Pointe Coupee Parish School Board VS The Louisiana School Employee's Retirement System, John N. Kennedy, State Treasurer, and Louisiana Department of Education (2013CA1100 Consolidated With 2013CA1102 2013CA1101)

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STATE OF LQUI IANA COUR.T OF APPEAL FIRST CIRCUIT N0. 2 13 CA 11OQ POINTE COUPEE P IRISF SCHO L BOARD VERSUS THE LOUISIANA SCHOOL EMPLOYEE'S REfIREMENT SYSTEM, JOHN N. KENNEDY, STATE TREASURER, AND LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION CONSOLIDATED WITH NO. 2013 CA 1101 M EVANGELINE PARISH SCHOOL BOARD Y" ` VERSUS THE LOUISIANA SCHOOL EMPLOYEE' S RETIREMENT SYSTEM, JOHN N. KENNEDY, STATE TREASURER, AND LOUISIANA DEPAR`TMENT OF EDUCATION CONSOLIDATED WITH NO. 2013 CA 1102 ST. ) AMES PARISH SCHOOL BOARD VERSUS THE LOUISIANA SCHOOL EMPLOYEE'S RETIREMENT SYSTEM, JOHN N. KENNEDY, STATE TREASURER, AND LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION 7udgment rendered App2aled from the 19r" Judicoal Distriet Court in and for the Parish of East Baton Rouge, Louisiana Trial Court Nos. 613906, 6P3907, 615872 Honorable Todd Hernandez, Jud e AITORNEYS FOR ROBERT L. HAMMONDS FRANKLIN V. ENDOM, JR. LAINTIFFS- APPELLANT$ ERIC M. BARRILLEAUX PQINTE COUPEE PARISH SCHOOL BATON ROUGE, LA BOARD, EVANGELiNE PARISH SCHOOL BQARD, ANp ST. JAMES PARISH SCHOpL BOARD M. BRENT HICKS A-fTORNEI`S FQR KIMBERLY D. HIGGINBOTHAM DEFENDANT-APGELLEE BATON ROUGE, LA L4 UISIANA SCHOOL EMPLOYEES' RErIREMENT SYSTEM BEFORE: PETTIGREW, MCDONALD, AND McCLENDON, ]). 2 PETTIGREW, J. In this consolidated proceedErag, thr e ; parish school boards have sought declaratory and injunctive reGef a air, t tih System ( LSERS), S tate Treasurer Jka Education to treasury prahibit pursuant the n to La. R. S. Kes r ecy. v. withdrawas Gf L. ui i na School Empioyees' Retirement naas 11. 1202. Th red the Louisiana Department of or their benefik from the state rasfabi r ad co act denied the school boards' request for deciaratory and injunctive relief and overr led an exception of res judicata raised by the Pointe Coupee Parish School Board. The suics, were dismissed with prejudice, and the school boards now appeal. After a thorough review of the record and the arguments presented, we find no merit to the school bQards' assignments of error and affirm the judgment of the trial court. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY This suit arises out of the privatization f bus transportation services by the Pointe Coupee, Evangeline, and St. James Parish school boards. school boards independently eontracte affiliate Between 2005 and 2011, the with Laidlaw Education Services and/ or an company, First Student, Inc- ( hereinafter coliectively referred to as " Laidiaw', to be the private provider of student transpo tation services. The contracts provided that Laidlaw would be awarded indivfdual school bus routes as they oeeame available, resulting in the elimination of severa( dr ver pcs tians previc;usly h id by publie employees who were contributing members of LSERS. Ir± totaYF P i te G upee elirr inated eight driver positions, Evangeline eliminated fve pcsitions, and St. James eliminated twelve positions during the time period relevant to this litigationo As a result of the alleged privatization of these positions, LSERS made demands upon the schoof boards for payment of a claimed portion of its unfunded accrued liability UAL) pursuant to La. RoS. 11: 1195. 1 and La. R. S. 11: 1195. 2.' Specifically, LSERS Louisiana Revised Statutes 11: 1Y95. 1 and 1Y95, 2 provide guideiines relative to LSERS and provide, in pertinent part, as follows: 1195, 1. Unfunded accrued liabilityp payment by employer A. Notwithstanding any other proviseon of law, if an employer termirates a group of employees belonging to this system by eiiminating the positions held foy those employees 3 demanded payment in the following Pointe Coupee Parish School Board; Board; and ( 3) $ 2( amounts, plus interest: ( 1) $ 310, 856. 00 from the 2) $ 256,041. 00 from the Evangeline Parish School 958, 518. 00 from the St, James Parish School Board. The school boards refused to voluntarily relinquish payment, and LSERS gave notice of its intent to utilize the procedures detailed in La. R. S. 11: 1202 to mandate that the state treasurer or Department of Education deduct the delinquent payments from any monies then due the school boards. 3 In response, the school boards each individually brought suit in the 19"' Judicial District Court, seeking to enjoin LSERS from invoking collection procedures pursuant to La. R. S. 11: 1202. The Pointe Coupee Parish School Board argued in its petition that LSERS was collaterally estopped and barred by a final consent judgment rendered in a prior proceeding entitled Pointe Coupee Parish School Boa d v. The Louisiana School Emp/oyees' RetirementSystem, 19"' Judicial District Court, Docket No. 574,462. Also, the school boards sought declaratory judgment that the amounts due were calculated incorrectly and that the provisions of La. R.S. 11: 1202 purporting to authorize LSERS to Continued) through privatizing, outsourcing, contrecting the service with a private employer, or any other means, then the employer shall remit that portion of the unfunded accrued liability eacisting on June thirtieth, immediately prior to the date of termination attributable to the employees being terminated. 1195. 2. Unfunded acvued liability; payment by employer; any position A. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, if an employer eliminates any position through privatizing, outsourcing, contracting the service with a private employer, or any other means, then the employer shall remit that portion of the unfunded accrued liability existing on June thirtieth, immediately prior to the date of termination of the employee in that position, which is attributable to that position. Z We noted inconsistencies in the remrd. The petition states $ 310, 856. 00, while the briefs state 301, 856. 00. 3 Louisiana Revised Statute 11: 1202 provides, in relevant part: A. ( 1) Should any parish or city school board or other employer refuse to transmit either employer's contributions or members' contributions by the due date, the payment of such contributions shall be delinquent. 2) Upon a certification to the state treasurer or the Department of Education by the board of trustees of the School Employees' Retirement System of Louisiana that a payment is delinquent, the state treasurer or the Department of Education shall deduct the amount thereof from any monies then available for distribution to or for the benefit of that parish or city school board . . . and shall transmit said amount directly to the board of trustees. 4 collect from the state treasurer monies then available fvr distribution to or for the benefit of the school 8, § 13( A) of boards are in conflict with Articie 3 § 16 A), Article 7, § 10( D)( 1), and Article the Louisiana Constitution 1474. of o the extent that the suits involve common issues of law and fact, they were consofidated for joint consideration pursuant to orders dated July 24, 2012, and Ockober 19; 2Q1'c. On December 13, 2012, the consolidateci matter proceeded to trial. On February 11, 2013, the trial court issued written reasons finding no merit to the Pointe Coupee Parish School Board' s claim of collateral estoppel. Moreover, the court found that the statutes in question do not conflict with the provisions of the Louisiana Constitution. Also, the court found that the school boards failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that they would sufFer irreparable injury so as to warrant injunctive relief. On February 25, 2013, the trial court signed a written.judgment denying the school boards' requests for declaratory and injunctive relief, overruling the Pointe Coupee Parish School Board' s exception of res judicata, and dismissing the plaintiffs' petitions with prejudice. The school boards have now appealed that judgment. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW On appeal, the school boards argu2 that the procedure for deducting funds from the state treasury pursuant to La. R. S. 11: 1202 conflicts with the provisions of La. Const. Art. 3, § 16( A), Article 7, § 10( D), and Article 8, § 13( B). Alternatively, the school boards argue that the provisions of La. R. S. 11: 1195. 1 and La. R.S. 11: 1195. 2 do not apply to employees who retire or resign without termination or whose routes are eliminated through merger or consolidation. Also, the schooi boards argue that the UAL attributable to the identified employees was erroneously calculated and that the UAL allegedly attributable to resigning employees would be extinguished by their withdrawal of retirement contributions. The school boards additionally argue that the doctrine of collateral estoppel bars LSERS from enforcing collection from the Pointe Coupee Parish School Board. Lastly, the school boards submit that they would sustain irreparable harm without recourse if fSERS is allowed to withdraw funds held for their benefit from the state treasury or Department of Education. 5 DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS Constitutional Claims At the outset, we note that the constitutionality Qf La. R. S. 11: 1202 is a legal question, which is subjeet to de nouo review. Lao Mun. Ass' n v. the State of La. and the Firefighters' Retirement Sys., 20Q4-Ot2io p, qS ( La. 1/ 19/ 05), 893 SoZd 809, 842. Statutes are generally presumed to be conszitutionai and the party challenging the validity of the statute has the burden of proving it is unconstitutional. State v. Fleury, 2001- 0871, p. 5 ( La. 10/ 16/ O1), 799 So. 2d 468, 472. The provisions of fhe Louisiana Constitution are not grants of power but instead are limitations on the otherwise plenary power of the people exercised through the Jegislature. Bd. of Comm' rs of North Lafourche Conservation, Levee and Drainage Dist. v. Bd. of Comm' rs of Atchafalaya Basin Levee Distr., 95- 1353, p. 3 ( La. 1/ 16/ 96), 666 So.2d 636, 639. Therefore, the legislature may enact any legislation that the state constitution does not prohibit. Bd. of Comm' rs, 95- 1353 at 4, 666 So.2d at 639. In that context, the party challenging the constitutionality of a statute must cite to the specific provision of the constitution which prohibits the legislative action. Fleury, 2001- 0871 at 5, 799 So. 2d at 472; Bd. of Comm' rs, 95- 1353 at 4, 666 So. 2d at 639. The plaintiffs bear the burden of proving the unconstitutionality of the statutes at issue. La. Mun. Ass' n, 2004- 0227 at 45, 893 So. 2d at 843. The school boards argue that the collection mechanism in La. R.S. 11: 1202 violates La. Const. Art. 3, § 16( A) and La. Const, Ark. 7, § 1 1( D). Louisiana Constitution Article 3, 16(A) states that "[ e] xcept as otherwise provided by thie constitution, no money shall be withdrawn from the state treasury except through specific appropriation, and no appropriation shall be made under the heading of contingencies or for longer than one year." Similarly, La. Const. Art. 7, § 10( D)( 1) deals with the expenditure of state funds and provides that '"[e] xeept as otherwise provided by Ehis constitution, money shall be drawn from the state treasury only pursuant to an appropriation made in accordance with law." Insofar as La. R.S. 11: 1202 authorizes the transmission of school board funds based upon a " certification" by the board of trustees of LSERS that a payment is 6 delinquent, the bc) ards schoQl argue chat o 2 st viqlates the constitutional appropriations requirement. In So. 2d he support, 1175 ( La. App. school 1 Cir bc ap cis 19 Firefight ers' Ret. Syso tite 0j, , roX t i d 57' v, So. 2d £ sil . andrieu, ( La. 1391). 572 In Firefighters, the police and fir fighter r tq emer+ syskems sought judgment declaring that they were entitled to possession of funds eoiiected pursuant to La. R. S. 22: 1419( A) and held by the state treasurer.4 The triaf co ct ordered the treasurer to remit the funds, and an appeal was taken. On appeal, the state treasurer argued that the trial court erred by ordering her to release the funds without an appropriation of the legislature, as provided for in La. Const. Art. 3, § 16( Aj and Article 7, § 10( A). This court pointed out that the constitutional provisions relied upon by the treasurer pertained to the withdrawal of state funds from the state treasury and require a legislative appropriation for such actions. Firefighters, 572 So.2d at 11 0. The retirement systems' funds, by contrast, were not required to be deposited in the state treasury therefore, this court held that no appropriation was needed to remove the fur ds firrom the rationale in Firefighters, the school boards argu state treasury. Id. Under the herein that LSERS seeks to withdraw state funds and that the withdrawal requires a legisiative appropriation. We do not find the school boards' constitutional arguments under La. Const. Art. 3, 16( A) and Art. 7, § 10( A) to be persuasive. Louisiana Revised Statute 11: 1202(A)( 2) clearly states that ° the state treasurer or the Department of Ed cation shall deduct the amount thereof from any monies then auaifab/e for distribution to or for the beneft of that parish or city schooi board ( emphasis addedl." he statute is clear that a deduction is allowed only if funds have already been appropriated and are available, Monies are made avaifabie ko parish: school boards ti rough allocation and disbursements pursuank to the Minbmum Foundation Program ( MFP) formula. Louisiana 4 Louisiana Revised Statute 22: 141, dealing with assessments against insurers, was redesignated as La. R. S. 22: 1476 by Acts 2008, No. 415, § l, effedive January 1; 2009. 7 Constitution Article 8, § 13, dealing with funding and apportionment for education, provides, in relevant patt: B) Minimum Foundation Program. Edu The State Board of or its successor, shall Elementary Secondary annualty develop and adopt a form la which shall be used to and determine education the in all cost public of a atian, mi omu n elementary anc faundation program of econdary schoois as well as to equitably allccate the func s to parish and city school systems. Such formula shall provicie for a contribution by every city and parish school system. Prior to approval of the formula by the legislature, the legislature may return the formula adopted by the board to the board and may recommend to the board an amended formula for consideration by the board and submission to the legislature for approvaL The legislature shall annually appropriate funds sufficient to fully fund the current cost to the state of such a program as determined by applying the approved formula in order to insure a minimum foundation of education in all public elementary and secondary schools. Neither the go.vernor nor the legislature may reduce such appropriation, except that the governor may reduce such appropriation using means provided in the act containing the appropriation provided that any such reduction is consented to in writing by two- thirds of the elected members of each house of the legislature. The funds appropriated shall be equitably allocated to parish and city school systems according to the formula as adopted by the State Board of Elementary and Secondary Education, or its successor, and approved by the legislature prior to making the appropriation. Whenever the legislature fails to approve the formula most recently adopted by the board, or its successor, the last formula adopted by the board, or its successor, and approved by the legislature shall be used for the determination of the cost of the minimum foundation program and for the allocation of funds appropriated ( emphasis addedj. Article 8, § 13( B) dictates specific and unique procedures for educationaf expenditures made through the MFP. The MFP formula originates with the State Board of Elementary and Secondary Education and is approved by the iegislature. La. Const. Art. 8, § 13( B). Once approved, the legislature is required to .fuify fund the curren.t cost to the state of such a program as determined by applying, the approved formula. I 1. The funding is accomplished via concurrent resolution and .appropriated through a bill passed by both houses of the legisiature. La. Const. Art. 8, § 13( B); see also La. Fed' n of Teachers v. State, 2013-0120, p. 15 ( La, 5/ 7/ 13), 118 So. 3d 1033, 1044 citina 7oint Rules of the Louisiana Senate available and House, Rule No. 20(A)( 1)( b)( fii). for allocation or distribution to the Once appropriated, MFP funds are schooi systems. 8 La. Const. Art. 8, § 13( B). In light of the detailed funding and apportionment provisions of La. Const. Art. 8, 13, it is clear that the MFP funds are a propriated by khe legislature and are then available for allocation r istributian to the school syskems. The school boards have failed to cite any constitutional provision that prohibits LSERS from deducting from the allocated funds the 11: 1202 is read in amounts it is owed pursuar conjunction with i a. t to La. R. S. 11: 1202. When La. R.S. Const. Art. 8, § 13, it is apparent that the school boards' argument that the statute allows LSERS to unilaterally withdraw funds from the state treasury is unfounded. If there are no appropriated funds available for distribution, then no deduction can be made under La. R. S. 11: 1202(A)( 2). Moreover, the school boards' reliance on Firefighters is misplaced, because this case does not involve an attempt to withdraw unappropriated state funds. Thus, we find that the school boards failed to satisfy the burden of proving La, R.S. 11: 1202 is unconstitutional. Also, we reject the school boards' arguments that LSERS' invocation of La. R.S. 11: 1202 violates La. Const. Art. 8, § 13( B) by diverting MFP funds from their intended use. Retirement funds are a fundamental component in the cost of pubiic education. The MFP formula includes an allowance for the support of increased mandated costs in retirement. See S. Con. Res. No. 99, La. 2012 Reg. Sess. Section N(E) of the current MFP formuia is entitled " Support for Increasing Mandated Costs in Health Insurance, Retirement, and Fuel," and states that "[ c] ity, parish, and other focal public school systems shall receive a minimum of $ 100. 00 provisions of for each student in the prior year February 1 membership." Id. The La. Const. Art. 8, § Z3, which require that MFP funds be used for a minimum foundation program of education, are not violated where the funds are being used for their intended purpose, which includes the retirement costs of school employees.s We, therefore, find that the school boards have failed to satisfy the burden of proof to show that La. R. S. 11: 1202 violates La. Const. Art. 8, § 13. 5 We are aware that the Louisiana Supreme Court has held that the diversion of MFP funds from public schools to nonpublic schools violates La. Const. Art. 8, § 13( B). See La. Fed.' n of Teachers v. State, 2013- 0120 ( La. 5/ 7/ 13), 118 So3d 1033. However, we distinguish the holding in La. Fed.' n of Teachers from the facts herein, where the MFP funds are being used for the purposes encompassed by the MFP. 9 Application of La. R.S. 11: 1195. 1 and i1: liJ5.2 We next turn to the schooi boards° a gum rats that LSERS misapplied La. R. S. 11: 1195. 1 and La, RS. 9. 1: 1i95. 2 Ynsaf r s thP schaql b ards' arguments relate to the factual findings of the trial courM as *.c anrheth r th privatized or eliminated within the m using a manifest relevant raver posit ons were f 4 ae t t t s, we shall review those claims ar? i error standard of review. Almon v. Almon, 2005- 1848, p. 3 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 9/ 15/ 06), 943 So. 2d 1113, 1115. The tvvo- pa t test for appellate review of a factual is: ( finding 1) whether there is a reasonable factuaf basis in the record for the finding of the trial court; and ( 2) whether the record further establishes that the finding is not manifestly erroneous. Mart v. Hill, 505 So. 2d f120, 1127 ( La. 1987). If a reasonable factual basis exists, an appellate court may set aside a trial court's factual finding only if, after reviewing the record in its entirety, it determines the trial court was clearly wrong. See Stobart v. State, through Dept. of Transp. and Dev., 617 So. 2d 880, 882 ( La. 1993). The school boards show on appeaf that, except for one Pointe Coupee employee who was terminated, all of the employees identifed in LSERS' demands either resigned or retired.' Thus, the school boards contend that La: R. 11: 1195. 1 is inapplicable, because 6 We note that even if we view the school boards° argunier?S that iSERS misapplied La. R. S. 11: 1195. 1 and La. R. S. 11: 1195. 2 as a mixed question of law and fact, the issue ; s still subject to a manifest error standard of review. See Dufrene v. Morgan Equipme C RenYal, Inc., 9- 1582, p. 8 ( La. App. 1 Cir, 9J24( 99), 754 So.2d 1000, 1005. The school boards contend that the positions at issue in hfs ii igation were e iminated as follows: Former Em lo Parish Means Disposition Reficed Me Terri Saizan Pointe Coupee Pointe Cou ee Linda Batiste Pointe Cou Diedre Clark ee Clarence Christo he er/ Conso; dation I Retired Privatized ee Retired Privatized Pointe Coupee Retired I I Position Assumed by I Another Driver Sylvia Cook Pointe Coupee Marcella Field Pointe Cou Retired -- j privatized Virginia Lejeune Pointe Coupee Terminated i Position Assumed by ' Stacie M Poin#e Coupee Evan eline Reti ed I Retire i ee Po t Assumed by I Another Driver Another Driver _ Hose ers Guillo I Dfsability/ Retired Warren Guillo Evan eline Retired Brenda Frank Evan eline Retired Elizabeth Lafleur Evangeline__ Disabili / Retired fl0 1 privatized i Privatized Pnvatized Privat¢ ed i Privatized J the statute s tu tmru wi rP ar "'errployer Yerm,inates a group of conterr2plates th empioyees." ( Emphasis lerr added. ver, th at least one of the odentified empiQy as retirement the and at leas t routes of dep thre Pai tce . s rting drivers ' TR La. R. S. 11: 1195. 2 condition through '°p ivatization," and va r appl ca mere e another raute upon his aver that both i_a, r. S. 11: 1145. 1 and ioar e schaap not rrier ed : vit rfv cs are i.x i r St. .]amGS drivers assumed upe the schocal baards poinit out that the route of rA ta a rrspioyer's removal of a position iminatis n. fiie school boards suggest that elimination of a driver position through merger r assumption of a route does not equate to a privatization under the controlliny staku tes. In considering the school boar s' argumen', statutes themselves. w f ¬ turn to the language of the rsk Loaisiana Revised Statu e 11: 119. 1 provides for payment of the UAL by the employer " if an employer terminates a yrvup of empioyees belonging to this system by eliminating the service with a private positions . . . employ r, or aroy through privat zong, outsoureing, contracting the other means" ( Emphasis added.) Likewise, La. R.S. 11: 1195. 2 provides for UA. pa rmer k " i an emp9a yer eliminates any position through Continued) Jimm Menier Evan elire Ret9r d St. James Morris Bowser Retired Privatized Posftion Assumed b I Jerome Bradford St. James I Another Driver Resi d Position Assumed by Substitute Drivers, I Ter Felton St, James St. James Alinda Johnson Resi gs Res+ khen Privatized Privadzed ned Position Assumed by , ed I Mildred Malarcher St. James Catherine Morton Oscar Stewart St. James I RetAred Gloria Gaudet i Maelise Millet Gwen Patterson St. ] ames Retir d T------ Retired St. James 5t. James RQtired j-P, etired I I then Privatized Position Assumed by Otf er Drivers Privatized etired __ St. James Substitute Drivers, i position Assume by i Another Driver Position Assumed by Another Driver i Privatized Privatized, Then AssumPd by Anotner I river I David 1Nonchester St, Jarnes Rasigned I Privatized, Then Assumed by Another j Driver 11 J ing, co oiractary means" ( one Emphasis added.) another, we beli v LoQici g of the statutes tForcA the rei van s r w; uf? al ye, iy c n±emplated the ur ;; ner t a r n r v w: ry_is ;+ ar q privatQ or any other t ates ir uvhoie part and in conjunetion with r a cer, s rvit"r e at th that the lav,F positions are efiminated, wilether reading t? outsourt; privatizing, xh R . rr ans. ituatian where ased on a plain s re s a ic s o a public position and employee that otherwise would n avaiiaibl fiv, co tr9b ace to iLSERS, Our inkerpretation of the statutory iavr i s ppQrted by the testim ny af LSERS Executive Director Charles Bujo. Afkhougn: t je tutes st privatization,'° Mr. Bujo! confirmed at tr ai th Y " do nof defn tt e term r v tized pos tion° is " that which is normaliy part of the employment of the schar>i boarcf tnat has een ou sourced to a entity that no longer partic pates. in, the i. SE S private etirement system." Mr. Bujol furtfner explained that "[ i] f an, existing .schoai b aard empioyee takas th position of the person who retired or left far uvhatever r ason and dowu the line it creates a privatized position, that is the a privatized position and schQOl system is ass ssed that - informed that they have to pay that debt." The undisputed facts herein are that ea h f fi school boards contracfed wiih Laidlaw to be the privafe, pre;vider o ¬ stu de t trad pr rtatio eliminated several positions p eviously hel i employees employee, merged. retired, with there became one Regardless of who filled tYoe one less public empPayee contribut;ng positions at y pubiic empioyees. lM1Jhen the ider t fed 6ess b Ehe exception pf the s l i ai a r e. Aimir ated Q ISER', issue were elirr i ated as cc k seavices and thereafter uce that was riven by a public pee employee whose route was atici,. the resuit was that there was T'tius; th re is no eai dispute that the mpiat d by , R,S. li:li 5. 1 and La. R.S. li:i195,2. We, therefore, concfuae that the triaA et art id nof rri nifesk9y err in finding as a factual matter tnat the positions were elimirrated as contempiated by the statutes and that the school boards are liable ta LSERS far thak portien ot the UAL iost as a result af the rernoval of thes p sitions AfternativelyF the schoo! boards arg e that LS RS cor ectly calculaked khe UAL under La. R.S. 11: 1195. 1 and La R.S. 11: 1195.2 ar d, thereforeo t iQ trial court rreci sn 12 denying declaratory re ief. Lcuisia a tevis d Stat te 11: 1195. 1 req ires payment of" the unfunded accrued liability expsting termination attributabie 11: 1195. 2 req aires to n June th rtieth; immediately ,prior to the date of em loyees the ayment of " ith aeong r t+nd c accr ter ninated." Lik wise, La. R. S. d ia lity xis'riny on JUne thirtieth, immediately prior to "the dat c f erminatscar uf ii e empioy 2 in that Rositio a, which is attributable The schc ol boards argue that calculation of the UAL to that position." requires identification of the benefits liability for the terminated employees to be factored by that portion of the accrued liability that is unfunded. Instead, LSERS based its calculations on the portion of the UAL that was attributable to each of the respective school boards as a whole. Those portions were determined by factoring privatized payroll with the total payroll for all LSERS members. _The school boards submit that use of those values does not comply with La. R.S. 11: 1195. 1 and La. R,S. 11: 1195. 2. Further, it is the position of the schooi boa ds that the UAL atEributable to resigning employees were extinguished by tfie withdrawa of their retirement contributions. In all, the school boards point out that four of the identified employees withdrew tf eir contributions from ISERS before demand was made for payment of the UAL attributable to their positions.$ To the e ent that n adjustr ent was made to the UAL due fo these withdrawals, ti e school boards submit that the caEculations were erroneo s. At trial, LSERS actuary Charles Fiall tesfified in detail as to how he determined the amount due for the privatized positions. Mr. Hall testified that La. RS. 11: 102 has very extensive instructions as to how to construck the funding Qf the plan and that he complied with those instructions. To calculate retirement system funding, Mr. Hall identified the normal cost of the plan, which is the eost of acerued benefits for a year, along with the UAL which is amortized over a prescrib d period. The total calculation is then divided by the total active payroll, as required by from the privatized positions at issu e The following the legislature, To determine the UAL resulting for each parush, Mr. Hall then determined the by retiring empioyees: ( 1) $ 10, 282. 33 by Diedre Cfark on July 15, 2011; ( 2)$ 23, 000. 15 6yBrenda Frank on November 10; ZO1C ( 3) $ 5, 569.16 by Morris Bowser on December wiYhdrarvais were made 15, 2010; and ( 4) $ 10, 19Y. 57 by Jerome Bradford on December 7. 5, 2010. 13 percentage of the payrofl attributable to the position that was privatized and allocated this percentage to the UAL. Mr. Hall further testifed that a withdrawal of retirement benefits does not extinguish the UAL for the former employee' s position. Rather, Mr. Hall explained that the obligation to repay the UAL exists, regardless of what action the former employee takes. Mr. Hall defined the UAL as " the present value of future contentioned events," which takes into consideration unforeseen circumstances including early retirement and withdrawal of benefits, among We note that the others. school boards did not present any testimony or evidence that a different method of calculation would be preferable or that any such method would have produced a different result. The school board also failed' to produce any testimony that the UAL attributable to retiring employees was extinguished by the withdrawal of their retirement contributions. Indeed, no evidence was presented to contradict the testimony of Mr. Hall at all. Accordingly, we find no merit to the school board' s claim that the UAL was improperly calculated. Res 7udicata/ Collateral Estoppel The school boards argue on appeal that collateral estoppel bars LSERS from enforcing collection against the Pointe Coupee Parish School Board pursuant to La. R.S. 11: 1202. The school boards rely on the outcome of a prior case, captioned as Pointe Coupee Parish Schoo/ Board v. The Louisiana SehooO Employees' Retrrement System, Docket. No. 574,462, which matter was also filed in the 19"' Judicial District Court and involved similar issues. Specifically, in Suit No. 574, 462, a petition was filed by the Pointe Coupee Parish School Board, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief precluding LSERS from collecting the sum of $ 106, 136. 23 plus interest as a claimed portion of its UAL following the resignation or retirement of four employees in 2007 and 2008. Suit No. 574,462 was ultimately resolved by virtue of a Consent Permanent Injunction dated March 23, 2010. The consent injunction rendered judgment " permanently enjoining and prohibiting defendant, The Louisiana School , Employees' Retirement System, from attempting to collect, directly from the Pointe Coupee Parish School Board or indirectly 14 from the State Treasurer and the State epartment of Education, any portion of the LSERS unfunded accrued liability that defendamt aas cVai oe due in the LSERS demand of constitutioe al contend arg; caupee Parish School Board raised the same Because the Pc;nt October 22, 2 Q&." mer t a in Suot Nt. 5? 4, I. that the doctrine nf llaterai cf esta zn c rre t litigation; the school boards a r s nently preduoes iSERS from attempting to collect UAL arising out of the subsequ nt privatization or elimination of driver positions for the Pointe Coupee Parish School Board. The doctrine of res judicata is set forth in La. R. S. 13: 4231. The statute states: Except as otherwise provided by law, a valid and final judgment is conclusive between the same parties, except on appeal or other direct review, to the following extent; 1) If the judgment is in fiavor of the plaintiff, all causes of action existing at the time of final judgment arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the litigation are e inguished and merged in the judgment. 2) If the judgment is in favor of the defendant, all causes of action existing at the time of fnaf judgmenk aris ng out of the transaction or occurrence that is the su bject matE r of th G tfgation are e inguished and the judgment bars a subseq en± action on those causes of action. 3) A judgment in favor of either the plaontiff or the defendant is conclusive, in any subsequent ac ion betv}r n them, with respect to any issue actually litigated and determined if its etermination was essential to that judgment. The statute, as amended in 1990, emEaraces both ciaim preclusion ( traditional res judicata) and issue preclusion ; coliateraf estoppel). Water Dist., 2012- 0797, p. 5 ( La. denied, 2013- 0653 ( La. 4/ 26/ 13), App. Gabriel v. Lafourche Parish 1 Cir. 2/ 25i33), 112 So. 3d 281, 285, writ 112 So,3d 848. Under issue preclusion or collatera! estoppel, resolution of an issue of fact or iaw essencial to the determination of 'the dispute precludes relitigation of the sa re issue in a different action between the same parties. Gabriel, 2012- 0797 at 5, 112 So. 3d at 285 citina Chaisson v. Central Crane Serv., 2010- 0112, pp. 5- 6 ( La, App. 1 Cir. 7/ 29/ 10), 44 So. 3d 883, 886- 87; also citina Mandalay Oil & Gas, L. L. C. v Energy Dev. Corp. 2001- 0993, p. 9 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 8/ 4j04), 880 So. 2d 129, 135- 36 wri denied, 2004- 2426 ( La. 1/ 28{ 05), 893 So. 2d 72. 15 Irr generai, the doetrine of res Udbeat subsequent action when all of th 1) the judgment is valic!F as sei farth n La. R.S. 13: 4231, bars a tio ic vrins e e 2 t. are satisfied in a prior action: ( 2) the j de s e 4) the eause or causes of actiors asserted r as at h fraal ; 3) the arties are the same; seco+d suit exi ted at tn time of the final judgment in the first litigation, arad ( 5 th ; zuse Qr causes af action in the second suit arose out of the transaCtion or o ci rren, e tt at waz the subject matter of the first litigation. Burguieres v. Pollingue, 2002- 13$ 5, p. 8 ( La 2/ 25/ 03), 843 So. 2d 1049, 1053. Herein, elements four and five do not appear.to be satisfied. Suit No. 574, 462 was filed on January Zl, 2009, and reiates to a dernand fior payment made upon Pointe Coupee Parish Schooi Board on October 22, 20Q8 as a result of the resignation and of retirement employees in 2007 and 2 08. The instant suit by Poir te Coupee captioned as Suit No. 613, 906, by ontrasfi, was filed onJuly 20, 2012, and reiates to a demand for payment made on April 20, 2012, as a resuit of the retirement, resignation, and termination of empfoyees in 2010 and 2011 To the extent that the posit ons at issue in the current litigation were no't even privatized ntil after Suit No. 574, 462 was filed and the demand for payment giving rise to the c.urrent suit was issued over two years after the Consent Permanent Injunctior was issued an Suit No. 574,462, it is dear that the causes of action raised qy the Poi nte Caupee Parfsh School Board herein did not exist at the time judgment was issu d 'qn the iirsfi suit, Additionally, since Suit No. 574, 462 was in response ta the October 22, 20U was in cases response to the April 2, arise out of the ame emand letter and S ait No, 613, 906 2Q12 demand IetkerF i eannot be said that the two cc rre ce nder the traditional doctrine of transacti n o res judicatae We afso ciismiss the schocY b ard`s argurrients of essue preclusion u der La. R, S. 13: 4231( 3). There is no andication in the Consent Permanent Injunckion that the court ever considered the merits of the co istitutional and other arguments raised by the Pointe Coupee Parish School Board, and no rvling was made as to those issues. The consent judgment in Suit No. 574,462 was limited and only enjoined LSERS for the unfunded accrued liability sought in tfne 16 October 22, 2008 demand letter. The injunction made no mer+ion Of fu' e r d the school board' S claims of res ii. s;. a err in overrulirg tt e . cep ior, c r' re ; r. ds. rr . Vu', t ra9 r 4 he. fore, do nor find any merit to r stcaNpeL 7he trial court did not acN r ta, Injuncti re Relief Lastly, denying the aoa zs sct aoo their request for s a t injunct vc i iief. aac t. ¢ t° aI o rt c rr n; ted legai error in La s;ar a (; Qde of Civsi Procedure , 4rticle 3601( A) provides that "[ a] n injt;nct9n shai9_be wss ed in ; ases where irreparabl injury, loss, or damage may otherwise result t the appiicar? pr in other cases specifieally t provided by law." Alternatively, a. petitionec is er itied to injunctive r Vief without the requisite showing of irreparable injvry when the s;anduct sought ta be restrained is unconstitutional or unla ful, i. e., when the conauet sought to be enj4ined constitutes a direck violation of a prohibitory law and/ or a viplatic n of a constitutlonal right, Jurisich v. 7enkins, 99- 0076, p. 4 ( La. 10/ 19/'99) 749 So. 2d 597f S99 itin Tel. Co. v. La. Pub. Serv. Comm`n, 555 ' Sa. 2d 13' 7Q ( La. 199U), South Cent. Bell Once a plaintiff has made a prfma facie showing that the conduct tQ be en ined is reprobated by ia v, the petitioner is entitfed to injunc ive relief with t he necessity af si owing tt t no other adequate legal remedy exists. JurisiGh, 99- n a76 at 4, 749 G. 2d at 599- GC 0 citi a Ouachita Parish Police Jury v, Am.' iNaste EE Paliution Control, 606 So. z.d 134i La, A p. 2 Cir.), writ denied, 609 Sc. d 23} ; La, 1 92;, cert, denied, 50$ U. S. 909,. 113 S. Ct. 2339, 124 LoEd. 2d 249 ( 1993). for reasons previously diseussed he ein, e fn that the chool boards have failed to make a prima facieshowiny that La. R.S i1: i2Q2 violates any provislon of the Louisiana Constitu ion. Afso; we fir d that F e se c f MFP funds for retirement Is consistent with the purpose of and s for the benefit of the parish scho l boards. 9 Thus, we do not find that the triai cour? corr ittee 9 g A error in fir ding that the schootl 9 Although the schcaol boards arguecf, khai hey c uld suffer acrYPntial' n"nancial naras iip, hey 9ailed to present any real cubstantive evidence of irreparable harrn ir, sispport af the, laini for injunctive relief. j7. boards failed tc proo e irre arabAe Enj ¬ ry Gy a r po erancE of the evidence. Accordingly, the schoo! boards are no entitled t ie lunct'sve r lief. COI CLUSTOIV Based on our review of ihe recc rd an boards on appeai, we find that th th argumen s preser ted by the school trfal co rt do ot err in denying the school boards' requests for declaratory and injunctive relief and in overruling the exception of res judicata raised by the Pointe Coupee Parish School Board. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court dated February 25, 2013. Costs of this appeal in the amount of $ 3, 888. 50 are assessed against the plaintiffs- appellants, the Pointe Coupee Parish School Board, the Evangeline Parish School Board; and the St. James Parish School Board. AFFIRMED. 18

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