Monica Anderson VS State Farm & Casualty Insurance Company and Gordon A. Pugh, Jr.
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL FIRST CIRCUIT 2010 CA 0036 MONICA ANDERSON VERSUS STATE FARM FIRE CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY AND GORDON A PUGH JR DATE OFJUDGMENT 6 ZQ 13 ON APPEAL FROM THE EIGHTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT NCJMBER 63 DIV A PARISH OF IBERVILLE 602 STATE OF LOUISIANA HONORABLE JAMES J BEST JUDGE i 4 u t 1 1 J Joseph C Possa Stephanie M Possa Baton Rouge Louisiana Counsel for Plaintiff Appellant Robert J Counsel for Defendant Appeilee David Jr Monica Anderson Sue Nations National Union Fire Insurance Lafayette Louisiana Company of Pittsburgl PA BEFORE PARRO Ki AND McDONALD JJ JHN Disposition AFFIRMED KUHN J appellant Plaintiff Monica Anderson appeals the trial court grant of s summary judgment dismissing her claims based on its conclusion that Donald Anderson an employee of LFI Ft Pierre Inc d Labor Finders Labor a b Finders was not an insured under a liability policy issued to Labar Finders by appellee defendant National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh Pennsylvania National Union We affirm FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND s Anderson father Donald Anderson was killed in a car accident when an oncoming motorist Gardon Pugh Jr crossed the center line and struck the car Donald Anderson was driving At the time of his death Donald Anderson was within the course and scope of his employment with Labor Finders Labor Finders had a liability insurance policy issued by National Union that was in effect at the time of the accident Anderson filed this survival and wrongful death action on March 24 2006 naming Pugh and his insurer as defendants She subsequently amended her petition on December 5 2007 to add National Union as a defendant aileging that her father was an insured under the liability insurance policy issued to Labor Finders and therefore that he was entitled to coverage by statutorily required underinsured uninsured motorist UM insurance suit generally denying her allegations National Union answered the Anderson settled with Pugh insurer in s March 2008 National Union subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment and Anderson filed a cross motion on the coverage issue The trial court concluded that the policy was clear unambiguous and that under its terms Donald 2 Anderson was not an insured to whom it afforded coverage Thus the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of National Union denied Anderson motion s and dismissed her claims Anderson appealed DISCUSSION Summary judgments are reviewed on appeal de novo with the appellate court using the same criteria that govern the trial court determination of whether s summary judgment is appropriate Smith u Our Lady of the Lake Hospital Inc 2512 93 La 7 639 So 730 750 A motion for summary judgment is a 94 5 2d procedural device used to avoid a full trial when there is no genuine issue of scale material fact Jarred v Carter 632 So 321 323 La App 1 st Cir 1993 writ 2d denied 94 La 4637 So 467 The summary judgment procedure 0700 94 29 2d is favored and is designed to secure the just speedy and inexpensive determination of every action La C art 966 Rambo v Walker 96 P 2 A 2538 La App lst Cir ll 704 So 30 32 The motion should be granted 97 7 2d only if the pleadings depositions answers to interrogatories and admissions on file together with any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact and that mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law La C art P B 966 When the issue before the court on the motion for summary judgment is one on which the party bringing the motion will bear the burden of proof at trial the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact is on the party bringing the motion La C art 966 Buck Run Enterprises Inc v P 2 Cs Mapp Const Inc 99 La App lst Cir 2 808 So 428 431 3054 O1 16 2d However on issues for which the moving party will not bear the burden of proof 3 at trial the moving party burden of proof on the motion is satisfied by pointing s out to the court that there is an absence of factual support for one or mare elements essential to the adverse s party claim action or defense Thereafter the nonmoving party must produce factual support sufficient to establish that it will be able to satisfy its evidentiary burden of proof at trial failure to do so shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact La C art 966 Clark v P 2 C ora 1802 Fava 98 La App 1 st Cir 9 745 So 666 673 The summary 99 24 2d judgment being appealed in this case was submitted by the defendant who would not bear the burden of proof on the issue of coverage at trial Because it is the applicable substantive law that determines materiality whether a particular fact in dispute is material for summary judgment purposes can be seen only in light of the substantive law applicable to the case Guardia v Lakeview Regional Medical Ctn 2008 La App lst Cir 5 13 So 625 628 1369 09 8 3d Insurance policies are subject to the general rules of contract interpretation in Louisiana Reynolds v Select Props Ltd 93 La 4 634 So 1480 94 11 2d 1180 1183 The court is to interpret the parties intent in forming the contract See Huggins v Gerry Lane Enterprises Inc 06 La 5 957 So 2816 07 22 2d 127 129 In ascertaining the common intent of the insured and insurer courts begin their analysis with a review of the words in the insurance contract Words in an insurance contract must be ascribed their generally prevailing meaning unless the words have acquired a technical meaning in which case the words must be ascribed their technical meaning See La C art 2047 Succession of Fannaly v Lafayette Ins Co O1 La l So 1134 ll37 Mareover an 1355 02 15 805 2d insurance contract is construed as a whole and each provision in the contract must 4 be interpreted in light of the other provisions One provision of the contract should not be construed separately at the expense of disregarding other provisions See La C art 2050 Peterson v Schimek 98 La 3 729 So 1024 1712 99 02 2d 1029 When the words of an insurance contract are clear and explicit and lead to no absurd consequences courts must enforce the contract as written See La C art 2046 Insurance policies are meant to effect coverage and therefore the contract is additionally interpreted to effect coverage where possible See Yount v Maisano 627 So 148 151 La 1993 However if an ambiguity remains after 2d applying the general rules of contractual interpretation to an insurance contract the ambiguous contractual provision is construed against the insurer who furnished the contract text and in favor of the insured See La C art 2056 s All liability insurance policies issued in the state of Louisiana are required to offer UM coverage in an amount equal to their liability coverage absent an express waiver or reduction in UM coverage La R 22 Qualification for S 1295 UM coverage in Louisiana attaches to the person of the insured and only requires that an insured person be injured by a UM Howell v Balboa Ins Co 564 So 2d 298 301 La 1990 The test to determine whether a person qualifies for LTM 02 coverage under a liability insurance policy is to ask whether they would be covered if they were at fault for the accident See Succession of Fannaly 805 2d So at 1140 In support of its motion for summary judgment National Union offered into evidence the original policy the relevant endorsement and an affidavit of a Labor La R 22 was in effect at the time of the accident It was re as La R S 680 designated S 1295 22 by 2008 La Acts No 415 1 effective January 1 2009 5 Finders vice president In her cross motion Anderson relied on the same documents National Union does not dispute that its insurance policy is required to provide UM coverage to those insured under its policy as required by La R S 1295 22 Thus we examine the evidence to ascertain whether ponald Anderson was an insured under the original terms of the National Union policy Section VIII defines Who is au Insured under the original policy stating in relevant part a Labor Finders employees other than Labor Finders executive officers but only for acts within the scope of their employment by Labor FindersJ or while performing duties related to the conduct of Labor Finders It is undisputed that Donald Anderson was both an employee of Labor Finders and that he was within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident Therefore under the plain language of the contract Donald Anderson was an insured under the National Union policy unless an exclusion applies lnsurers have the right to limit coverage in any manner desired so long as the limitations are clearly and unambiguously set forth in the contract and are not in conflict with statutory provisions or public policy Campbell u Markel American Ins Co 00 La App lst Cir 9 822 So 617 623 1448 01 21 2d 24 writ denied 01 La 1 805 So 204 Coverage exclusions in 2813 02 4 2d insurance contracts are construed strictly against the insurer See State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co v Noyes 02 La App 1 st Cir 2872 So l 133 1876 04 23 2d z Although this section contains additional limitations neither side contends and nothing in the record supports a finding that they are relevant to this case 6 1136 However if the wording of the policy is clear and expresses the parties intent the policy must be enforced as written This rule is applicable even to policy provisions that limit the insurer liability ar place restrictions on policy s obligations unless the provision conflicts with statutes or public policy Pareti v Sentry Indem Co 536 So 417 420 La 1988 2d 21 The original policy exclusions to Coverage B are listed in Section IV of the original policy Exclusion H states NATIONAL UNION SHALL NOT DEFEND OR PAY FOR ANY CLAIMS FOR COVERAGE B BODILY INJURY OR PROPERTY DAMAGE ARISING OUT OF Aircraft Auto or Watercraft Bodily injury or property damage or wrongful acts arising out of the ownership maintenance use of any auto owned or operated by any Insured Thus under the original policy although Donald Anderson was an insured the policy exclusion afforded him no coverage because his bodily injury arose out of his use of an auto Anderson contends however that her father was covered under one of the endorsements to Labor Finders insurance policy Labor Finders insurance policy is subject to multiple endorsements One endorsement Endarsement 3 deleted Exclusion H and added limited automobile coverage for Hired Auto and Non Owned Auto Liability to the policy Anderson asserts that the non auto owned liability coverage added in Endorsement 3 offers coverage to her father for the car wreck 3 Anderson does not contend and nothing in the record supports a finding that the hired auto provision of Endorsement 3 is applicable to her fathex 7 Insurance endorsements are a part of the policy and are construed using the same rules as the original policy See La R 22 To be valid endorsements S 881 must be in writing and physically attached to the policy See La R 22 The S 867 record establishes that these two requirements are satisfied here Section 1 of Endorsement 3 states B Non Auto Liability Owed This insurance provided under Coverage B Bodily Injury and Property Damage applies to Bodily Injury or Property Damage arising out of the use of a Non Auto by any Owned person other than Labor Finders in the course of your business as a Staff Service ing Under the section entitled DEFINITIONS Endorsement 3 in pertinent part further provides B For purposes of this endorsement only Section VIII Who is an Insured is amended to include Insured means 3 with respect to Non Auto any partner ar officer of Owned Labor Finders but only while such Non Auto is Owned being used in Labor Finders business as a Staffing Service D Non Aato means any Auto Labor Finders does not Owned own lease hire rent or borrow which is used in connection with Labor Finders business as a Staff Service This includes ng Autos owned by Labor Finders Employees Labor Finders partners or Labor Finders officers or members of their household but while used on Labor Finders business as a Staf Service ng Applying the definition of non auto provided far in Endorsement 3 owned Donald Anderson car which was not owned by Labor Finders was clearly a s owned non auto But the affidavit of Labor Finders vice president and risk 8 manager Gary L Struder indicates Donald Anderson was neither a partner nor an officer of Labor Finders The Louisiana Supreme Court considered a non auto provision owned functionally identical to the one in the present case in Successian of Fannaly 805 2d So aC 1138 In Successian of Fannaly the court heid that four independent contractors were not able to recover under a non auto endorsement that owned like Endorseinent 3 only covered partners and executive officers Id at 1140 41 The court reasoned that the four contractors were not partners or executive officers and therefore not insureds Id at l 139 40 Anderson asserts that the holding in Succession of Fannaly is inapplicable because the endorsement in Yhat case expressly stated that it replaced the section defming who is an insured in the original policy But we fmd nothing in the Succession of Fannaly court opinion that sets forth any language expressly s replacing the original section that defined who is an insured See Succession of Fannaly 805 So at 1138 d Based on Succession of Fannaly the language of Endorsement 3 is clear unambiguous and enforceable Therefore Endorsement 3 is to be applied as written See La C art 2046 Since Donald Anderson was not a partner or officer of Labor Finders he is not an insured under this endorsement See Succession of Fannaly at 1139 Relying on Home Ins Co u Doe 321 So 24 28 La App 3d Cir 2d Any conflict that does arise between Endorsement 3 and the original policy is resolved in favor of the endorsement See also McWright v Modern Iron Works Inc 567 So 707 711 La 2d App 2d Gir wrU denied 571 So 651 La 1990 where the policy and an attachment to the 2d policy conflict the latter controls 9 1975 Anderson contends that the language of Endorsement 3 must be read to expand coverage in light of its use of the words amended to include As such she avers that Endorsement 3 expands who is an insured and therefore reading Section VIII of the original policy Donald Anderson was an insured Unlike the language examined by the Doe court Endorsement 3 expressly defines Who is an Insured fJor purposes of this endorsement only Clearly this restrictive language indicates the intentions of the contracting parties to draw a narrow universe of insureds for the purpose of the limited automobile coverage provided by Endorsement 3 Endorsement 3 deletes Exclusion H of the original policy but only with respect to the coverage expressly granted by the terms set forth in the endorsement The endorsement definition of Who is an Insured is s obviously a self universe of insureds meant to define who is covered by contained the insurance granted therein To interpret Endorsement 3 as an expansion in coverage as urged by Anderson would contradict both the plain language of the policy see La C art 2046 and the intent of the parties in confecting the contract See Campbell 822 So at 623 cf McWright v Modern Iron 2d 24 5 We find further support in the layout of the endorsement provisions themselves for our determination that the endorsement definition of Who is an Insured was not intended by the s parties to expand non auto coverage to employees who were not also a partner or officer owned of Labor Finders Endorsement 3 places the modification of Who is an Insured in a section entitled DEFINITIONS Nothing in the endorsement purports to place the statement of Who is an Insured which modifies the scope of coverage insofar as Endorsement 3 within Section VIII which would correspond to its placement in the original policy Indeed Endorsement 3 does not contain a Section VIII This contrasts with the modificarion of the exclusions section contained in Endorsement 3 Although neither pariy contends the exclusions of Endorsement 3 are applicable to the facts of this case we find it noteworthy that the exclusions set forth in Endorsement 3 are a continuation of the sequence of lettexing contained in Section IV of the ariginal policy Section IV of Endorsement 3 entitled BXCLUSIONS states the listed exclusions are added to Section IV of the original policy The list of exclusions set forth in Endorsement 3 designates the first exclusion in Endorsement 3 as T which corresponds to the last exclusion in the original policy designated S Thus had the parties intended to expand the statement of Who is an Insured so as to include those listed in the DEFINITIONS section of Endorsement 3 as well as those set forth in Section VIII of the original policy the language of the 10 Works Inc 567 So 707 711 La App 2d Cir writ denied 571 So 651 2d 2d La 1990 where the policy and an attachment to policy conflict the latter controls Accordingly the trial court correctly concluded that Donald Anderson was not an insured under the non auto provisions of Endorsement 3 of the owned policy Because he was not an insured he was not eligible for liabiliry coverage under the National Union policy and Anderson has no claim for iJM coverage under such policy DECREE For these reasons the trial court judgment granting summary judgment in s favor of defendant appellee National Pittsburgh Pennsylvania is affirmed Union Fire Insurance Company of appellant Plaintiff Monica Anderson is assessed with all costs of this appeal AFFIRMED Continued endorsement could have continued with the listed categories set forth in Section VIII of the original policy as was done with the exclusions Because it did not do this we believe the distinction supports our more restrictive interpretation of the parties intent insofax as the non owned auto liability coverage set forth in Endorsement 3 I1
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
