In Re: Billy W.

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In re Billy W., Jessica W., Mary S., and George B., No. 92, September Term, 2004. Family Law: Appe als- Perm anenc y Plan H earing. In an action between the biological mother and the State inv olving child ren declare d to be in need of assistance, a court order maintaining the permanency plan for the children is not an appealable final judgment under Md. Code (1 974, 200 2 Repl. V ol.), § 12-303 (x) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 92 September Term, 2004 IN RE BILL Y W ., JESS ICA W ., MARY S. & GEORGE B. Bell, C.J. Raker Wilner Cathell Harrell Battaglia Greene, JJ. Opinion by Battaglia, J. Filed: May 11, 2005 In this action between the biological parent, Tammy B., and the State we have been asked to consider whethe r the trial court properly admitted hearsay testimony, within the context of a permane ncy planning hearing in which the court maintained extant permanency plans for children who previously had been d eclared in n eed of ass istance. W e decline to reach the admissibility issue, however, because the trial court s orders, from which the appeal was taken, c ontinu ing the p erman ency plan s for the children , do not constitute final judgments nor appealable interlocutory orders. I. Facts and Procedural History Tammy B. has four children: Mary S ., born in 19 91, Jessica W ., born in 199 2, Billy W., born in 1994, and George B., born in 2000. The father of Mary S ., Jessica W ., and Billy W. is deceased and the father of George B. is Michael B., Tammy B. s husband, from whom she is now s eparate d. All four children resided with both Tammy B. and Michael B. prior to the parents sep aration. The family first cam e to the attentio n of the B altimore C ounty Department of Soc ial Serv ices ( D SS ) w hen M ary S., then eight years old, alleged that she had been sexually abused by Michael B., who was later charged and convicted. DSS, during its investigation of the sexual abuse allegations, determined that Tammy B. was aware of Michael B. s past history of sexual abuse an d knew of M ichael B. s behavior w ith Mary S ., but had failed to take appropriate action to protect the girl. All of the children, nevertheless, remained in Tammy B. s care after sh e and M ichael B . separa ted. During the next tw o years there were four additional investigations by DSS of abuse and negle ct, including allegations that M ary S. had sexual ly abused Billy W. On February 7, 2002, DSS removed all four children from Tammy B. s care, placed them under emergency shelter care, and subsequently filed a petition in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County requesting judicial approval of she lter care for the children. The co urt conducted a hearing and ordered DSS custody of the children, and shelter care for them, pending an adjudicatory hearing.1 Thereafter, during the adjudicatory hearing, all four children were declared to be children in need of assistance ( CINA )2 and committed to the care and custody of DSS for placement in foster care. The court also established a permanency plan3 of reunific ation with T ammy B. if s he satisfied v arious con ditions set for th 1 An adjudicato ry hearing is a h earing und er this subtitle [Ju venile Ca uses] to determine whether the allegation s in the petition, other than th e allegation th at the child requires the court s intervention, are true. Md. Code (1973, 2002 Repl. Vol.), § 3-801(c) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. 2 Md. Code (1973, 2002 Repl. Vol.), § 3-801(f) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article defines a CINA as: Child in need of assistance means a child who requires court intervention because: (1) The child has been abused, has been neglected, has a developmental disability, or has a mental disorder; and (2) The child s parents, gu ardian, or cu stodian are u nable or unwilling to give proper care and attention to the child and the child s n eeds. 3 Md. Code (1984, 1999 R epl. Vol.), § 5-525(e) of the Family Law Article states: Development of a permanency plan. (1) In developing a permanency plan for a child in an out-of-home placement, the local department of social services shall give primary consideration to the best interests of the child. The local department shall consider the follow ing factors in determining the permanency plan that is in the best interests of the child: (i) the child s ab ility to be safe and healthy in the home (contin ued...) 2 in the court s order as follows: ORDERED . . . Visitation for mother shall be two hours 3 (...continued) of the child s parent; (ii) the child s attachment and emotional ties to the child s natural parents and siblings; (iii) the child s emotional attachment to the child s current c areg iver and the c areg iver s fa mily; (iv) the length of time the child has resided with the current caregiver; (v) the potential emotional, developmental, and educational harm to the child if moved from the child s current placement; and (vi) the potential harm to the child b y remaining in State custody for an excessive period of time. In addition, M aryland Cod e (1973, 20 02 Rep l. Vol.), Section 3-823 (e) o f the Cou rts and Judic ial Proceed ings Article s tates: Determinations to be made at hearing. At a permanency planning h earing, the co urt shall: (1) Determine the child s permanency plan, which may be: (i) Reunification with the parent or guardian; (ii) Placement with a relative for: 1. Adoption; or 2. Custody and guardianship; (iii) Adoption by a nonrelative; (iv) Guardianship by a nonrelative; (v) Continua tion in a spec ified placem ent on a permanent basis because of the child s special needs or circumstances; (vi) Continuation in placement for a specified period because of the child s special needs or circumstances; or (vii) Independent living; and (2) For a child who has attained the age of 16, determine the services needed to assist the child to make the transition from p laceme nt to ind epend ent livin g. 3 one time a week at DSS agency with the girls (Jessica and Mary Alice) unless oth erwise indicated differently by Mary Alice s therapist. Visitation for father shall be one hour one time per week supervised with the boys (Billy and George) at the DSS agen cy. If father does not exercise his visitation then mother may pick another location for her visitation as agreed . . . . it is further ORDERED that . . . reasonable efforts continue to be made to make it possible for the children to return home. Conditions - Mother is to coop erate with DSS in providing background information, signing release forms for any education al, medical or any other information needed to provide services for c hildren a nd famil y . . . . Mother is to continue and finish parenting skills classes and sign release of information regarding parenting class. Mother is to submit to a psychiatric and psych olog ical e valu ation by a qualified doctor in respect to her parenting abilities and techniques, she is to follow any recommendations for treatment as a result of the evaluation. Initia lly, DSS placed Billy W. and George B. together in a foster home; how ever, both boys were removed due to allegations that Billy W. ha d sexually abu sed a young er child in the home. After a brief stay in another home, Billy W. was committe d to St. Vincent s Center, a residential treatment center, from June 2002 until November 2003, when DSS transferred him to a therapeutic foster home. During that same time, George B. was moved to another foster home where he has remained. Mary S. and Jessica W. were placed tog ether in a fo ster home ; after six we eks both were moved to a therapeutic foster ho me. In Au gust 2002 , Mary S. w as admitted to Sheppard Pratt Hospital for suicidal behavior, where she was diagnosed with aggressive disorder rec urrent with psychosis and possible dissociative disorder. Mary S. stayed at Sheppard Pratt for six weeks, was discharged and moved to transitional housing, and then 4 to the Villa Maria Residential Treatment Center for six months, before returning to the original therapeutic foster home in May 2003. Jessica W. has remained in the original therape utic fos ter hom e the en tire time. The Circuit Court conducted periodic review hearings,4 and on June 23, 2003, DSS recommended, and the court ordered, a change in the permanency plan for George B. from reunification to a concurrent plan of reunification with Tam my B. and adoption. T he court also increased B illy W., Jessica W., and Mary S. s visitation with Tammy B. to include one additional hour of unsupervised visitation and maintained the same plans of reunification with Tammy B. for the th ree children . Tamm y B. did not object to the maintenance of the permanency plans for Billy W., Jessica W. or Mary S., but contested the change in the permanency plan for George B. and noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, which 4 Md. Code (1973, 2002 Repl. Vol.), § 3-823(h) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article states: Periodic reviews. (1)(i) Except as provided in subparagraphs (ii) and (iii) of this p aragraph, th e court shall conduct a hearing to review the perma nency plan a t least every 6 m onths until commitment is rescinded. (ii) The cou rt shall conduct a review hearing every 12 months after the court determines that the child shall be continued in out-of-home placement with a specific caregiver who agrees to care for the child on a permanent basis. (iii) 1. Unless the court finds good cau se, a case sha ll be terminated after the court grants custody and guardianship of the child to a relative o r other in dividu al. 2. If the Court finds good cause not to terminate a case, the court shall conduct a review hearing every 12 months u ntil the case is termin ated. 5 affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court in an unre ported opinio n, see In re George B., No. 1029, September Term 2003 (filed June 10, 2004). While that appeal was pending in the Court of Special Appeals, the Circuit Court held another six month review hearing on Novem ber 10, 200 3, which is the subject o f the presen t appeal bef ore this Co urt. During the review hearing, DSS filed a report addressing the status of each child and Tammy B. s efforts to comply with various service agreements, to which Tammy B. objected on hearsay grounds, which was overruled by the court. In addition, DSS produce d its only witness, the foster care worker, Ms. Kristy Caceres, who testified about the current status of each child and the interactions among Tammy B. and the children. During the November 10, 2003 hearing, Tammy B. testified about her relationships with the children and her ab ility to care for them. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court continued the commitment of all four children to the care and custody of DSS. The judge also continued the permanency plans for Billy W., Jessica W., and Mary S. as reunification with Tammy B., and noted that if the continued visitations [did not] show improvement and there [were] really serious behavioral ramifications to the[se] [three older] children, the plans ought to be something other than to return h ome. Accord ingly, the court or dered that T ammy B. s v isitation with Billy W. and Jessica W. would remain two hours supervised per week and one hour unsupervised per week . As to M ary S., the parties ag reed, and th e court acquiesced in the decision, that Tamm y B. would be permitted one hour supervised visitation per w eek with 6 Mary S. and that the unsupervised visitation would be suspended.5 With respect to George B., the hearing judge noted that the problem [was] different : With George B. there is a concurre nt plan [of reunification with Tammy B. and adoptio n] . . . . The difference with the way I see George B. s visits structured is that you have a three-and-a-halfyear-old child who has three hours of visits with mother once a week and then sometimes we back that up with an extra hour with his father. I don t know whether his processing difficulties and his behav ioral difficulties are because he sees his mother and has visits or because we load so much up at one time that he can t adjust to that and cope with that . . . . [Tammy B.] has had a total of three hours a week [of visitation], and I think that we ought to mix it up, an hour and a half unsupervised and an hour and a h alf sup ervised [visitatio n], and s ee how that goe s. Essentially, Tammy B. continued to have three hours of visitation with George B., but the supervised visitation was reduced to o ne and a half hou rs per week. In add ition, the court ordered that the permanency plan for George B. should remain a concurrent plan of reunification with Tammy B. and adoption. Both Ta mmy B. an d Mich ael B. noted separate 5 During the Novem ber 10, 2003 hearing, Ms. Caceres testified about the visitation betwe en Tam my B. an d Ma ry S.: As of right now Mary sees her mother during fam ily the rapy . . . . The Court ha d specified that Mrs. B . was entitled to unsupervised visits with Mary as well as the supervised portion. It was several mo nths, at least as of August, that stopp ed. Mary indicated to first her foster p arent, then to workers , and then to her mother, Mrs. B. that she did no t want to have unsupervised visits with her m other, and those - - and M rs. B. agreed and it stopped. 7 appeals to the Court of Special Appeals concernin g all of the children with respect to the admissibility of hearsay testimony during the hearing, and from the court s order regarding George B. In an unreported opinion, the intermediate appellate court addressed the substantive issues raised b y the parties and affirmed the judgm ents of the C ircuit Court. 6 Thereafter, Tammy B. filed a petition for writ of certiorari7 in this Court to consider the follow ing question : Did the trial judge err in admitting hearsay evidence at the permanency plan review hearing in these CINA cases? We granted the petition and issued the writ of c ertiorari, In re Bi lly W., Je ssica W ., Mary S., and George W., 383 Md. 569 , 861 A.2d 60 (2 004). Because w e hold that the trial court s orders, from which this appeal is taken, continuing the permanency plans for the children do not constitute final judgments nor appealable interlocutory orders, we do not reach any other issue. See Montgomery C ounty v. Ward, 331 Md. 521 , 528-29, 629 A .2d 619, 622-23 (1 993). 6 In the Circuit Court, the cases pertaining to each child were separately docketed; however, the various hearings were always consolidated to include all four children in a single hearing . On appeal to the C ourt of Special Ap peals, Tammy B. and Michael B. s separate appeals were consolidated, briefed and argued, all of which occurred prior to our recent decision in In re Samone H. and Marchay E., __ Md. __, __ A .2d __ (2005), establishing the requirements of appellate review for judgments arising from permanency plan rev iew he arings. 7 We granted certiorari and docketed this case as In re Billy W., Je ssica W ., Mary S., and George W., No. 92, September Term, 2004, and ordered that the case be heard on the same day as a se cond re lated ca se, In re Billy W., Jessica W., Mary S., and George W., No. 100, September Term, 2004, and also In re Ashley E., Laione D., Matthew B., Gregory B.-G., No. 90, September Term, 2004. 8 II. Discussion As a thresh old matter in this case, we are faced, once again, with resolving whether an order continuing a previousl y established permanency plan is appealable. Tammy B. argues that such orders should be appealable because the trial court s refusal to abrogate DSS s custody of the children an d to return them to her is a denial of h er parental rights. In Tammy B. s view , as long as D SS has cu stody of the ch ildren, she is being deprived of her parental rights, an d theref ore, the o rders co ntinuin g the pe rmane ncy plan s are ap pealab le. DSS contends that, based upon our recent decision in In re Samone H. and Marchay E., __ Md. __, __ A.2d __ (2005), the trial court s orders preserving the existing permanency plans for the children are not imm ediately appea lable becau se the order s did not ad versely affect Tamm y B. s par ental rig hts. We agree a nd sha ll explain . A. Funda mental Righ ts of Parents As w e have often s tated, a parent s interest in raising a child is a fu ndamen tal right, recognized by the United States Sup reme Co urt as well as this Court. See Troxel v. Granville , 530 U.S. 57, 66, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 2060, 147 L. Ed.2d 49, 57 (20 00); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S. Ct 138 8, 1394-9 5, 71 L. Ed .2d 599, 60 6 (1982); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651, 92 S. Ct. 1208, 1212, 31 L. Ed.2d 55 1, 558 (19 72); Prince v. Massa chusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166, 64 S.Ct. 438, 442, 88 L. Ed. 645, 652 (1944); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S. Ct 625, 626, 67 L. Ed. 1041 , 1045 (19 23); In re Victor A., __ Md. __, __ A.2d __ (2005); In re Mark M., 365 Md. 687, 705, 782 A.2d 332, 342-43 9 (2001). Such rights are so f undame ntal that they can not be take n away un less clearly justified, Boswe ll v. Boswe ll, 352 M d. 204, 218 , 721 A.2d 662, 669 (1998)(citing In re Adoption No. 10941, 335 Md. 99, 112, 642 A.2d 201 (199 4)), because a parent s interest occupies a unique place in our legal culture, given the centrality of family life as the focus for personal meaning and responsibility. In re Yve S. 373 M d. 551, 567, 819 A.2d 1030, 1039 (2003), quoting In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 10941, 335 Md. 99, 112, 642 A.2d 201 (1994), in turn quoting Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S . 18, 101 S .Ct. 2153, 68 L.Ed .2d 640 (1 981); see also, Shurupoff v. Vockroth , 372 Md. 639, 650, 814 A.2d 543, 550 (2003 ); In re Mark M., 365 Md. at 705, 782 A.2d at 34 2-43; Boswe ll, 352 Md. at 218, 72 1 A.2d at 669. We have recognized , however, that a parent s right to raise his or her children is not absolute, and there may be countervailing considerations that the State, pursuant to its parens patriae authority, must p rotect: We have held that the b est interests of the child may take precedence over the pa rent s liberty interest in the course of a custody, visitation, or adoption dispute. Boswe ll, 352 Md. at 219, 721 A.2 d at 669; see also In re Adoption No. 10941, 335 Md. at 113, 642 A.2d at 208 (stating that the controlling factor . . . is . . . wha t best ser ves the interest o f the ch ild ). That which will best promote the child s welfare becomes particularly consequential where the interests of a child are in jeopardy, as is ofte n the case in situatio ns in volv ing s exual, ph ysical, or emotional abuse by a parent. As we stated in In re Adoption/Guardianship No. A91-71A, 334 Md. 538, 640 A.2d 1085 (1994), the child s welfare is a consideration that is of transcendent importanc e when the child might otherwise be in jeopard y. Id. at 561, 6 40 A.2 d at 109 6 (citatio n omitte d). 10 *** We have recognized that in cases where abuse or neglect is evidenced, particularly in a CINA case, the court s role is necessarily more p ro-activ e. See In re Justin D., [357 Md. 431, 448, 745 A.2d 408, 417 (2000 )]. In re Mark M., at 365 Md. at 705-07, 782 A.2d at 343-44. B. The Child Welfare System and Permanency Planning In Maryland, the General Assembly has enacted a comprehensive statutory scheme to ascertain whether a child is in need of assistance due to his or her parents inability or unwillingness to care f or him o r her. Pursuant to the statute, when the local department of social services receives reports of abuse or neglect, it is required to investigate such reports, and in accorda nce with its f indings, rend er approp riate services in the best interests of the child, including re unifying the c hild with a parent or petitioning the juvenile co urt to comm it the child to the department s care an d custo dy. See Md. Code (1984, 2002 Repl. Vol., 2004 Cum. Supp.), § 5-710 of the Family Law Article. If the juvenile court determines that the child is in need of assistance (C INA), the court may order, among several options, that the child be comm itted to the loca l departme nt for out-of-home placement in a foster home or with relatives . See Md. C ode, (19 84, 200 2 Rep l. Vol., 20 04 Cu m. Supp.) § 5-525 of the Family L aw A rticle. One of the importa nt purpose s of the child welfare system is to provide a permanent and stable environment fo r children declared CIN A, and to prevent those children from languishing in foster care. Accordingly, in order to facilitate this goal, the M aryland statutory 11 scheme directs the local department of social services to develop and impleme nt a permanency plan that is in the best interests of those children committed to the custody of those departm ents. In re Yve S., 373 M d. at 574, 819 A.2d at 1044, quoting In re Adoption /Guardia nship No. 10941, 335 Md. at 103 -06, 642 A.2d at 20 3-05; Md. Code (1984, 1999 Repl. Vol., 2002 Cum. Supp.), § 5-525(e) of the Family Law Article. In In re Damon M., we identified the importance of a permanency plan: The permanency plan is an integral part of the statutory scheme designed to expedite the movement of Maryland s children from foster care to a permanent living, and hopefully, family arrangem ent. It provides the goal toward which the parties and the court are co mmitted to w ork. It sets the tone for the parties and the court an d, indeed, m ay be outcom e determinative. Services to be provided by the local social service department and commitments that must be made by the parents and children are dete rmined by the pe rmane ncy plan . 362 Md. at 436, 765 A.2d at 627-28. In In re Yve S. we explained the need for trial courts to review permanency plans to ensure that children are being cared for in the best pos sible manner: As In re Damon M. observes, the purpose of a permanency plan is to set the direction in which the parent, agencies, and the court will work in terms of reaching a satisfactory conclusion to the situation. Once set initially, the goal of the perma nency plan is re-visited periodically at hearings to determine progress and whether, due to historical and contemporary circumstances, that goal should be changed. It is not the purpose of the initial permanency plan hearing, however, to resolve all issues involved in that final resolution. If that were the case, there would be no need for review of how, on a regular basis, the plan is progressing or not. Also as In re Damon M. indicates, the initial permanency plan hearing is to be held and conducted 12 expediti ousl y. Protracted proceedings in establishing the initial plan defeat the purpose of the statute. The statute presume s that, unless there are compelling circumstances to the contrary, the plan should be to work toward reunification, as it is presumed that it is in the best interest of a child to be returned to h is or her natural pare nt. 373 Md. at 582, 819 A.2d at 1049. In In re Y ve S., quoting from In re Damon M., we also delineated the requirements a trial court must follow when implementing a permanency plan: [T]he court has the responsibility for determining the permanency plan, § 3-826.1(a)(1) and justifying the placement of children in out of home placements for a specified period or on a long-term o r permane nt basis, § 3-8 26.1(d), in ad dition to condu cting pe riodic, six month review s. § 3-82 6.1 (f). *** Section 3-826.1 [ now co dified as Se ction 3-823 of the Co urts and Judicial Proceedings A rticle] requires the court, not later than 11 months after a child found to be in need of assistance has been placed in foster care, see also Md. Code (1989, 1991 Repl. Vol., 1997 Cum. Supp.) § 501(m) of the Family Law Article, to hold a permanency planning hearing to determine the permanency plan for tha t child. § 3-826.1(a)(1) [now § 3823(b)(1)]. At that hearing, for each child in placemen t and in determining the plan, the court is required to make certain decisions and findings, § 3-826.1(c), [now § 3-82 3(e)] spec ifica lly, whether the child sho uld be: return ed to the parent or guardian, § 3-826.1(c)(1)(i) [now § 3-823(e)(1)(i)]; placed with relatives to whom adoption or guardianship is granted, § 3826.1(c)(1 )(ii) [now § 3-823(e)(1)(ii)]; placed for adoption, § 3826.1(c)(1 )(iii) [now § 3-823(e)(1)(iii)]; emancipated, § 3826.1(c)(1)(iv) [now deleted]; or because of the child s special needs or circums tances, con tinued in placement on a permanent or long-term basis or for a sp ecified period . § 3-826.1(c)(1)(v) and (vi ) [now § 3-82 3(e)(1) (v) and (vi)]. Id. at 577-81, 819 A.2d at 1046-48 (additions in original). We explained: 13 Section 3-826.1(f) [now § 3-823(h)] mandates periodic reviews of the perma nency plan b y the court. Sub section (f)(1 )(i) provides [now § 3-82 3(h)(1)(i)] that such reviews will be no less frequently than every six mo nths until com mitment is rescind ed. If, however, at the permanency planning hearing or a subsequent review hearing, the court, inter alia, or ders a child continued in permanent foster care, the court is no longer required to hold the review hearings at six month intervals. Subsection (f)(1)(ii) [now § 3-823(h )(1)(ii), is revised to require review hearings every 12 months.]. As is true of the initial permanency planning hearing, the court must make some determinations at the hearing to review the permanency plan. § 3-826.1(f)(2) [now § 3-8 23(h)(2)]. A mong o ther things, in addition to determining whether the commitment remains necessary and appropriate, subsection (f)(2)(i) [now § 3823(h)(2)(i)], and evaluating the progress made toward alleviating or mitigating the causes o f the com mitment, subsection (f)(2)(iii) [now § 3-823(h)(2)(iii)], the court is required to determine the extent of compliance with the permanency plan, Subsection (f)(2)(ii) [now § 3-823 (h)(2)(ii)], and to change it if a change in the permanency plan would be in the child s best interest. Subsection (f)(2)(v) [now § 3-823 (h)(2)(vi)]. Id. at 581, 8 19A.2 d at 104 8 (addi tions in o riginal). C. Appealability of Permanency Plan Orders Appea ls may only be tak en from a final judgm ent of the trial court pursu ant to Maryland Code (1974, 2002 Repl. Vol.), Section 12-301 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, wh ich states that, a party may appeal fro m a final jud gment en tered in a civil . . . case . . . [whether] entered . . . in the exercise of original, special, limited, or statutory jurisdiction, unless . . . expressly denied by law. Smith v. Taylor, 285 Md. 143, 146, 400 A.2d 1130, 1132 (1979) (internal citations omitted). For the trial court s ruling to 14 be a final judgment it must either determine and conclude the rights of the parties involved or deny a party the means to prosecut[e] or defend[] his or her rights and interests in the subject matter of the proceeding. Rohrbeck v. Rohrbeck, 318 M d. 28, 41 , 566 A.2d 767, 773 (1989). In considering whether a particular court order or ruling constitutes an appealab le judgment, we assess whether any further order is to be issued or whether any further action is to be ta ken in th e case. See Rohrbeck, 318 Md. at 41-42, 566 A.2d at 774. There are instances when a trial court s order constitutes a final appealable judgment even though th e order fails to settle th e unde rlying disp ute betw een the parties. See Ferrell v. Benson, 352 Md. 2, 6, 720 A.2d 583, 585-86 (1998) (holding that order transferring case to district court w as a final an d appeala ble judgm ent), and cas es cited there in; Moore v. Pomory, 329 Md. 428, 432, 620 A.2d 323, 325 (1993) (determining that trial court s order dismissing complaint without prejudice was a fin al judgme nt); Horsey v. Horsey, 329 Md. 392, 401, 620 A.2d 305, 310 (1993) (concluding that trial court s order dismissing former husband s contempt petition against former wife and directing arbitration of alimony dispute was a final appealable order because it had the ef fect of putting the parties out of court). Clea rly, in this case, ho wever, co urt orders arising from a periodic review hearing that maintain the permanency plans for the c hildren do not c onstitute final jud gmen ts. See In re Samone H., __ Md. at __, __ A.2d at __ ; In re Damon M., 362 Md. 429, 434, 765 A.2d 624, 627 (2001). A n order that is n ot a final judgment may qualify as an interlocutory order, but ordinarily is not appealable unless it falls within one of the statutory excep tions set forth in 15 Maryland Code (1974 , 2002 Repl. Vo l.), Section 12-303 of the Court and Judicial Proceedings Article.8 See In re Samone H., __ Md . at __, __ A .2d at __; In re Damon M., 8 Md. Code, §12-303 of the Co urt and Judicial Proceedings Article provides: A party may appea l from any of the follow ing interlocu tory orders entered by a circuit court in a civil case: (1) An order entered with regard to the possession of pro perty with which the action is concerned or with reference to the receipt or charging of the income, interest, or dividends therefrom, or the refusal to modify, dissolve, or discharge such an order; (2) An orde r granting o r denying a m otion to quash a writ of attachment; and (3) An order: (i) Granting or dissolving an injunction, but if the appeal is from an order granting an injunction, only if the appellant h as first filed his a nswer in th e cause; (ii) Refusing to dissolve an injunction, but only if the appellant has first filed h is answer in the cause; (iii) Refusing to grant an injunctio n; and the rig ht of appe al is not prejudiced by the filing of an answer to the bill of complaint or petition for an injunction on behalf of any opposing party, nor by the taking o f deposition s in reference to the allegations of the bill of complaint to be read on the hearing of the application for an injunctio n; (iv) Appointing a receiver but only if the appellant has first filed his answe r in the cause ; (v) For the sale, conveyance, or delivery of real or personal property or the payment of money, or the refusal to rescind or discharge such an order, unless the delivery or paym ent is directed to b e made to a receiver ap pointed by the court; (vi) Determining a question of right between the parties and directing an account to be stated on the principle of such determina tion; (vii) Requiring bond from a person to whom the distribution or delivery of property is directed, or withholding distribution or (contin ued...) 16 362 Md. at 434, 765 A.2d at 626-27. In In re Samone H., we scrutinized whether an appeal would lie from an order entered after a permanency plan review hearing where the order continuing the perma nency plan d id not adversely affect the parental rights or change the terms of the permanency plan to the parent s detriment. In that case, the Circuit Court for Baltimore City previously had implemented permanency plans of adoption for two children, Samone H. and Marchay E., both of whom had been adjudicated children in need of assistance, based upon allegations of neglect by their mo ther, Ka tina M . Id. at __, __ A.2d at __. After several periodic review hearings, Katina M. filed a req uest for a bondin g stu dy to have the children evaluated by a psychiatrist to provide an assessme nt of her rela tionship with her children. She also had the children subpoenaed to testify at another pending review hearing. During that hearing, the trial judge denied both requests and maintained the extant permanency plans for a doption, fro m which Katina M . appealed. O n appeal, th e Court of 8 (...continued) delivery and ordering the retention or accum ulation of p roperty by the fiduciary or its transfer to a trustee or receiver, or deferring the passage of the court's decree in an action under Title 10, Ch apter 600 o f the Ma ryland Rules; (viii) Deciding any question in an insolvency proceeding brought under Title 15, Subtitle 1 of the Commercial Law Article; (ix) Granting a petition to stay arbitration pursuant to § 3-208 of this article; (x) Deprivin g a parent, g randparen t, or natural guardian of the care and custody of his child, or changing the terms of such an order; and (xi) Denying im munity asserted under § 5-525 or § 5-526 of this article. 17 Special Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court, and this Court after granting certiorari, dismissed the appeal, hold ing that the trial court s order denying the motion for [bonding] stud y [was] not an appealable final judgment and [did] not constitute an interlocutory order under Section 12-303(x). Id. at __, __ A.2d at __.9 In reaching that conclusion, we explained that, [b]ecause the order continuing the permanency plan did not adversely affect Katina M. s parental rights or change the terms of the permanency plan to Katina M. s detriment, the trial judge s ac tions [we re] not review able by this Court. Id. at __, __ A.2d at __. We further noted that the court s order was not appealab le under the collateral order doctrine becau se the order did not con clusively determine whether the permanency plans should have been changed, was not separate from the merits of the action, and would be reviewable on appeal if the denial had affected the mother s parenta l rights. Id. at __ n.13, __ A.2d at __ n.13. Thus, to be app ealable, court orders arising from the permanency plan review hearing must operate to either deprive Tammy B. of the care and custody of her children or change the terms of her care and 9 Maryland Code (1974, 1998 Repl. Vol.) Section 12-303 (x) of the Court and Judicial Proceedings Article provides: A party may appeal from any of the follow ing interlocutory orders entered by a circuit court in a civil case: *** (3) An order: *** (x) Depriving a parent, grandparent, or natural guardian of the care and custody of his child, or changing the terms of such an order . . . . 18 custody of the children to her d etrimen t. Id. at __, __ A .2d at ___; In re Damon M., 362 Md. at 438, 765 A.2d at 628. Analogous to the circumstances in In re Samone H., the orders continuing the permanency plans for all four children in the case sub judice, are not appealable because the orders did not detrimentally affect Tammy B. s custody rights or visitation with the children, even thou gh T amm y B. ha d sou ght f ull cu stod y. As in In re Samone H., we conclude once again, that in the absence of a detrimental change in Tammy B. s care and custody of the children, her parental rights have not been adversely affected to permit an appeal of the lower court s orders maintaining the extant permanency plans. In re Samone H., __ Md at __, __ A.2d at __; In re Damon M., 362 Md. at 438, 765 A.2d at 628. Likewise, the orders are not appealable as collateral orders because the orders are subject to review and change; do not conclusive ly determine the custody of the children ; and do no t adversely affect Tammy B. s custod ial rights. See In re Samone H., __ M d. at __ n .13, __ A .2d at __ n.13. During oral argument before this Court, Tammy B. asserted that our decision in Frase v. Barnhart, 379 Md. 100 , 840 A.2d 114 (2003), should control decisions affecting the appealab ility of court orders arising from permanency plan review hearings. The circumstances of Frase involved a custody dispute b etween a mo ther and her child s caretakers, who, during part of the mother s incarceration, volunteered to care for the child and then sought custody. Id. at 102, 840 A.2d at 11 5. The trial co urt resolved the dispute by granting custo dy to the mother, but imposing various conditions upon the terms of her 19 custody including: that she vacate her existing housing, that she apply to and obtain new housing at a specific place where the mother did not want to live, and that the child spend every other w eeken d with t he care givers. Id. at 120, 840 A.2d at 125. The trial court left open the prospe ct of chan ging the m other s custo dy if the moth er did not meet the conditions. This Court determined that the custodial order was appealable under Section 12-303(x) because the court s order operated as a substantial, albeit partial, deprivation of her custody. Id. at 119-20, 840 A.2d at 125. Similarly, to be appealable in CINA cases involving the biological p arent and th e State, a cou rt order mu st operate to deprive a parent of the care and custody of his or her child, or change the terms of custody to the parent s detriment. The present case, nonetheless, is dissimilar from Frase in that Tammy B. s custodial rights had been abrogated wh en the children were declared in need o f assistance a nd comm itted to DSS s custody, but not when the trial court maintained the permanency plans for the children, which did not adversely affect Tammy B. s parental rights. As a result, we conclude that this case is controlled by our decision In re Samone H., and that the trial court s permanency plan orders emanating from the November 10, 2003, hearing are nonreviewable. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL A P P E A LS VACATED, AND C A SE REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO DISMISS APPEAL; PET ITIO NER TO P AY C OST S. 20