COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY V. BERTRAND HOWLETT
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED : DECEMBER 16, 2010
TO BE PUBLISHED
,;vuyrrmr Courf of ~irufurk
2010-SC-000128-CL
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
V.
APPELLANT
CERTIFICATION OF LAW FROM
JEFFERSON COUNTY DISTRICT COURT
NO . 06-T-088131
BERTRAND HOWLETT
APPELLEE
OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE CUNNINGHAM
CERTIFYING THE LAW
The Commonwealth, pursuant to Section 115 of the Constitution of
Kentucky and CR 76 .37(10), petitions this Court for certification of the law
regarding the limitations of judicial notice. Specifically, the Commonwealth
seeks certification of the law on the following question :
In light of KRE 201's pre-Rules case law and its
current Federal equivalent, what if any special
prohibitions exist in a bench trial against the use of a
judge's taking judicial notice of a fact that comes from
the judge's personal knowledge given KRE 201's
silence on the matter?
The relevant facts are as follows. On November 26, 2006, Bertrand
Howlett was stopped by Sgt. Steve Williams of the St. Matthews Police
Department for speeding. Upon approaching the vehicle, Sgt. Williams noticed
that Howlett's eyes were bloodshot and that his breath smelled of alcohol . Sgt.
Williams administered three field sobriety tests, each of which Howlett failed .
Howlett was subsequently arrested and a breath test administered, where he
blew a .150 . Howlett was charged with speeding, reckless driving, and DUI .
During a two-day bench trial, testimony was offered regarding the
necessity of a twenty-minute observation period prior to the administration of
the breath test. Howlett testified that he burped during the observation period .
When the court convened the following day, Judge Donald Armstrong of the
Jefferson District Court,
sua sponte,
noted the following: "I take judicial notice
of the fact that a burp during the operation or observation time needs to start
the observation time all over again . . . by the manufacturer of the machine,
Smith and Wesson . Therefore, I'm going to find him not guilty of that." Judge
Armstrong's concerns over Howlett's burping during the observation period
were seemingly based on his prior experience as a DUI prosecutor and his
knowledge of the operating instructions for the breathalyzer machine .
Prior to the enactment of KRE 201, our case law on this issue was
unambiguous :
While it may be that the trial judge had information
from an undisclosed source that appellant was
feigning illness, such information does not constitute
evidence, nor would the judge be authorized to act
upon such information as constituting a fact within
his judicial knowledge . `It matters not what is known
to the judge if it is not known to him judicially,' is a
maxim of the doctrine of judicial notice. We have also
held that the court must act upon evidence heard in
open court and cannot make a private investigation of
a matter pending before the court and then base his
decision upon information obtained thereby . To hold
otherwise would destroy the very purpose for which
our courts are established .
Gray v. Commonwealth, 264 S.W.2d 69, 70-71 (Ky. 1954) (internal citations
omitted) .
The Commonwealth notes that this Court has not specifically addressed
this issue since the adoption of KRE 201 and, therefore, requests a certification
of the law for guidance to the bench and bar .
Kentucky Rule of Evidence 201 provides :
(a) Scope of rule . This rule governs only judicial notice
of adjudicative facts .
(b) Kinds of facts . A judicially noticed fact must be one
not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either:
(1) Generally known within the county from which
the jurors are drawn, or, in a nonjury matter, the
county in which the venue of the action is fixed ;
or
(2) Capable of accurate and ready determination
by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot
reasonably be questioned .
(c) When discretionary. A court may take judicial
notice, whether requested or not.
(d) When mandatory. A court shall take judicial notice
if requested by a party and supplied with the
necessary information .
(e) Opportunity to be heard. A party is entitled upon
timely request to an opportunity to be heard as to the
propriety of taking judicial notice and the tenor of the
matter noticed. In the absence of prior notification, the
request may be made after judicial notice has been
taken.
(fl Time of taking notice . Judicial notice may be taken
at any stage of the proceeding .
(g) Instructing the jury. The court shall instruct the
jury to accept as conclusive any fact judicially noticed .
As can be seen, KRE 201 is silent on the subject of judicial notice of a
fact peculiarly known to the judge. However, we see no reason to depart from
our previous case law on the subject. It is axiomatic that judicial notice is
different from judicial knowledge . Shapleigh v. Mier, 299 U.S . 468, 475 (1937) .
See also R.T.K., Comment Note.Distinction between judicial notice and judicial
knowledge, 113 ALR 258 (1938) . In his treatise on Kentucky Evidence,
Professor Robert G . Lawson noted that "[the] drafters [of KRE 201 ] expressed a
clear intent to have the provision construed to be in accord with the pre-Rules
case law: `Judicial notice of a fact peculiarly known to the judge is
inappropriate."' Robert G. Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook, §
1 .00[3][c], at 12 (4th ed. 2003) (quoting Evidence Rules Study Committee,
Kentucky Rules ofEvidenceFinal Draft, p.16 (Nov . 1989)) . This position is
widely accepted among federal courts in cases involving KRE 201's federal
counterpart as well. Id. at 13 . "While a resident judge's background
knowledge of an area may `inform the judge's assessment of the historical
facts,' the judge may not actually testify in the proceeding or interject facts
(excluding facts for which proper judicial notice is taken) ." U.S. v. Berber-
Tinoco, 510 F .3d 1083, 1091 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal citation omitted) .
Although KRE 201 (a) specifically empowers courts to take judicial notice
of "adjudicative facts," we must conclude that the taking of judicial notice
which is derived from the court's personal knowledge of a fact peculiarly known
to the judge is a fact neither "[g]enerally known within the county from which
the jurors are drawn, or, in a nonjury matter, the county in which the venue of
the action is fixed; [nor] [c]apable of accurate and ready determination by resort
to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned ." KRE
201 (b) (1) (2) . Thus, we reaffirm our longstanding position that, under KRE 201,
a trial judge is prohibited from relying on his personal experience to support
the taking of judicial notice .
Procedurally, we cannot address Section 2 of KRE 201(b) . That section
allows judicial notice of a proposed fact if it is "[c]apable of accurate and ready
determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be
questioned." However, KRE 201(e) states: "A party is entitled upon timely
request to an opportunity to be heard as to the propriety of taking judicial
notice and the tenor of the matter noticed." But procedurally ; the taking of
judicial notice on that ground was flawed .
The trial judge, in this case, proclaimed judicial notice without request of
either lawyer, and then proceeded to dismiss the case in the same motion.
There was no opportunity to make a "timely request" for "an opportunity to be
heard ." The judge did refer to "Smith and Wesson" as an apparent attempt to
cite a source "whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned ."' This was
not sufficient .
In a jury trial, when it is requested that judicial notice be taken of a fact,
the other party is afforded the opportunity to respond . No less right is afforded
parties in a bench trial. Here, there was no opportunity to "reasonably"
question the source . "The drafters of KRE 201, following the lead of most
commentators, encouraged courts to give advance notification when feasible : `If
a court acts on its own initiative, the parties should be informed of the facts
noticed and given an opportunity to respond."' Lawson, supra, § 1 .00[5[[e], at
20 (quoting Evidence Rules Study Committee, Kentucky Rules ofEvidenceFinal
Draft, p . 16 (Nov. 1989)) .
Therefore, it was improper for the court to find judicial notice sua sponte
and dismiss the case, all in one fell swoop . Judicial notice, as utilized in this
case, was inappropriate.
The law is so certified .
Minton, C .J . ; Abramson, Noble, Schroder and Venters, JJ., concur .
Scott, J ., dissents by separate opinion.
SCOTT, J., DISSENTING : I respectfully dissent from the majority's
certification limiting a court's judicial notice under KRE 201 (b)(2), as the fact in
issue in this case was clearly one "capable of accurate and ready determination
by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned," i .e ., the
1 We also note that the manufacturer of the breathalyzer was CMI, Inc., not Smith
and Wesson. This further underscores how ill-advised it is for a judge to sua sponte
take judicial notice based upon his own memory.
manufacturer's manual, which states, [d]wring [the observation] period the
subject shall not have oral or nasal intake of substances which will affect the
test." CMI, Inc., Intoxilyzer 5000EN Breath Analysis Instrument Operator's
Manual (Kentucky Model) 12 (2000) . Moreover, a prior decision establishes that
a "burp" constitutes an "oral or nasal intake of substances which will affect the
test." See Eldridge v. Commonwealth, 68 S.W.3d 388, 392 (Ky. App . 2001)
("Belching and regurgitating may contaminate the mouth with alcohol volumes
from the stomach, and this is a rational basis for re-administering the
observation period .") .
District Judge Armstrong has been doing this work for many years as a
prosecutor and a judge and few would argue about the accuracy of his
decision, especially in light of the fact that the trial lasted two days and
involved evidence of the necessity of a twenty-minute observation period prior
to the administration of the test. Yet, by this decision today, we deprive him
and other trial judges of the ability to utilize their professional knowledge
"capable of [an] accurate and [a] ready determination"-in the determination of
matters rightly before them. See KRE 201(b)(2) . In effect, we are overmanaging
our decision maker in a matter that had nothing to do with "fairness"-but now
does! Thus, I must dissent.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Michael J. O'Connell
Jefferson County Attorney
600 W. Jefferson Street
Louisville, KY 40202
Benjamin Francis Wyman, III
Assistant Jefferson County Attorney
600 W. Jefferson Street
Louisville, KY 40202
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Paul S. Gold
701 West Jefferson Street
Louisville, KY 40202
Michael Romano Mazzoli
Cox Sv Mazzoli, PLLC
600 West Main Street
Suite 300
Louisville, KY 40202
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.