in the jud iciary.... The statements of this and other courts announcing the obligation of the judicial branch of government to monitor and manage its own house are not hollow proclamations of power, for the placement of this respo nsibility with the judiciary represents a recognition of this special, and to a degree, unique relationship that has evolved over the years between the legal profession and the tribunals of justice it serves. In this country, it is a well known maxim that attor neys function as officers of the courts, and, as such, are a necessary and important adjunct to th e administra tion of justice . This truism n ecessarily derives, in our view, from the very theory of the structure of our system of justice. 289 Md. at 69 2-695, 426 A .2d at 935-936 (and cases therein cited). To be sure, the judicial power of admitting attorneys to the practice of law was exercised, between 1715 and 1898, by both the county courts and this Court-- initially by the county courts exclusively, William H. A dkins, II, What Doth the Board Require of Thee?, 28 M D. L. R EV. 103, 104 (1 968); see State v. Johnston, 2 H. & McH. 160, 1786 WL 52, 2-3 (General Court,178 6) (refusin g to grant certiora ri to review th e action of a lower co urt in admitting to practice one who h ad been a Tory), 19 and, later, con currently with th is Court. 19 A sim ilar situat ion e xiste d with regard to disciplinar y actio ns ag ainst an a ttorn ey. Petition of Brack, 187 M d. 407, 408 , 50 A.2d 4 32, 432 (1 946); In re Williams, 180 Md. 689, 689, 23 A .2d 7, 11 (1941). -15- Adkins, 28 Md. L. Rev. at 104. The current pro cedures fo r admitting a ttorneys have th eir genesis in Ch. 139, 1898 Md. Laws, the enactmen t of which placed in th is Court exclusive jurisdiction over admissions.20 Chapter 139 provided: 20 This recognition and allocation of jurisdiction is now codified in Md. Code (1989, 2004 Replacement Vol.), Title 10, Subtitles 1 and 2 of the Business Occupations and Professions Article. In Bastain v. Watkins, 230 Md. 325, 29, 187 A.2d 304, 306 (1963), this Court commented, in that regard: It has long been recognized that the admission of a residen t of Marylan d to practice la w is a legislativ e, not a judicia l, function in that the right m ay constitutiona lly be regulated b y statute. As ind icated in Attorney General v. Waldron, 289 Md. 683 , 698-699, 426 A .2d 929, 937 - 938 (1981), this observation was reflective of the comfortable accommodation, Public Service Commission v. Hahn Transp., Inc., 253 Md. 571, 583, 253 A.2d 845, 852 (1969), which has deve loped betw een the Jud iciary and the L egislature an d, despite its c onstitutionally imposed responsibility to re gulate the p ractice of law , the admissio n of new membe rs to the bar, and the discipline of attorneys, was consistent with the Court s recognition of the General A ssembly s ability to a ct pursuan t to its police or o ther legitimate power to aid the courts in the performance of their judicial functions ... and ... [to] establish minimum criteria for the learning and character of persons admitted to the bar of this State. We were clea r, howev er, that There can be no doubt ... that the deferential respect accorded the legislative branch by the judicial must neither undermine nor dilute the fundamental authority and responsibility vested in the judiciary to carry out its constitutionally required function, an aspect of which, as we have seen, is the sup ervision of prac ticing atto rneys, and that since admission to the bar is a judicial function, the Legislature may not prescribe the maximu m qualifica tions neces sary for adm ittance, for this Court is always free to adopt any additional requirements it deems necessary to maintain a high level of professional competence in the bar and promo te public trust in an d respe ct for th e profe ssion. Thus, the Judiciary s responsibility and obligation with regard to the practice and admiss ion pro cess are recogn ized thro ughou t the statu te. Section 10-103 provides for the Court t o ado pt rules th at gove rn the sta ndards and pro cedure s for ad mission to the B ar. Section 10-206 provides: (a) Except as otherwise provided by law, before an individual may practice law in the S tate, the individ ual shall: -16- All applications for admission to the bar in this State shall be made by petition to the Court of Appeals. A State Board of Law Examiners is hereby created to consist of three members of the bar of at least ten years standing, who shall be appointed by the Court of Appeals, and shall hold office for the term of three years... . All applications for admission to the bar shall be referred by the Court of Appeals to the State Board of Law Examiners, who shall examine the applicant, touching his qualifications for admission to the bar. The said board shall report their proceedings in the examination of applicants to the Court of Appeals with any recommendations said board may desire to make. If the Court o f Appe als shall then f ind the applicant to be qualified to discharge the duties of an attorney, and to be of good moral character and worthy to be admitted, they shall pass an ord er admitting him to practice in all the c ourts of the State . Therefore, it has been clear, since 1898, that the Court of Appeals has had exclusive jurisdiction over the regulatio n of, an d adm ission to , the prac tice of la w. See Bastian v. Watkins, 230 Md. 325, 329, 187 A.2d 304, 306 (1963) ( [I]n 1898, following a definite trend toward uniformity that apparently began as early as 1831, th e Court of Appea ls of Maryland was vested with exclusive p ower to admit app licants to practice law. ); Maryland Bar Ass n v. Boone, 255 Md. 420, 430, 258 A.2d 438, 443 (1969) ( Since the passage of Ch. 139 of the Laws of 1898 ... the Court of Appea ls in the exercise of its inherent and fundamental judicial powers has supervised, regulated and controlled the admission of law yers. ); Application of (1) be admitted to the Bar; and (2) meet any requirement that the Court of Appeals may set by rule. Section 10-207 (f) prescribes that, to qualify for admission to the bar, in addition to the statutory provisions, [a]n applicant shall meet any other qualification or requirement that the Co urt of A ppeals establish es by rule. Moreover, the R ules Governing A dmission to the Bar o f Maryland are comprehensive. -17- Allan S ., 282 Md. 68 3, 689, 387 A.2d 271, 275 (1978 ) ( Upon this Co urt falls the primary and ultimate responsibility for regulating the practice of law and the conduct and admission of attorneys in this S tate. ); In the Matter of the Application of William H. Hyland, 339 Md. 521, 534, 663 A.2d 13 09, 1315 (1995). It fo llows that the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County simply had no jurisdiction over any aspect of the applicant s bar admission, including the circumstances surrounding his bar examination. III. Despite the foregoing and its clarity on the question of this Court s exclusive jurisdiction, the a pplicant ne vertheless ar gues, on th is appeal: Although the Court s order could only have meant that the Board (1) administer the bar exam, (2) anonymously grade the bar exam, and (3 ) if Mr. Kimmer passed the anonymou sly graded bar exam, rep ort the results to th is Court in the same manner that it would for any other successful candidate, the Board refused to report the favorable results unless Mr. Kimmer obtained another court order, [21] in a separate hearing on the merits, ruling that he was entitled to ADA accommodations, even though, under the Circuit Court s order, Mr. Kimmer s July 2005 exam, as administered, would forever be his only July 20 05 exa m. 21 This is not correct. The Board did report the applicant s favorable results to the Court, but th en filed an exception to his admis sion, as it was permitted b y Rule 10 (c) to do. It also is worth remembering that the trial court s ruling was a temporary ruling and was only intended to be as much. The order contained a provision making this fact crystal clear; by its terms, the temporary restraining order would expire in ten days from the date of the order. Tellingly, it was the trial judge herself who penciled in that provisio n. Moreover, the propriety of issuing the temporary restraining order was a contested issue, and its resolution on a temporary basis did not, as the Board s letter of Augu st 2, 200 5 mad e amp ly clear, am ount to its resolu tion on a perm anent b asis. Certainly, the Board did not acquiesce in the decision. -18- Notwithstanding the implications of this argument, the applicant denies that he has sought, or is seeking, to have the trial court direct his admission to the bar. Rather, he says, he merely used appropriate legal process to obtain valid enforcement of his federal ADA rights, i.e. injunctive relief. Mo reover, he a sserts that, beca use the A DA pre empts state and local law to the contrary, it controls even in cases of bar licensure, which the applicant concedes is an issue for this Court. Further, the applicant notes, and e mphasize s, that state courts, and consequently Maryland circuit courts, have concurrent jurisdiction with the federal judiciary over ADA claims. The applicant thus concludes: Merely because Mr. Kimmer s AD A issue arises in the context of the bar exam does not p lace it outside th e statutory jurisdictio n of the C ircuit Court. No one would suggest that an applicant for a CPA exam or a medical board certification would litigate the denial of ADA accommodatio ns before accountant or medical licensure bodies, simply because th ey, like this Cou rt, ultimate ly control th e licensu re proc ess of th eir prof ession. [22] Notwithstanding the applican t s protestations to the contrary, the thrust of his argument is that the trial court s preliminary ruling is dispositive, and not only of the ADA 22 We are not persuaded. This Court acts both legislatively and judicially. We act legislativ ely when we pro mulga te rules o f proce dure an d practic e, i.e., the Maryland Rules o f Practi ce and Proced ure, or to regulate the pro fession , i.e., the Rules Governing Admission to the Bar of Maryland. The source of our legislative power is the Maryland Constitution, Md. C ONST. Art. IV , § 18(a) , and the separation of powers doctrine, Md. C ONST., Decla ration o f Righ ts, Art. 8. T hus, w e have , by rule, see Rule 3 of the Rules of the Maryland State Board of Law Examiners, required applicants to present their bar admission-related ADA claims to the Board of Law Examiners for consideration and decision an d thus, ultima tely, to this Court. A djudication of this case is pursuant to this Court s co nstitutional resp onsibility and jurisd iction, as the hig hest Cou rt in this state, to regulate the p ractice and o versee adm issions to the b ar. The co mparison of our pro cess to a professional licensure board s hearing of an ADA claim is, consequently, and to say the least, inappropriate and inapposite. -19- accommodation question, but also of the Board s obligation not simply to report the applicant s favorable results but, as it would do in the case of a person taking the examination withou t accom moda tion, to re comm end his admiss ion to th e bar. T hat is necessarily the case when the effect of other actions that must be taken subsequent to the court s temporary ruling necessarily must be informed by, and conform to, w hat the court must have meant w hen it made the ruling, w hether or not the issue driving the ruling was contested. The implications of adopting that argument in this context are clear; at least with regard to applicants to the bar w ho claim to have disab ilities covered b y the ADA , the circuit courts will have concurrent jurisdiction with this Court with regard to their bar admission. While the regulatio n of the practice of law, including the admission to the bar, was at one time a shared responsibility between the county courts and the General Court and then, later, between the county co urts and this Court, that no longer is the case. We decline to retreat to that earlier time. Sidestepping the historical basis of this Court s exclusive jurisdiction over bar admission matters, the applicant attempts to argue that concurrent jurisdiction be tween this Court and the circuit courts is necessary in instances where immediate relief, which, pres uma bly, only the circuit courts are equipped to grant, is required. Of course, he believes his case is one of these instances; his reasoning is that, because he submitted his request for accommodations to the Boa rd well within the Board s own deadline, and because he followed each action by the Board with speedy action of his own, the fact that he still had an -20- unfavorable outcome four days be fore the ba r examina tion for w hich he pla nned to sit required that, to obtain the ADA accomm odations h e sought, h e had to see k immed iate injuncti ve relief throug h the C ircuit Co urt. The prem ise on wh ich this argum ent procee ds is faulty. Neither this applicant nor any other has the rig ht to take a p articular bar ex amination at a particular tim e, nor to be admitted to the bar at any particular time. That the Board of Law Examiners took longer than the applicant would have lik ed to render its final decision does not mean that it acted unreason ably or placed the applicant in a situation which could be remedied only by obtaining injuncti ve relief from th e Circu it Cour t. With respect to the July bar examination, the applicant had two choices: he could have taken the examination unaccommodated, or he could have postponed taking the examination to pursue, through the administrative process, the accommodation to which he believed he was entitled. To be sure, the applicant, without accommodation, may have failed the bar examination had he taken it, or he may have had to dela y taking the examination. That, however, is irrelevant to our analysis and to the procedures prescribed by this Court in bar admission matters. There simply is no such immedia te need pres ent in bar ad mission m atters such tha t circuit court jurisdic tion is required. Further, that our ow n jurisdictional rules require the applicant to bring his bar admission-related ADA claim to the Boa rd and this Court rather than to any other state co urt does not contrad ict the ADA and its preemption prov isions, contrary to the applicant s -21- arguments. The applicant is correct in tha t cases arising under the A DA m ay be heard in either federa l or state c ourts, Yellow Freigh t System, I nc. v. D onnelly, 494 U.S. 820, 823, 110 S. Ct. 1566, 1568, 108 L.Ed.2d 834, 839 (199 0); R.A. Ponte Architects v. Investors Alert, Inc., 382 Md. 689, 715, 857 A.2d 1, 16 (2004); 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006), and rules which would outrightly prohibit such claims, or their adj udicatio n, are pr eemp ted. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State E nergy R esourc es Con ser. & Dev. Comm n, 461 U.S. 190, 203204, 103 S .Ct. 1713, 1 722, 75 L .Ed.2d 75 2, 765 (19 83). The A DA do es not man date specific state cou rt proce dures b y which a plaintif f must b e heard , howe ver. Ware v. Wyoming Board of Law Ex aminers, 973 F. Supp. 1339, 1353 (D.Wy. 1997) ( The ADA does not comp letely preempt o r displace a state s procedure for licensing attorneys, rather the ADA merely prohibits states from discriminating on the basis of disability. ). Federal preemption of state laws occurs only to the extent to which there is a conflict between the state court proced ure and the AD A. Pacific Gas and Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conser. & Dev. Comm n, 461 U.S. 190, 203-204, 103 S.Ct. 1713, 1722, 75 L.Ed.2d 752, 765 (1983). Therefore, that our rules require the applicant to present his ADA accommodation entitlement claim to the B oard of L aw Exa miners fo r determina tion, with the ultimate resolution being entru sted to this C ourt, and no t to any other state court, does not violate the ADA. The applicant s opportunity to be heard, albeit through procedures which differ from those that govern ADA claims which do not arise in the bar ad mission co ntext, is nevertheless preserved. -22- It should be noted tha t similar conclusions have b een reached by other co urts. In Varad v. Barshak, 261 F.Supp.2d 47 (D.Mass. 2003), plaintiff/applicant orally requested ADA accomm odations during the bar exa mination f rom a me mber of th e Massa chusetts Board of Bar Examiners ( BBE ), but did not mak e tha t request in writing or w ithin seve ntyfive days prior to the bar examination, as the B BE re quired . Id. at 55. Because she had failed to follow the processes dictated by the BBE, and, thus, failed to exhaust her remedies under the BBE, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court refused to hear the case, to intervene, or to gran t her acc omm odation s. Id. at 52. The applicant sought relief from the United States District Court for the District of Ma ssachusetts. That court similarly denied the ap plicant s request, on summary judgment, because, despite having received notice of the procedures necessary to obtain accomm odations, the applicant h ad failed to c omply with th em. Id. at 55. Thus, it was determ ined, if only implicitly, that the Massachusetts Board of Bar Examiners rules and procedures for obtaining ADA accomm odations d id not violate the ADA or deny the app licant he r right to b e heard . As our historical a nalysis and jurisp rudence m ake clear, this Court, since 1898, is the only court with jurisdiction over bar admission matters . None o f the applica nt s argum ents to the contrary has merit. The Circuit Co urt simply had n o jurisdiction to order the injunctive relief in this case. Accordingly, the Board s exceptions are sustained. IV Neither Title 10 of the Maryland Code, Business Occupations and Profession s Article -23- nor the Rules Governing Admission to the Bar of Maryland [Rules] specifically addresses procedures to be followed in a situation such as the applicant s, where an applicant seeks further review of the Board of Law Exa miner s decision to deny him ADA accommodations for the bar examination. T here are, however, Rules that are pertinent and, therefore, instructiv e. Rules 5 23 , 1024 , and 1325 of the Rules G overning Adm ission to the Bar of Maryland 23 Rule 5. Character Review. (a) Burden of proof. The applicant bears the burden of proving to the Character Committee, the Board, and the Court the applicant s good moral character and fitness for the practice o f law. Failu re or refusa l to answe r fully and can didly any question set forth in the application or any relevant question asked by a member of the Character Committee, the Board, or the Court is sufficient cause for a finding that the applicant has not met this burden. (b) Investigation and report of character committee. (1) On receipt of a character questionnaire forwarded by the Board pursuant to Rule 2 (d), the Character Committee shall (A) through one of its members, personally interview the applicant, (B) verify the facts stated in the questionnaire, contact the applicant s references, and make any further investigation it finds necessary or desirable, (C) evaluate the applicant s character and fitness for the practice of law, and (D) transmit to the Board a report of its investigation and a recommendation as to the approval or denial of the application for admission. (2) If the Committee concludes that there may be grounds for recommending denial of the application, it shall notify the applicant and schedule a hearing. The hearing shall be conducted on the record and the applicant shall have the right to testify, to present witnesses, and to be represented by counsel. A transcript of the hearing shall be transmitted by the C ommittee to the Bo ard along with the C ommittee s report. The Committee s report shall set forth findings of fact on which the recomm endation is b ased and a statemen t supporting the conclu sion. The C ommittee s hall mail a copy of its report to the applicant, and a copy of the hearing transcript shall be furnished to the applicant upon payment of reasonable charges. (c) Hearing by the board. If the Board con cludes after review of the Comm ittee s report and the transcript that there may be grounds for recommending denial of the application, it shall promptly afford the applicant the opportunity for a hearing on the record made before the Committee. The Board shall mail a copy of its report and -24- recommendation to the applicant and the Committee. If the Board decides to recommend denial of the application in its report to the Court, the Board shall first give the applicant an opportunity to withdraw the application. If the applicant withdraws the application, the Board sh all retain the rec ords. Othe rwise, it shall tran smit to the C ourt a repor t of its proceedings and a recommendation as to the approval or denial of the application together with all papers relating to the ma tter. (d) Review by court. (1) If the applicant elects not to withdraw the application, after the Board submits its report and adverse recommendation the Court shall require the applicant to show cause why the application should not be denied. (2) If the Board recommends approval of the application contrary to an adverse recomm endation by the Com mittee, within 30 days after the filing of the Board s report the Committee may file with the Court exceptions to the Board s recommendation. The Committee shall mail copies of its exceptions to the applicant and the Board. (3) Proceedings in the Court under this section shall be on the records made before the Character Committee and the Board. If the Court denies the application, the Board shall retain the records. (e) Continuing review. All applicants remain subject to further Committee review and rep ort until a dmitted to the B ar. 24 See supra, n.n. 15, 16, and 17. 25 Rule 13 provides, as relevant, and regarding out-of-state attorneys: (f) Petition. (1) The petitioner shall file with the Board a petition under oath on a form prescribed by the Board, accompanied by the fees required by the Board and the costs assessed for the character and fitness investig ation an d repor t by the N ational C onfere nce of Bar E xamin ers. (2) The petitioner shall state (A) each jurisdiction in which the petitioner has been admitted to the Bar and whether each admission was by examination, by diploma privilege or on motion; and (B) the additional facts showing that the petitioner meets the requirements of section (a) of this Rule or should be qualified under section (e) of this Rule. (3) The petitioner shall file with the petition the supporting data required by the Board as to the petitioner s professional experience, character, and fitness to practice law. (4) The p etitioner shall be under a co ntinuing ob ligation to report to the Board any material change in information previously furnished. * * * * -25- describe the general procedures by which bar admissions are controlled. Rule 5 addresses character review. Pursuant to that Rule, an applicant s character qu estionnaire is submitted to the Character Committee for investigation and report. Rule 5 (b) (1). If the Committee concludes that there may be a basis to recommend denial of the applicant s application, after affording the applicant the opportunity for an on-the-record hearing, at which the applicant may be represented by counse l, pre sent witn esse s, and testify, it will transmit the transcript (h) Time for filing. The petition shall be filed at least 60 days before the scheduled attorney examination that the petitioner wishes to take. On written request of the petitioner and for good cause shown, the Board may accept a petition filed after the deadline. If the Board rejects the petition, the petitioner may file an exception with the Court within five days after notice of the rejection. * * * * (j) Action by board on petition. The Board shall investigate the matters set forth in the petition. (1) If the Board decides that the petition should be accepted, it shall mail notice of its decision to recommend acceptance of the petition to the petitioner. (2) If the Board concludes that there may be grounds for rejecting the petition, the Board shall notify the petitioner and shall afford the petitioner a n opportu nity for the hear ing. The h earing w ill not be held until after the National Conference of Bar Examiners completes its investigation of the petitioner s character and fitness to practice law and reports to the Board. The petitioner may be represented by an attorney at the hearing. Promptly after the Board makes its final decision to recommend acceptanc e or rejection of the petition , the Board shall mail no tice of its decision to the petitioner. (3) If the Board decides to recommend rejection of the petition , it shall file with th e Court a re port of its dec ision and all papers relating to the matter. (k) Exceptions. Within 30 days after the Board mails notice of its adverse decision to the petitioner, the petitioner may file with the Court exceptions to the Board s decision. The petitioner shall mail or deliver to the Board a copy of the exceptions. The Court may hear the exceptions or may appoint an exam iner to hear th e evidenc e and sha ll afford the Board an opportun ity to be he ard on t he exc eptions . -26- of the hearing, along w ith its report and recommendation, to the Board. Rule 5 (b) (2). The Board shall also afford the applicant, as to whom it concludes there is a basis to recommend that his or her application be denied, an opportunity for a hearing, and, if it so recommends, an oppor tunity to w ithdraw the app lication. R ule 5 (c). If the Board recommends that an applicant be denied admission or recommends admission contrary to an adverse recommendation of the Character Committee, and the Committee excepts, proceedings on the record (in the case of the former, the applicant being required to s how ca use and, in the case of the latter, a hearing on the Committee s exceptions) will be held in the Court of Appe als. Rul e 5 (d). Rule 10 governs the rep ort and recom mendatio n required to be made by the Board to the Court, as to each successful applicant. Rule 10 (a). This Rule permits any person, including the Board , to take exce ptions to the admission of any applicant. Rule 10 (c). As we have seen, the board excepted to the applicant s admission. Rule 10 (c) also provides, as relevant: A hearing on the exceptions shall be held to allow the exceptant and candidate to present ev idence in su pport of o r in oppositio n to the exceptions and the Board and Character Committee to be heard. The Co urt may hold the hearing or may refer the exceptions to the Board, the Character Committee, or an examine r for hearing . The Bo ard, Chara cter Com mittee, or examiner hearing the exceptions shall file with the Court, as soon as practicable after the hearing, a report of the proceedings. The Court may decide the exceptions withou t furthe r hearin g. Rule 13 describes the p roce dure s by w hich out-of-s tate a ttorn eys are admitted to the bar of Maryland. After receipt and investigation of an applicant s petition and supporting -27- data, if the Boa rd conclud es that there a re ground s to reject the p etition, it must afford the petitioner an oppo rtunity for a hea ring. Rule 13(j). If the Board recommends rejection, the petitioner may file exceptions with the Court o f Appe als. Rule 13 (k). The C ourt will determine whether to hear the exceptions or appoint an examiner to hear the evidence. In analyzing each of th ese rules, a ge neral proce ss of review begins to emerge: if there is a basis for the Bo ard to recom mend de nial of an a pplicant s ap plication or p etition, it shall afford the applicant a hea ring. If the B oard doe s recomm end denia l, the applican t is entitled to be heard , and the C ourt will issue a show c ause orde r or the applic ant may file exceptions with this Court. Except with respect to character matters, where the proceedings will be on the records m ade before the Character Comm ittee and the B oard, the C ourt will either hear the issue or designate the Board or anothe r body or person to hear the issue . In no circu mstanc e does t he app licant rem ain unh eard. Similarly, the applicant here, upon receiving the Board s letter den ying his a ppeal, could, and perhaps should, have filed a request for a hearing with the Board. Thereafter, he could h ave sou ght rev iew, by ex ception s, in this C ourt. Rather than pursue the matter of his entitlement to ADA accomm odation in th is Court, the applicant sought relief in the Circuit Court, thus circumventing this Court s admission procedures and, in the process, underm ining this Court s exclusive jurisdiction. Were we to hold that circuit courts have jurisdiction to decide ADA, and other issues, in the bar admission context, w e would be participatin g in the und ermining o f our jurisdiction; we -28- would be relinquishing our exclusive power over bar admission matters. Th at exclusivity has existed unabated and unassailed since 18 98. We h ave no inte ntion of relin quishing it to any degree or extent. As indicated, the exceptions of the B oard of Law Examiners are sustained. Accord ingly, the applica nt s admissio n to the Ba r of the State of Ma ryland is denied. IT IS SO ORDERED. -29-
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