Johnson v. Nationwide

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Johnson v. Nationwide No. 125, September Term, 2004 UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE Section 19-509 of the Insurance Article does not require an insurer to provide uninsured motorist coverage for the wrongful death of a person who was not an insured un der the polic y. Section 19-5 09(c)(1) req uires the insu rer to pay the insured for his or her own bodily injuries, suffered as a result of a collision with an uninsured motorist. Section 19509(c)(2) makes it clea r that if a person who is insured under the policy dies as a result of a motor vehicle collision with an uninsured motorist, the surviving relatives of that insured can recover for the wro ngful d eath of the insu red und er the ins ured s p olicy. In the Circu it Court for B altimore C ity Case No. 24-C-02-005485 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 125 September Term, 2004 ______________________________________ JAEDON JOHNSON v. NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY ____________________________________ Bell, C.J. Raker Wilner Cathell Harrell Battaglia Greene, JJ. ______________________________________ Opinion by Greene, J. ______________________________________ Filed: July 15, 2005 Jaedon Johnson is a minor ch ild whose father, Jerm al Thom as, was kille d in an automobile accident on March 6, 2002. Mr. Thomas, riding in a car driven by Damon Gaither, was killed by the negligent actions of Mr. G aither.1 Mr. Gaither had no automob ile insurance. Mr. Thomas was insured by Hartford Underwriters Insurance Company ( Hartford ) and his policy provided un insured motorist coverag e of $20,000. Jaed on s mother, Tammika Johnson, was insured by Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company ( Nationwide ) and her policy provided uninsured motorist coverage in the amount of $25,000. On October 2, 2002 , Jadeon filed a Com plaint against Mr. Gaither (W rongful Death), Hartford (Breach of Contract), and Nationwide (Breach of Contract). The counts against M r. Gaither and Hartford were resolved with the dismissal of the complaint against Mr. Gaither and the payment of $20,000 from Hartford. Jaedon continued to pursue his claim for uninsured motorist coverage under h is mother s policy, and on June 19, 2003, he filed a motion for partial summary judgment against Nationwide. On July 2, 2003, Nationwide filed a cross-motion for sum mary judgment. On July 28, the Circuit Court for Baltim ore City held a hearing on the matter, granted Jaedon s motion, and issued an order which states, in pertinent pa rt: [T]he plaintiff s motion is hereby GRANTED and the defendant Nationwide Mutual Insurance Com pany s contract is determined to provide underinsured motorist coverage in the amount of $5,000.00 to Jaedon Johnson, in addition to the $20,000 in benefits available under the insurance p olicy of the dec edent, 1 The parties have agreed for purposes of this litigation that Mr. Gaither was negligent and that his actions caused the death of Mr. Thomas. Jermal Thoma s. This issue is controlled by the Court of Appeals alternative holding in Forbes v. Harleyville Mutual, 322 Md. 689 , 708-713 (1991 ), notwithstanding the language of M d. Code An n. [Ins. Art.] §19-50 9 (c)(2) . Nationwide appea led and on Oc tober 6 , 2004, th e Cou rt of Sp ecial A ppeals , in a reported opinion, reverse d the C ircuit Co urt. Nation wide M ut. Ins. C o. v. Joh nson, 159 Md. App. 345, 859 A.2d 279 (2004). The Court of Special Appeals held that Jaedon s claim for the wrongful death of his father (Mr. Thomas) was not covered under his mother s Nationwide policy because Mr. Thomas was not an insured under that policy. Jaedon filed a petition for writ of certio rari, wh ich we granted . Johnson v. Nationwide, 384 Md. 581, 865 A.2d 589 (2005). The question before us is whether § 19-509 of the Insurance Article requires an insurer to provide uninsured motorist coverage for the wrongful death of a person who was not an insured under the policy. We hold that § 19-509 d oes not require an insurer to provide such co verage . FACTS Jadeon lived with his mother at the time of Mr. Tho mas s acc ident. Mr. T homas d id not live with Ms. Johnson, nor was he ever married to Ms. Johnson. Mr. Thomas was not an insured on Ms. Johnson s Nationwide policy. Ms. Johnson was the only named insured under her policy. The Nationwide policy issued to M s. Johnson provides, in pertinent pa rt: We will pay compensatory damages, including derivative claims, which are due by law to you or a relative from the owner or driver of an uninsured motor -2- vehicle because o f bodily injury suffered by you or a relative, and because of proper ty damag e . . . . You and Your mean the policyholder and spouse if living in the same household. Relative means one who regularly lives in your household and who is related to you by blood, marriage or adop tion (including a ward o r foster child). A relative may live temporarily outside your household. Insured means one who is described as entitled to protection under each coverage. STANDARD OF REVIEW As stated in Md. Rule 2-501(f), [t]he court shall enter judgment in favor of or against the moving party if the motion and resp onse show tha t there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the party in whose favor judgment is entered is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Wh ether summary judgment was properly granted is a question of law, and we must determine whether the trial court was leg ally correc t in doin g so. Goodwich v. Sinai Hosp. of Baltim ore, 343 Md. 185, 204, 680 A.2d 1067, 1076 (1996). In the present case, the parties agree that there are no factual disputes. Rather, the application of case law and the interpretation of a particu lar section of the Insuran ce Article were the only questions before the trial court, and they are the only questions now before us. As such, it is clear that our review is de novo. See W alter v. G unter, 367 Md. 386, 392, 788 A.2d 609, 612 (2002) (noting that where the order of the trial court involves an interpretation and application of Maryland statutory and case law, our Court must determine whether the lower court s conclusions are legally correct under a de novo standa rd of re view ). -3- DISCUSSION No one argues that M r. Thomas was a named insured on Ms. Johnson s Nationwide policy and Jaedo n is not a rguing that the p olicy itself r equires covera ge. Ra ther, Jaedon argues that § 19-509 (c)(2) of the Insurance Article requires Nationwide to pay the benef its sought. Section 19-509 (a)(1) of the Insurance Article defines uninsured motor vehicle as a motor vehicle, the ownership, maintenan ce, or use of which h as resulted in th e bodily injury or death of an insured[.] Md. Code (1997, 2002 Repl. Vol.), § 19-509 (a)(1) of the Insurance Article. ( Emph asis add ed.) 2 We note that the mo tor vehicle inv olved in the present case was not an uninsured motor vehicle as defin ed by § 1 9-509 (a)(1), in relation to Ms. Johnson s Nationwide policy, because Mr. Tho mas was not a n ins ured under that po licy. Nonetheless, Jaedon is attempting to collect uninsured motorist ben efits for the death of M r. Tho mas und er M s. Joh nson s Nation wide policy. In support of this attempt, Jaedon relies on Section 19-509 (c) of the Insurance article, which provides: In addition to any other coverage required by this s ubtitle, each m otor vehicle liability insurance policy issued, sold, or delivered in the State after July 1, 1975, sha ll contain cov erage for d amages, su bject to the po licy limits, that: (1) the insured is entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle because of bodily injuries sustained in a motor veh icle accident arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of the uninsured 2 Section 19-501 (d) defines named insured as the person denominated in the declarations in a motor vehicle liability insurance policy. Md. Code (1997, 20 02 Rep l. Vol.), § 19-50 4 (d) of the Insu rance A rticle. -4- motor vehicle; and (2) a surviving relative of the insured, who is described in § 3-904 Courts Article, is entitled to recover from the owner or operator uninsured motor vehicle because the insured died as the result of a vehicle accident arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use uninsu red mo tor veh icle. of the of an motor of the Md. Code (1997, 2002 Repl. V ol.), § 19-5 09 (c) o f the Ins urance Article. ( Emph asis add ed.) As we have so often stated, the cardinal rule of statutory interp retation is to asc ertain and effect uate the intentio n of the legislatu re. Oaks v. Con ners, 339 Md. 24, 35, 660 A.2d 423, 429 (1995). To begin with, we must consider the plain language of the statute. As noted in Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co. v. Director of Finance for May or and C ity Council of Baltimore, 343 Md. 567, 683 A.2d 512 (1996), we begin our inquiry with the words of th e statute a nd, o rdinarily, when the words of the statute are clear and unambiguous, according to their comm only und erstood mean ing, we end ou r inquiry th ere also . Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone, 343 Md. at 578, 683 A.2 d at 517; see also Jones v. State, 336 Md. 255, 261, 647 A.2d 1204, 1206-07 ("If the words of the statute, construed according to their common and everyday meaning, are clear and unambiguous and express a plain meaning, we will give effect to the statute as it is written ."). Moreover, [w]here the statutory language is plain and unambiguous, a court may neither add nor delete language so as to reflect an intent not evidenced in that language. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone, 343 Md. at 579, 683 A.2d at 517 (quoting Cond on v. Sta te, 332 Md. 481, 491, 632 A.2d 753, 755 (1 993)). -5- Considering the plain language of § 19-502 (c)(1),3 Jaedon cannot recover under that section for th e wrong ful death o f his father, Mr. Thom as. The words o f the statute require each motor veh icle liability insurance policy to include coverage for that policy s insured for bodily injuries sustained by that policy s insured, in a motor vehicle accident involving the use of an uninsured motor vehicle. Jaedon s argument that the only requirement for Jaedon s recovery under his mother s policy is that Jaedon be a survivorship [sic] of an insured under the statu te . . . (em phasis a dded), is illogica l. To interpret the statute that way would mean that the legislature was requiring every policy to provide uninsured motorist coverage to an unknown number of people, not named in the p olicy, who are related to (but not living with) someone who is protected by the policy, in the event that tho se unkno wn peo ple should be involved in an accident with an uninsured motor vehicle. We can only describe this construction of the statute as convoluted. Our goal in interpreting sta tutes is to give them their most re asonable in terpretation, in a ccord w ith logic and common sense, and to avoid a construction not otherwise evident by the words actually used. Greco v. State, 347 Md. 423, 429, 701 A.2d 41 9, 422 (19 97). We w ill avoid constructions that are illogical, unreasonable, or inconsistent with common sense. Frost 3 As previously stated, that section provides that each motor vehicle liability insurance policy shall contain coverage for damages that the insured is entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle because of bodily injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of the uninsured motor vehicle . . . . Md. Code (1997, 2002 Repl. Vol.), § 19-509 (c)(1) of the Insurance Article. -6- v. State, 336 Md. 125, 137, 647 A.2d 106, 112 (1994). Moreover, we will not engage in a forced or subtle interpretation in an attempt to extend or limit the statute s meaning. Nesbit v. GEICO, 382 Md. 65, 76, 854 A.2 879, 885 (2004) (quoting Taylor v. NationsBank, 365 Md. 1 66, 181 , 776 A .2d 645 , 654 (2 001)). In our view, § 19-506 (c)(1) requires that the insurance policy provide coverage to the insured for his or her own bodily injuries. Considering the word s of § 19-5 09 (c)(2), it is sim ilarly not possible for Jaed on to recover under that section because it only requires the insurance policy to provide coverage to surviving relatives for the death of the insured. Although Jaedon is a surviving relative of Mr. Thom as, Mr. Thomas was not an insured under the Nationwide policy through which the uninsured covera ge is sough t. That fact p rohibits Jaed on from recovering under that policy through the use of Section 19-509 (c) (2), which plainly states that surviving relatives of the insured may recover for the death of the insured. Jaedon relies on Forbe s v. Harleysville Mutual Insuran ce Co mpan y, 322 Md. 689, 589 A.2d 944 (1991) to sup port his position. In Forbe s, we held that Art. 48A, § 541 (c)(2), the predecessor to § 19- 509 (c) (1), enc ompa ssed w rongf ul death claims. Forbes, 322 Md. at 701, 589 A.2d at 949. Section 541 (c)(2) provided, in pertinent part, that every policy issued must contain coverage for dam ages wh ich the insure d is entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle because of bodily injuries su stained in an accident arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of such uninsured motor vehicle. Md. Code (1957 , 1991 R ep. Vo l.), Art. 48 A, § 54 1 (c)(2) . -7- Carol and Ro bin Forbes were married but not living together when Carol Forbes was killed in an automobile accident involving an uninsured motor vehicle on September 22, 1984. Forbes, 322 Md. at 692, 589 A.2d at 945. Carol had lived with her husband and children (Connie and G eorge) until A ugust 4 , 1984, w hen sh e mov ed out. Id. On August 27, 1984, she also moved the children out of the f amily home and into he r new ap artment, without the con sent of Robin . Id. The Fo rbeses nev er discussed divorce an d Carol did not change her address with the Motor Vehicle Administration or for voter registration when she moved out of th e famil y home. Id. In addition, R obin and Carol Forbes owned a Chevrolet station wagon which was titled in both their names and was insured by Harleysville Mutual Insurance Com pany (H arleysville ). Forbe s, 322 Md. at 693 n.1, 5 89 A.2d at 946 n.1. W hile only Robin w as designa ted in the po licy as named insured , both Carol and R obin were listed on the dec laration page o f the po licy as ope rators of the veh icle. Id. Robin filed suit in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County against his uninsured motorist carrier, H arleysville and ag ainst the tortfeas or. Forbe s, 322 M d. at 692-93, 589 A.2d at 945. Among other things, Robin made claims on behalf of himself, Connie, and George for the w rongf ul death of Ca rol. Forbe s, 322 Md. at 693, 589 A.2d at 946. The Circuit Court granted sum mary judgmen t on behalf of Harleysv ille as to the w rongful d eath claims, reasoning that Carol had moved out of the home and, therefore, was not an insured under the polic y. Id. Robin appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. Forbe s, 322 Md. at 694, 58 9 A.2d at 946. -8- While his appeal was pe nding, the Court of Specia l Appeals decided Globe American Casualty v. Chu ng, 76 Md. App. 524, 547 A .2d 654 (1988 ), vacated, 322 Md. 713, 589 A.2d 956 (1991), in w hich the interm ediate appellate court considered the language of Art. 48A, § 541 (c)(2) and con cluded that the statutorily required uninsure d motorist co verage in automob ile insurance policies does not include wrongful death claims. Forbes, 322 Md. at 694, 589 A.2d at 946. After the filing of the Globe opinion and before the Court of Special Appea ls heard the Forbes case, Robin Forb es petitioned for a writ of ce rtiorari, which we granted . Forbes v. Harleysville Mutual Ins. Co., 316 M d. 107, 5 57 A.2 d 255 ( 1989) . In Forbes, we reviewed the context of Art. 48A, § 541(c)(2 ) and discu ssed the pu blic policy of assuring financial reco very to innocent victims of unin sured motor vehicle accidents,4 noting that the remedial nature of the uninsured motorist statute dictates a liberal construction in order to effectuate its purpose. Forbes, 322 Md. at 698, 589 A.2d at 948 (quoting Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Web b, 291 Md. 721, 737, 436 A.2d 465, 475 (1981 )). Noting that wrongful death is included in the liability covera ge of stand ard autom obile insurance p olicies and th at the cover age is man dated by statute, w e reasoned that, 4 We cited Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Webb, 291 Md. 721 , 436 A.2d 465 (1981), in which the Cou rt stated that the purpose o f uninsure d motorist sta tutes is that each insured under suc h coverag e have av ailable the fu ll statutory minimum to exactly the same extent as would have been available had the tortfeasor comp lied with the minimum requireme nts of the financial responsibility Law. Webb, 291 Md. at 737, 436 A.2d at 474 (quoting Webb v. State Farm Mutual Autom obile In s. Co., 479 S.W.2d 148, 152 (Mo.App. 1972)). -9- the purpose of the required uninsured motorist cov erage is to m ake availab le the same coverage as would have been available had the tortfeasor complied with the liability insurance requirements of the financial responsibility law. Since the liability insurance required by the financial responsibility law includes wrongful dea th claims, it follows that the uninsure d motorist coverage also inc ludes w rongf ul death claims. Forbe s, 322 M d. at 698 , 589 A .2d at 94 8. Harleysville also claimed that, even if the uninsured motorist statute covered wrongful death actions, there could be no coverage because Carol Forbes was not insured b y the policy. She was not the named insured on the policy, nor did she live in the home of the named insured at the time of the a cciden t. Forbe s, 322 Md. at 701, 589 A.2d at 950.5 We disagreed with Ha rleysville and he ld under the particular circumstances of that case, Carol Forbes was an insured or covered person at the time of the accident. Forbe s, 322 Md. at 702, 589 A.2d at 950. In support of this conclusion, we noted: It is almost certain that the intent of C arol and R obin Forbes in obtaining the Harleysville policy on the family station wagon was that both of them as coowners and co-o perators w ould be ins ured with respect to their vehicle. Acceptance of Harleysville s theory would frustrate this intent. Moreover, under Harleysville s construction of the policy, whenever a married couple in the position of Carol and Robin Forbes separated, even temporarily, one of them would have to obtain a second policy on the family car if he or she we re going t o be fu lly insured with re gard to the veh icle. Forbes, 322 Md. at 705, 589 A.2d at 952. We concluded that even though Carol had temporarily moved out of the family home, she was still considered a resident of the 5 Harleysville conceded, how ever, that the children were insureds within the meaning of the policy, even though they were not named insureds and did not live in the home of the name d insure d at the tim e of the accide nt. Id. -10- insured s hous ehold f or purp oses of being c overed by the co uple s in suranc e policy. Id. There is no question that the facts of the instant case are distinguishable from Forbes. Jaedon seeks to recover und er his mother s insurance p olicy for the dea th of his father, a man who was not a named insured under that policy, was not married to th e policyholde r, and did not live with the policyholder. Recognizing that the Court s main ho lding does not supp ort his case, Jaedo n urges us to consider the alternate holding discussed by the Co urt in Forbes. The Court noted that [a]s an alternate holding, w e agree with the petitioner s argument that the minor children s wrongful death claims were within the mandatory uninsured motoris t covera ge of A rt. 48A , § 541 (c), regardless of Carol Forbes s status under the language of the policy. Forbe s, 322 Md. at 708, 589 A.2d at 953. The Court mentioned the statutory language death of the insured and stated that [w]e do no t believe, however, that the language of § 541 (c)(1) and (3) means that the deceased must always be an insured under the particular language of the insurance policy. Forbe s, 322 Md. at 709, 589 A.2d at 954. To explain this conclusion, the Court wrote: The basic coverage language of § 541 (c) is set forth in paragraph (2) and requires coverage for damages which the insured is entitled to recover from the owner o r operator o f an unins ured mo tor vehicle because of bodily injuries [including death] sustained in an accident arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of such uninsured motor v ehicle. The Forbes c hildren s wrongful death claim s squarely fall w ithin this statutory langu age even if their mother at the time of the accident was not an insured under the language of Harleysville s policy. The children are insureds under the H arleysville policy. Under Maryland s wrongful death statute the children a re legally entitled to damages from the owner or operator of an uninsu red motor vehicle -11- because of the death of their mother sustained in an accident arising out of the operatio n of the uninsu red veh icle. Forbe s, 322 M d. at 709 , 589 A .2d at 95 4. The language of the unin sured mo torist statute has changed since Forbes.6 As a result, the alternate h olding in Forbes does n ot contr ol the ou tcome of this c ase. The current statutory language makes it very clear that surviving family members can recover under the uninsured motorist cov erage for th e wrong ful death of people who were insured under that policy.7 Section 19-509 (c) (1), while its la nguage is similar to the langua ge interprete d in Forbes, must be considered along with § 19-5 09 (c)(2), a section that was not before the 6 As disc ussed in the opin ion of th e Cou rt of Sp ecial A ppeals, Forbes was filed on May 10, 1991. On April 7, 1991, the General Assembly amended the uninsured motorist statute and the new law became effective on July 1, 199 1. Nationwide v. Johnson, 159 Md. App. 3 45, 353 , 859 A .2d 279 , 284 (2 004). 7 As noted previously, § 19-509 (c) provides: In addition to a ny other cove rage require d by this subtitle, each motor veh icle liability insurance p olicy issued, sold, o r delivered in the State after July 1, 1975, sha ll contain cov erage for d amages, su bject to the po licy limits, that: (1) the insured is entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor veh icle becaus e of bodily inju ries sustained in a motor v ehicle accident arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of the uninsured motor vehicle; and (2) a surviving relative of the insured, who is described in § 3-904 of the Courts Article, is entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle because the insured died as the result of a motor vehicle accident arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of the uninsu red mo tor veh icle. Md. C ode (199 7, 2002 R epl. Vol.), § 19-509 (c) of the Insuran ce Artic le. (Em phasis a dded.) -12- Court in Forbes. When th e sections are viewed to gether, it is clear that § 19-509 (c)(1) gives no indication that the insured can recover for the bodily injuries of anyone but himself under that section. Th ere is simply no roo m in the cu rrent statute to find that insured persons can recover under their own uninsured motorist po licy for the wro ngful dea th of family members who are not c overed by that po licy. As succinctly stated in the opinion of the Court of Special Appeals: Because the General Assembly included a subsection specifically addressing wrongful death claims - Ins. § 19-509 (c)(2) - it is evident that the legislature intended the subsection to regulate all instances in which a claimant seeks wrongful death ben efits under an unin sure d mo toris t policy. Thus, con trary to appelle e s argu ment, In s. § 19-5 09 (c)(1 ) does n ot apply. Nationwide v. Johnson, 159 M d. App . at 354, 8 59 A.2 d at 284 . We ag ree. We recognize that the purp ose of the r equired un insured m otorist covera ge is to assure financial co mpensa tion to the inn ocent victim s of moto r vehicle accidents who are unable to recover from fina ncially irresponsible uninsured motorists. Lane v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co ., 321 Md. 1 65, 169, 582 A.2d 501, 503 (quoting Pennsylvania Nat l. Mut. v. Gartelman, 288 Md. 151, 157, 416 A.2d 734, 737 (1980)). We also recognize that the remedial nature of the uninsured motorist statute dictates a liberal cons truction in order to effectuate its purpose. Nationw ide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Web b, 291 Md. at 737, 436 A.2d at 475 (quoting State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mary land A uto. Ins. F und, 277 Md. 602, 605, 356 A.2d 560, 562 (197 6)). That pu rpose, how ever, is not w ithout limits. The wo rds of the sta tute itself delineate the extent of the statute s reach. See Stearman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. -13- Co., 381 Md. 436, 449, 849 A.2d 539, 547 (2004) (noting that the General A ssembly s purpose in enacting the compulsory insurance statutes was not to assure complete insurance recovery for all victims of automobile accidents and reaffirming that the purpose did not extend beyond the prescribed sta tutory minimu m covera ge regardin g the hous ehold exclusion); see also Mayo r & City C ouncil o f Baltim ore v. C assidy, 338 Md. 88, 97, 656 A.2d 757, 762 (1995) (noting that the court may not disregard the plain meaning of the Workers Compensation Act, also a remedial statute, in the name of liberal construction). To interpret the statute in the present case as suggested by Jaedon would re quire us to ignore the plain language and rewrite it ourselves. That is not within our power. A s stated in Stearman: We will not invade the province of the General Assembly and rewrite the law for them, no matter how just or fair we may think such a new law or public policy would be. The formidable doctrine of separation of powers demands that the courts remain in the sphere that belongs uniquely to the judiciary -- that of interpreting, but not creating , the statu tory law. Stearman, 381 M d. at 454 , 849 A .2d at 55 0. In conclusion, we hold tha t § 19-509 of the Insu rance Article does no t require an insurer to provide uninsured motorist coverage for the wrongful death of a person who was not an insu red und er the po licy. Section 19-509(c)(1) clearly requires the insurer to pay the insured for his or her own bodily injuries, suffered as a result of a collision with an uninsured motorist. Section 19-509(c)(2) makes it clear that if a person who is insured under the policy dies as a result of a motor vehicle collision with an uninsured motorist, the surviving relatives -14- of that insured can recover for the wrongful death of the insured under the in sure d s p olicy. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED. APPELLANT TO PAY ALL COSTS. -15-