SHERI LYNN REINSTEDLER V. DANIEL THOMAS REINSTEDLER
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IMPORTANT NOTICE .
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED."
PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C),
'THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER
CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE; HOWEVER,
UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS,
RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR
CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED
OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE
BEFORE THE COURT. OPINIONS CITED FOR CONSIDERATION
BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED
DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A COPY OF THE
ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG WITH THE
DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO THE
ACTION.
RENDERED : March 24, 2011
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
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SHERI LYNN REINSTEDLER
V.
APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
CASE NO . 2007-CA-002227-MR
JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT NO. 06-CI-502147
DANIEL THOMAS REINSTEDLER
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
REVERSING AND REMANDING
The controversy presented in this dissolution proceeding centers
around the status of the land upon which the parties' marital home was
built. The Jefferson Circuit Court determined that the land was marital
property, but the Court of Appeals concluded that the land was the
separate property of Appellee, Daniel Reinstedler. Appellant, Sheri
Reinstedler, sought review in this Court, asserting that the Court of
Appeals erred in reversing the circuit court's determination . We agree
that the Court of Appeals failed to give proper deference to the trial
court's credibility determinations and instead improperly substituted its
judgment for that of the trial court. We, therefore, reverse the Court of
Appeals decision and remand for reinstatement of the judgment of the
Jefferson Circuit Court.
The parties married in 1983 and divorced twenty-four years later,
in 2007. More than seven years into the marriage, Daniel's parents
conveyed a five-acre tract of land to the couple . They built a home on
this property and lived there until their divorce . Daniel maintains that
the land is his nonmarital property because it was a gift to him, alone,
while Sheri contends that it was a gift to them both .
KRS 403 .190 governs the disposition of property upon dissolution
of marriage. KRS 403 .190(3) provides:
All property acquired by either spouse after the
marriage and before a decree of legal separation is presumed
to be marital property, regardless of whether title is held
individually or by the spouses in some form of co-ownership
such as joint tenancy, tenancy in common, tenancy by the
entirety, and community property. The presumption of
marital property is overcome by a showing that the property
was acquired by a method listed in subsection (2) of this
section.
Accordingly, the tract in question is presumed to be marital property and
the burden to prove otherwise rests with Daniel . As noted earlier, Daniel
attempted to overcome the marital property presumption established in
KRS 403 .190(3) by showing that the tract was a nonmarital gift. Indeed,
KRS 403 .190(2)(a) provides that "[p]roperty acquired by gift . . . during
the marriage" is an exception to the general rule that all property
acquired by either spouse subsequent to the marriage is marital
property. Of course, if the gift is made jointly to the spouses from a third
party during the course of the marriage, it is deemed marital property.
Calloway v. Calloway, 832 S.W.2d 890 (Ky. App . 1992) .
In Sexton
v.
Sexton, 125
S .W.3d
258, 269 (Ky. 2004), this
Court
explained that "the donor's intent is . . . the primary factor in
determining whether a gift is made jointly to spouses or individually to
one spouse ." And, while the donor's testimony is highly probative, the
surrounding facts and circumstances, including the relationship of the
parties and the parties' conduct, must also be considered in discerning
the donor's intent. Id. Ultimately, though, "[t]he determination of
whether a gift was jointly or individually made is a factual issue, and
therefore, subject to CR 52 .01's clearly erroneous standard of review," id.
at 269, and "[d]ue regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial
court to judge the credibility of the witnesses."
CR 52 .01 .
Here, according to the deed, the subject tract of land was conveyed
to both Daniel and Sheri . Specifically, the deed stated that the fee simple
conveyance was:
for a VALUABLE CONSIDERATION paid, the receipt of
which is hereby acknowledged, and the further consideration
of the love and affection which first parties [Daniel's parents]
have for second parties who are their son and daughter-inlaw.
Contrary to the language in the deed, Daniel's mother testified that her
intent was to give the land only to Daniel . The Court of Appeals
reasoned that Daniel's mother's testimony overwhelmingly established
that her intent was to make a nonmarital gift of the tract to Daniel,
notwithstanding the language utilized in the deed. Consequently, the
Court of Appeals held that the trial court clearly erred in its decision to
the contrary.
However, appellate courts must remain mindful that clear error is
the most deferential standard of appellate review . Edwards v. Hickman,
237 S .W .3d 183 (Ky. 2007) . As such, an appellate court should resist
the temptation to substitute its judgment for that of the factfinder unless
the record is devoid of substantial evidence to support the factfinder's
decision. Moore v. Asente, 110 S .W.3d 336 (Ky. 2003) . Substantial
evidence is "[evvddence that a reasonable mind would accept as adequate
to support a conclusion," id. at 354 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 580
(7th ed. 1999)), or evidence that "has sufficient probative value to induce
conviction in the minds of reasonable men," id. (quoting City of Monticello
v. Rankin, 521 S.W.2d 79, 80 (Ky. 1975)) .
Here, the trial court stated :
[T]he gift of land from [Danny's] parents was a gift to
both parties . The Court further concludes that the intent of
the donors at the time was evidenced in the deed, which
listed the land as being transferred to both [Danny] and
[Sheri] . There was no need to put it in both names if the
intent of the donors was to make a gift to [Danny] only. The
donors were his parents. At the time both parties were
natural objects of their bounty. [Sheri] is less an object of
their bounty when the parties are going through a divorce .
It is apparent that the trial court gave deliberate consideration to the
testimony of Daniel's mother, but found that the donors' intent was more
accurately reflected by the deed, executed at the time of the gift, than by
the testimony given years later, after the couple separated. Further, the
foregoing comments clearly encompass the trial court's assessment of the
credibility of Daniel's mother's testimony, an assessment that is entitled
to great deference . CR 52 .01 .
As there is substantial evidence to support the trial court's
determination, we must conclude that the Court of Appeals improperly
usurped the trial court's authority and failed to give adequate deference
to the trial court's credibility determinations . We, therefore, reverse the
decision of the Court of Appeals. Our decision in this regard renders
moot any remaining arguments concerning the need to apportion the
increase in value of the property between the tract of land and the
residence .
For the foregoing reasons, the Court of Appeals opinion is reversed
and this cause is remanded for reinstatement of the judgment of the
Jefferson Circuit Court.
All sitting. All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Gary W. Anderson
Anderson Law Center, PSC
333 Guthrie Green
Suite 310
Louisville, Kentucky 40202
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Jacqueline M. Caldwell
150 South Third Street
Louisville, Kentucky 40202
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