Whiting v. State

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Wesley Whiting, a/k/a Jeffrey Wilson, a/k/a L ynell Whiting v. State of M aryland, No. 4, September Term, 2005. CRIMINAL LAW - FOURTH AMENDMENT - SEARCH OF PREMISES: Petitioner challenged the denial of a motion to suppress evidence found during two searches of a vac ant h ouse own ed by the C ity of Baltimore where he had been "squatting" in the upstairs rear bedro om. The Court of Appea ls held that pe titioner did possess a subjective expectation of privacy in the upstairs rear bedroom of the vacant ho use, but bec ause he d id not lawfully ow n, lease, contro l, occupy, or righ tfully possess the bedroom or the hou se, did not possess an objective expectation of privacy in the bedroom or the house. The Court of Appea ls therefore h eld that petition er did not ha ve standing to challenge the two searches of the house and upheld the trial court s denial of petitioner s motion to suppress the evidence. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 4 September Term, 2005 WESLEY WHITING A/K/A JEFFREY WILSON A/K/A LYNELL WHITING v. STATE OF MARYLAND Bell, C.J. Raker Wilner Cathell Harrell Battaglia Greene, JJ. Opinion by Battaglia, J. Bell , C.J. join s in th e jud gme nt on ly. Filed: November 8, 2005 Petitioner Wesley Whiting, also known as Jeffrey Wilson and Lynell Whiting, seeks review of a judgment of the Court of Special Appeals affirming the Circuit Court s dismissal of Whiting s motion to suppress evidence as the fruit of alleged illegal searches of 810 East Preston Street, Baltimore, Maryland, a house owned by the City in which Whiting was a squat ter. On April 7, 2005, this Court granted Whiting s Petition for Writ of C ertiorari to address the question that Whiting has presented to us for review: Did the lower C ourt err by ruling that Petitioner d id not have standing to challeng e the legality of the search of the house where h e was resid ing witho ut a property inte rest? Whiting v. State, 386 M d. 180, 872 A.2d 47 (2005). W e hold that, alth ough W hiting did possess a subjective expectation of privacy in the second floor rear bedroom of 810 East Preston Street, his expectation of privacy was not objectively reasonable, and as a result, he did not have standing under the Fourth Amendment to challenge the searches. 1 I. Background On April 7, 2001, Baltimore City Police Officers responded to 1136 Homewood Avenue in Baltimore to try to find William Jerome Moore, Jr., a Correctional Officer who had failed to report to work for two days. Upon arriving at the home, the officers discovered Moore s body. An autopsy show ed that Moore s d eath was caused by blunt force trauma. 1 The question presented in the Petition for Certiora ri is phrased in the singular w ith respect to search, although there were two searches that occurre d, one on A pril 27, 2001 and one on May 4, 2001. The transcript of the suppression hearing reflects consideration of standing with respect to both searches, although the Court of Special Appeals appears to have evaluated Whiting s standing only with regard to the May 4, 2001 search. The Petition for Writ of Certiorari refers to two searches. Our holding disposes of the standing question w ith respect to both the April 27, 2001 and May 4, 2001 searches. During the investigation, detectives were able to identify Moore s cellular phone number, despite failing to recov er the ph one. The cellular phone records were subpoenaed from the phone company and reflected use after Moore s death. On April 26, 2001, after having traced calls made from the cellular phone, detectives located and spoke with a witness who had received a call from Whiting and believed that Whiting had called from a number resembling Moore s pho ne number. A nother witness also made a photographic identification of Whiting as the individual in possession of Moore s cellular phone, and an acquaintance of Whiting reported that Whiting lived at 810 East Preston Street in Baltimore, where, in fact, he had been arrested on April 21, 2001, on unrelated charges. T he investiga tion eventu ally culminated in the execution of two search warrants on April 27, and May 4, 2001 at 810 East Preston Street where police recovered various items of personal property, some of which contain ed bloo d. On April 30, 2001, W hiting was served w ith an arrest warrant for the murder of Moore. He was later indicted for one count of first degree murder in violation of Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.), Section 407 of Article 27,2 one coun t of first degre e assault 2 Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.), Section 407 of Article 27, states: All murder which shall be perpetrated by means of poison, or lying in wait, or by any kind of wilful, deliberate and premeditated killing shall be murder in the first degree. Section 407 has been rec odified without substan tive change as M aryland Code (2002 ), Section 2-201 of the C riminal L aw A rticle. -2- in violation of Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.), Section 12A-1 of Article 27,3 one count of second degree assault in violation of Ma ryland Code (1957, 19 96 Repl. Vol.), Section 12A of Article 27,4 one count of robbery in violation of Maryland Code (1957, 1996 3 Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Rep. Vol., 2001 Supp.), Section 12A-1 of Article 27, states: (a) Serious physical injury; use of a firearm. (1) A person may not intentionally cause or attempt to cause serious physical injury to another. (2) A person may not commit an assault with a firearm, including: (i) A handgu n, antique firearm, rifle, shotgun, short-barreled shotgun, or short-barreled rifle, as those terms are defined in § 36F of this article; (ii) An assault pistol, as defined in § 36H-1 of this article; (iii) A pistol, revolver, or antique pistol or revolver, as those terms are defined in § 441 of this article; and (iv) A machine gun, as defined in § 372 of this article. (b) Penalty. A person who violates this section is guilty of the felony of assault in the first degree and on conviction is subject to imprisonment for not more than 25 years. Section 12A 1 has been recodified without substantive change as Maryland Code (2002 ), Sectio n 3-20 2 of the Crimin al Law Article. 4 Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.), Section 12A of Article 27, states: (a) General prohibition. A perso n may not co mmit an a ssault. (b) Violation; penalties. A person who vio lates this section is guilty of the misdeme anor of as sault in the second degree and on conviction is subject to a fine of not more than $2,500 or imprisonment for not more than 10 years or both. Section 12A has bee n recodified withou t substantive change as M aryland Code (2002 ), Section 3-203 of the C riminal L aw A rticle. -3- Repl. Vol.), Section 486 of Article 27,5 and one count of theft in violation of Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.), Section 342 of Article 27.6 Whiting moved to suppress the evidence seized during the April 27 and May 4, 2001 searches of 810 East Preston Street. The State countered by contesting Whiting s standing to challenge the searches, alleging that Whiting was a squatter or trespasser in the house. At the suppression hearing, Whiting argued that he had standing to challenge the searches 5 Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.), Section 486 of Article 27, states: Every person convicted of the crim e of robb ery or attempt to rob, or as acces sory thereto befo re the fac t, is guilty o f a fe lony, shall restore the thing robbed or taken to the owner, or shall pay to him the full value thereof, and be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than 15 years. Section 486 has been recodified without substantive change as Maryland C ode (2002), Section s 3-401 and 3-4 02 of th e Crim inal La w Art icle. 6 Maryland Code (1 957, 199 6 Repl. V ol.), Section 3 42 of A rticle 27, in relev ant part, states: (a) Obtainin g or exertin g unauth orized con trol. A person commits the offen se of theft w hen he w illfully or know ingly obtains control which is unauthorized or exerts co ntrol which is unauthorized over property of the owner, and: (i) Has the purpose of depriving the owner of the property; or (ii) Willfully or knowingly uses, conceals, or abandons the property in such manner as to deprive the owner of the prop erty; or (iii) Uses, conceals, or abandons the property knowing the use, concealm ent, or abandonment probably will deprive the owner of th e pro perty. Section 482 has been rec odified without substan tive change as M aryland Code (2002 ), Section 7-104 of the C riminal L aw A rticle. -4- of 810 East Preston Street beca use he ha d a legitimate expectation of privacy in the second floor room where he was staying and, as evidence of such, introduced items seized during the April 27th search of 810 East Preston Street, including: one college registration in the name of Wesley Whiting, his address listed at 39 Liberty Road; four photographs; one letter addressed to Jeffrey Wilson at 300 East Madison Street from Crystal Whiting, and one letter addressed to Crystal Whiting at 609 29th Street from Wesley Whiting w ith his return address listed as Forrest Street. Whiting also introduced the affidavit in support of the application for the April 27th search warrant of 810 East Preston Street, which included the phrase that a witness who reported knowing Wesley Whiting said when interviewed that Wesley Whiting had told him that he had been living at the address determined to be the vacant house at 810 East Preston Street. The State, conv ersely, argued th at Whiting did not have standing to challenge the searches and introduced a copy of a deed reflecting that the Housing Authority of Baltimore City owned 810 Eas t Preston Stre et, and a copy of the last lease for the premises, showing that Joyce Melvin, Robert Anderson, Corderio Washington, and Donna Fowles had been the last tenants, having vacated the premises in May of 2000. The State also submitted the processing information and Statement of Charges against Whiting, showing that Whiting had not provided any home address, as well as the intake f acility processing information for Whiting, in which he listed his add ress as 39 Liberty Street, a copy of Whiting s arrest information showing his address as 609 North Ellwood Ave nue, and a copy of W hiting s motor vehicle records showing he reported his home address as 550 Saint M ary s Street and -5- 828 E ast Pres ton Stre et. Detective Ronald Berger testified at the suppression hearing that when he visited the premises in April and May of 2001, the front door of 810 East Preston Street was sealed shut with either brick or boards while the rear door was unlocked. Berger could n ot recall whether the rear door s doorkn ob had a func tioning lock, or if he had occasion to use any lights in the house. The Housing Authority of Baltimore City later confirmed that the meters for the electricity wer e never disc onnected to the home, but that the electricity had not been used since 2000. Detective Berger also identified photographs taken on April 27, 2001 of the premises which showed that the rear d oor to the 81 0 East Pre ston Street h ad a brok en wind ow in it with some type of material patching behind the inside area of the broken glass and that the rear door also had a bolt-type lock above the door knob. The photographs also showed a second floor rear bedroom with a green wall where Whiting had been staying; the room contained bedding on the floor, along with some personal items about in the room, a television, and a piece of plywood on the wall that appeared to cover a window. In another room on the second floor, distinguished by its white wall, there was also some bedding on the floor and a window frame with red trim covered by plywoo d. A May 4th photograph reflected the addition of a green trash can in th e second floor rear bedroom with the green wall. Robert Jones, also known as Crystal Whiting, also testified at the suppression hearing. Jones noted that he temporarily had been staying at 810 East Preston Street. He stated that -6- he shared the second floor rear bedroom of the hou se with W hiting, and th at approxim ately four other peop le also lived in the house. According to Jones, Whiting kept people out of the room by means o f a lock on the door, fo r which W hiting had the only key. Jones acknowledged that he never paid rent for staying at 810 East Preston Street, nor did he ever have keys to the home. He stated that he gained admission to the house through the back door, wh ich was a lways unloc ked. Jones did not kn ow, how ever, whe ther the othe r people who resided in the home had keys or how they entered the house because he did not sociali ze w ith them . In ruling that W hiting lacked standing to challenge the searches, Judge Joseph P. McC urdy stated: Well, I think as a matter of fact I can find that the property at issue in this case, which is 810 East Presto n Street, is owned by the Hou sing Authority of Baltimore City. I find as a matter of fact that the property was not - th ere was n o operab le lease in effect regarding this property at the time of the search and seizure, or at the time the Defendant arguably occupied the premises, the last lease having expired in the year 2000. I find, as a matte r of fac t, and this is essentially admitted by the Defend ant, that the Defendant was what would n ormally call [sic] a squatter in the abandoned property, or a trespasser in the . . . of the la w. That De fendant h ad no righ ts to the prop erty whatsoever, no possessory interest in the property at all that s recognize d under th e law, either th e constitution , which w ould be a property right, or any statuto ry law or com mon law in Maryland. I find as a matter of fact that the Defendant w as occupying the property in some manner. And it s unclear if he was actu ally living there full-time, or whether he spent time there. It does appear that there was some personal property on the premises. There s no evidence that the property, the television, the bedding, and those items that belonged to the Defendant. The only evidenc e of any prop erty belonging to -7- Defendant that s been admitted is copies of the correspondence addressed to the Defendant at another address, and a copy of a registration form for Baltimo re City Comm unity College in the name of the De fendant a t another address. There s evidence through the exhibits that the Defendant had other addresses at some point in the pa st. There s a Liberty Road address, I think there s another Mary Street address that was mentioned. I think that the conclu sion here is th at the Def endant, at so me point, at some time, occu pied this pro perty as a trespas ser. Now , this objective question of whether or not he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the property, I suppose he did. Because I suppose he felt that he could have some privacy interest in that property if he could keep some things in there, he wasn t expecting the general public to walk in a nd out and to pick up his property. The other part of the issu e though is society prepared to recognize that expectation of privacy, and I say it is not. Because the public policy of the City of Baltimore and the State of Maryland is to keep these properties va cant. In fact, the property ow ner who culpably allows their pro perty to be occupied by squatters is himself in violation of the Baltimore City Housing Code. So the Defendant is trespassing on the prop erty, is essentially com mitting a criminal act, although a very minor criminal act, and expecting to generate from that an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize, and I do not agr ee with tha t principle. I no te the closing statements and dissent in the case of Commonwealth versus Gordon, which is the Pennsylvania case cited by the State, and the closing words of the defense is; the poorest man ma y in his cottage b id defiance to all forces of the crown. It may be frail, its roof may shake, the wind m ay blow thro ugh it, the storm may enter, the rain may enter, but the king of England cann ot enter. All h is force dares not cross this ruined tenement. Well that assumes that the Defendant has a right to be there to begin with. Simply stated, this is no t his hou se. He did not have permission to be there, he was n ot authorized by the owner or anyone on the owner s behalf, he is a trespasser. So I m going to grant the State s Motion regarding a lack of standing of the Defe ndant to challenge th e search an d seizure of 810 Eas t Preston Stre et. Thereafter, the jury found Whiting guilty of first degree murder, possession of a -8- deadly weapo n with the in tent to injure, robbe ry with a dead ly weapon, f irst degree as sault, and theft, and not guilty of the charge of theft of property valued at greater than $500. Whiting later filed an unsuccessful motion for a new trial. On June 24, 2002, Whiting was sentenced to life imprisonment for the first degree murder conviction and to a consecutive twenty-five year term of incarceration for the conviction of robbe ry with a deadly weapon. For the purposes of sentencing, the first degree assault conviction was merged into the first degree murder conviction, and both the possession of a deadly weapon, and the theft convictions merged into the robbery with a deadly weapon conviction. Whiting noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, contending that the suppression court erred in denying his motion to suppress the fruits of the May 4th search of the bedroom at 810 East Preston Street and that the eviden ce was in sufficient to sustain his convictions.7 The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the conviction and, with respect to the standing issue, held that, [b]ecause the Housing Authority could enter the premises or could permit anyone else to do so, and because [Whiting] had no right to exclude anyone from the premises . . . any expectation [Whiting] had that the poli ce would not enter was unreas onable . Whiting v. State, 160 Md.A pp. 285, 304, 863 A .2d 1017, 1027-2 8 (2004). II. Standard of Review In reviewing the grant of a motion to suppress evidence, we ordinarily consid er only the evidence before the court at the suppression hearing, and not that of the record of the 7 The sufficiency issue is not before us as Whiting did not raise it in his Petition for Certiorari. -9- trial. Nieves v. S tate, 383 Md. 573, 581, 861 A.2d 62, 6 7 (2004); Laney v. S tate, 379 Md. 522, 533-34, 842 A.2d 773, 779-80 (2004); State v. Green, 375 Md. 595, 607, 826 Md. 486, 493 (2003); State v. Rucker, 374 Md. 199, 207, 821 A.2d 439, 443-44 (2003). We view the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the prevailing party on th e motio n. Laney, 379 Md. at 533-34, 842 A.2d at 779-80; Green, 375 Md. at 607, 826 A.2d at 49 3; Dashiell v. S tate, 374 Md. 85, 93, 821 A.2d 372, 376-77 (2003) (quoting State v. Collins, 367 Md. 700, 706-07, 790 A.2d 660, 663 (citing Riddick v. S tate, 319 Md. 180, 183, 571 A.2d 1239, 1240 (1990))). Although we extend great deference to the hearing judge s findings of fact, we review independently the application o f the law to those facts to determine if the evidence at issue was obtained in violation of the law and, acco rdingly, should be suppressed. See Laney, 379 Md. at 533-34, 842 A.2d at 779-80; Green, 375 M d. at 607, 826 A.2 d at 493; Wallace v . State, 373 Md. 69, 78, 816 A.2d 883, 888-8 9 (200 3). III. Discussion Whiting argues that he has standing under the Fourth Amendment to challenge the searches of 810 E ast Preston S treet becaus e he lived th ere and, ther efore, had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the house. He argues that, although 810 East Preston Street was owned by the City of Baltimore, he kept possessions in a locked room in the home and there was no indication that the City had made any effort to remove him. Moreover, he notes that the City had kept the electricity on, reflecting its acquiescence to his presence in the home. Whiting iterates that an indigent s expectation of privacy in the place where he or she s tays -10- should be acknowledged, just as the law respects the millionaire s right to privacy, because to do otherwise, would be to discriminate against the homeless and destitute. Con vers ely, the State argues that the Cou rt of Special Appeals properly affirmed the Circuit Court s rulin g that Wh iting lacked s tanding to contest the searches u nder the F ourth Amen dment. The State alleges that Whiting has failed to provide any evidence of a right to exclude others from the house where he was residing or any other factor that could constitute a reasonable expectation of privacy. Moreover, the State contends that Whiting never held title to the premises, nor did he have permission from the owner of the home to be there. According to the State, as a squatter or trespasser in the vacant house, Whiting does not have an expectation of privacy that society would consider reasonable or legitimate. A. Standing Under the Fourth Amendment The Fourth A mendm ent of the U nited States, m ade applica ble to the Sta tes by the Fourteen th Amen dment, gu arantees ind ividuals the rig ht to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effe cts, against un reasonab le search es and s eizures . 8 United States v. Stevenson, 396 F.3d 538, 545 (4th Cir. 2005) ; Nieves, 383 M d. at 583, 86 1 A.2d a t 68; Laney, 379 Md. at 545, 842 A.2d at 786. The capacity to invoke Fourth Amendment protection requires the individual to establish that he or she maintained a legitimate expectation of privacy in the house, papers, or effect s search ed or se ized. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353, 88 S.Ct. 507, 51 2, 19 L.Ed.2d 57 6, 583 (1967); Rakas v. Illin ois, 439 U.S. 128, 8 The Supreme C ourt made clear that the Fourth Amendment is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961). -11- 143, 99 S.Ct. 421, 430 , 58 L.Ed.2 d 387, 40 1 (1978); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 2481, 53 L.Ed.2d 5 38, 545-4 6 (1977); United Sta tes v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752, 91 S.Ct. 1122, 1126, 28 L.Ed .2d 453, 45 9 (1971); Laney, 379 Md. at 545, 842 A.2d at 786; Wallace, 373 Md. at 79, 816 A.2d at 889; Simpson v. State, 121 Md. App. 263, 277, 708 A.2d 1126, 1133 (1998). Accordingly, to determine whether an individual has standing under the Fourth Amendment, we must examine whether the individual possessed a legitimate expectation of privacy in the eff ects or premises searched or seized, thereby implicating s ubstantive rig hts protected by the Fourth Amen dment. The Supreme Court reconciled standing to challenge a search or seizure with the substantive rights protected by the Fourth Amendment in Rakas, 439 U.S. at 140, 99 S .Ct. at 429, 58 L.Ed.2d at 387, stating: [T]his Court s long history of insistence that Fo urth Amendment rights are personal in nature has already answered many of these traditional standing inquiries, and we think that definition of those rights is more properly placed within the purview of substantive Fourth Amendment law than within that of standing. Analyzed in these terms, the question is whether the challenged search or seizure violated the Fourth Amendment rights of a criminal defendant who seeks to exclude the evidence obtained during it. That inquiry in turn requires a determination of whether the disputed search and seizure has infringed an interest of the defen dant wh ich the Fou rth Ame ndment w as designe d to protect . . . . [B]y frankly recognizing that this aspect of the analysis belongs m ore prope rly under the heading of substantive Fourth Amendment doctrine than under the heading of standing, we think the decision of this issue will rest on sounder logical footing. See also Ricks v. State , 312 Md. 11, 26-27, 537 A.2d 612, 619-20 (1988). Thus, the question -12- of whether an individual has standing under the F ourth Amendment is best analyzed in terms of the individual s substantive rights and requires us first to look at whether the individual invoking the Fourth A mendm ent possess ed a legitima te expectatio n of privac y in the effects or place searched or seized.9 A legitimate expectation of privacy has been defined by the Supreme Court as: [M]ore than a sub jective expe ctation of not being discovered. A burglar plying his trade in a summer cabin during the off season may have a thoroughly justified subjective expectation of privacy, but it is not one which the law recog nizes as 9 The history of standing under the Fourth Amendment was summarized in Graham v. State, 47 Md.App. 287, 421 A.2d 1385 (1980), in an opinion authored by Judge Wilner, who now sits on this Court, when he was on th e Court of Special A ppeals. Af ter exploring its history, Judge Wilner succinctly opined: [T]he standing question is a preliminary one that should be resolved, for if appellant has no lawful right to contest the respective searches, the question of their validity beco mes mo ot. Putting the cart before the horse may sometimes be easier to do, but it does make the ultimate journey considerably more difficult. When may a person be heard to compla in that his Fo urth Amendment right has been violated? Id. at 291, 421 A.2d at 1387. Judge Wilner then answers his question by stating: The considerations here are not so simple as they may appear at first glance . Even under Rakas, the precepts of civil prop erty law, though highly relevant, are not necessarily controlling. The legitimacy of one s expectation of privacy is in large measure a function of its reason ableness, an d that, in turn, is d etermined to some extent by the elements of time, place, and circumstance. Id. at 294, 421 A.2d at 1389. -13- legitim ate. His presen ce . . . is wron gful; his expecta tion is not one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143 n.12, 99 S.Ct. at 430 n.12, 58 L.Ed.2d at 401 n.12 (citations omitted); Ricks, 312 M d. at 27, 537 Md. at 62 0; Graham, 47 M d.App . at 293, 4 21 A.2 d at 138 9. In order to evaluate the legitimacy of a privacy expectation, Justice Harlan, in a concurring opinion in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353, 88 S.Ct. 507, 512, 19 L.Ed.2d 576, 583 (1967), formulated a two-prong test which requires that the person claiming protection under the Fourth Amendment must have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy in the item or place searched, as well as have proven that the expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as reason able. Id. at 361, 88 S .Ct. at 516, 19 L .Ed.2d at 58 7-88; see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 2580, 61 L.Ed.2d 220, 226-27 (1979 ); California v . Ciraolo, 476 U.S . 207, 211, 1 06 S.Ct. 1809, 1811, 90 L.Ed .2d 210, 21 5 (1986); Laney, 379 Md. at 545, 842 A.2d at 78 6-87; Owens v. State, 322 Md. 616, 626, 589 A.2d 59 , 63 (1991); Ricks, 312 Md. at 27, 537 A.2d at 620. In a later ca se, California v. Greenwood, 486 U .S. 35, 108 S.Ct. 1625, 100 L.Ed.2d 30 (1988), the Supreme Court embraced and further refined Justice Harlan s tw o-prong te st to require that the person claiming protection under the Fourth Amendment must manifest a subjec tive exp ectation of priv acy that is objectiv ely reason able. The question that delineates whether a defendant possesses a subjective expectation of privacy is whether . . . the individual has shown that he seeks to preserve something as private. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. at 740, 99 S.Ct. at 2580, 61 L.Ed.2d at 226 (quoting -14- Katz, 389 U .S. at 351 , 88 S.C t. at 516, 1 9 L.Ed .2d at 57 9. The Supreme Court found, for example, that t he defen dant had succ essf ully met the subjective e xpectation criterion in California v. Ciraolo , 476 U.S. 207, 211, 106 S.Ct. 1809, 1811, 90 L.Ed.2d 21 0, 215 (1986), and Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 109 S.Ct. 693, 102 L.Ed.2d 835 (1988). In California v. Ciraolo, the defendant ch allenge d the se arch of his bac kyard by po lice. Id. at 209, 106 S.Ct. at 1810, 90 L.Ed.2d at 214. Observing that the defendant had surrounded his bac kyard by both a six foot high outer fence and a ten foot hig h inner fen ce, the Cou rt noted, [c]le arly - and understandably - respondent has met the test of manifesting his own subjective intent and desire to ma intain privacy as to his unlawful agricultural pursuits. Id. at 211, 106 S.Ct. at 1811-12, 90 L.Ed.2d at 215. In Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. at 450, 109 S.Ct. at 696-97, 102 L.Ed.2d at 842, the defendant challenged a helicopter search of his greenhouse by the police, and the Court, noting the fact that two sides of the greenhouse were enclosed, and the other two obsc ured by trees an d shr ubbery, concluded that the defendant no doubt intended and expected that his green house w ould not b e open to p ublic inspection, and the precautions he took protected against ground-level observation. Id. Despite being an integral part of the inquiry into whether the individual possessed a legitimate expectation of privacy, the Supreme Court nevertheless has remarked, that in some cases, the lack of a subjective ex pectation of privacy wou ld not defeat a party s claim to a reasonab le expec tation of privacy. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 316, 107 S.Ct. 1134, 1147, 94 L.Ed.2d 32 6, 344-45 (1987 ); Smith, 442 U.S . at 740, 99 S .Ct. at 2580, 61 L.Ed.2d at 226-27. In fact, in Smith v. Maryland, the Court assumed that the defenda nt intended to -15- maintain the privacy of the items searched and proceeded to measure the objective reasonableness of that expectation. 442 U.S. at 743, 99 S.Ct. at 2582, 61 L.Ed.2d at 228-29. As to the secon d prong o f the test, wh ether an ind ividual s exp ectation is ob jectively reasonable, inquiry must be made into the substance of the defendant s claim that he or she possessed a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area search ed. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 104, 99 S.Ct. at 430, 58 L.Ed.2d at 387; Wallace, 373 Md. at 81, 816 A.2d at 890. As the Supreme Court has explica ted, in determ ining wh ether the ind ividual s exp ectation is objectively reasonable, we must evaluate the pragmatics of the situation, and although concepts of real or personal property law, or understandings recognized and permitted by society, are to be taken into consideration, arcane distinctions developed in pro perty and tort law between guests, licensees, invitees, and the like are not controlling in the inquiry. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 104 & 143, 99 S.Ct. at 430 & 433, 58 L.Ed .2d at 387; see also Wallace, 373 M d. at 81, 8 16 A.2 d at 890 . B. The Maryland Experience Before the application of the Fourth Amendment to the States in 1961, this Court as early as 1932 in Baum v. State, 163 Md. 153, 161 A. 244 (1932), clearly identified the sources from which an individual may derive a legitimate expectation of privacy in premises. In Baum we recog nized that o nly those whose private rights have been violated can challenge the legality of a search and seizure: [I]t is certain that one cannot complain of an illegal search and seizure of premises or property which he neither owns, nor leases, nor controls, nor law fully occupies , nor rightfully -16- possesses, or in whic h he has n o interest. Or, stating it convers ely, those whose private rights have been or may be disturbed alone may invoke the constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure. Id. at 157, 1 61 A.2 d at 245 . In Baum, police officers seized gambling paraphernalia from a house during a search, after calling and placing a bet with the person who answered the phone. Id. at 158, 161 A.2d at 246. Various def endants, not own ers of the house, m oved to suppress the evidence, but this Court denied the claim, for the reason that the immu nity from illegal search and seizure is a privilege personal to those whose rights thereunder have been infringed, and they alone may invoke it. Id. at 156, 161 A.2d at 245. We further refined the concept of lawful occupancy of premises in Resnick v . State, 183 Md. 15, 36 A.2d 347 (1944), in which the police, pursuant to a search warrant, seized betting slips and other g amblin g acco uterme nts. Various individuals, who claimed to have worked in the home for approximately a year, challenged the legality of the search and seizure. We determined that they failed to prove that the property or possessions seized and searched were owned, leased, controlled or rightfully possessed by them or that they had any interest in them, an d so lacked a valid claim of lawful occupancy in order to challenge the search warra nt. Id. at 18, 36 A.2d a t 348. In Lambert v. State, 196 Md. 57, 75 A.2d 327 (1950), we exp lained that one must lawfully oc cupy the pre mises; mer e presence is not sufficie nt: [O]ne cannot complain of an illegal search and seizure of premises or property which he ne ither owns, nor leases, nor controls, nor lawfully occupies, nor rightfully possesses, or in which he has no interest10. Only recently we cited the cases -17- which followed that formula, and re-affirmed it as a positive statement of those w ho could c omplain . Kapla r v. State, 194 Md. 580, 71 A.2d 860. In all of these cases the w ords lawf ully occupies are intended to be of the same nature and kind as the others used, and contemplate an occupation of some character which is connected with the property or the premises by some lawful means . . . . The occupan cy must have some relatio n to the property or premises searched in order to enable such occupants to claim that their possessions have been unla wfully seized. It is not sufficient that they are merely there when the search is made. They must be there w ith some sh ow of rig ht to be in poss essio n of the p remises o r pro perty. Id. at 64, 75 A .2d at 330 (e mphasis in original); see also Carter v. State, 236 Md. 450, 453, 204 A.2d 322, 323 (1964) (holding that appellants had no standing to challenge search of car because they had no ownersh ip or posses sory rights of an y kind in the car. ); Ferguson v. State, 236 Md. 148, 158-59, 202 A.2d 758, 763 (1964) (holding that Ferguson had no right to complain of search because he was not in lawful possession of the property. ); Rizzo v. State, 201 Md. 206, 209, 93 A.2d 280, 281 (1952) (concluding that defendants could not complain of search o f apartme nt in which they had no in terest but for illegal opera tions); Saunde rs v. State, 199 Md. 568, 573, 87 A.2d 618, 620 (1952) (noting that accused cannot contest searc h of prop erty in which h e had no r ight, title, or interest); Lingner v. State, 199 Md. 503, 505-06, 86 A.2d 888, 890 (1952) (holding that defendant could not complain of search and seizure of bag s in which he disclaim ed any ownership); Franto m v. State, 195 Md. 163, 167, 72 A.2d 744, 746 (1950) (concluding that owner could contest search of garage that he had lease d out to another person ). Amidst this exploration of lawful occupancy and searches of premises, we also had -18- the opportunity to address the two-prong test to evaluate the legitimacy of a claim of privacy articulated by Justice Ha rlan in his concurrence in Katz in Venner v . State, 279 Md. 47, 5152, 367 A.2d 949, 952 (1977). In Venner, the defendant challenged the search and seizure of the contents of his bedpan during his stay in the hospital. Id. at 48-49, 950-51. We concluded that, [u]tilizing the criteria of Mr. Justice Harlan, we are of the view that Venner could not have had an expectation . . . that society was prepared to recognize as reasonable. Id. at 59, 36 7 A.2d at 956. This Court first applied Justice Harlan s two-prong test within the purview of standing to challenge the search of premises in Ricks v. State , 312 Md. 11, 537 A.2d 612 (1988), disapproved on other g rounds in Ragland v. State, 385 Md. 706, 719, 870 A.2d 609, 617 (2005), where we iterated the premise in Lambert, supra, that [i]t is not sufficient to establish standing, where challenged, merely to show that one was on the premises where a search occurs . Rath er, [t]he focus of the inquiry is directed to the substance of the defendant s claim that he or she possessed a legitim ate expectation of privacy in the area searched, . . . arcane distinctions developed in property and tort law between guests, licensees, invitees, and the like, are not con trolling. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 104, 99 S.Ct. at 430, 58 L.Ed.2d at 387. The determination whether a legitimate expectation of privacy ex ists embraces two discrete questions . . . the first is whether the individual, by his conduct, has exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy (that he seeks to preserve something as private), and the second question is w hether the individual s subjective expectation of privacy is on e that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable (whether the individual s expectation, viewed objectively, is justifiable under the circum stances). -19- Id. at 26-27, 537 A.2d at 619-20 (citations omitted). In Ricks, appellants challenged the video surveillance of an apartment where they had been conducting illegal sales of narcotics. Id. at 18, 537 A.2d at 615. In reviewing the appellants claim to a legitimate expectation of privacy in the ap artment, this C ourt conclu ded that: [W]hile appellants counsel s assertion that the appellants were 'invitees' did not constitute evidence, it was confirmatory of the apparent earlier concession by the prosecutor that the app ellants were in the apartment at the invitation of the lessee. Moreov er, there was an indicatio n . . . that on severa l occasio ns . . . appellant Ricks, used a key to gain entrance, either to the building in whic h the ap artmen t was lo cated, or into the apartment itself . . . . [M]ere presence in another s apartmen t, without more, wo uld not suf fice to establish a legitimate expectation of privacy. M ore than m ere presen ce, howe ver, is arguably shown in this case. Id. at 27, 537 A.2d at 619-20 (citations omitted). The Court in Ricks went on to find that, whereas appellants had standing to challeng e the search , the search d id not violate th e Fourth Ame ndme nt. Id. at 27-28, 537 A.2d at 620. In State v. Sampson, 362 Md. 438, 765 A.2d 629 (2001), Judge W ilner, speaking for this Court, adopted the refined two-prong test articulated in California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 39, 108 S.Ct. at 1628, 100 L.Ed.2d at 36. In Sampson, the defendant challenged the search of trash that she had placed inside her yard, but also within reach from a municipal sidewalk. 362 Md. at 441, 765 A.2d at 630. We noted that the proper focus af ter Greenwood was whether the defendant s subjective expectation of privacy in her trash was objectively -20- reason able. Id. at 444-45, 756 A.2d at 632-33.10 This Court recently had the occasion to apply the objective reasonableness standard in Laney v. S tate, 379 Md. 522, 842 A.2d 773 (2004), within the context of lawful possession of premises. In Laney, the mortgagor of a home that had been foreclosed upon challenged 10 We also had occasion in Wallace v . State, 379 Md. 69, 816 A.2d 883 (2 003), to explore in dicta the concept of standing in the Fourth Amendment context, where Judge Cathell, writing for the Court, stated: The United States Supre me Court has revisited its interpretation of an individual s legitimate expectation of privacy on several occasions. In Rakas v. Illin ois . . . the Supreme Court further developed this analysis by minim izing the distinction between substantive Fourth Amendment analysis and Fourth Amendment standin g. Id. at 80, 816 A.2d at 889-90 (citations omitted). Judge Cathell went on to state: The Suprem e Court ha s subsequ ently articulated the Rakas twostep analysis as follows: "[I]n order to claim the protection of the Fourth Ame ndment, a defen dant must demo nstrate that he personally has an expectation of privacy in the place searched, and that his expecta tion is reason able; i.e., one that has 'a source outside of the Fo urth Am endmen t, either by referen ce to concepts of real or pe rsonal property law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by society.' " Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88, 119 S.Ct. 469, 472, 142 L.Ed.2d 373, 379 (1998) (quoting Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143-44 n.12, 99 S.Ct. at 430-31 n.12, 58 L.Ed.2 d at 401 -02 n.1 2). See also C alifornia v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39-4 0, 108 S.Ct. 1625, 1628, 100 L.Ed.2d 30, 36 (1988) (stating that "An expectation of privacy does not give rise to Fourth Am endment protection, ho wever, unless society is prepared to accept that expectation as objectiv ely reason able"). Id. at 81, 816 A.2d at 890. -21- several warrantless searches of the h ouse whe re he had pers onal property. Id. at 527-28, 842 A.2d at 777. The searches occurred after title in the home had passed to the Department of Veteran Affairs ( V.A. ) - the original guarantor of the mortgage. Id. Laney claimed that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the house under the F ourth Am endmen t despite the fact that title had passed to the V.A. because the V.A. s ownership rights in the house were inferior to his po ssessor y and priv ate right s in the house . Id. at 534, 842 A.2d at 780. This Court dete rmined tha t Laney had no reason able expe ctation of privacy in the home because at the time of the s earche s the ow nership of the p roperty ha d passe d to the V .A., which, accordingly, had authority to enter and possess the home . Id. at 527, 842 A.2d at 776. The facts found by the trial court, viewed within the objectively reasonable standard, rendered L aney s claim w ithout merit. C. Squatters Nationwide Some courts th roug hout the c ountry, in trying to determine whether a squatter has standing under the Fourth Amendment, have asked whether the individual manifested an actual, subjective expectation of privacy in the place searched and whether his or her expectation was one tha t society is p repared to recog nize as r easona ble or leg itimate. United States v. Gale, 136 F.3d 192, 195 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding that squatter had no standing to challenge search of abandoned apartment which he had occupied solely for the business of packing for distribution for narcotic s. ); United States v. Whitehead, 415 F.3d 583, 588 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that a squatter had no standing to challenge search of vacant home he frequented for the sole purpose o f engaging in drug -related business transactions. ); -22- United States v. Hunyady, 409 F.3d 297, 301 -02 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding that Hunyady had no standing to challenge search of home he illegally entered because his presence was wrongful. ); United States v. McRae, 156 F.3d 708, 711 (6th Cir. 1998) (determining that squatter had no standing to challenge search of aband oned ho me): United States v. Dodds, 946 F.2d 726, 728-729 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that squatter had no standing to challenge search of abandoned apartment because hardly more than a fugitive presence would not be one that could b e accepted by society. ); United Sta tes v. Ruckman, 806 F.2d 1471, 1472 (10th Cir. 1986) (finding that squatter had no standing to challenge search of cave where he had been staying for eight months); Commonwealth v. Gordon, 683 A.2d 253, 259 (Pa. 1997) (holding that squatter had no standing to challenge search of abandoned house where he was staying); State v. Linton, 812 A.2d 382, 383 (N.J. Super. 2002) (stating that defendant, at best a transient squatter, had no constitutionally-reasonable expectation of privacy. ); Comm onwea lth v. Cameron, 561 A.2d 783, 787-88 (Pa. Super. 1989) (holding that squatter had no reason able expe ctation of p rivacy, and there fore no F ourth Am endmen t standing to challenge search of a bandon ed structure) ; Commonwealth v. Peterson, 596 A.2d 172, 178-79 (Pa. Super. 1991) (finding that squatter could not claim Fourth Amendment right to privacy in abandon ed structure) ; but cf. State v. Dias, 609 P.2d 637, 639-40 (Haw. 1980) (holding that squatters on state-owned land had s tanding to c hallenge se arch con sistent not on ly with reason but also with ou r tradition al notion s of fair play and justice. ). The only definitive circumstance, apparently, that has led to a different result where -23- courts have considered societal policy, is that the own er of the pre mises had acquiesce d in the squatting. In State v. Dias, 609 P.2d 637 (Ha w. 1980 ), standing un der the Fo urth Amendment was accorded to the squatters because the squatters presence was well-known to the State, and had existed, without objection, for a considerable period of time. The premises searched were d escribe d as a s hack, a well lit structure built on stilts and attached to the side of an old bus, in an area recognized as S quatters Row, located on prop erty owne d by the S tate of H awaii. Id. at 639. Th e Haw aii court con cluded tha t: Squatters Row on Sand Island has been allowed to exist by sufferance of the State for a cons iderable period of time. And although no tenancy under property concepts was thereby created, we think that this long acquiescence by the government has given rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy on the part of the [squatters], at least with respect to the interior of the building itself. Id. at 640.11 In addition to those courts wh ich have in voked p olicy grounds to deny standin g to squat ters, other courts have merely questioned whether a squatter could have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the p remise s search ed. See Amezquita v. Hernandez-Colon, 518 F.2d 8, 11-12 (1 st Cir. 1975) (stating that squ atters on pu blic land co uld not avail themselves of Fourth Amendment p rotection); State v. Gilmore, 104 P.3d 1051, 1055 (Mont. 2004) 11 New York courts apparently have also recognized the concept of acquiescence but have yet to hold that a plaintiff has successfully demonstrated acquiescence by the landowner. See Walls v. Guiliani, 916 F.Supp. 214, 221 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) ( [I]f plaintiffs can prove the acquiescence and toleration that they allege, they are not trespassers and they have a possessory interest that enjoys some degre e of legitimacy under Ne w York law . ). -24- (holding that trespasse r did not have expectation of privacy in bedroom where he did not pay rent and had been asked to leave); State v. Cruz, 809 P.2d 1233, 1240 (Kan. App. 1991) (finding that Fourth Amendment was not applicable to trespasser in house); People v. Sum lin, 431 N.Y.S.2d 967, 970 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980) (determining that guest of squatter did not have Fourth Ame ndment rights in apartm ent where squatter w as staying). Other courts, like this Court, utilizing the objectively reasonable standard, have determined that squatters do not have s tanding to c hallenge th e legality of a search of the premises in which they stayed. See Zimmerman v. Bishop, 25 F.3d 784, 788 (9th Cir. 1993) (concluding that Fourth Amendment rights of guest of squatter were not violated by search of shack on another s p roperty); Davis v. State, 119 S.W.3d 359, 367 (Tex. App. 2003) (holding that squatter in home did not have standing to challenge search of house where he was staying); Woods on v. Com monw ealth, 491 S.E.2d 743, 745 (Va.App. 1997) (finding that trespasser lacked standing to claim protection of the Fourth Amendment in premises from which he had been barred). D. The Searches of 810 East Preston Street The first question to be addressed is whether Whiting had a subjective expectation of privacy. Although courts have assumed in the context of standing that the defendant had a sufficient expectation of privacy in order to reach the second issue, whether an objective expectation existed , Ruckman, 806 F.2d at 1472 ( We shall assume that Ruckman entertained a subjective expectation of privacy, i.e. absent a search warrant or probable cause -25- or exigent circumstances . . . his cave could not be searched. ), we need not so assume because Whiting manifested his desire to maintain privacy in the second floor rear bedroom. The trial court found that Whiting was occupying 810 East Pr eston S treet in s ome m anner, and that he kept some personal property on the premises, specifically correspondence addressed to or from W hiting and a college reg istration form . Whiting k ept people out of the bedroom with the green wall by means of a lock on the door for which only he had the key. Whiting clearly sought to preserve the room as at least semi-private, and, therefore, demo nstrated that he p ossesse d a sub jective e xpecta tion of p rivacy in th e room . Was Whiting s subjective expectation of privacy objectively reasonable? Laney, 379 Md. at 545, 842 A.2d at 787. Drawing from Baum and its progeny we look at the following factors to determine objective reasonableness: whether the individual owned, leased, controlled, lawfully occupied, or rightfully possessed the premis es searc hed. Baum, 163 Md. at 157, 161 A. at 245; Resnic k, 183 Md. at 18, 36 A.2d at 348; Lambert, 196 Md. at 64, 75 A.2d at 330; Carter, 236 Md. at 453, 204 A.2d at 323; Ferguson, 236 M d. at 158-59, 202 A.2d at 763; Rizzo, 201 Md. at 209, 93 A.2d at 281; Saunders, 199 Md. at 573, 87 A.2d at 620; Lingner, 199 Md. at 505-06, 86 A.2d at 890; Frantom, 195 Md. at 167, 72 A.2d at 746. Turning to the first factor, it is uncontested that Whiting did not own 810 East Preston Street12 - the house w as ow ned by the Hou sing Authority of B altim ore C ity. 13 Secondly, 12 Whiting cites State v. Adams, 5 P.3d 90 3, 904 (A riz. Ct. App . 2000), in su pport of h is claim. In Adams, the court found that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his second floor apartment, despite the fact that the apartment itself constituted a zoning -26- Whiting was not a lessee of the house or even a lessee of the second floor rear bedroom, as evidenced by the fact that th e home w as last leased b y the City in 2000 , and the last ten ants vacated in Ma y of that year.14 Nevertheless, Whiting contends that he established an ability to exclude others from the second floor rear bedroom by virtue of the lock on the door, thereby demonstrating control over the premises. Whiting relies on a Pennsylvania Supreme Court opinion, Comm onwea lth v. Gordon, 683 A.2d at 258, to support his assertion that the right to exclude others from the premises is a critical characteristic of de facto ownership.15 In Gordon, a violation. Id. In so holding, the court relie d on the fa ct that Ada ms legally ow ned his building and enjoyed the right to exclu de anyon e he w ished f rom the proper ty. Id. at 907. Becau se Wh iting w as not th e own er of 81 0 East P reston S treet, Adams is inapplicable. 13 Even if Whiting had squa tted there for the approp riate period o f time, he co uld not avail himself of the doctrine of adverse possession because the property is owned by the City of Baltim ore. Siejack v. City of Baltimore, 270 Md. 640, 644, 313 A.2d 843, 846 (1974) ( Quite likel y nothing is more establis hed than the rule th at title to p rope rty held by a municipal corporatio n in its governmental capacity . . . cannot be acquired by adverse possession. ). 14 Whiting also relies on Community for Creative Non-violence v. United States Marsh als Service, 791 F. Supp . 1 (D.D .C. 199 2). Community for Creative Non-violence ( CCNV ) involv ed an e arly morn ing raid of a ho meless shelter. Id. In finding that CCNV had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the homeless shelter, the court noted that CCNV was the exclusive licensee of the shelter. Id. at 3-4. Unlike the corporation in CCNV, Whitin g was not a lice nsee, or lessee, o f 810 E ast Pres ton Stre et. 15 The power to exclude others is not synonymous with the right to exclude others. To have the pow er means to have the ability to do or act; capability of doing or accomplishing someth ing, Random H ouse Dictionary of the E nglish Languag e 1516 (2d ed. un abridged 1987), whereas to have the right means to have a just claim or title, whether legal, prescriptive, or moral. Random House Dictionary of the English Language 1656 (2d ed. unabridged 198 7). -27- police officer investigating a purse snatching searched the dining room of an abandoned house, the rear door o f whic h was open a nd fallin g off its hinges . Id. at 255. The officer found the defendant in the dining room, which was closed off from the rest of the house by a sheet hanging in the doorway and which contained a lamp, a television on a milk crate, and a beer ball. Id. The defendant claimed that the sheet hanging in the dining room doorway was proof that he e xclude d other s from the dinin g room . Id. at 258. The court concluded that the defenda nt s claime d exclusion of the pub lic from the dining roo m is implausible because the evidence revealed that the house had an unlocked, exterior door. Id. at 258. Whiting, nevertheless, contends that his case is much stronger than that in Gordon because Whiting placed a lock on the doo r to the bedroom and whenever he left the bedroom door unlocked, Robert Jo nes was in the room to preven t anyone from e ntering . In this case, however, 810 East Preston Street, like the premises in Gordon, also had an unlocked, exterior door, the back door to the house, a fact that the Pennsylvania Court found controlling, and the front door was boarded to exclude even Whiting. Moreover, to control something is to exe rcise restraint or d irection ove r it. Random House Dictionary of the English Language 442 (2d ed. unabridged 1987). In the present case, Whiting shared the second floor rear bedroom with Robert Jones, and shared the entire house with four or more strangers. Sharing dominion over the premises o rdinarily does not reflect e xclusiv e contro l. See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143, 99 S. Ct. at 430, 58 L.Ed.2d at 402 (noting that [o]n e of t he m ain rights atta chin g to p rope rty is the right to exclude -28- others . . . and one w ho . . . controls p roperty will in all likelihood hav e a legitimate expectation of privacy by virtu e of this right to exclude. ). A s noted, the special p ower to exclud e is not th e same as the rig ht to exc lude. Most importantly with respect to control, even though Whiting maintained a lock on the bedroom door, he could h ave be en rem oved b y the City at a ny time. See Gilmore, 104 P.3d at 1055 (finding that defendant had no expectation of privacy in bedroom, despite the fact that he kept the door locked and the home owner did not have the key or any right to access the bedroo m); Davis, 119 S.W.3d at 367-68 (holding tha t defenda nt staying in abandoned house ha d no legitim ate expectation of privacy in the house despite having a key to the house and the a bility to let people in and out of it). 16 With respect to rightful possession or lawful occupancy of 810 Eas t Preston Stre et, Whiting argues that he was a lawful occupant because the City had acq uiesced to h is presence in 810 East Preston, which, he argues, was demonstrated by the fact that the Housing Authority made no effort to remove him from the premises and had not shut off the electricity in the hous e. Acqu iesce is def ined as to a ssent tacitly; subm it or comply silently or without protest; agree; consent. Random Hou se Dictionary of the English Language 18 (2d ed. unabridged 1987). Knowledge and consent are elements of acquiescence. See Dias, 609 P.2d at 639-40 (finding that the State of Hawaii knew of the 16 Whiting cites to Commonwealth v. Govens, 632 A.2d 1316 (P a.Super.Ct. 1993). In Govens, the court emphasized the fact that the state had failed to contest standing in the trial court and had not established a sufficient record for a finding of lack of standing. -29- existence of sq uatters r ow a nd allow ed it to ex ist.). Whiting has failed to demon strate in this case that the City knew of his presence at 810 East Preston Street and that it consented to his presence. Whiting, neverthele ss, analogize s his situation to defenda nts who s uccessfu lly challenged searches of tents they themselves constructed, citing United States v. Sandoval, 200 F.3d 659, 691 (9th Cir. 200 0), United States v. Gooch, 6 F.3d 67 3, 677 (9th Cir. 1993), and Kelley v. Sta te, 245 S.E.2d 872, 874 (Ga.App. 1978). In Sandoval, 200 F.3d at 661, the court found th at the defen dant posse ssed an ob jectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the tent where he was staying on federally owned land. Although it was questionable whether the defendant had permission to do so, the court stated: [C]amping on public land, even w ithout permission, is far different from squa tting in a priva te residence . A private residence is easily identif iable and clea rly off-limits, whereas public land is often unmarked and may appear to b e open to camping. Thus, we think it much m ore likely that socie ty would recognize an expec tation of priv acy for the cam per on pu blic land tha n for th e squat ter in a pr ivate res idence . Id. at 661. Gooch, 6 F.3d at 677, involved the search of the defenda nt s tent, but in a state campground, so that the Ninth Circuit Court opined: We have already established that a person can have an objectively reasonab le expectation of privacy in a tent on priva te property. LaDuke v. Nelson, 762 F.2d 1318, 1326 n.11, 1332 n.19 (9th Cir. 1985). Accord LaDuke v. Castillo, 455 F.Supp. 209 (E.D.Wash. 1978). This reasonable expectation is not destroyed when a person's tent is pitched instead on a public camp groun d whe re one is legally pe rmitted to camp . -30- Id. at 677. Kelley, 245 S.E.2d at 875, also involved a search of a tent but one apparently on private property - owned by a relative of two of the defendants - upon which law enforcement officers had trespassed . All three ca ses are disting uishable be cause a pu blic campground invites tent dwellers an d clearly 810 E ast Preston S treet, although publicly owned, did not invite inhabitants, and there is no element of police misconduct in effecting the search.17 Fina lly, Whiting asserts that we should acknowledge an indigent s expectation of privacy in the place where h e or she stays because to not do so is to discriminate against indigents and the homeless in favor of people who a re fortun ate eno ugh to h ave m oney. A person s mon etary wo rth, how ever, is n ot the iss ue; the is sue is law ful occ upanc y. Whiting neither lawfully owne d, lea sed, controlle d, oc cupied, n or rig htfu lly possessed 810 East Preston Street, or any part of the premises therein. Accordingly, we find that Whiting lack ed standing to challen ge th e Ap ril 27 and May 4, 2001 searches because, although he may have possessed a subjective expectation of privacy, that expectation was not objectively reasonable. 17 Lastly, Whiting also cites to People v . Smith, 448 N.Y.S.2d 404, 406 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982) and State v. Mooney, 588 A.2d 145 , 153 (Conn. 199 1) to support his claim. In People v. Smith, the issue only was whether the trial court should hold a hearing regarding standing when the defendant alleged he paid rent to one who may have ben a squatter. The trial court recognized that a sq uatter do es not h ave an y basic leg al right to an apa rtment. Id. at 406. In Mooney, the court found that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in h is closed duffel bag and cardboard box, but did not address the issue of whether he had a reasonab le expectation of privacy in th e premises - the bridge a butment - where those items were lo cated. 5 88 A.2 d at 153 . -31- JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRM ED WITH CO STS. Chief Ju dge Bell joins in th e jud gme nt on ly. -32-