State v. Logan
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State of Maryland v. James Ramiah Logan No. 100, September Term, 2005. CRIMINAL LAW - EVIDENCE - CONFESSIONS: Admission into evidence in State s case in chief of confession obtained by police in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1996) was not harmless error. CRIMINAL LAW JURY COMPETENCY OF JURORS, CHALLENGES, AND OBJECTION: Trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to ask petitioner s proposed voir dire questions as to not criminally responsible and to pre-trial publicity. Each part of the proposed multi-part question regarding the not criminally responsible defense was improperly phrased. CRIMINAL LAW JURY COMPETENCY OF JURORS, CHALLENGES, AND OBJECTION: Trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to ask petitioner s proposed voir dire questions as to pre-trial publicity. The trial court is not required to ask content-based questions. In the Circu it Court for P rince Geo rge s Cou nty Case No. CT021581X IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 100 September Term, 2005 STATE OF MARYLAND v. JAMES RAMIAH LOGAN Bell, C.J. Raker Wilner Cathell Harrell Battaglia Greene, JJ. Opinion by Raker, J. Bell, C.J., joins in the judgm ent only Filed: September 1, 2006 We granted review to consider two issues in this case. We granted the State s petition for certiorari to consider whether the trial court acted within its discretion in refusing to pose Logan s multi-part voir dire question s regarding the defen se of not cr iminally respon sible (NCR) and the potential effect of pretrial publicity. We granted Logan s cross-petition to consider whether the trial court s e rror in adm itting into evidence his confes sion in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), was harmless error. I. James Ramiah Logan was indicted by the Gran d Jury for Prin ce Georg e s Coun ty for two counts of first-degree premeditated murder and two counts of use of a handgun during the commission of a crime of violence. He entered a plea of not guilty and not crim inally responsible. The jury fou nd him g uilty of two counts of second-degree murder and two counts of the han dgun of fense. He was also f ound crim inally responsible. The Circuit Court sentenced Logan to a total term of incarceration of one hundred years. On or around August 25, 2003, Lo gan bega n behavin g in a man ner that alarm ed his fam ily. He went to Prince George s County Hospital for an evaluation and w hile there, admitted to past use of PCP. His blood tested positive for cocaine. Logan s family requested that Logan admit himself voluntarily to a hospital, but Logan refused to do so. On August 29, 2003, Logan s wife and his mother obtained a court order directing the Prince George s -2- County Sheriff s Office to transport Logan for the purpose of conducting an emergency psychiatric evaluation. That day, Logan smoked several bowls of marijuana and then went to his parents house with two friends to conduct a bible study. On the evening of August 29, 2003 , Deputies J ames A rnaud an d Elizabeth Magruder went to Logan s parents home to enforce the emergency order for psychiatric evaluation. The deputies went to the basement where Loga n was particip ating in t he bible study. Logan fled upstairs and the deputies pursued him. As they were standing outside of his bedroom door, Logan shot and killed both of them. Logan was arrested by the Prince George s County Police for the murder of the two deputies. He wa s transported to police he adquarters , where he was interv iewed by P rince George s County homicide Detective Vincent Canales for approximately three and one h alf hours. Prior to reading Logan h is Miranda rights, the dete ctive assured Logan re peatedly that he was not going to harm him, that they were just talking, and that he would not allow any harm to come to Logan s parents about whom Logan had expressed concern. During the discussion of Miranda rights, Detective Canales assured L ogan that his role was n ot to hurt him, and that he would be one hundred percent truthful with Logan, if Logan would be the same way. Immediately before Logan said he would waive his Miranda rights, the detective told Logan that the only way he would be jeopardized was if he did not tell the truth. Logan said he would waive his rights, and then admitted shooting Deputies Arnaud -3- and Magruder. Logan explained to the detective that he had intended to kill the deputies, stating as follows: DET. CANA LES: Okay, so when you shot them, I m ean, it was with the intention of hurting them, w as the intentio n basically getting rid of them altogether? LOGAN: It was inten tional on, yeah, to put them down, boom, just you know what I m saying. DET. CANALES: When you say put them down, I mean, you come and LOG AN: I ca me out inte nding to d o it. DET. CANALES: Intended to kill them. LOGAN: Yeah. *** DET. CANALES: You knew you were going to shoot them once you ca me out? LOG AN: ( shakes head.) DET. CANALES: And you c ame out a nd you killed th em, right? LOGAN: Um -hum. Logan filed a mo tion to suppress his confession to Detective Canales on the ground that the police violated Miranda. The Circuit Court denied the motion. Logan entered a plea of not guilty and no t crimina lly respon sible. The State filed a notice of its intent to seek the -4- death penalty. 1 At trial, Loga n requested that the judg e ask spec ific questions on voir dire to the venire regarding the NCR defense and pretrial publicity surrounding the case, which the trial judge refused to do. At trial, Logan s counsel conc eded that Logan shot Deputies A rnaud and M agruder, but claimed that Logan was not criminally responsible fo r his actions. He presented e xpert testimony that Logan was suffering from paranoid schizophrenia at the time of the shootings, which prevented him from app reciating the c riminality of his co nduct or co nforming his conduct to the requirements of the law. In response, the State presented expert testimony that Logan s behavior was caused by his voluntary ingestion of drugs. The jury found Logan guilty of two counts of second degree murder and found him criminally responsible for the murders. Logan noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. In a reported opinion, the Court of Special Ap peals re versed . Logan v . State, 164 Md. App. 1, 882 A.2d 330 (2005). The court he ld that the admission of Logan s confession was in violation of Miranda, but that the error was harmless beyond a reaso nable d oubt. Id. at 52, 882 A.2d at 359. With respect to the voir dire issues, the court conclude d that the trial co urt abused its discretion by failing to probe for bias regarding the NCR defense, even if Logan s proposed questions were imp roper. In add ition, the court h eld that the question on pretrial publicity 1 Because the jury returned verdicts of second degree m urder, Log an was n ot eligible for the death penalty. -5- posed by the trial judge to the venire was contrary to Dingle v. S tate, 361 Md. 1, 750 A.2d 819 (2000), because that query sought only to uncover the jurors own bottom-line conclusions as to their impartiality. The intermediate appellate court concluded that the trial court should have inquired whether jurors exposed to pretrial publicity had formed an opinion regarding the case due to such expos ure. Logan, 164 Md. App. at 72-73, 882 A.2d at 369-71. We granted the State s petition for certiorari to decide the following question: Did the Court of Special Appeals err wh en it vacated Logan s convictions on the basis that the trial court failed to formulate and pose additional questions to the venire panel regarding the defense of not criminally responsible and the issue of pretrial publicity? State v. Logan, 390 Md. 28 4, 888 A.2d 34 1 (2005). In addition, we granted L ogan s conditional cross-petition for certiorari to decide the following question: Did the Court of Spe cial Appeals err in ruling that the admission of Respondent s confession obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt? Id. II. We address the harmless error issue first. In his cross-petition, Logan argues that the Court of Special Appeals erred in ruling that the admission of his confessio n obtained in -6- violation of Miranda was harm less error. In M aryland, error is ha rmless if a reviewing court, upon its own independent review of the record, is able to declare a belief, beyond a reasonab le doubt, that the error in no way influenced the verdict. Dorsey v . State, 276 Md. 638, 659, 350 A .2d 665, 678 (197 6). The intermediate appellate court found the error to be harmless. As to the guilt/innocence determination, the court held that, because at trial petitioner conceded criminal agency, the admission of his confession was not prejudicial with respect to the identity of the m urdere r. Logan, 164 Md. App. at 50, 882 A.2d at 358. As to the impact on the NCR defense, th e court held that becaus e the defen se relied hea vily on Logan s statements to Detective Canales to support the NCR defen se, there was n o preju dice. See id. at 50-52, 882 A.2d at 358-59. Logan argues that the admission of his confession was not harmless error because the State used the conf ession in tw o ways to bo lster its claim that L ogan w as criminally responsible: first, that the State s experts co nsidered th e confess ion in forming their opinion that Logan was criminally responsible, and second, that the prosecutor used the confession repeatedly in closing argument to show that he was responsible. As to the defense s use of the confession, Logan responds that once the confession had been admitted into evidence, he had no ch oice but to make the best of a bad situation and try to rebut or explain the evidence. -7- Before this Court, the State does not dispute the holding of the Court of Special Appea ls that the trial court erred in finding a waiver of Miranda. The State argues that the jury verdict rejecting the NCR defense was not impacted by the introduction of petitioner s confession. We hold that the error was not harmless. The confession undisputedly was taken by the police in violation of Miranda and was adm itted improp erly into evidence. Experts for both parties testified that they considered the videotape confession in arriving at their opinion regarding Logan s criminal responsibility. In closing argument, the State urged the jury to reject the NCR defense, pointed to the videotape of the confession, and argued as follows: You see in his statement time and time again he says I made the decision to do this. That tape does not in any way show the person to be schizophrenic. First of all psychotic does not equal schizophrenia. We w ill get to that in a little bit. That tape shows clearly the perso n can ans wer que stions, know s what is going on. He has a different thought process, he has his Biblical referen ces. In its rebuttal closing argument, the State again alluded to petitioner s statements, urging the jury to consider all of the evidence after they listen to the ex perts, after they listen to all of the evidence. The State referred to the detective s interview w ith Logan, and read a part of the interview to the jury in which Logan admitted that he had formed the intent to kill the deputies. The State then noted as follows: The words and actions of the defendant, Mr. Logan, tell us everything we need to know about his inte nt and his premeditation for purposes of first degree murder under -8- Maryland law. I wanted to annihilate them, I couldn t leave them alive. The State urged the jury to look at and to consider the videotaped confession in determining the validity of the NCR defense. In addition, the State s experts considered the videotaped confession in forming their opinions as to petitioner s responsibility at the time of the crimes. The State introduced the entire taped interview of petitioner conducted by Detective Canales. On the tape, Mr. Logan stated repeatedly that he knew what he was doing and that he intended to kill the sherif fs; the jury heard and saw him adm it that on the videotape. After hearing such info rmation fro m the def endant, it would be difficult for the jury not to use the confe ssion in arriving at its verd ict. We cannot say that the error in no way influenced the verdict. See Arizo na v. Fulm inante, 499 U .S. 279, 296, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1258, 113 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1991) (observing that a full confession in which the defendant discloses the motive for and means of the crime may tempt the jury to rely upon that evidence alone in reaching its decision ). The fact that the defense used the confession does not change our view. The State is arguing that because petitioner used parts of the videotape d confes sion to support his NCR defense, he either waived the error, or alter nativ ely, that the defense would have introduced the evidence on its own and therefore, the error was harmless. We do not agree. The defendant does not w aive an erro r by attempting to minimize o r explain improperly admitted evidence. 1 W IGMORE, E VIDENCE § 18, at 836-38 (Tillers rev. 1983) (noting that an opponent ordinarily waiv es his own objection if he makes subsequent use of evidence similar -9- to that which he had previously objected, except where such subsequent use was done me rely in self-defense, to explain or rebut the original evidence ). It would be unfair to permit the State to introdu ce evid ence, albeit later found to be inadm issible, but not to permit the defendant, upon pa in of wa iver, to at tempt to meet it, e xplain it , rebut it o r deny it. See Rogers v. State, 853 S.W.2d 29, 35 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (stating that while ordinarily the general rule is that a defendant waives an erro r regarding improper ly admitted evid ence if the defendant or the State later introduces the same evidence without objection, the error is not waived when th e evidenc e is brou ght in late r in an eff ort to mee t, reb ut, de stroy, deny, or explain the improperly admitted evidence ). Here, petitioner did not introduce the confession, but merely attempted to meet it. The co nfession show ed both Logan s state of mind and demeanor shortly after the murders, and thus, was powerful evidence against him. See Fulm inante, 499 U.S. at 296, 111 S. Ct. at 1257-58. Under the circum stances, the S tate cannot show that prejudice against Logan did not result from the improper admission of his confession at trial. See Collin s v. State, 318 Md. 269, 286-87, 568 A.2d 1, 9 (19 90); M cLain, M aryland E videnc e, § 103 :22(c), a t 99-10 0. We cannot conclude that there is no reasonable possibility that the erroneously admitted confession did not con tribute to the jur y s renditio n of a g uilty verdic t. Dorsey, 276 Md. at 659, 350 A.2 d at 678; see also F ulminan te, 499 U.S. at 313-14, 111 S. Ct. at 1266-67 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (discussing the significant impact that the admission of a full confession may have upon the trier of fact as distinguished from the impact of an isolated -10- statement that is incriminating only when connected to other evidence). Accordingly, we hold that the admission of Logan s confession into evidence, in violation of Miranda, was not harmle ss error beyon d a reason able doub t. III. Although the voir dire issue has become moot in light of our disposition regarding harmless error, we address the issue for guidance because on retrial it is likely to arise again. During voir dire, the trial court propounded questions to three separate venire panels. Logan proposed a number of q uestions for the trial court to ask prosp ective jurors during voir dire, including the following multi-part question regarding an NCR defense: 7. Evidenc e will be pro duced du ring trial showing that the Defendant suffered from par anoid schizophrenia at the time of the crime. To that end, the defense will argue that the defendant was not criminally responsible at the time of the crime because, due to this mental disorder, he lacked substantial ca pacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. a. If the defe ndant satisfie s his burden in this regard, will any member of the jury be u nable to find the defendant not criminally responsible? b. Does any juror an ticipate havin g difficulty following the Court s instructions on the defense of not criminally responsible, particularly in view of th e crimes ch arged in the indictmen t? c. Has any m ember of the jury studied psych olog y or ps ychia try? -11- d. Do you have any reservations or feelings that would prevent you from fairly considering the evidence in the case? e. In view of the defense of not crimin ally responsib le, does any membe r of the venire prefer not to sit on the case? The trial court did not ask Logan s Question 7, as proposed, but asked each jury panel whether any member of the venire or members of their families had any experience, training, or educatio n in a men tal he alth f ield, such as ps ychology o r psyc hiatr y. Each juror who responded affirmatively was asked follow-up questions at the bench. Logan also requested that the trial court ask the following question to uncover bias from any pretrial publicity to which venirepersons were exposed: 4. The allegation in this case is that on August 29, 2002, two employees from the Prince George s C ounty Sheriff s Departm ent, Elizabeth M agruder an d James A rnaud w ent to the home of Mr. L ogan s pa rents to serve him with an Order for an Emergency Psychiatric Commitment. It is further alleged that in the process of serving the Orde r for an Em ergency Psych iatric Comm itment, the two S heriffs w ere shot and killed by the defenda nt. With regard to the following questions, please listen to the questions, and if you have an affirmative answer to one or more of these questions, please then stand and we will deal w ith each of you ind ividually. INDIVIDUAL VOIR DIRE AT BENCH a. Have any of you read, heard, or seen on TV, anything about the case? -12- b. From where did you obtain your knowledge of the facts? c. What did you hear? d. As a resu lt of what you heard about the case, have you fo rmed any op inion as to the guilt or innocence of Mr. Logan or whether he was not criminally responsible at the time of the alleged crimes? e. What is your opinion? f. In light of your pre-formed opinion do you believe you still could be fair and impartial and render a verdict based solely on the evidence? The trial court did not ask Logan s Question 4 as proposed, but did ask whether anyone had personal knowledge of the case or knowledge gained from other individuals or news media about the facts of the case . With respect to the court s questioning regarding prior know ledge, a total of thirty-eight prospective jurors responded affirmatively that they had prior knowledge of the case. When a prospective juror indicated prior knowledge of the case, the judge asked him or her for the source of the information and whether knowledge of the inform ation wou ld prohibit the juror from serving fa irly and impartially. If the juror responded that he or she could not serve fairly and impartially, the judge excused the prospective juror. Logan objected on several occasions to the manner in which the trial judge was questioning the prospective jurors about their prior knowledge of the case. -13- As to the NCR defense, the Court o f Special A ppeals held that because the ve nire s views towards th e NCR defense w ere crucial to the determination of whether there was cause for disqualification, the trial court should have inquired whether any prospective jurors had reservations or stron g feelin gs rega rding su ch a de fense. See Logan, 164 Md. App. at 66, 882 A.2d at 367. The intermed iate appellate court concluded that the trial court either erred or abused its d iscretion in fa iling to propo und que stions conc erning juro r attitudes and potential bias abou t an NC R defen se, even tho ugh Lo gan s que stions on tha t topic were framed improp erly. See id. at 61, 65, 6 9, 882 A.2d at 364, 367, 369. As to the pretrial publicity issue, the Co urt of Spe cial Appeals held that even though the trial court was not required to ask content-based questions, the trial court erred in not asking some variation of Logan s proposed Question 4d, which asked jurors who had been exposed to pretrial publicity whether they had fo rmed a n opini on abo ut the ca se base d on su ch exp osure. Id. at 72-73, 882 A.2d at 37 0-71. The intermed iate appellate court reasoned tha t the trial court s procedure in inquiring merely whether the jurors believed they could serve fairly and impartially shifted to the venire its responsibility to decide juror bias. Id. at 72, 882 A.2d at 371 (quoting Dingle, 361 Md. at 21, 75 9 A.2d at 830). The State presents several arguments to support its position that the trial court did not abuse its discretion w hen it refuse d to ask the jury venire panel Logan s questions related to his NCR defense. The State maintains that the trial court need not ask voir dire questions related to the NCR defense because a defense, unlike a criminal charge, might not be -14- generated at trial. Therefore, the State reasons, voir dire questions related to a defense differ markedly from questions related to the crime itself where the nature of the charges might arouse strong fee lings, such as a narcotics p ossession c harge or se xual assau lt against a minor. Alternatively, if probing a s to views o n the NC R defen se are requ ired, the State argues that the voir dire questions posed by the trial court were sufficient to ascertain whether any prospective juror had any disqualifying bias toward NCR defenses. Fina lly, the State argues that Logan s proposed five-part question as to the NCR defense was improper, that the trial court was not required to refo rmulate the voir dire questions and that the trial court did not deny him the opportunity to propose additional questions that might have been proper. The State s position as to pretrial publicity and voir dire is that the Court of Special Appea ls erred in concluding that the trial judge was required to ask specific questions as to whether prospective jurors had formed an opinion of the case based on pretrial exposure. The State reasons that the decision to make such an inquiry is committed to the discretion of the trial court. With respect to the catch-all question, asking prospective jurors whether they had any additional reason which would make them unable to render a fair and impartial verdict solely on the evidence, the State argues that through this question, biases based on exposure to pretrial publicity would have been detected. Finally, the State contends that the voir dire conducted in this case concerning pretrial publicity did not run afoul of Dingle; the trial court exerc ised its discretion to make a n inquiry into pre trial publicity, and then -15- determined independently whether each juror to whom it individually posed follow-up question s cou ld serve impa rtiall y. Logan a rgues that the Court of Special of Appea ls concluded correctly that the trial court should have posed additional voir dire questions to the venirepersons concerning the NCR defense and pretrial publicity. He maintains that a prospective juror s view regarding an NCR defense is likely to evoke strong feelings that may hinder a juror s ability to serve fairly and impa rtially. Moreov er, if the trial judge believed that the propo sed questions were improper ly phrased, he should have asked counsel to reformulate the question or done so on his own. As to pretrial pub licity and voir dire, L ogan arg ues that this C ourt s prece dents addressing the scope of voir dire in M aryland required the trial judge to condu ct a more thorough questioning of venirep ersons in or der to ferret o ut bias. Such an inquiry w ould include questions about the nature of what the prospective juror heard, whether the juror had formed an opinion about the case based on that information, and if so, what the juror s actual opinion was regarding the case. With respect to the questions on pretrial pu blicity actually posed by the trial judge, Logan a rgues that the y were inade quate in light of Dingle, because they sought little more than the prospective jurors bottom-line conclusions about whether the jurors co uld be fair a nd impartia l. -16- IV. Voir dire is critical to the protection of a criminal defendant s right to a fair and impartial jury, as guarante ed by the Sixth Amen dment to the United States Constitution and Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rig hts. Curtin v. State, __ Md. __, __ A.2d __, WL 2095869, at *3 (2006); White v. Sta te, 374 Md. 232, 240, 821 A.2d 459, 463 (2003); State v. Thomas, 369 M d. 202, 2 06, 798 A.2d 5 66, 568 (2002). In Maryland, the primary purpose of voir dire is to ensure a fair and impartial jury by determining the existence of cause f or disqu alificatio n. Thomas, 369 Md. at 207, 798 A.2d at 569. We have ide ntifi ed tw o bro ad ar eas o f inq uiry that may reveal cause for disqualification: (1) an exam ination to de termine w hether pros pective juro rs meet the minimum statutory qualifications for jury service; or (2) an examination to discover the juror s state of mind as to the matter in hand or any collateral matter reasonably liable to unduly influence him. Davis v. Sta te, 333 Md. 27, 35-36, 633 A.2d 867, 871 (1993). The scope of voir dire and the form of questions propounded rest firmly within the discretion of the trial judg e. Curtin, WL 2095869, at *5; Boyd v. S tate, 341 Md. 431, 436, 671 A.2d 33, 35 (1996) (quoting Davis, 333 Md. at 34, 633 A.2d at 870-71). Accordingly, it is the responsibility of the trial judge to conduct an adequate voir dire to eliminate prospectiv e jurors from the v enire wh o will be un able to perf orm their duty fairly an d impa rtially. White, 374 Md. at 240, 821 A.2d at 463. To that end, the trial judge should focus questions upon issues particular to the defendant s case so that biases directly related to the crime, the -17- witnesses, or the defendant may be uncovered. Thomas, 369 Md. at 207-08, 798 A.2d at 569. On app ellate review, because the trial judge has had the opportunity to hear and observe the prospectiv e jurors, we pay substantial d eference to the judge s conclusions, unless they are the pro duct of a voir d ire that is c ursory, rus hed, an d undu ly limited. Id. at 241, 821 A.2d at 464. W e review the trial judge s rulings on the record of the voir dire process as a whole to determine whether the trial judge abused his or he r discretio n. White, 374 Md. at 243, 821 A.2d at 466. A. Voir D ire and D efense of Not Crim inally Respon sible We reiterate that which we have stated repeatedly: the trial court has very wide discretion in conducting voir dire, and the court s rulings will not be disturbed on appeal unless it constitutes an abuse of disc retion. See, e.g., Landon v. Zorn, 389 Md. 206, 216, 884 A.2d 142, 147 -48 (2005 ); White, 374 M d. at 241, 82 1 A.2d a t 464; Dingle, 361 Md. at 13, 759 A.2d at 826. Defenses, including the NCR defense, do not fall within the category of mandatory inquiry on voir dire.2 Prior to questioning each panel of venirepersons, the trial 2 This Court has identified areas o f mandatory inquiry for the trial judge to address on voir dire. See H ernan dez v. S tate, 357 Md. 204, 232 , 742 A.2d 952, 967 (1999) (rac ial, ethnic, and cultural bias); Langley v . State, 281 Md. 337, 349, 378 A.2d 133, 134 (1977) (placement of undu e weight o n police of ficer credib ility); Casey v. R oman C atholic Archbishop of Baltimore, 217 Md. 595, 606-07, 143 A .2d 627, 632 (195 8) (religious bias). In a possession of narcotics case, we have held that a trial court abused its discretion by failing to voir dire a jury panel for strong feelings regarding violations of the narcotics laws. Thomas, 369 Md. at 204, 798 A.2d at 567. We similarly determined that a trial court abused its discretion when it refused to question venirepersons in a sexual offense c ase as to whether the charges stir up strong emotional feelings in you that would affect your ability to be fair and impartial in [that] case? Sweet v. Sta te, 371 Md. 1, 9, 806 A.2d 265, 270-71 (contin ued...) -18- court provided a brief factual s ummary of the case, and explained that as a result of the deaths of the deputy sheriffs, the defendant was charged with murder and handgun charges, and entered pleas o f not gu ilty and no t crimina lly respon sible. The trial court asked the venire if any member thereof or their immediate family members had any experience, training or ed ucation in th e mental h ealth field , such as p sychiatry or psyc holo gy, and also inquired on a pretrial q uestionnaire sent to all prospective jurors, in Q uestion 15, [i]f psychiatric or psychological evid ence wa s presented at sentencin g, would you be able to fairly weigh this evidence along with all other evidence presented? The trial judge also asked the venire whether they had any religious, moral, philosophical, or any other personal reasons that made it difficult to sit in jud gment of another pe rson. Finally, the trial judge asked the v enire wh ethe r there w as an y other reason not otherwise addressed by the trial judge that prevented them from rendering a fair and im partial verdict. R eviewing the voir dire as a whole, we conclude that the trial court acted within its discretion in asking these questions and declining to ask Logan s proposed questions to determine any juror bias or prejudice.3 See Wh ite, 374 Md. at 243-44, 821 A.2d at 465 (concluding that a trial court has 2 (...continued) (2002). Thus, w here the pro posed vo ir dire question is directed at biases, relating spec ifically to a defendant s alleged criminal act, they would, if revealed, be disqualifying when they impaired the ability of the juror to be fair and impartial. See id. at 10, 806 A.2d at 271. In such instances, the trial judge abuses his or her discretion by not asking requisite questions to the ve nire. Id. 3 Logan maintains that even if his prop osed question was not f ramed prope rly, Maryland law required the trial judge to ask defense counsel to reformulate the question, or (contin ued...) -19- acted within its proper discretion when, the voir dire process is viewed as a whole, it is clear that the trial court conducted exten sive voir dire examinations o f prospective jurors ). Each part of Logan s p roposed multi-part question regarding the NCR defense, w ith the exception of Question 7c, which was covered by the trial judge, was improperly phrased, and thus, it was not an abu se of discretion for the trial judge to refu se to ask Logan s proposed questions to the venire. Question 7a on the NCR defense, stated: [i]f the defendant satisfies his bu rden in this reg ard, will any member of the jury be unable to find the defendant not criminally responsible? The Court of Special Appeals reasoned that Question 7a was not a proper voir dire question because it asked prospective jurors whether they would apply the rules of law as i nstructe d by the tria l court. Logan v. State, 164 Md. App. at 65, 88 2 A.2d at 367. We agree that Question 7a amounts to a solicitation of whether prospective jurors would follow the court s instructions on the law . This practice is ge nerally 3 (...continued) to rephrase the questions on its own initiative. The Court of Special Appeals reasoned as follows: Even if appellant s qu estions were not well framed, how ever, it is clear that he sought to discover cause for disqualification based on bias towards an insanity defense. On that basis, if the court below was not satisfied with the form, it could have reformulated the questions or allowe d defe nse cou nsel to d o so. Logan, 164 M d. App . at 61, 882 A.2d at 364. The State contends that, assuming that the NCR defense was an a ppropriate to pic for voir dire, it w as Logan s obligation to present a properly formed question on the topic which was designed to reveal juror bias. Because the court was not required to ask questions specifically directed to the NCR defense, there was no obligation on the court to re-frame Logan s improperly phrased questions. -20- disfavored in Maryland, and we find no a buse o f discre tion on this poin t. See Twining v. State, 234 Md. 97, 100, 198 A.2d 29 1, 293 (19 64) (stating it is g enerally recogn ized that it is inappropriate . . . to question the jury as to whether or not they would be disposed to follow or apply stated rules of law ). In addition, Question 7a was vagu e, and thus th e trial judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing to propou nd it to the ven ire. See Gro gg v. State, 231 Md. 530, 532, 192 A.2d 435, 436 (1960) (con cluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when refusing to ask a question that it held too broad, because it was a vague, blunderbuss-type question, the answer to which would have been of little aid in appellant s determining whether a particular juror had any predisposition concerning either the science of psychiatry or the defense of insan ity ). The q uestion uses the phrase burde n in this r egard, although not stating but obviously referring to the burden of preponderance of the evidence that Logan would have to satisfy in order to be found no t criminally responsible. The question, how ever, neither identifies specifically, nor explains Logan s burden with respect to an NCR defense. Because prospective jurors were asked to conclude whether they could return a verdict of NCR without an explanation of the defense or the burden of persuasion, the question w ould have been of little assistance in uncovering potential juror bias. Logan s proposed Question 7b read [ d]oes any juro r anticipate ha ving diffic ulty following the Court s instructions on the def ense of n ot criminally responsible , particularly in view of th e crimes ch arged in the indictment? The question suffers from the same flaw -21- as Ques tion 7a: w hether ju rors, without knowing what the court s instructions on the law would be, were asked if they would have difficulty following them. Not unlike Question 7a, Question 7b is too vague to be of any assistance to Logan, and thus the trial judge did not abuse his discretio n in refu sing to p ropou nd Qu estion 7 b to the v enire. See Grogg, 231 Md 530, 192 A.2d 435. As we made clear in Twining, 234 Md. at 100 , 198 A.2d at 293 , voir dire is not the app ropriate time for the trial judge to instruct the jury on the law applicable to the case. Proposed Question 7c read [ h]as any mem ber of the ju ry studied psychology or psychiatry? The trial court asked this question . We find no error. Question 7d read [d]o you have any reservation or feelings that would prevent you from fairly considering the evidence in the case? The co urt asked the prospective juro rs several questions similar to this reques ted question . The cou rt asked [w ]ould any member of this panel for a ny religious, mo ral, philosoph ical or person al reasons b e unable . . . to sit in judgment of another person and to fairly serve as a juror? The court concluded the general voir dire w ith the following question: [f]inally, do any of you have any reason that I haven t gone into specifically why you believe th at you could not sit as a juror in this case and render a fair and imp artial verdict based solely on the evidence? In the written questionnaire, the court asked [is] there anything else that wo uld interfere with your ab ility to sit as an impa rtial juror in this ca se, fairly and objectively considering all of the evidence, and ultimately rende ring a fair and impartial verdict based solely on the evidence presented -22- in the courtroom and the court s instructions on the law? Question 7d was fairly covered during the voir dire. Question 7e read [i]n view of the defense of not criminally responsible, does any member of the ven ire prefer no t to sit on the ca se? Th is question is sim ply an improper question and the trial co urt is not required to ask it. The issue is not whe ther a juror prefers not to sit on a case ; the issue is wh ether the juro r is biased. It is a citize n s civic du ty, if selected, to serve as a juror. The court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to ask this question. B. Voir D ire and Pretria l Publicity Logan argues that the form of the trial court s questions as to pretrial publicity was inadequate in light of this Court s opinion in Dingle, 361 Md. 1, 759 A.2d 819, and seeks reversal. We disagree. Logan primarily argues that because the court did not inquire about the nature of what the potential juror heard, whether the juror had formed an opinion about the case as a result of that information, or wha t the opinion was of that juror, that the court permitted the juror to self-assess his or her impartiality in violation of Dingle. The trial cou rt did not ask compound questions but rather asked broad, sing le issue que stions, and if a juror responded, the juror was invited to the bench for follow-up questions. -23- Contrary to Logan s suggestion, a trial court is not required to ask content-based questions. As the U .S. Suprem e Court ex plained in Mu m in v. Virginia , 500 U.S. 415, 42536, 111 S.Ct. 1899 , 1905, 114 L.Ed .2d 493 (1991): Whether a trial court decides to put questions about the content of publicity to a pote ntial juror or no t, it must make the same decision at the end of questioning: is this juror to be believed when he says he has not formed an opinion about the case? Questions about the content of publicity to which jurors have been exposed might be helpful in assessing whether a juror is impartial. To be constitutiona lly compelled, h oweve r, it is not enough that such questions might be helpful. Rather, the trial court s failure to ask these questions must render the defen dant s tr ial fund amen tally unfa ir. We agree. The trial court in this case made the required decision at the end of the individual voir dire conducted at the bench in light of all of the questioning: can this juror be believed when the juror said h e or she could be fa ir or impartial? We find n o error. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED. COSTS IN THIS COURT AND THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY PRINC E GEO RGE S COUNTY. Chief Ju dge Bell joins in th e jud gme nt on ly. -24-
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