Goff v. State

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James Paul Goff v. Maryland No. 102, September Term, 2004 RESTITUTION DIRECT RESULT-- Restitution may be imposed upon a defendant as a condition of probation or as part of a sentence where the damages are a direct result of the crime committed. A direct result occurs if there is no intervening agent or event or there is no lapse between the criminal act and the resulting injury or damage. RESTITUTION-- TENANT PROPERTY INTEREST The fact that the landlord also suffered a loss to his property does not change the fact that the tenant suffered a loss to his possessory property right, for which restitution may properly be granted pursuant to §11-603. RESTITUTION REPLACEMENT VALUE The trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in determining that the State s estimate to replace the shower was fair and reasonable under the circumstances. In the Circu it Court for C arroll Coun ty No. K-2003-30396 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 102 September Term, 2004 ______________________________________ JAMES PAUL GOFF v. STATE OF MARYLAND ______________________________________ Bell, C.J. Raker Wilner Cathell Harrell Battaglia Greene, JJ. ______________________________________ Opinion by Greene, J. ______________________________________ Filed: June 6, 2005 On April 25, 2003, the State charged James P. Goff with a number of crimes, including, inter alia, burg lary, a ssau lt, trespas s, and ma licio us de struc tion of prope rty, resulting from an incident occurring on February 28, 2003, at the apartment of Patrick Had ley. On August 19, 2003, Mr. Goff entered a plea of not guilty in the Circuit Court for Carroll County and proceeded on an agreed state ment of f acts. The co urt found him guilty of second-d egree assa ult and trespass.1 The State dismissed the rema ining counts. The co urt ordered Mr. Goff to pay a fine in the amount of $150.00 for the trespass. In addition, the court sentenced Mr. Goff to eighteen-months incarceration for the assault, suspended that sentence, and placed him on two years of supervised probation. The court also ordered, as a condition of probation, that Mr. Goff pay restitution in an amount to be determined. Months later, the court h eld a hearing on restitution, and on February 17, 200 4, ordered Mr. Goff to pay $2,156 .00 to Patrick Hadle y, the victim of the a ssault. Mr. Goff appealed to the Court of Spe cial Ap peals. On December 17, 2004, before the case was heard in the Court of Special Appeals, we granted certiorari on our own initiative. Goff. v. State, 384 Md. 448, 863 A.2d 99 7 (2004). The only question before us is whether the Circuit Court s order of restitution was proper. We hold that the court did not err by ordering Mr. Goff to pay restitution to the victim of the assault because the damage to property was a direct result of the assault and the victi m w as respon sible for r epai ring the p rope rty. 1 The court also found Mr. Goff guilty of driving on a suspended license, but that convic tion has no relev ance to this case . FACTS As previously noted, the parties proceeded on an agreed statement of facts, which included, in pertinent part, the following: Your Honor, had the State proceeded to trial, we would have also called Officer Warehime and he would have testified that, on Friday, February 28th of 2003, at approximately 12:44 a.m., he responded to the address of 3181 Main Street, in Man chester, Ca rroll County, State of Ma ryland, for an a ssault in prog ress. Upon arrival, he observed the Defendant, James Paul Goff, standing on the porch of that address. Previously, Goff had been advised that he was not to be at that home and had been notified by the lessee, who is Patrick H adley, not to come onto th e prope rty. Offic er Wa rehime had be en pres ent . . . and had advised the Defendant that he would be arrested next time the Officer had seen the Defendant at that address. At that time, Officer Warehime spoke with Patrick Michael Hadley, the lessee of the p rope rty. Hadley stated that Goff knocked down the door and demanded to see Hadley s then girlfriend, Dana Karen Barnes, also known as Dana Smith. Hadley then stated that he told Goff to go away. Gof f then forc ed his way into his apartme nt . . . and bega n to strike Hadley repeatedly with a closed fist. Hadley further stated that Goff was pushing him around the living room and that they ended up in the bathroom. Hadley stated that Goff had pinned him in the shower where he struck him several times in the face. Officer Warehime saw that Hadley had a bloody face and that the shower insert in the bathroom had been broken d ue to the ass ault. (Empha sis added.) B efore reciting those facts, th e State info rmed the court that, [o]ur recommendation would be to defer to the [c]ourt, ask for restitution for the show er, and ask for no contact with Patrick Hadley or Dana Smith . . . . In addition, after the court found Mr. Goff guilty, defense counsel noted that M r. Goff was w illing to make restitution. I m assuming at some point the State . . . will get us a figure on that[.] [I]t was one of these -2- shower inserts that got c racked and w e need . . . some sort of statement on that. The trial judge ordered that, [d]efendant is to pay restitution in an amount to be determined. I ll give the State thirty days to submit restitution figures. In the event that the figure is disputed, of course , we ca n have a hearin g. The parties disagreed about the figure and on February 11, 2004, the court held a hearing on restitution. Defense counsel noted at the start of the hearing that Mr. Goff agreed to pay restitu tion, w ith the un derstan ding th at it was five hu ndred d ollars, or less. The State called M r. Hadley to the stand who testified that he rented the apartment in which the assault took place. Mr. Hadley described the damage to the shower as follows: There s [sic] numerous ho les and cracks all through the side of the showe r. The panels that are glued on to either side of the shower that are like two by two, they ve popp ed off an d I canno t reattach them . I have righ t now, to keep the water damage down, I have duct tape and trash bags hanging over the holes to keep th e wate r from g oing th rough the sho wer. He also testified that the damage occurred as a result of the fight and that he had not yet fixed the shower because he did not have the money to do so. The State introduced an estimate of the cost to replace the show er in the amount of $2,156, obtained by Mr. Hadley from Caton Plumbing. The written estimate , signed by an estimator named Kevin Ohl, did not differentiate between costs of lab or and m aterials but did provide a list of materials needed and w ork exp ected to be com pleted. Mr. Hadley testified that he obtained the estimate from Caton Plumbing because he -3- worked for that com pany and it w as conve nient. 2 He also testified that he reported the shower damage to his landlo rd, who did not replac e it because he conside red it Mr. Hadley s respon sibility. Mr. Goff also testified at the hearing on February 11. He stated that he earned $14.00 per hour as a carpenter and that he could not afford to pay the estimated cost to replace the shower. Mr. Goff attempted to testify about the c ost of a fibe rglass show er wall kit that he saw at Lowe s. The State objected and the court continued the hearing to give Mr. Goff an oppor tunity to ob tain his o wn w ritten estim ate of th e cost to replace the sho wer. When the hearing resumed on February 17, Mr. Goff testified that he had obtained an estimate from Low e s for the cost of a surround kit. Lowe s estimated th e cost of the kit as $111.30. Mr. Goff also testified that he obtained an estimate for the cost of repairing the shower from a contractor, Mr. Blizzard of B. D. Blizzard Construction, in the total amount of $513.00, including $88.00 for the shower kit and $425.00 for labor. The estimate obtained from Mr. Blizzard was handwritten on a generic invoice, without letterhead, and was signed by Mr. Blizzard. Mr. Goff admitted on cross-ex amination that he did no t know if M r. Blizza rd was a license d plum ber. The State called Kevin Ohl as a rebuttal witness. He testified that he was a plumbing 2 Mr. Hadley is a master plumber who does new construction. He testified that he does not m ake repairs a nd that he d id not wan t to attempt to re pair the sho wer him self because if something is wrong with the shower, I don t want it to have to come back on me. I d rathe r have the c ompany tha t s doing the work stan d behind it a nd guara ntee it and be responsible if there s anything wrong with the new installation. -4- estimator for Caton Plumbing and that he had held that position for ten years. He also testified that the estimate from Lowe s was for a shower and wall set and that there was no listing of a ba se or the actu al wall kit itself.3 He also mentioned that the Low e s estimate did not account for replacement of the green wall board or replacement of the drain and some of the piping. In view of the fact that the shower was very old, Mr. Ohl testified that he expected the repair to include stripping the shower down to the studs, putting up waterproof sheetrock, and then installing the new show er.4 He testified that he believ ed it would take ten to tw elve ho urs to co mplete the pro ject. Regarding the estimate provided by Mr. Blizzard, Mr. Ohl testified that it did not 3 Mr. Ohl explained what he meant by shower and wall set by stating: They re basicall y pieces th at conn ect the p anels in the corn ers. You ge t corner piec es that are fib erglass that ba sically connect those corners together. When you buy a shower, you buy the separate parts. The only way to buy a shower intact would be a one-piece shower that you put in a new construction house that you ca n never get into a hou se that s already been pre-made, because that type of shower that you would get a price on if I went in and asked for a shower wall kit and just got one p rice for a sho wer wa ll kit, it would be a one-piece shower that s prefab that s already put together. You could never get that into a house because the house is already built, so when you go back in to redoing a shower that s been damaged or needs to be replaced, you have to buy the pieces of the shower and they have to be put together. 4 At that point in the questioning, defense counsel conceded that the Lowe s price only contained an estimate for the cost of a shower kit and did not contain an estimate for labor. -5- account for a sufficient amount of hours of work to replace the shower. 5 In addition, Mr. Ohl testified that a competitive hourly rate for plumbing work is $122.00 per hour and that the Blizzard estimate included an hourly rate o f approx imately $50.00 per hour. Moreover, the Blizzard estimate contained no m ark up on the supp lies needed to replace the sho wer. Mr. Ohl concluded that Mr. Blizzard would be losing a lot money if he completed the work at the price estimated.6 At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial judge ordered restitution in the amount of $2,156.00 and made the following remarks: Well, I guess the thing is, I think there was some testimony last week that the thing simply could not be repaired. Numerous cracks and holes, which were a direct r esult of the incid ent wh ich led to Mr. G off be ing con victed. * * * Here what we have is an item whic h was pro bably, prior to the incident, perfectly functional and after the incident, it s not functional . . . it s not the value of the shower stall here, it s the value of the materials and services needed to replace it because it s no longer function al an d I think the te stimony, the last tim e, was a dequa te to esta blish tha t. So, then, the issue is, what is a fair amount of restitution, assuming that the item has to be replaced . . . it is the burden of the Defendant to show that the suggested charges by the State are not fair and reasonable and that I think the Defendant has h as not m et his bu rden. I think that, based upon what we we have heard over both hearings, I I think that, although it sounds like a lot 5 Mr. Blizzard s estimate stated that the repair would take between six and eight hours. 6 Mr. Ohl testified that it would cost him approximately $315.00 to purchase a Swan white fiberglass shower wall kit and approximately $105.00 to purchase the shower base, not inc luding ma rk-up. He also testified th at three shee ts of green wall board would cost $1 8.00. -6- of money, anytime you have damage to something in a home which is going to require some degree of labor, it doesn t take very long to run up a a total, which is proba bly going to be m ore than the hom e own er expe cts. Now, one of the questions that I had in this case was, is the tenant and everybody seems to be operating under the assumption that in a situation like this, that it s necessarily the tenant s responsibility well, the landlord appears to believe that it s the tenant s responsibility. Actually, I think there s an argument that can be made that it s not the tenant who is really the victim; it s the landlord who who s the victim, since he s the property owner and anytime the property owner has damage to his property of course, I can understand the landlord taking the position saying, well, I m not the one that has to use the shower. I ll just lay it in the lap of the tenant and let him collect on my behalf. A nd, I guess I c an t argue w ith the logic, bu t I think there is certainly an argum ent that can b e made th at perhaps the lan dlord is responsible for repairing it and perhaps he s the one w ho s entitled to restitutio n. Mr. Hadley seems to take the position that h e believes it s h is responsib ility and that he ought to, you know, take care of it. One thing that concerned me, quite honestly, is supp ose the mo ney is paid by M r. Goff an d the prop erty never gets repaired. Suppose Mr. Hadley moves out at some point in time and the property never is repaired and then is the could the landlord come back, potentially sue Mr. Goff as a person who perpetrated this and M r. Goff w ould have paid the money in restitution to M r. Hadley. So, I m assuming that any money paid here will be used for the intended purpose . . . . I would not be happy to learn tha t that did n t hap pen . . . . I think the the estimate, taking everything in consideration provided at the last hearing is is fair and reasonable and I order restitution in that amount [$2,156.00]. The court ordered payment of the restitution through the Division of Parole and Probation and fu ll paymen t no later than O ctober 2 0, 2004 . STANDARD OF REVIEW Md. Rule 8-131 (c) states: -7- When an action has been tried without a jury, the appellate court will review the case on both the law and the evidence. It will not set aside the judgment of the trial court on the evidence unless clearly erroneous, and will give due regard to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. The issue raised in this case involves a review of the facts foun d by the trial judg e as well as the interpretation of a statute. Our review of the statute is de novo. As noted in Nesbit v. Government Employees Insurance Company, 382 Md. 65, 85 4 A.2d 879 (2 004): The deference shown to the trial court s factual findings under the clearly erroneo us standard does not, of course, apply to legal conclusions. When the trial court s [decision] involves an interpretation and applic ation of M aryland statutory and case law, our Court must determine whether the lower court s conclusions are legally correct under a de novo standard of review. Nesbit, 382 Md. at 72, 854 A.2d at 883 (internal citations omitted). We will not disturb the judgment on the facts, however, unless the trial court s findings are clearly erroneous. If there is any competent evidence to support the factual findings of the trial court, those findings cannot be held to be clearly erroneous. Solomon v. Solomon, 383 Md 176, 202, 857 A.2d 1109, 1123 (2004) (quoting Fuge v. Fuge, 146 Md. App. 142, 180, 806 A.2d 716, 738 (2 002)). DISCUSSION As very recently discussed in Williams v. State, 385 Md. 50 , 867 A.2d 305 (2005), Restitution imposed under [§ 11-603 o f the Crim inal Proced ure Article] is a criminal sanction, not a civil remedy. Grey v. Allstate Insurance Company, 363 Md. 445, 451, 769 A.2d 891, 895 (2001) (emphasis in original). Judge Wilner, writing for this Court in Grey, traced the history of restitution and -8- explained that it serves retributive, deterrent, and rehabilitative objectives, which are the princip al func tions of crimina l punish ment. Id. at 459-60, 769 A.2d at 899-900. We explained that penal goals are accomplished through restitution to the extent that the defendant is forced to focus on the harm that was caused to the victim . Grey, 363 Md. at 459, 769 A.2d at 899. Likewise, restitution is a monetary detriment to the defendant and satisf[ies] society s demand for meaningful justice, thus serving the punitive objective of the crimina l system. Williams, 385 Md. at 58-59, 867 A.2d at 310 (footnote omitted) (quoting State v. Ga rnett, 384 Md. 466, 475, 863 A.2d 1007, 1012 (some internal citations omitted)). Restitution may be imposed as a conditio n of pr obation or as pa rt of a se ntence . Pete v. S tate, 384 Md. 47, 55, 862 A .2d 419, 42 3 (2004); Garn ett, 384 Md. at 476, 863 A.2d at 1013. Mr. Goff argues that the trial court erred by ordering restitution for three reasons: (1) the damage to the shower is not the direct result of the crime; (2) the shower is not the property of the victim; and (3) ordering replacement instead of repair is not fair and reasonable. We beg in by discussing the State s contention that Mr. Goff s first two grounds for attacking the restitution order are not preserved for our review because defense counsel never raised them below. The State points out that Mr. Goff agreed to pay restitution and that the parties proceeded on an agreed statement of facts that included the following description: Officer Warehime saw that Hadley had a bloody face and that the sh ower insert in the bathroom had been broken due to the a ssault. (Em phasis a dded.) Mr. Goff s brief does not address the preservation question. In oral argument, how ever, counsel argued that a defend ant canno t agree to an illegal sentenc e and that, the refore, the q uestion is pro perly before the Co urt. -9- As state d in M d. Ru le 8-131 (a), [o]r dina rily, w e will not dec ide a ny other issue unless it plainly appears by the record to have been raised in or decided by the trial court, but the Court may decide suc h an issue if necessary or desirable to g uide the trial court or to avoid the expense and delay of another appeal. We note at the outset that it appears the issue was raised in or decided b y the trial court. D efense co unsel did o bject at trial to the reasonableness of the amount of restitution ordered by the trial court, properly placing the review of the restitution order before us. Moreover, it is clear from the trial court s opinion on the record that the specific question of whether Mr. Ha dley was the v ictim of the p roperty damage was considered and decided by the trial court, even if not argued by the parties. If the issues in this case had not been reviewed b y the trial court, we would still consider Mr. Go ff s appe al. As stated in Walczak v. State, 302 Md. 422, 427, 488 A.2d 949, 951 (1985): [W]hen the trial court ha s allegedly imposed a sentence not permitted by law, the issue sho uld ordinarily be reviewed on direct appeal even if no objection was made in the tria l court . . . . Thus, a defendant who fails to object to the imposition of an illegal sentence does not waive forever his right to challenge that sen tence. An order to pay restitution as a condition of probation is part of the punishment for the crime. Walczak, 302 Md. at 426, n. 1. As such, an illegal condition of probation can be challenged as an illegal sentence. Id.7 7 But see Lee v. S tate, 307 Md. 74, 81, 512 A.2d 372, 375-76 (1986) (recognizing a narrow exception to the rule in Walczak and permitting payment of restitution in an amount greater than that involved in the crime for which the defendant has been (continued...) -10- The Direct Results of the Crime In support of his argument that the damage to the shower was not a direct result of the crime of assault against Mr. Hadley, Mr. Goff relies on Section 11-603 of the Criminal Procedu re Article, w hich prov ides, in pertine nt part: (a) Conditions for judgment of restitution. A court may enter a judgment of restitution that orders a defendant or ch ild respond ent to mak e restitution in addition to any other penalty for the commission of a crime or delinquen t act, if: (1) as a direct result of the crime or de linquent ac t, property of the victim was stolen, dam aged, destroyed, converted, or unlawfully obtained, or its value substantially decreased; (2) as a direct result of the crime or delinquent ac t, the victim suffered: (I) actual med ical, dental, hos pital, counse ling, funera l, or burial expenses; (ii) any oth er direc t out-of -pocke t loss . . . . (b) Right of victims to restitution. A victim is p resumed to have a rig ht to restitution under subsection (a) of this section if: (1) the victim or the State requests restitution; and (2) the court is presented with competent evidence of any item listed in subsection (a) of this section. Md. C ode (20 01, 200 4 Sup p.), § 11 -603 o f the C riminal P rocedu re Artic le. As stated in Oaks v. Conners, 339 Md. 24, 35, 660 A.2d 423, 429 (1995), [t]he first step in determining legislative intent is to look at the statutory language and [i]f the words of the statute, construed according to their common and everyday meaning, are clear and 7 (...continued) convicted, where the defendant agreed to pay the additional amount pursuant to a plea agreement and there was an admission of guilt to the criminal acts underlying the additional loss). -11- unambiguous and express a plain meaning, we will give ef fect to the statute as it is written. " Oaks, 339 Md. at 35, 660 A.2d at 429 (quoting Jones v. State, 336 Md. 255, 261, 647 A.2d 1204, 1206-07 (1994). In Pete v. State, 384 M d. 47, 862 A .2d 419 (2 004), we determine d that the pro perty damage for which the defendant was ordered to pay restitution was not the direct result of the crime of assault for which Pete was convicted. In Pete, the defendant entered the apartment of Sus an Ra ickle an d hit her on the b ack of the hea d. Pete, 384 Md. at 51, 862 A.2d at 421. Ms. Raickle called the p olice w ho bro adcaste d a look out for Mr. Pe te. Id. Almost two hours later, Patrolman First Class Cheesman saw a man matching Mr. Pete s description in a truck stop ped at a traff ic light. Id. Patrolman Cheesm an turned o n his overhead lights and attempted to stop M r. Pete, who sped away from the police c ruiser. Id. During the chase, Mr. Pete stopped abruptly, causing Patrolman C heesman to strike M r. Pete s truck. Pete, 384 Md. at 52, 862 A.2d at 421. The police cruiser sustained $6,490.53 in dama ges. Id. Mr. Pete was convicted of second degree assault and reckless driving, among other th ings. Pete, 384 Md. at 49, 862 A.2d at 420. For the assault on Ms. Raickle, the court se ntence d him to eightee n mon ths, with all but tw o mon ths susp ended . Id. The court also placed Pete on probation for three years upon his relea se. Id. The conditions of his probation included an order to make restitution to the victim for her injuries, and to the Local Government Insurance Trust (L GIT) f or repa irs to the p olice cru iser. Pete, 384 Md. at 50, 86 2 A.2d at 420. -12- We held that restitution to the LG IT as a part of the sente nce for ass ault was improper because the damage to Patrolma n Chees man s cru iser did not aris e as a direct re sult of the second degree assault on Ms. Raikle. Pete, 384 Md. at 57, 862 A.2d at 424.8 We reaffirmed, stating: The chief goa l of statutory interp retation is to discover the actual intent of the legislature in enacting the statute, and the le gion of ca ses that supp ort this proposition need not be repeated here. In fact, all statutory interpretation begins, and usually ends, with the statutory text itself for the legislative intent of a statute p rimarily reveals itself through the statute s very words. A cou rt may neither add nor delete language so as to reflect an intent not eviden ced in the plain and unambiguous language of the statute; nor may it construe the statute with forced or subtle interpretations that limit or extend its application. In short, if the words of a statute clearly and unambiguously delineate the legislative intent, ou rs is an ep heme ral enter prise. We need investigate no further but sim ply apply the statute a s it reads . Pete, 384 Md. at 57-58, 862 A.2d at 425 (quoting Price v. State , 378 Md. 378, 387-88, 835 A.2d 1221, 1226 (20 03)). Mr. Pete argued that we should interpret the statute to mean that a direct result of a crime is limited to the victim of the qualifying crime and that victim s 8 Though not relevant to the resolution of the instant case, we point out for the sake of completeness that we also held in Pete that restitution to th e LGIT was not a vailable under § 11-603 of the Criminal Procedure Article for the reckless driving charge, even though the damage to the police cruiser was undoubtedly a direct result of the reckless driving. Pete, 384 Md. at 56. That decision was based on the fact that reckless driving is not a crime for which restitution may be ordered, as that term is defined by § 11601(d)(2). The 2001 § 11-601 (d)(2) provided that [c]rime includes a violation of the Transp ortation Article t hat is pu nishab le by a term of con finem ent. M d. Cod e (2001 ), § 11-601 (d)(2) of the Criminal Procedure Article. Reckless driving, under § 21-901.1 of the Transportation Article, is not an offense that may be punished by a term of confinement. Md. Code (1977, 2002 Repl. Vol.), § 21-901.1 of the Transportation Article. -13- injuries and/or dama ges arisi ng fro m that c rime. Pete, 384 Md. at 59 , 862 A.2d at 426 . Mr. Pete also suggested that we apply a proximate cause analysis to determine the extent of direct result u nder th e statute . Id. The State argued that we should conclude that any count for which a defendant is convicted under the same charging document would be sufficient to satisfy the statutory direct result test. Pete, 384 Md. at 60, 862 A.2d at 426. In deciding this issue, Judge Harrell, writing for the Court said: The standards governing restitution as a direct penalty for the second degree assault conviction in this case req uire a pa rticular typ e of crim e, a victim, and damages as a direct result of the crime. We need not engage in a tort causal relationship analysis, nor weigh the persuasion quotient of an attenuated nexus between the dama ges to Patrolman Cheesm an s police c ruiser and th e assault on Ms. Raickle. The General Assembly has required a direct result between the qualifying crime committed and the damages inflicted before restitution may be ordered. * * * It is easy to see on this record that the damage to the police cruiser could not be a direct result of the assault on another individual that occurred approximately two hours earlier than the vehicle collision. Pete, 384 M d. at 60- 61, 862 A.2d a t 426-2 7. By contrast, in the instant case, Mr. Hadley s assaultive behavior directly caused the damage to the show er, in addition to causing p hysical injury to M r. Hadley. Tha t fact is easily established by a review of the record, which included the agreed-upon fact that Officer Warehime saw that Hadley had a bloody face and that the shower insert in the bathro om ha d been broken due to th e assau lt. Mr. Goff argues that, while physical injury to Mr. Ha dley resulting fro m the assa ult may be a direct result of the assault, the damage to the show er canno t legitimately be said to be the direct result of that crime. Mr. Goff -14- offers no support in his brief or in oral argument fo r that conclusory assertion, and we are unable to find a ny suppo rt in the re cord or the law . Section 11-601 of the Criminal Procedure Article, the definition section of the restitution statute, does not include a definition of the te rm direct re sult. As no ted in Schmerling v. Injure d Wor kers In suranc e Fun d, 368 Md. 434, 795 A.2d 715 (2002), when statutory definitions are not explicitly provided, we determ ine the intended scope of the term by applying the lan guage's na tural and ord inary meanin g, by considering the express and implied purpo se of th e statute , and by em ploying b asic prin ciples o f com mon se nse, the meaning these word s intend to conv ey. Schm erling, 368 Md. at 444, 795 A.2d at 720. The natural and ordinary meaning of the term direct result most certainly includes the damage done to the shower in the instant case.9 It is clear that Mr. Goff damaged the shower during and because of the assault on Mr. Hadley. No intervening agent or occurrence caused the damage. Additi onally, no time lapsed between the criminal act and the resulting damage caused.10 That leads us to conclude, considering the plain language of the statute, that the 9 Direct is d efined as stemming immedia tely from a sou rce, [as in dire ct] result . . . proceeding from one point to another in time or space without deviation or interruption . . . marked by absence of an intervening agency, instrumentality, or influence . . . . Merriam-Webster s Collegiate Dictionary 327 (10th ed. 2001). 10 By contrast, in Pete, a significant amount of time lapsed between the criminal act and the p roperty dama ge. Mor eover, eve nts other than Pete s assau lt on Ms. R aikle caused the dam age to th e police cruiser in that case . -15- damage to the shower was a direct result of the crime for which Mr. Goff was convicted.11 There fore, the order to pay restitu tion wa s prope r. The Victims of the Crime Section 11-601 o f the Crim inal Proced ure Article defines victim as a person who suffers personal in jury or property da mage or lo ss as a direct re sult of a crim e . . . . Md. Code (2001, 2004 Supp.), § 11-601 (j)(1) of the Criminal Proced ure Article. Mr. Goff argues that because the victim of the assault (Mr. Hadley) is a tenant and not the owner of the apartmen t, § 11-603 does not permit the court to order payme nt of restitution to Mr. Hadley for the repair of the shower, in connection with the assault conviction. In his brief, Mr. Goff argues that the property own er was the party who tru ly suffered the loss via any pro perty damages, and [Mr. Goff] was not convicted of any crime wherein the landlord/property owner . . .wa s the victi m. T hus, the restitu tion awa rd to Mr. Had ley . . . for the prop erty 11 The instant case is also distinguishable from William s v. State , 385 Md. 50, 867 A.2d 305 (2005), in which we vacated an order of restitution. In William s, the defendant stole motorc ycles from the victim wh ich were la ter recovere d by the police and place d in the city lot. William s, 385 Md. at 52, 867 A.2d at 307. The city would not release the vehicle s from the lot be cause th e victim had no t registere d them . Id. We held that, [the victim s] inability to reclaim the undamaged motorcycles was not the direct result of Williams s theft of them. While there is undeniably a causal link between the theft in Baltimore County and the motorcycles ending up in the Baltimore City impoundment lot, that nexus does not partake of the directness required by the statute. Moreover, [the v ictim s] failure to produce proof of ownership to s ecure release of the vehicles is in n o way a direc t result of their und erlying theft. William s, 385 Md. at 62, 867 A.2d at 312-313. -16- damage/loss suffer ed by the landlor d . . . was in approp riate und er § 11- 603. As previo usly discussed, § 11-603 permits a court to order a defendant to make restitution if as a direct result of the c rime . . . property o f the victim was stolen, damaged, destroyed . . . . Md. Code (2001, 2004 Supp.), § 11-603(a)(1) of the Criminal Procedure Article (emphasis added). While it is true that M r. Hadley doe s not own the apartm ent in which he lives, it is equally true that as a ten ant he has a property interest in the nature o f a possess ory property right in the apartm ent. 12 The fact that the landlord also suffered a loss to his property does 12 A leasehold estate or tenancy is more than a non-possessory interest in property, yet som ething less tha n a presen t freehold estate. To better understand the nature of the landlord-tenant relationship, the spectrum of interests in pro perty should be analyzed. On one end of the spectrum is a non-po ssessory interest in property. For example, a lodger or roomer may be entitled to the mere use of the premises subject to the control of a hotel owner. At the other end of th e spectrum is the present freehold estate, which involves the conveyance of both present possessory and future interest estates. In the middle of the spectrum is tenancy, which involves the conveyance of a present possessory leasehold estate . . . . In a free hold or leas ehold estate, the holder has a possessory interest and, therefore, has property-based remedies, such as an action in trespass to protect or regain possession, available to the leaseholder against bo th the owner and third pa rties . . . . One party, the landlord, allows to the other, the tenant, a temporary claim and possession of land, thereby creating a property interest, in return for a fixed fee pa id over a period of time . DOUGLAS M. BREGMAN & GARY G. EVERNGAM, MARYLAND LANDLORD-TENANT LAW PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, at 15-16 (3d ed. 2003) -17- not change the fact that the tenant suffered a loss to his possessory property right, for which restitution may properly be granted pursuant to § 11-603.13 We strive to give statutes their most reasonable interpretation, in accord with logic and common sense, and to avoid a construction not otherwise evident by the words actually used. Greco v . State, 347 Md. 423, 13 The show er insert is clearly a fixture. Under the comm on law, fixtures are treated as pa rt of the realty. A f ixture is an item that is so con nected to th e land that it [cannot] be removed without substantial injury to itself or the land. Colonial Pipeline Co. v. State Dept. of Assessments and Taxation, 371 Md. 16, 32-33, 806 A. 2d 648, 658 (200 2) (c iting Rich ard R . Pow ell, P owe ll on Rea l Pro perty § 57-23 ( 1969)). O rdinarily, the nature of the landlord-tenant relationship is such that the landlord transfers to the tenant everything that is properly appurtenant to the demised premises or everything essentia l or reaso nably ne cessary to the full b enefic ial use an d enjoym ent of th e prope rty. Jackson v. Birgfeld,189 Md.552 , 554, 56 A.2d 79 3, 795 (1948). He nce, Mr. Gof f s damage to the shower insert interfered with Mr. Hadley s use, possession and enjoyment of the p remise s. Furthermore, the common law rule is that the tenant has a duty to keep the leased premis es in rep air. Shum v. Gau dreau , 317 Md. 49, 65, 562 A.2d 707, 715 (1989). The duty has been interpreted as demanding no more than that the tenant keep the premises windtight and watertight. Shum, 317 Md. at 65, 562 A.2d at 715 (quoting Katz v. William s, 239 Md. 355, 360, 211 A.2d 723, 726 (1965)). A tenant is required to su rrender the premises in good condition at the end of the term with allowances generally made for normal wear and tear. DOUGLAS M. BREGMAN & GARY G. EVERNGAM, MARYL AND LAN DLORD-TEN ANT LAW PRACTICE A ND PROC EDURE, at 24 (3d ed. 2003) (footnote omitted). Moreover, the common law does not impose any obligation upon the landlord to repair the premises or to rebuild or restore any building destroyed without his fault, in the absence of an agreement to do so. Miller v. Howard, 206 Md. 148, 154, 110 A.2d 683, 685 (1954). Mr. Hadley testified that he was responsible for fixing the shower and that his landlord expected him to do so. There was no evid ence th at there w as any ag reeme nt that th e landlo rd wo uld rep air the pr emises . In addition, in the appropriate case, it may be proper for the court to order restitution payable jointly to two or more persons because they have a joint interest in the property loss/damage. A joint restitution order was not necessary in this case because the tenant, Mr. Hadley, was re sponsible for repairing the d amage to the show er. -18- 429, 701 A .2d 419 , 422 (1 997). To interpret the term property of th e victim so narrowly as to discount the property rights of tenants vis-a- vis restitution in a criminal cas e such as th is one is not in accord with logic and common sense. Moreove r, our interpreta tion is supported by the underlying purposes of restitution; namely, rehabilitation, deterrence, and retribution. Grey, 363 Md. at 459, 769 A.2d at 899.14 Mr. Hadley testified that he was responsible for repairing the shower and that his landlord expected him to repair it. Mr. Goff presented no evidence to refute that assertion. Consequently, the court did not err by deciding that Mr. Hadley was the proper victim for purposes of § 11-603.15 This case is not like Walczak v. State, 302 Md. 422, 488 A.2d 949 (1985), in which 14 As described by Judg e Wilner, Restitution is regarded as rehabilitative to the extent that it causes the offender to focus on the victim and the harm that he or she has caused to the victim . . . . Restitutio n is viewe d as a deterre nt, more so th an a civil judgment, because it is usually tailored to the defendant s ability to pay and it must be paid personally by the defendant, not by an insurance company or other third pa rty . . . . The retributive v alue of restitu tion lies not on ly in the person al econom ic detriment to the offen der, who may be sadd led with a non-dischargeable debt for quite some time, but as well in satisfying society s demand for meaningful justice. Grey, 363 Md. at 459-60, 769 A.2d at 899-900. 15 See Pe ople v. C hristm an, 265 A.D.2d 856, 696 N.Y.S.2d 594, 595 (1999), leave to appeal denied, 726 N.E.2d 487, 94 N.Y.2d 878, 705 N.Y.S.2d 10 (2000) (upholding an order of restitution to the tenant of a building vandalized by the defendant and rejecting the conten tion that the b usiness tena nt of the bu ilding vand alized by defe ndant is no t a victim for the purpose of receiving restitution. The record established that the tenant was a victim of defendant s damaging the windows in the building and a computer used by the tenant in his business. ). -19- we determined that the trial court erred by ordering Walczak to pay restitution to the victim of a robbe ry of wh ich he w as not c onvicte d. Walczak, 302 Md. at 430, 488 A.2d at 969. We stated that restitution is punishment for the c rime of which the defendant has been convicted. Restitution depends on the existence of that crime, and the statute authorizes the court to order restitution only where the court is otherwise authorized to impose punis hmen t. Walczak, 302 Md. at 429, 488 A.2d at 969. In the present case, the court ordered Mr. Goff to pay restitution as punishment for the crime of which he was convicted assault, which resulted in dam age to M r. Hadle y s person and pro perty. Concluding our discussion of this issue, we note that during oral argument, counsel for Mr. Goff raised a numb er of co ncerns about w hat mig ht happ en civilly if Mr. Hadle y takes the restitution m oney and fa ils to repair the shower. We decline to respond to those questions because an answ er is not necessary for us to decide the present case. We reemphasize, howe ver, that r estitution is a crim inal san ction, no t a civil rem edy. Grey, 363 Md. at 45 1, 769 A .2d at 895. F urthermo re, we rem ind the parties that, [t]he order of re stitution, even when entered as a civil judgment, concludes only the matters that were ra ised or that co uld have been raised, in the criminal proceeding. Although it may be enforced in the manner that a civil judgment may be enforced, it does not, and cannot, establish civil liability for anything beyond the ma tters it con cludes . Id. The Reasonableness of the Restitution Order Fina lly, Mr. Goff argues that the restitution award should have been for repair of the -20- shower instead of re placemen t because, in his view, complete replacement is not reasonable. Mr. Goff argues that replacement is unreasonable because the $2,156.00 replacement estimate was based on what Mr. Hadley told the estimator about the damage and not based on the estimator s first-hand view of the d amag ed sho wer. Mr. Goff a lso complains that M r. Hadle y only soug ht out o ne estim ate for th e cost o f replac emen t. Mr. Goff relies on § 11-615 in support of his argument, which provides: (a) Fair and reasonable charges. In a restitution hearing held under § 11-603 of this subtitle, a w ritten statemen t or bill for me dical, dental, ho spital, counseling, funeral, or b urial expen ses is legally suff icient eviden ce that a charge shown on the w ritten statemen t or bill is a fair and re asonable charge for the services or materials provided. (b) Burden of proof. A person who challenges the fairness and reasonableness of the amount on the statement or bill has the burden of provin g that the amou nt is not f air and r easona ble. Md. Code (2001), § 11-615 of the Criminal Procedure Article.16 The trial court held two hearings on the question of the cost to repair or replace the damaged shower. At the first hearing, Mr. Hadley, a master plumber himself, testified about the damage to the shower and stated that there were numerous holes and cracks all through the side of the showe r. In addition, the State intro duced a w ritten estimate f rom Cato n Plumb ing in the amount of 16 It appears fr om the arg ument in th e trial court that b oth parties ass umed tha t § 11-615 a pplied to the facts of this c ase, even th ough the k ind of exp enses at issue in this case are no t mentione d in that sectio n. None theless, the stan dard desc ribed therein regarding th e proof o f reasonab leness of p articular exp enses is also th e correct stan dard to apply in restitution hearings concerning expenses not specifically mentioned in that section . -21- $2,156, signed by Kevin Ohl. At the second hearing, the State called Kevin Ohl who testified in detail about the need to replace the shower and the cost to do so. Mr. Goff testified that he had obtained a n estimate for some supplies at L owe s an d an estima te for the cost of repairing the shower from a contractor, named Mr. Blizzard, in the amount of $523.00. Mr. Goff presented no evidence to rebut t he testimony of Mr. Ohl regarding the need or cost to replace the show er. By contrast, Mr. Ohl testified that the estimate provided by Mr. Blizzard was far below current market prices. As previously mentioned, after hearing the eviden ce, the court s tated: Here what we have is an item whic h was pro bably, prior to the incident, perfectly functional and after the incident, it s not functional . . . it s not the value of the shower stall here , it s the value of the materials and services needed to replace it because it s no longer functional and I think the te stimony, the last tim e, was a dequa te to esta blish tha t. So, then, the issue is, what is a fair amount of restitution, assuming that the item has to be replaced . . . it is the burden of the Defendant to show that the suggested charges b y the State are not fair a nd reason able and th at I think the Defe ndant h as has not me t his burd en. In view of th e testimony pre sented at the restitution hea rings, the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in determining that the State s estimate to replace the shower was fair and reason able un der the c ircums tances. CONCLUSION In summary, we hold that: (1) th e damag e to the shower is one of the direct results of the crime of assault; (2) the shower is the property of the victim of the assault, even though he is the tenant and not the owner of the apartment; and (3) ordering replacement of the -22- show er instea d of rep air was fair and reason able un der the c ircums tances. JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR CARROLL COUNTY AFFIRMED; APPELLANT T O PAY COST S. -23-