State Of Louisiana VS Jeffery Blanton
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NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL FIRST CIRCUIT W NUMBER 2010 KA 0517 Wl A C STATE OF LOUISIANA VERSUS JEFFERY BLANTON Judgment Rendered September 10 2010 Appealed from the Seventeenth Judicial District Court in and for the Parish of Lafourche State of Louisiana Trial Court Number 446701 Honorable Ashly Bruce Simpson Judge Presiding Camille A Morvant II Counsel for Appellee Steven M Miller State of Louisiana Thibodaux LA Gwendolyn K Brown Baton Rouge LA Counsel for Defendant Appellant Jeffery Blanton BEFORE WHIPPLE McDONALD AND McCLENDON JJ WHIPPLE J The defendant Jeffery Blanton was charged by bill of information with possession of cocaine a violation of LSAR 40 He pled not guilty and S 967 C proceeded to trial before a jury The jury determined that the defendant was guilty and the trial court sentenced him to a term of four years at hard labor The defendant appeals asserting four issues for review Finding no error we affirm the s defendant conviction and sentence FACTS On July 10 2007 Sergeant John Champagne with the Lafourche Parish s Sheriff Office served an arrest warrant on Victoria Cheramie at her home Cheramie asked to speak with Champagne privately and told him that she was expecting a black guy by the name of Jeffery who was bringing a large amount of crack cocaine to her home Cheramie said that Jeffery would be driving a white Yukon Approximately fifteen minutes later a white Yukon arrived with two passengers One person stayed in the Yukon while the other came to Cheramie s door Agent Robert Mason approached the defendant who was the person who stayed in the Yukon and asked him to step out of the car As the defendant was getting out of the car Mason saw the defendant arm move in a way that s suggested he was dropping something Officers discovered a Money Gram and approximately 6 grams of crack cocaine underneath the car 3 MOTION TO SUPPRESS In his first assignment of error the defendant contends that the court erred in denying his motion to suppress He argues that the tip from Cheramie was unreliable as she denied having told Champagne anything and there were no corroborating witnesses to support Champagne claims s The defendant acknowledges that it was within the court discretion to believe Champagne s s testimony and to find Cheramie lacking in credibility but argues that the court 04 erred in its application of the law to the facts Specifically the defendant argues that the court erroneously determined that the officers had sufficient reasonable suspicion to believe a crime was being committed as to justify their approach of the Yukon and interaction with the defendant When a trial court denies a motion to suppress factual and credibility determinations should not be reversed in the absence of a clear abuse of the trial s court discretion i unless such ruling is not supported by the evidence See e State v Green 940887 p 11 La 5 655 So 2d 272 28081 However a 95 22 trial court legal findings are subject to a de novo standard of review See State v s Hunt 20091589 p 6 La 12 25 So 3d 746 751 In determining whether 09 1 the ruling on a motion to suppress was correct the court is not limited to the evidence adduced at the hearing on the motion but may consider all pertinent evidence given at the trial of the case State v Chopin 372 So 2d 1222 1223 n 2 La 1979 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and La Const Art 1 5 protect individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures State v Belton 441 So 2d 1195 1198 La 1983 cert denied 466 U 953 104 S Ct 2158 80 S L Ed 2d 543 1984 If evidence was derived from an unreasonable search or seizure the proper remedy is exclusion of the evidence from trial State v Benjamin 973065 p 3 La 12 722 So 2d 988 989 98 1 As a general rule searches and seizures must be conducted pursuant to a validly executed search warrant or arrest warrant Warrantless searches and seizures are considered to be per se unreasonable unless they can be justified by one of the Fourth Amendment warrant exceptions State v Warren 05 2248 La s 07 22 2 949 So 2d 1215 1226 The State has the burden of showing that one of the exceptions applies LSAC art 703D P Cr However the right of law enforcement officers to stop and question a person 3 where there is reasonable suspicion to believe that the person is committing has committed or is about to commit a crime was established in Terry v Ohio 392 S U 1 88 S Ct 1868 20 L Ed 2d 889 1968 and codified by LSAC art P Cr 1 215 Article 215 provides that a law enforcement officer may stop a person 1A in a public place whom he reasonably suspects is committing has committed or is about to commit an offense and may demand of him his name address and an explanation of his actions ry Ter stops require reasonable suspicion of criminal activity The test for reasonable suspicion is whether the police officer had sufficient knowledge of the facts and circumstances to justify an infringement upon the individual right to s be free from governmental interference State v Robertson 972960 pp 23 La 98 20 10 721 So 2d 1268 1269 The facts upon which an officer bases an investigatory stop should be evaluated in light of the circumstances surrounding the incident A reviewing court must take into consideration the totality of the circumstances and give deference to the inferences and deductions of a trained police officer that might elude an untrained person State v Huntley 970965 p 3 La 3 708 So 2d 1048 98 13 1049 per curiam An informant tip can provide a police officer with reasonable cause to s support a Terry stop Adams v Williams 407 U 143 14647 92 S Ct 1921 S 1923 24 32 L Ed 2d 612 1972 State v Thomas 583 So 2d 895 898 La App 1st Cir 1991 In Illinois v Gates 462 U 213 103 S Ct 2317 76 L Ed 2d 527 S 1983 a case which dealt with an anonymous tip in the probable cause context the United States Supreme Court outlined the totality of the circumstances analysis for determining whether or not an informant tip establishes probable s cause In Alabama v White 496 U 325 33031 110 S Ct 2412 2416 110 L S Ed 2d 301 1990 the Court discussed review of the totality of the circumstances 4 when reasonable suspicion rather than probable cause justified the encounter with a suspect Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause Adams v Williams demonstrates as much We there assumed that the unverified tip from the known informant might not have been reliable enough to establish probable cause but nevertheless found it sufficiently reliable to justify a Terry stop Reasonable suspicion like probable cause is dependent upon both the content of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability Both factors quantity and qualityare considered in the totality of the circumstances the whole picture that must be taken into account when evaluating whether there is reasonable suspicion Thus if a tip has a relatively low degree of reliability more information will be required to establish the requisite quantum of suspicion than would be required if the tip were more reliable The Gates Court applied its totality ofthecircumstances approach in this manner taking into account the facts known to the officers from personal observation and giving the anonymous tip the weight it deserved in light of its indicia of reliability as established through independent police work The same approach applies in the reasonable suspicion context the only difference being the level of suspicion that must be established Internal citations omitted In the instant matter the information was provided to officers who had previously worked in the area and knew the area to be a haven for drugs The officers were also familiar with Cheramie the informant and her prior drug history The tip was specific timely and accurate in predicting that a white Yukon would arrive Once it did officers observed the defendant get out of the car open the trunk close it begin to walk across the street stop look around furtively turn around walk back to the car and sit in the driver seat s After watching the defendant appear to retrieve something from his trunk to bring to the residence and to then change his mind while en route to the house and return to the Yukon coupled with the tip from Cheramie the officers had a reasonable suspicion to detain the defendant who was seen dropping something onto the ground while getting out of the car at Mason request Upon observing s this behavior officers had a reasonable suspicion for further detention of the W defendant and were justified in seizing the drugs from the ground Thus the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress This assignment of error lacks merit THESENTENCE In three assignments of error the defendant contends that the court erred in imposing an excessive sentence and in denying his motion to reconsider sentence He suggests that the amount of cocaine in his possession was small and that when imposing sentence the court improperly focused on his prior felony conviction for distribution of controlled dangerous substances while ignoring other details of his background including his employment education and family history Article I Section 20 of the Louisiana Constitution prohibits the imposition of excessive punishment Although a sentence may be within statutory limits it may violate a defendant constitutional right against excessive punishment and is s subject to appellate review Generally a sentence is considered excessive if it is grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime or is nothing more than the needless imposition of pain and suffering A sentence is considered grossly disproportionate if when the crime and punishment are considered in light of the harm to society it is so disproportionate as to shock one sense of justice A trial s judge is given wide discretion in the imposition of sentences within statutory limits and the sentence imposed should not be set aside as excessive in the absence of manifest abuse of discretion State v Hurst 992868 pp 1011 La App 1st Cir 10 797 So 2d 75 83 writ denied 20003053 La 1015101 798 So 2d 00 3 962 Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 894 sets forth items that 1 must be considered by the trial court before imposing sentence The trial court need not recite the entire checklist of Article 894 1 but the record must reflect that it adequately considered the criteria State v Leblanc 20041032 p 10 La App 6 1st Cir 12 897 So 2d 736 743 writ denied 2005 0150 La 4 901 04 17 05 29 So 2d 1063 cert denied 546 U 905 126 S Ct 254 163 L Ed 2d 231 2005 S State v Faul 2003 1423 p 4 La App 1st Cir 2 873 So 2d 690 692 04 23 Failure to comply with Article 894 does not necessitate the invalidation of a 1 sentence or warrant a remand for resentencing if the record clearly illumines and supports the sentencing choice State v Smith 430 So 31 46 La 1983 2d Maximum sentences may be imposed only for the most serious offenses and the worst offenders or when the offender poses an unusual risk to the public safety due to his past conduct of repeated criminality State v Miller 962040 p 4 La App 1 st Cir 11 703 So 2d 698 701 writ denied 98 0039 La 5 719 So 97 7 98 15 2d 459 A trial court is entitled to consider the defendant entire criminal history s in determining the appropriate sentence to be imposed State v Ballett 98 2568 p 25 La App 4th Cir 3 756 So 2d 587 602 writ denied 20001490 La 00 15 01 9 2 785 So 2d 31 The defendant was convicted of possession of cocaine which is punishable by imprisonment with or without hard labor for not more than five years or a fine of not more than 5 or both LSAR 40 The defendant four 00 000 S 967C 2 s year sentence with no fine imposed was not the maximum possible sentence In imposing sentence the court stated The Court is required to state on the record its reasons for sentencing The defendant has a prior felony conviction in the State of Mississippi involving Therefore this the distribution of a controlled dangerous substance conviction is the defendant second felony conviction involving a s controlled dangerous substance For these reasons there is an undue risk that during the period of probation the defendant will commit another crime and there is evidence that he is in need of correctional treatment Although the court did not articulate its consideration of the defendant s work and family history it is apparent from the record that the court was aware of the defendant history carefully considered the sentence it was imposing and s complied with Article 894 in imposing its sentence which was not excessive 1 under the facts and circumstances herein According these assignments of error also lack merit CONCLUSION Having found no merit in the defendant assignments of error the s s defendant conviction and sentence are affirmed CONVICTION AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED
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