Fowler v. MVA

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Zacha ry Sha wn Fo wler v. M otor Ve hicle A dminis tration, No. 111, Sept. Term, 2005. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE DRIVER LICENSE SUSPENSION HEARING MOTION TO SUBPOENA THE ARRESTING POLICE OFFICER ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT DRIVER FULLY ADVISED OF RIGHTS The Court of Appeals considered whether, during a driver license suspension hearing conducted under §16-205.1 of the Transportation Article, Maryland C ode (197 7, 2002 R epl. Vol.), an administrative law judge ( ALJ ), faced with conflicting evidence in the form of an arresting police officer s written certification in a DR-15 Advice of Rights form and testimony from the arrested driver, may deny the driver's motion to subpoena the officer where the driver disputes that he was fully advised by the officer of the consequence for refusing to take a chemical breath test. Noting its decision in Forma n v. Moto r Vehicle Administration, 332 Md. 201, 630 A.2d 752 (1993), the Court re-emphasized the three options for an ALJ during a §16-205.1 hearing where the arrested driver files a motion for a subpoena request and proffers evidence to support the request: accept the proffer and deny the subpo ena, reject the proffer and deny the subpoena, or issue the subpoena to receive additional evidence. The C ourt noted that an ALJ s treatment of the proffer must be indicated clearly. Here, the record yielded no specific or explicit statement indicating whether the ALJ accepted or rejected Fowler's proffered testimony. While it recognized that the ALJ might have attempted to comply with one of the options outlined in Forman, the Court ultimately remanded the case because, while the ALJ clearly denied the subpoena request, the basis fo r his decision was not a pparent. T he Cou rt emphasized that for it to perform its reviewing function, an ALJ s decision must contain full, complete and detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Circuit Co urt for Mo ntgomery C ounty Case # 256013 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 111 September Term, 2005 ZACHARY SHAWN FOW LER v. MOTOR VEHICLE ADMINISTRATION Bell, C.J. Raker Wilner Cathell Harrell Battaglia Greene, JJ. Opinion by Harrell, J. Filed: August 30, 2006 We consider here whether, during a driver license suspension hearing conducted under §16-2 05.1 of the Transporta tion Article, Maryland Cod e (1977, 2002 R epl. Vol.), 1 an administrative law judge ( ALJ ), faced w ith conflicting evidence in the f orm of an arresting police officer s written certific ation in a D R-15 A dvice of R ights form and testimony from the arrested driver, may den y the driver's motion to subpoena the officer where the driver disputes that he was fully advised by the officer of the consequence for refusing to take a chemical b reath test. 2 I. On 12 June 2004, Zachary Shawn Fow ler, Petitioner, was stopp ed b y a Howard County police officer for making an unsafe lane change. The arresting officer, noticing a strong odor of alcohol, asked Fowler to perform certain field sobriety tests. Fowle r performed poorly on thes e tests. The o fficer then a sked Fow ler to subm it to a preliminary breath test ( PBT ). 3 Fowl er refus ed. Based on his performance on the field sobriety tests, the off icer arre sted Fo wler fo r drunk driving and tran sported him to th e police station. 1 All statutory references, unless otherwise noted, are hereafter to the Transportation Article of the Ma ryland Code (1977, 20 02 Repl. Vol.). 2 A chemical breath test is [a] test of a person s breath or of 1 specimen of a person s blood to determine alcohol concentration. §16-205.1(a)(1)(iv)(1). While a person may not be compelled to take a chemical breath test, refus al to take a test re sults in autom atic suspen sion of the pers on s dr iver s lice nse. See §16-2 05.1(b )(1). 3 A preliminary breath test ( PBT ) may be requested by a police officer, without making an arrest and prior to issuing a citation, in order to guide [] the police officer in deciding whether an arrest should be ma de. §1 6-205 .2(a) an d (c). However, the State may not use the resu lts of a P BT in a court a ction. §1 6-205 .2(c). At the police station, the officer provided Fowler with a DR-15 Advice of Rig hts form. The use of this form is intended, first, to advise the arrested driver of the consequences of refusing or failing a ch emical brea th test and, second, to certify that the officer complied with the statute s advice of rights require ment. 4 The form includes the following language to ensure th e driver s rec eipt of the req uired advic e of rights: Read B efore Sign ing: I, the undersigned driver, acknowledge that I have been read or I have read the above stated Advice of Rights as certified by the police officer. I understand that this requested test is in addition to any preliminary tests that w ere take n. Both Fowler and the arresting officer signed the DR-15 Advice of Rights form. The officer completed also a DR-15A form, which contained his sworn statement that he had reasonab le grounds to stop Fow ler and that Fowler refused a chemical breath test at the station after being fully advised of the applicable sanctions, as provided in the DR-15 Advice of Rights form. Separate from the criminal charges for drunk driving, Fowler was charged also with refusing to take a chemical alcoh ol concentration breath test in violation o f §16-205.1. Section 16-205.1 imposes a mandato ry license suspe nsion upo n an individ ual, suspected of driving under the influence of alcohol, who either refuses to take a chemical breath test or 4 Under §16-205.1(b)(2), an officer who believes that an individual has been driving under the influence of alcohol is required to (i) Detain the person; (ii) Request that the person permit a test to be taken; [and] (iii) Advise the person of the administrative sanctions that shall be imposed for refusal to take the test . . . . 2 submits to a test and registers a blood alcohol concentration result in excess of 0.08.5 In accordance with §16-205.1(f)(1), Fowler requested a hearing before the Motor Vehicle Administration ( MVA ) to contest his license suspension . Fowler filed also a motion requesting a subpoena for the arresting officer, in compliance with the Code of Maryland Regulations ( COMAR ) 11.11.03.07, to question the officer in an effort to sup port his claim that he was not advised fully of the administrative sanctions for refusing to take an alcohol concentration chemical breath test. The subpoena request proffered that the offic er would 5 Section 16 -205.1(a)(2 ) provides, in pertinent pa rt: Any person who drives or attempts to drive a motor vehicle on a highway or on any private property that is used by the p ublic in general in this State is deemed to have consented . . . to take a [chemical breath] test if the person should be detained on suspicion of driving or attempting to drive while under the influen ce of a lcohol, w hile imp aired by a lcohol . . . . Section 16 -205.1(b)(1 )(i) describes th e manda tory license susp ension sch eme: (i) In the case o f a person licensed un der this title: 1. For a test result indicating an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or m ore at the time of testing: A. For a first offense, suspend the driver s license for 45 days; or B. For a second offense or subsequent offense, suspend the driver s license for 90 days; or 2. For a test ref usal: A. For a first offense, suspend the driver s license for 120 days; or B. For a second offense or subsequent offense, suspend the driver s license f or 1 year. 3 testify that the officer did not fully advise [Fowler] of the admin istrative sanctio ns that shall be imposed for submitting to or refusing a test and that legally improper and misleading advice was given. Fowler deferred a decision on his subpoena request to the ALJ condu cting his suspen sion he aring. See COM AR 1 1.11.03 .07D. At his hearing before the ALJ, Fowler disputed that he was f ully advised of his rights. Specifically, he contended that while the officer advised him that his license would be suspended for 120 days if he refused to take a breath test, the officer did so only at the scene of the arrest, but not at the police station. Moreover, Fowler argued that when he was provided the DR -15 Adv ice of Rig hts form a t the station the o fficer info rmed him that his license was being suspended because Fowler already had refused to take the test, which Fowler believed referred to the PBT.6 Fowler stated that he was never off ered a seco nd test, 6 The follo wing ex cerpt is from Fowler s testimony at the s uspension hearing: [Fowler s Attorney]: Did he ever tell you that if you did not take the test at the station that your license would be suspended for 120 days? [Fow ler]: We ll, he told me tha t on the s treet. [Fowler s Attorney]: What did he say on the street? [Fowler]: He told m e that if I -- he ac tually told me when I was actually -- on the street he told me that if I didn t take the test he would take me to the station. When I got to the station after waiting there for an extensive period of time he brought me into the room and gave me pape rs to actually (contin ued...) 4 the chemical breath test, at the station. He believed that by signing the DR-15 form he was merely acknowledging his refusal of the PBT requested by the officer on the street and, therefore, he did not k nowing ly refuse a chemical breath test at the station. While Fowler conceded that he was given the D R-15 fo rm to read a nd sign, he stated that he m erely skimmed over it before signing it. He testified as w ell that the off icer did not re ad it to him. Fowler asserted that if the arresting officer were subpoenaed, the officer would testify consistently with Fowler s version.7 After hearing Fowler s proffer of what the arresting officer would testify to, the ALJ denied Fo wler s sub poena req uest. In his ora l ruling, the A LJ stated: First off, I m going to find that the licensee was fully advised. I conclude primarily from the certification of the officer that he was fully advised a nd it's bolstered by the testimon y of the licensee wh[o] was to ld to read it and he skimm ed ove r it. And 6 (...continued) look at and read, and told me that because I d idn t take the test my license was going to be suspended and it was his preroga tive wheth er to detain me that night or not to, so he decided not to. [Fowler s Attorney]: D id he ever d istinguish between the test that you refused on the street, did he ever explain to you that it was a separate test that he wanted you to take at the station? [Fow ler]: No . . . . 7 The ALJ entered both the DR-15 Advice of Rights form and the DR-15A form as eviden ce for th e Mo tor Veh icle Ad ministra tion ( M VA ). 5 I don t see the need to ca ll the officer to cross examine him. There s no indicatio n the PB T was re lied on or no t relied on in this case . *** My finding is he was fully advised, and the other finding is I don t se e the ne ed to ca ll the off icer to cla rify anythin g . . . . The ALJ su spended Fowler s license for 120 days, but modified the sentence to only five days of suspension on the condition that he participate in the Ignition Interlock Program for one year . Fowler sought judicial review of the ALJ s decision by the Circuit Court for Montgom ery County, which affirmed relying upon this Court s decision in Motor Vehicle Administration v. Karwa cki, 340 Md. 271, 666 A.2d 511 (1995). The Circuit Court concluded that the ALJ properly exercised his discretion by resolving the conflicting evidence of Fow ler s testimony an d the offic er s certification on the D R-15 A dvice of R ights form. Noting that Fowler had an opportunity to read the DR-15 fo rm, the court found the re was substantial evidence to support the ALJ s decision th at Fowler was info rmed of h is rights. Specifically, the Circuit Court emphasized that under Karwacki, [t]he ALJ was under no obligation to believe Petitioner over the officer s sworn stateme nt. Thus, because the ALJ found the police officer s sworn statement credible, the Circuit Court determined that the A LJ pro perly rejec ted Fow ler's requ est to sub poena the arre sting of ficer. Fowler filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari with this Court. W e granted Fow ler s petition to consider whether the ALJ , faced w ith the office r s certification on the DR-15 6 Advice of Rights form and Fowler s conflicting testimony, properly denied Fowler s request to subpoena the arresting officer. 8 Fowler v. MVA, 390 Md. 500 , 889 A.2d 418 (2006). II. Under §10-222(h)(3) of the State Government Article, Maryland Code (1984, 2004 Repl. Vol.), a revie wing co urt may revers e or mod ify an admin istrative decisio n of a state agency if it: (i) is unconstitu tional; (ii) exceeds the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the final decision maker; (iii) results from an unlawful procedure; (iv) is affected by any other error of law; (v) is unsupported by competent, material and substantial eviden ce in light of the entire record as submitted; or (vi) is arbitrary or capricious. A final administrative decision or order shall contain separate statements of: (i) the findings of fact; (ii) the conclusions of law; and (iii) the order. Maryland Code (1984, 2004 Repl. Vol.), State Gov ernment Article, § 10-221(b)(1). As this Court has noted, for a reviewing court to perform properly its examination function, an administrativ e decision m ust contain factual findings on all the material issues of a case and a clear, explicit statement of the agency s rational e. Harford County v. Preston, 322 Md. 493, 505, 588 A.2d 772, 778 8 Fowler su bmitted the f ollowing question in h is petition: Whether an ALJ in a driver license suspension hearing must apply the rule of Forman v. MVA, [332 Md. 201, 630 A.2d 752 (1993 ),] rather than MVA v. Karwacki, [340 Md. 271, 666 A.2d 511 (1995),] w here there is a dispute on a genuine issue of fact and the licensee has properly requested a subpoena for the witness? 7 (1991). A fully explained administrative decision also fulfills another purpose; it recognizes the fundamental right of a party to a proceeding before an administrative agency to be apprised of the facts relied upon by the agency in reaching its decision . . . . Id. When evaluating an administrative agency's decision,9 a reviewing court must not substitute its judgment for that exercised properly by the agency, especially where the expertise of the a gency is e mployed in reach ing its de cision. See Board of Physician v. Banks, 354 Md. 59, 68, 729 A.2d 376, 381 (1999). It is well-settled in this State tha t it is the function of an adm inistrative agency to make factual findings and to draw inferences from the facts found. Karwacki, 340 M d. at 280, 66 6 A.2d a t 515. As su ch, a court s ro le in reviewing an agenc y s factual determinations is particularly narrow, limited to determining whether there is substantial evidence in the record to support the agency s decision. See Banks, 354 Md. at 67-68, 729 A.2d at 380; United Parce l v. Peop le s Co unsel, 336 Md. 569, 576, 650 A.2d 226, 230 (1994). In defining substantial evidence, we have stated that it requires relevant evidence [that a] reasonab le mind m ight accept a s adequa te to suppo rt a conclu sion. Caucus v. Maryland Securities, 320 Md. 31 3, 324, 577 A.2d 783, 788 (1990 ); see also Liberty Nursing v. Departm ent of Hea lth and M ental H ygiene , 330 Md. 433, 443, 624 A.2d 941, 946 (1993) (stating that if reasoning minds could reasonably reach the 9 In this case, the MVA is the relevan t administrative agency. The MVA delegated authority to conduct hearings and render final decisions in contested matters, such as Fowler s case, to th e Off ice of A dminis trative H earings . See Code of Maryland Regulations ( CO MA R ) 11 .11.02.0 7. 8 conclusion reached by the agency from the facts in the record, then it is based upon substantial evidence, and the court has no power to reject that conclusion ). An agency decisio n is pres umed to be va lid on its f ace. Liberty Nursing, 330 Md. at 443, 624 A.2d at 946. Thus, where the dispute concerns a factual matter and substantial evidence supports an agenc y or adm inistrativ e decisio n, we a ffirm. Id. A reviewing court is not under similar restraint when evaluating administrative decisions premised on erroneous conclusions of law . See id. (clarifying that when an issue before an agency is one of law, no deference is appropriate and the scope of review is much broader than when reviewing factual determinations); People s Counsel v. Maryland Marine, 316 Md. 491, 497, 560 A.2d 32, 34-35 (1989). Despite this broader scope of review, w e have noted that "with regard to some legal issues, a degree of deference should often be accorded the position of the a dminis trative ag ency." MVA v. Lytle, 374 Md. 37, 57, 821 A.2d 62, 73 (2003) (quoting Bank s, 354 Md. at 69, 729 A.2d at 381). Thus, a reviewing court may give co nsidera ble we ight to th e agen cy s interp retation of its ow n statute s. Id. III. Section 16-205.1 imposes mandatory license suspension for an individual, suspected of driving under the influence of alcohol, who either refuses to take a chemical breath test or submits to a test and registers a result in excess of the legal maximum of 0.0 8 alcohol 9 concentration.10 To encourage drivers to submit to a chemical breath test, the statute imposes harsher sanctions for refusing to submit to the test than for failin g the tes t. See §16205.1(b)(1)(i); Form an v. M otor Ve hicle A dmin., 332 Md. 201, 206, 630 A.2d 753 , 756 (1993) (stating that the s trict penalty for ref using to take a breath test is designed to encourage licensees to take, rather than to refuse alcohol concentration breath te sts). The statute, however, specifically requires officers to advise drivers of the sanctions to ensure that arrested drivers ma y make fully inform ed dec isions. See §16-205.1(b)(1) and (2). A driver whose license has been suspended under §16-205.1 may request a hearing before the MVA on certain limited is sues, inc luding wheth er the dr iver wa s fully ad vised. 11 See §16205.1( f)(1). In Form an v. M otor Ve hicle A dminis tration, s upra, 332 Md. at 222, 630 A.2d at 764, this Court examined the options an AL J considers when a driver, during a §16-205.1 hearing, files a motion for a subpoena request. Forman, charged with a violation of §16-205.1 for refusing a chemical breath test, requested both an administrative hearing to contest her suspension and a subpoena to compel the arresting officer to testify at her hea ring. Forman, 10 This section has been referred to as Maryland s implied consent and administrativ e per se law against drunk driving because it provides for swift administrative action to suspend suspected drunk driv ers licenses, in a ddition to criminal penalties that ma y also be im posed . Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Gad dy, 335 Md. 342, 344 n.1, 643 A.2d 442, 442 n.1, (19 94); see gen erally M otor Ve hicle A dmin. v . Shrad er, 324 Md. 454, 460-62, 597 A.2d 939, 941-43 (1991) (recounting the history leading to the passage of §16205.1) . 11 Section16-205.1(f)(7 )(i) sets forth the six issues that may be raised at a hearing under §16-205 .1(f). 10 332 Md. at 208, 630 A.2d at 757. The decision of the subpoena request was deferred to the ALJ at the he aring. Forman, 332 Md. at 209, 630 A.2d at 757. During the hearing, Forman asserted that, although she had read and signed the DR-15 Advice of Rights form, she was confused and misled by the officer s statements which suggested that suspension may not be man dato ry. Forem an, 332 Md. at 208-11, 630 A.2d at 758-59. She contended also that she was induced by the officer to refuse the test, an action contrary to the language of the statute and the intent of the Leg islature. Id. Forman stated that the o fficer promised to return her to a friend s home if sh e refused th e test, but told he r he wou ld take her to the police station if she took a nd failed th e test. Forman, 332 Md. at 210, 630 A.2d at 758. The ALJ denied Forma n s mo tion for a subp oena re quest. Form an, 332 M d. at 211 , 630 A .2d at 75 9. Finding that the ALJ failed to resolve the critical issue raised by Forman concerning her advice of rights, we reversed the Circuit Court s judgment affirming the ALJ s decision denying the sub poena reques t. Forman, 332 Md. at 222, 630 A.2d at 764. In doing so, we set forth the following analytical framework for ALJs when considering subpoena requests: [W]hen faced with a licensee s proffer and subpoena request, an ALJ has three distinct choices: (1) accept the proffer s c ontents as true, and indicate this acceptance; (2) reach no conclusion regarding the truth of the proffer (essentially suspending judgment) and issue the subpoena; or (3) reject the proffer and subpoena request entirely, and prov ide a valid explanation of the rejection. Id. 11 Add ition ally, in Forman, we emp hasized the need for a n individua l to receive a f ull and accurate ad vice of righ ts under t he imp lied con sent statu te. Form an, 332 Md. at 212-19, 630 A.2d at 75 9-63. We stated that it is imp erative that a person detained for drunk driving . . . be capable of makin g a know ing and vo luntary decision to refuse the alcohol concentration test. Forem an, 332 Md. at 218, 630 A.2d at 762. This is because an individual s driver s license is an important property interest that may be vital to his or her ability to function in society on a d aily basis. See Fo rman , 322 Md. at 214, 630 A.2d at 760. Importantly, we clarified that [f]ully advised [under §16-205 .1(f)(8)(i)(3)] m eans not o nly advised initially, but the detaining officer must also take care not to subseque ntly confuse or mislead the driver as to his or her rights under the statute. Forman, 332 Md. at 217, 630 A.2d at 762 (Emphasis in original). Likewise, we cautioned that due process demands that the State not mislead the defendant or construct road blocks, thus unduly burdening [the defendant s] decision-making. Form an, 332 Md. at 215, 630 A.2d at 761 (quoting Hare v. Moto r Vehic le Adm in., 326 Md. 29 6, 304, 604 A.2d 914, 918 (1992 )). Two years after Forman, in Motor Vehicle Administration v. Karwacki, supra, 340 Md. at 288-89, 666 A .2d at 519, w e re-affirm ed the three -option fram ework e nunciated in Forman. Karw acki, ch arged u nder §1 6-205 .1, argue d, like F orman , that he was n ot fully advised under t he statu te. Karw acki, 340 Md. at 279, 666 A.2d at 515. Specifically, as a repeat offender, Karwacki contend ed that the arr esting offic er only advised him that his license would be suspended for 120 days and did not inform him of the increased term of 12 suspension for a second of fense. Id. Faced with con flicting evidence from K arwacki s testimony and the officer s certification on the DR-15 form, the ALJ concluded that the certification was more credible than the driver s drunken recollection a nd suspen ded his license. Karw acki, 340 Md. at 278, 666 A.2d at 514. Affirming the decision, we noted that the ALJ was under no obligation to believe [Karwacki] over the prima facie evidence of the DR -15 fo rm. Karw acki, 340 Md. at 289, 6 66 A.2 d at 520 . In contrast to Form an, however, the petitioner in Karwacki did not file a motion for a subpoena requ est for the charging off icer.12 Id. Consequently, the ALJ was left to consider only the evidence in front of him: the DR-15 certification form and the petitioner s conflicting testimo ny. Id. As we noted, by not subpoenaing the arresting officer, Karwacki "presented the ALJ with an all or nothing choice." Id. Because a signed DR-15 form serves 12 In Karwacki, we noted, on numerous occasions , the absenc e of a sub poena req uest. For instance, in identifying the issue, we described it as whether, at a probable cause hearing, held pursuant to [§16-205.1(f)(7)], an administrative law judge may give greater credit to the swo rn written statement of an a bsent p olice of ficer, who was not subpoenaed by either p arty, than to the conflicting testimony of the motorist. Karwa cki, 340 Md. at 273, 666 A.2d at 51 2 (Emph asis added). Later, in distinguishing Forman, we noted it was not controlling because in K arwacki s case [h e] did not subpoena the arresting officer, and consequently, did not proffer what the officer s testimony would have been had he been called to testify. Karwa cki, 340 Md. at 28 7, 666 A.2d at 51 9 (Emphasis ad ded). Further, in summa rizing our h olding, we stated that by not subpoenaing the arresting officer and offering only his sworn testimony, directly conflicting the arresting officer s sworn statement on a critical point, [K arwacki] p resented the ALJ w ith an all or nothing choice. Karwa cki, 340 Md. at 289, 666 A.2d at 520 (Emph asis added). The ALJ was therefore entitled to, and did, resolve the factual dispute in favor of the prima facie evidence of the DR-15 certification. Id. The ALJ w as unde r no obligatio n to believe the resp onden t. Nor, in the absence of a request to do so, was he obliged to even consider whether to subpoena the arresting officer. Id. (Emp hasis ad ded). 13 as prima facie evidence to demonstrate that the driver refused the chemical breath test, we recognized that the AL J exercised properly his disc retion to resolve the conflicting evidence against the driv er. Karwa cki, 340 Md. at 283, 289, 666 A.2d a t 516, 520. W e ultimately affirmed the ALJ s determination that Karwacki s contradictory statements were not sufficient to rebut the documentary evidence. Karw acki, 340 Md. at 289, 666 A.2d at 520. IV. At his suspension hearing, Fowler filed a motion requesting a subpoena for the arresting officer; there fore, we s hall analyze his case acco rding to the p rinciples app lied in Forman. As w e noted , supra, where a mo tion for a subpoena request has been filed, an ALJ is faced with th ree optio ns. Form an, 332 M d. at 222 , 630 A .2d at 76 4. First, an ALJ may accept explicitly the entire proffer, denying the subpoena reques t. Id. The ALJ then assesses all the evid ence b efore h im or he r, includ ing the p roffer . Id. Under this optio n, an ALJ determines if the proffer, assumed to be true in its entirety, is sufficient to rebut any conflicting evidence. Second, an ALJ may reject the proffer as a whole, also denying the subpoena request; ho wever, the ALJ m ust provid e additionally a valid explanation for the rejection. Id. As we have noted, this option enables the ALJ to dispose of frivolous or otherwise improper subpoena requests. Id.; see also Maryland C ode (197 4, 1982 R epl. Vol.), State Government Article, §10-213(d) (allowing agencies to exclude evidence that is incompete nt, irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious at administrative hearings). Fina lly, an ALJ, uncertain of the accuracy of the driver s proffer, may grant the subpoena 14 request. Form an, 332 Md. at 222, 630 A.2d at 764. This action effectively suspends judgment on the merits of determining whether to suspend the driv er s license in o rder to allow th e ALJ to hear a ddition al testimo ny. Id. In the present case, while it is clear that the ALJ denied the subpoena request, the rationale or basis for his decision are not apparent. After hearing Fowler s testimony and proffer, the ALJ state d: First off, I m going to find that the licensee was fully advised. I conclude primarily from the certification of the officer that he was fully advised and it s bolstered by the testimony of the licensee wh[o] was told to read it and he skimmed over it. And I don t see the need to call the officer to cross examine him. There s no indicatio n the PB T was re lied on or no t relied on in this case . *** My finding is he was fully advised, and the other finding is I don t se e the ne ed to ca ll the off icer to cla rify anythin g . . . . Under Forman, an ALJ s decision either to deny or grant the subpoena request must be clearly indicate d. Form an, 332 Md. at 222, 630 A.2d at 764. Specifically, we emphasized that the ALJ may only avoid issuing the subpoena when he or she expli citly accepts the proffer o r rejects the pro ffer and p rovides a b asis for this rejection . Id. The record in the present case yields no specific or explicit statement indicating whether the ALJ accepted or rejected Fowler s proffered testimony. Th us, as a review ing court, we are unable to perform our function because the ALJ did not state clearly his decisio n or enun ciate fully his ration ale for denying F owler s su bpoena r equest. 15 A. For exam ple, one might in fer fro m the A LJ s lan guage , see supra, that he attempted to proceed under Forman by rejecting Fowler s proffer along with his subpoena request. The crux of Fowler s argument centers on his assertion that he was not offered a second test at the police station and his belief that the DR-15 form merely acknowledged his refusal of the PBT. The ALJ s statement regarding the PBT may be read as a rejection of that proffered testimony. Yet, assuming that the AL J intended to reject the pro ffer and d eny the reque st, he did not proceed correctly under Forman. First, the ALJ did not explain the reasons for his rejection. He concluded only that Fowler was f ully advised and that there was no need for the subpoena. Under the Forman framework, however, an ALJ who rejects the proffer of a driver and denies a subpoena request must also provide a valid explanation of the rejection. Forman, 332 Md. at 222, 630 A.2d at 76 4. A valid explanatio n should in clude ma king clear th e ALJ s d ecision to reject the proffer; it should not require a reviewing court to draw in ferences. A valid explanation also should provide a basis for rejection by explaining the reasons behind the ALJ s decisio n; it shou ld not m erely ann ounce a conc lusion. The Maryland Administrative Procedure Act, Maryland Code (19 84, 2004 Rep l. Vol), State Governme nt Article, and COM AR set forth reasons for denying a subpoe na reques t. Section 10-213 of the Administrative Procedure Act governs the admission and exclusion of evidence at administra tive hearings an d allows a gencies to e xclude ev idence that is 16 incompe tent, irrelevant, immaterial, o r unduly repetitio us. Maryland Code (1 984, 200 4 Repl. Vol.), State G overnm ent Art icle, §10 -213(d ). This language is mimick ed in the MV A s regulation pertaining to §16-205.1 proceedings and subpoena reques ts. See COMAR 11.11.03.07. While the decision of whether to issue a subpoena is within the ALJ s discretion, COMAR 11.11.03.07C provides circumstances that warrant the denial of a subpoena request: [a] request may be refused if the testimony or evidence to be offered: (1) is immaterial, irrelevant or un duly repetitious; o r (2) does no t pertain to a ge nuine issue in the contested case. Here, the ALJ stated that he did not see the need to call the police officer to cr oss-exam ine him, bu t failed to detail the circumstances purportedly justifying this rejec tion. Moreover, the o ption of rejec ting the p roff er an d denying the subpo ena reque st is inapprop riate given the factual circum stances in the present case. In Forman, we observed that this option enables the A LJ to dispose of frivo lous or otherwise improper subpoena reques ts. Forman, 332 Md. at 222, 630 A.2d at 764. In the present case, Fowler proffered that the police off icer did not f ully advise him of the con sequenc es of refu sing a breath test, as required under §16-205.1; also, he claimed he was misled by the officer s statements and the previous administration of a PBT. This proffer presents a g enuine fa ctual dispute for the ALJ to resolve. As we noted in Forman, evidence pertaining to negation of the advice of rights or inducement to refuse the alcohol concentration test is neithe r incompe tent, irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious. Form an, 332 M d. at 224, 63 0 A.2d a t 765; see 17 also §16-2 05.1(f)(7)(i)(3) (listing [w]hether the police officer requested a test after the person was fully advised as one of the issue s that may be ra ised in the he aring); Forman, 332 Md. at 223-24, 630 A.2d at 765 (concluding that proffered evidence as to whether Forman was properly and fully advised of the admin istrative sanctio ns directly pertain ed to a genuine iss ue). It is importa nt also that Fo wler s claim be resolved clearly, in light of the different statutory consequences of refusing a chemical breath test versus a PBT,13 particularly because [r]efusal to s ubmit to a preliminary breath test [does] not constitute a violation of §16-205.1. §1 6-205.2(d). If the ALJ decides F owler w as not offe red a breath test other than the PBT requested on the street prior to his arrest, Fowler cannot be convicted of a violation of §16-205.1. Fina lly, the ALJ appears to h ave enga ged in a cre dibility assessme nt in formin g his opinion about Fowler's contentions regarding the PBT. U nder Form an, however, none of the options provide for an ALJ to make a credibility determination when ruling on a subpoena request. Rather, the ALJ must either accept explicitly the proffer in its entirety or reject the stated pro ffer in wh ole, withou t assessing its v alidity in either case; otherwise, the ALJ m ust issue the sub poena to hear a ddition al testimo ny. 13 Section16-205.2 governs the administration of a prelim inary breath test ( PBT ). While the results of a preliminary breath test serve as a guide for th e officer to d etermine if arrest is necessary, there is no mandatory license susp ension for a test failure or refusal to take a P BT. See §16-2 05.2(c) . 18 In Karwacki, this Court highlighted the ability generally of an ALJ to make c redibility assessments. See Karwacki, 340 Md. at 283-84, 6 66 A.2d at 517. W e noted tha t frequently the resolution of conflicting evidence and inconsistent inferences involves making credibility determinations. Karwacki, 340 Md. at 284, 666 A.2d at 517. Th e ALJ in Karwacki, however, was faced with a confined set of conflicting evidence that of the DR15 form and the driver s contrary testimony due to the petitioner having not filed a motion for a subpoena request. Consequently, we concluded the ALJ properly engaged in a credibility determination finding that the officer s sworn certification in the DR-15 form was more credible . Karwacki, 340 M d. at 289, 666 A.2 d at 514. W here an A LJ is force d to consider only the factual evidence before him , as in Karwacki, this assessment is within the ALJ s province to resolve. In the present case, however, the ALJ, who concluded that Fowler did not rely as he claimed on the circumstances surrounding the advisement regarding the PBT , in fa ct seeme d to reject Fow ler s prof fer b y making a credibility assessment that Fowler did not rely on h is refusal of the PBT in signing the D R-15 fo rm. This cre dibility assessment is not perm itted under Forman. B. Under yet another scenario, one might infer that the ALJ proceeded under the Forman framework by accepting Fowler s proffer, but still denied his subpoena request. When accepting an individual s proffer, the ALJ treats it as a proven fact and, con sequently, there is no need to summon the officer to corroborate or clarify the info rmation . See Forman, 332 19 Md. at 224, 630 A.2d at 765. Theref ore, the AL J s statemen t that there w as no nee d to summon the officer could be viewed as an implicit acceptance of Fowler s proffer and an implicit weighing of the evidence of the proffer against the officer's certification. This requires a substantial inferential leap, howev er, one that w e are not pre pared to tak e on this record. Even if we were prepared to do so, under this Forman option, an ALJ is req uired to explicitly accept[] the proffer. Form an, 332 M d. at 222 , 630 A .2d at 76 4. The record does not ind icate tha t this wa s done . Because we are remanding the present case for further proceedings, we pause to highlight how an ALJ might proceed under this option. Accepting the proffer of the driver as to what the certifying officer s testimony would be does not imply automatically that the driver s proffer will be sufficient to exonerate him, or to overcome the prima facie evidence of the DR -15 form . Instead, the A LJ first acce pts the prof fer as if it were p roven t rue. By accepting the proffer of the certifying officer s testimony as truth there is no need to subpoena the off icer to re iterate the se facts . Forman, 332 M d. at 224, 360 A.2d at 765. After accepting explicitly the proffer, the ALJ next assesses the proffer against other competing evidence to determine if the evidence is sufficient to overcome other conflicting evidence. The DR-15 Advice of Rights form constitutes prima facie evidence of a test refusal. Prima facie evidence is good and sufficient on its face . . . to estab lish a giv en fac t," unless contrad icted. Karwacki, 340 Md. at 283, 666 A.2d at 516-17 (quoting B LACK'S L AW D ICTIONARY 1190 (6th Ed. 1990 )). Thus, the A LJ must e xercise his o r her discretion and 20 determine if a driver s p roffer as to w hat the certifying officer would testify overcomes suffici ently the p rima fa cie evid ence o f the fo rm. V. The importance of clear, explicit administrative agency decisions cannot b e overemphasized. [I]t is appropriate to point out, as we have in previous opinions, not only the importance but the necessity that administrative agencies re solve all significant c onflicts in the evidence and then chronicle, in the record, full, complete and detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law. State Comm n on Huma n Rel. v. M alakoff, 273 Md. 214, 229, 329 A.2d 8,17 (1974). Adm inistrative law judges must fu lly explain their decisions so that this Court and others may perform the function of re view accu ratel y and effe ctive ly. Harford County , 322 Md. at 505, 588 A.2d at 778. Such explanation is not only for the sake of judicial econo my, but als o ensu res that th e parties unders tand fu lly an agen cy s decis ions. See id. Upon remand, the option to reject both the proffer and the subpoena request is not viable, given the need to resolve the material factual issue raised by Fowler s proffer. Two options remain. The ALJ may accept explicitly the proffer, denying the subpoen a request, and procee d as des cribed, supra. Otherwise, the ALJ may choose to issue the subpoena. This option should be executed if the ALJ harbors reserv ations as to the accuracy or c redibility of Fowler s proffer. See Fo rman , 332 Md. at 224, 360 A.2d at 765. While we recognize that the General Assembly elected specifically to make the DR-15 form prim a facie evid ence to 21 avoid an unnecessary burden on the police force,14 we do not think the Legislature intended to preclude an officer from being called to testify at a suspension hearing when a key factual issue is in dispute, particularly where the issue involves an individual s advice of his or her rights under the law. JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR MONTGOMERY COUNTY REVERSED, AND CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH DIRECTIONS TO REVERSE THE DECISION OF THE MOTOR VEHICLE ADMINISTRATION AND REMAND THE CASE TO THE OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. COSTS TO BE PAID BY THE MOTOR VEHICLE ADMINISTRATION. 14 See §16-205.1(f)(7)(ii); see also MVA v. Lytle, 374 Md. 37, 51, 821 A.2d 62, 70 (2003) (recounting the legislative history behind §16-205.1 and concluding that the Legislature refused to adopt [statutory] amendments which would have allowed a driver to compel attendance of the police officer . . . at the hearings and, instead, retained the nature of an administrative per se hearing as one w here 'a sworn statement is prima facie evidence of a violation of § 16 -205.1' ). 22

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