State Of Louisiana VS Ronald J. Blake
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL FIRST CIRCUIT 2010 KA 0913 E K STA OF LOUISIANA VERSUS RONALD J BLAKE 6 DATE OF JUDGMENT DEC 2 2 2010 ON APPEAL FROM THE TWENTY SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT NUMBER 478846 DIVISION J PARISH OF ST TAMMANY STATE OF LOUISIANA HONORABLE WILLIAM J KNIGHT JUDGE Walter P Reed Counsel for Appellee District Attorney State of Louisiana Covington Louisiana Kathryn W Landry Baton Rouge Louisiana Frank Sloan Counsel for DefendantAppellant Mandeville Louisiana Ronald J Blake BEFORE KUHN PETTIGREW AND KLINE 1 Disposition CONVICTION AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED he l Ilonorable William F Kline Jr is serving pro teinpole by special appointment of the Louisiana Supreme Court 4 J KUHN J The defendant Ronald J Blake was charged by bill of information with one count of third offense operating a vehicle while intoxicated DWI a violation of La R 14 He initially pled not guilty and he filed a motion to quash S 98 D contending predicate offenses numbers one and two had been obtained in violation of his constitutional rights Following a hearing the motion was denied Thereafter he entered a guilty plea pursuant to State v Crosby 338 So 584 2d La 1976 reserving the right to challenge the ruling on the motion to quash He was sentenced to thirty months at hard labor He now appeals contending the trial court erred in denying the motion to quash and misinformed him of his right to confront the witnesses against hitn For the following reasons we affirm the conviction and sentence FACTS Due to the defendant guilty plea there was no trial and thus no trial s testimony concerning the facts in this matter At the hearing on the motion to quash however the defense stipulated to the bill of information as a factual basis for the plea The bill of information charged that the defendant committed the instant offense on December 8 2008 by operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or any scheduled controlled dangerous substance or while under the influence of alcohol and one or more drugs which are not scheduled controlled dangerous substances 2 Predicate number one was set forth as the defendant Decenibe 9 1998 DWI conviction under sr First Parish Court of Jefferson Parish docket number F1206079 Predicate number two was set forth as the defendant June 2 1999 DWI conviction under Slidell City Court in St Tammany s Parish docket number 99KS2144 2 MOTION TO QUASH In assignment of error number 1 the defendant argues the trial court erred in denying the motion to quash predicate number one because the minute entry and signed rights form relied upon by the State in connection therewith are woefully inadequate to establish a waiver of counsel under State v White 980343 La App 1st Cir 12 727 So 574 98 28 2d He also argues the documentation concerning the predicate offenses was never introduced into evidence by either the State or the Defense He makes no additional argument concerning predicate number two Initially we address the defendant claim concerning the introduction into s evidence of the documents concerning the predicate offenses The defendant relies on the following exchange at the hearing on the motion to quash Defense counsel Your Honor for purposes of the record I would mark the Jefferson Parish conviction as Defense Exhibit 1 for identification purposes And the Slidell conviction as Defense Exhibit t 2 for identification purposes I don think I have to introduce those right now they will be introduced at trial Court For purposes of the motion I allow that I have reviewed ll them in the back with counsel The Court will allow them to be marked but withheld from filing into evidence until during the trial As noted by the trial court the documents at issue were reviewed by the court and counsel at the hearing on the defendant motion to quash the predicate s offenses The defendant never objected to the use of the documents at the hearing To the contrary the defense marked the documents for identification and use at the hearing Furthermore during defendant testimony he identified and referenced s these same documents while testifying regarding his waiver of rights in connection with his prior guilty pleas pertaining to these predicate offenses Accordingly the 3 defendant failed to preserve any error regarding the lack of formal introduction of the documents into the record during the hearing An irregularity or error cannot be availed of after verdict unless it was objected to at the time of occurrence La Code Crim P art 841 A In order for a guilty plea to be used as a basis for actual imprisonment enhancement of actual imprisonment or conversion of a subsequent misdemeanor into a felony the trial judge must inform the defendant that by pleading guilty he waives a his privilege against compulsory self b his right to trial incrimination and jury trial where applicable and c his right to confront his accuser The judge must also ascertain that the accused understands what the plea connotes and its consequences If the defendant denies the allegations of the bill of information the State has the initial burden to prove the existence of the prior guilty plea and that the defendant was represented by counsel when it was taken If the State meets this burden the defendant has the burden to produce some affirmative evidence showing an infringement of his rights or a procedural irregularity in the taking of the plea If the defendant is able to do this then the burden of proving the constitutionality of the plea shifts to the State To meet this requirement the State may rely on a contemporaneous record of the guilty plea proceeding i e either the transcript of the plea or the minute entry State v Henry 20002250 p 8 La App 1st Cir 5111101 788 So 535 541 writ denied 2001 2299 La 2d 02 21 6 818 So 791 Everything that appears in the entire record concerning 2d the predicate as well as the trial judge opportunity to observe the defendant s s 3 Because the documents at issue are part of the appellate record there is no reason to remand for their introduction into evidence 4 appearance demeanor and responses in court should be considered in determining whether or not a knowing and intelligent waiver of rights occurred Boykin only requires that a defendant be informed of the three rights enumerated above The jurisprudence has been unwilling to extend the scope of Boykin to include advising the defendant of any other rights which he may have State v Henry 20002250 at pp 8 9 788 So at 541 2d Additionally an uncounseled DWI conviction may not be used to enhance punishment of a subsequent offense absent a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel When an accused waives his right to counsel in pleading guilty to a misdemeanor the trial court should expressly advise him of his right to counsel and to appointed counsel if he is indigent The court should further determine on the record that the waiver is made knowingly and intelligently under the circumstances Factors bearing on the validity of this determination include the age education experience background competency and conduct of the accused as well as the nature complexity and seriousness of the charge Determining the defendant s understanding of the waiver of counsel in a guilty plea to an uncomplicated misdemeanor requires less judicial inquiry than determining his understanding of his waiver of counsel for a felony trial Generally the court is not required to advise a defendant who is pleading guilty to a misdemeanor of the dangers and disadvantages of selfrepresentation The critical issue on review of the waiver of the right to counsel is whether the accused understood the waiver What the accused understood is deterspined in terms of the entire record and not just by certain magic words used by the judge Whether an accused has knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel is a question which depends on the facts and 61 circumstances of each case State v Cadiere 990970 pp 3 4 La App 1 st Cir 00 18 2 754 So 294 297 writ denied 20000815 La 11 774 So 2d 00 13 2d 971 When a trial court denies a motion to quash factual and credibility determinations should not be reversed in the absence of a clear abuse of the trial s court discretion See State v Odom 2002 2698 p 6 La App I st Cir 6 03 27 861 2d So 187 191 writ denied 2003 2142 La 10 855 So 765 03 17 2d However a trial court legal findings are subject to a de nova standard of review s See State v Smith 992094 992015 992019 990606 p 3 La 7 766 00 6 2d So 501 504 In White 980343 at p 5 727 So at 578 this court found the State 2d s evidence of a predicate DWI offense inadequate to establish a valid waiver of counsel The State relied on a minute entry and a rights waiverguiltyplea form to establish counsel waiver We held Mithout a transcript we can only conclude from the documents submitted into evidence that there was no inquiry on the record as to the defendant education experience background or competency nor can we s assume that this information was in the record At the hearing on the motion to quash the defendant testified that the judge did not ask him if the defendant understood what was happening to him White 98 0343 at P 5 727 So at 577 2d Vr However in State v Deville 2004 1 pp 1 2 La 7 879 So 689 401 04 2 2d 68990 per curiam the Louisiana Supreme Court held that a form acknowledging that the defendant had been advised of his right to counsel and waived that right in connection with a guilty plea to driving 6 under the influence revealed a presumptively valid conviction as to which the defendant offered no countervailing evidence The court explained Our decision in State v Carlos 981366 La 7 738 So 556 99 2d entitled the state to rely on this waiver form in discharging its initial burden of proving a prior valid conviction for D If a court may in I W the context of a collateral attack on a prior conviction used in recidivist proceedings presume from the fact of conviction alone i from a e silent record that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to trial then a court may also presume from a record which is not silent with respect to the waiver of counsel that the defendant made a knowing and intelligent decision to proceed without the guiding hand of an attorney and that the trial court would not have accepted the waiver if the contrary had appeared See Parke v Raley 506 U 20 S 30 113 S 517 524 121 L 391 1992 Ct 2d Ed here T is no principle of law better settled than that every act of a court of competent jurisdiction shall be presumed to have been rightly done till the contrary appears quoting Voorhees v Jackson 35 U 10 S Pet 449 472 9 L 490 1836 It remains for the defendant to Ed show otherwise if he is able to do so and for the trial court ultimately to resolve the question in light of all of the circumstances surrounding entry of the guilty plea See e State v Couture 289 Mont 215 g 959 P 948 95051 1998 although defendant executed affidavits 2d that he was not advised of his right to counsel in prior D guilty I U pleas trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding on the basis of waiver forms executed contemporaneously with the pleas that the defendant was advised of his right to counsel and waived that right Deville 20041401 at pp 5 6 879 So at 691 92 2d In the instant case in connection with predicate number one the State relied upon certified true copies of a WAIVER OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS PLEA OF GUILTY form court minutes and a commitment order See State Exhibit 1 D1 In pertinent part the waiverguilty plea form set forth I RONALD J BLAKE before my plea of GUILTY to the crime of OPERATING A VEHICLE WHILE INTOXICATED La R S 14 98 have been informed of and understand the charge to which I am pleading GUILTY I waive the following rights 1 I understand I have a right to a trial by a judge and if convicted a right to appeal 7 2 To face and cross examine the witnesses who accuse me of the crime charged 3 The privilege against self incrimination of having to take the stand and testify and The right to compulsory process of the Court to require witnesses to appear and testify for me 4 By entering this plea of GUILTY I am waiving all of those rights I am entering this plea of GUILTY because 1 ain in fact guilty I have not been forced threatened or intimidated to make this plea The acts and elements constituting the offense to which I am pleading GUILTY have been explained to me as well as the fact that for this crime I WILL receive a sentence of Applicable penalties for first and second offense operating a vehicle while intoxicated set forth I fully understand that this conviction may be used against me in the future to enhance or increase the sentence or penalties I will receive for any subsequent conviction of the crime of DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED If I elect to have a trial I have a right to have a competent counsel represent me at the trial and if I am unable to pay for counsel the Court will appoint a competent counsel to represent me If convicted after trial I have a right to appeal with competent counsel and by pleading GUILTY I am waiving these rights I am fully satisfied with the way the court has handled my case I fully understand that this GUILTY plea I am entering may result in a suspension of my driver license for a minimum of 60 days s No promises have been made to me by anyone in connection with this plea of GUILTY 98 9 12 Ronald J Blake DATE ENDANT DEH George Giacobbe 003206604 JUDGE S DRIVER LICENSE NO 12129149 XXXXXXXXXI DATL OF BIRTH SOCIAL SECURITY I M110AT 8 DEFENSE COUNSEL CERTIFICATE I hereby certify that the above rights have been read and and that I have no further explained to me to my full satisfaction questions to ask concerning by sic rights and that this acknowledgment by me will become part of these proceedings Metairie Louisiana this 9 day of Dec 1998 Ronald J Blake Signature of Defendant The minutes of December 9 1998 indicated Defendant advised of Boykin rights by the Court Defendant plead guilty under Art 894 as charged and sentenced as follows Docket Court Cost 50 261 Fine Amount 00 300 Active Probation 12 Months The defendant testified at the hearing on the motion to quash He indicated he was unrepresented by counsel when he entered his guilty plea to predicate number one He denied that anyone went over any rights with him at that time He claimed that although he had signed the waiverguilty plea form the trial judge had not gone over the form with him He indicated he did not recall waiving his right to counsel He also claimed the trial judge failed to explain his rights to trial to confront his accusers and against self incrimination He claimed he did not waive any of those rights On cross examination the defendant indicated he was fortyeight years old at the time of his guilty plea to predicate number one He indicated his educational level was 12th grade and he had no problem reading He indicated he could read at the time of his guilty plea to predicate number one and identified his signatures on the waiverguilty plea form When asked if he had fraudulently signed the form stating that he understood the rights that they had been explained to him and that 61 he waived them he replied No I just saying I don remember me signing and m t the Judge signing I don recall that t The trial court held predicate number one was an appropriately obtained conviction The court noted it had been presented with the minutes of December 9 1998 which indicated the defendant was advised of his Boykin rights and pled guilty as charged and the waiverguilty plea form which very clearly goes through the Boykin rights and is entitled very clearly Waiver of Constitutional Rights The court found the defendant had filled out the portions of the form with handwriting and signed the form with a knowing and voluntary waiver of his rights The trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in denying the motion to quash predicate number one on the basis that the waiver form executed contemporaneously with the plea indicated that the defendant was advised of his right to counsel and waived that right See Deville Id This assignment of error is without merit INSTANT OFFENSE ADVICE OF RIGHTS In assignment of error number 2 the defendant argues the trial court incorrectly advised him of his right to confront his accusers in connection with the instant offense because he never advised him he had the right to cross examine his accusers A plea of guilty normally waives all non jurisdictional defects in the proceedings prior to the plea Crosby 338 So at 586 In Crosby the court 2d held it was not barred from reviewing the assignments of error specifically reserved at the time of the plea of guilty where the trial court accepted the plea of guilty so conditioned which the court had discretion to refuse if proffered upon 10 such reservation Crosby 338 So at 588 2d The court noted analogously a defendant will also waive his right to review of a non jurisdictional preplea trial ruling unless at the time of his plea he expressly stipulates that he does not waive his right to review of it the normal consequence of a guilty plea Crosby 338 2d So at 591 In the instant case following the denial of his motion to quash predicates numbers one and two the defendant pled guilty pursuant to State v Crosby He raised no objection to the subsequent advice of rights including the advice of the right to confront his accusers The trial court specifically explained Since m I allowing the plea under Crosby the one issue you would be able to appeal even entering a plea is whether or not the Motion to Quash was handled properly Do you understand by entering these pleas of guilty you actually doing two re things you waiving or giving up those constitutional rights and admitting to me re re you in fact guilty The defendant answered affirmatively Ile also answered affirmatively when the court inquired And you choose to do that The defendant then pled guilty Accordingly the defendant waived his right to review of the instant assignment of error He failed to expressly stipulate that his guilty plea did not waive his right to review of the alleged error Moreover the defendant was sufficiently advised of his right to confront his accusers and the record reflects a knowing and voluntary waiver of his rights and compliance with the constitutional requirements for the taking of voluntary guilty pleas in Louisiana confrontation The trial court advised the defendant You have the right to That means you can be right there at this table see and hear everybody who comes to the witness stand to testify So it not done in secret s The defendant reliance on La Code Crim P art 556 is misplaced s 3 A 1 Article 556 does not provide an independent basis for upsetting a guilty plea 1 Violations of Article 556 that do not rise to the level of Boykin violations are 1 not exempt from the broad scope of La Code Crim P art 921 State v Guzman 991528 99 1753 p 10 La 5 769 So 1 1164 As noted supra the 00 16 2d 158 jurisprudence has been unwilling to extend the scope of Boykin to include advising the defendant of any other rights which he may have Henry 20002250 at pp 8 9 788 So at 541 2d See also State v Juniors 2003 2425 pp 6061 La 6 05 29 915 So 291 33435 cert denied 547 U 1115 126 S 1940 164 L 2d S Ct 2d Ed 669 2006 When a defendant is represented by counsel the trial court accepting his guilty plea may presume that counsel has explained the nature of the charge in sufficient detail that the defendant has notice of what his plea asks him to admit The ultimate inquiry under Boykin is whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant citations omitted At the time of his guilty plea to the instant offense the defendant was sixty years old had completed the 12th grade and was experienced with the criminal justice system He was represented by counsel stated he was satisfied with the services of counsel and indicated counsel had given him a full explanation of his constitutional rights the elements of the crime and the possible penalties This assignment of error is also without merit REVIEW FOR ERROR Initially we note that our review for error is pursuant to La Code Crim P art 920 which provides that the only matters to be considered on appeal are errors 12 designated in the assignments of error and error that is discoverable by a mere inspection of the pleadings and proceedings and without inspection of the evidence The trial court failed to impose the mandatory fine of two thousand dollars See La R 14 Although the failure to impose the fine is error under S 98 a 1 D Article 920 it certainly is not inherently prejudicial to the defendant 2 Because the trial court failure to impose the fine was not raised by the State in either the s trial court or on appeal we are not required to take any action As such we decline to correct the illegally lenient sentence See State v Price 2005 251 4 pp 18 22 La App 1st Cir 12 952 So 112 123 25 en bane writ 06 28 2d denied 20070130 La 2 976 So 1277 08 22 2d nrruru For these reasons the defendant conviction and sentence are affirmed s CONVICTION AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED 13
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
