JUAN JOHNSON V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED ."
PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C),
THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
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RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR
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BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED
DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A COPY OF THE
ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG WITH THE
DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO THE
ACTION.
RENDERED : NOVEMBER 18, 2010
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2009-SC-000656-MR
JUAN JOHNSON
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DATE~10k-)Q E-4111 APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PHILLIP J. SHEPHERD, JUDGE
NO. 07-CR-00153
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
Appellant, Juan D. Johnson, was convicted by a Franklin County Circuit
Court jury of first degree possession of a controlled substance, tampering with
physical evidence, fleeing or evading police in the second degree, resisting
arrest, and being a persistent felony offender. Appellant received a sentence
totaling twenty years for the crimes . He now appeals as a matter of right. Ky.
Const. ยง 110(2)(b) .
I. Background
On June 27, 2007, at approximately 2:30 a.m., Lieutenant Sutton and
Officer Curtsinger of the Frankfort Police Department were separately
dispatched to investigate a disturbance call in an apartment complex in Indian
Hills . Sutton testified that this location is a high crime area, with the police
frequently receiving drug and theft complaints . On the night in question, there
was a late-night party with excessively loud music playing.
Once the officers arrived and parked approximately one block from the
apartment complex, they both could hear loud music originating from the
parking lot in the apartment complex. The officers approached the source of
the music on foot. As they neared the source of the music, the officers
observed twenty to thirty people milling around and drinking alcohol in the
parking lot area. One of the party-goers observed the approaching officers and
screamed "Police!" which prompted some to set down their beer bottles and flee
the area. Although there were several cars in the parking lot, only one was
occupied--the car playing the piercingly loud music . Officer Curtsinger
smelled the odor of marijuana as he approached the vehicle .
Sutton approached the passenger's side of the subject vehicle and
Curtsinger approached the driver's side . Appellant and the driver were the
vehicle's only occupants . The driver consented to Curtsinger's requests to
search the car and his person, and both occupants were asked to exit the
vehicle for officer safety purposes .
Sutton testified that as he was speaking with Appellant, he smelled the
odor of alcohol emanating from Appellant's breath. Sutton next testified that
he asked Appellant whether he had any weapons or contraband on his person,
to which Appellant replied in the negative . According to Sutton, Appellant
consented to a search of his person. 1
Prior to exiting the vehicle, Appellant reached into the left, front pocket of
his shorts, apparently attempting to place an item next to the seat. This
movement prompted Sutton to instruct him to remove his hands from his
pockets. While getting out of the vehicle, Sutton testified that Appellant
disobeyed his prior request and again stuck his hand in his left, front pocket.
Sutton testified that he became concerned for his safety because he did not
know whether Appellant was reaching in his pocket to retrieve a "cigarette
lighter or a gun." As a result, Sutton performed a pat down .
During this pat down, Sutton stated that he felt a bulge, approximately
the size of ping-pong ball, in Appellant's left-side front pocket (the same pocket
Appellant repeatedly reached into), which he believed was contraband. Once
Sutton felt the bulge, Appellant attempted to jump over the roof of the car.
Sutton was able to tackle him; however, a struggle ensued when Appellant
attempted to flee . During this struggle, Curtsinger testified that he was struck,
from behind, with a plastic lawn chair. The officers were able to eventually
subdue and arrest Appellant approximately two car lengths away from the
point of original contact.
Once in handcuffs, a search incident to arrest of Appellant revealed that
the bulge in his left, front pocket was no longer there . However, a white
1 Sutton gave this testimony at the suppression hearing; the trial court did not make
any factual findings relating to consent.
substance wrapped in plastic, approximately the size of a ping-pong ball, was
found in plain view within arm's length of the area where Appellant struggled to
free himself from Sutton. The substance in the plastic wrapper was later
determined to be cocaine .
A jury convicted Appellant of possession of a controlled substance in the
first degree, tampering with physical evidence, fleeing or evading police in the
second degree, resisting arrest, and being a persistent felony offender.
Appellant now raises two allegations of error: 1) that the trial court erred
when it denied his motion to suppress evidence of the cocaine as the police did
not have a reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk him; and 2) that double
jeopardy prohibited him from being found guilty of both fleeing or evading
police in the second degree and resisting arrest.
For the reasons that follow, we affirm Appellant's convictions.
II. Analysis
A. Suppression Hearing
Prior to trial, Appellant moved to suppress the cocaine found in plain
view in the parking lot. Although using the phrase "probable cause," Appellant
essentially argued that the police had no reasonable suspicion to stop and
search him; therefore, the contraband is fruit of the poisonous tree and must
be suppressed.
The trial court found that the loud noise, the crowd gathering around the
site of the noise, and the odor of marijuana indicated the presence of illegal
activity, thus warranting further police investigation. The court also found that
Appellant had a noticeable bulge in his left front pocket, and attempted to flee
when Sutton's pat down revealed it. Next, the court concluded that Appellant's
attempt to escape from the police justified his arrest and subsequent search
incident to arrest. Finally, the court noted that the cocaine was found in plain
view in the parking lot, which implicated no privacy interests.
When reviewing the trial court's denial of a motion to suppress, we take a
two-step approach . We first review the trial court's factual findings under a
clearly erroneous standard. Commonwealth v. Banks, 68 S.W .3d 347 (Ky.
2001) . The trial court's factual findings are conclusive if supported by
substantial evidence . Adcock v. Commonwealth, 967 S.W .2d 6, 9 (Ky. 1998) ;
RCr 9 .78. We next undertake a de novo review of the trial court's conclusions
of law. Ornelas v. U.S., 517 U .S. 690, 691 (1996) .
After reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial court's factual
findings were supported by substantial evidence, and thus are conclusive . We
next conduct a de novo review of the law as applied to the trial court's findings
of fact.
1.
De Novo Review of the Alleged Seizure, Pat Down,
and Search Incident to Arrest.
Appellant contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to
suppress the cocaine discovered as a result of the allegedly illegal search.
Appellant claims that the stop and frisk, conducted by Sutton and Curtsinger,
violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures.
Appellant asserts that before seizing an individual, the police officer must have
a reasonable suspicion based on specific and articulable facts . According to
Appellant, Sutton and Curtsinger approached the vehicle only in response to a
noise complaint; no other suspicious behavior was occurring at the time of the
approach . Appellant further contends that the officers had no reasonable fear
that Appellant was armed, until after the illegal search began . Accordingly,
Appellant claims that the officers had no "right" to stop and frisk him.
The Commonwealth responds by contending that the odor of marijuana
alone is enough to create reasonable suspicion to justify the stop of Appellant.
Next, the Commonwealth argues that the pat down did not violate the Fourth
Amendment since Appellant twice stuck his hands in his pocket leading Sutton
to fear that Appellant may be armed . Furthermore, the Commonwealth points
out that Appellant consented to the pat down .
We hold that the Terry stop and frisk, and the search incident to arrest
were valid . Terry v. Ohio, 392 U .S. 1 (1968).
a. Terry "Stop"
The Fourth Amendment and Section 10 of the Kentucky Constitution
proscribe unreasonable seizures . However, a police officer may "stop" an
individual, without implicating any constitutional protections, if, objectively,
"the police officer [can] point to specific and articulable facts" which lead him to
reasonably conclude "that criminal activity may be afoot." Terry, 392 U .S. at
21, 30 (emphasis added) . As this Court characterized the relevant inquiry, "[i] n
other words, would the facts available to [the] [police] [o]fficer at that moment
convince a reasonable person that the action taken was appropriate ." Baker v.
Commonwealth, 5 S.W .3d 142, 145 (Ky. 1999) .
Both this Court and the Supreme Court of the United States have
clarified the minimal burden necessary for a constitutional stop. The Supreme
Court of the United States has stated that "[the] level of suspicion [required for
the stop] is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of
the evidence ." United States v. Sokolow, 490 U .S . 1, 7 (1989) . Moreover, the
Court also acknowledged that the underlying activity giving rise to reasonable
suspicion could actually be legal: "there could, of course, be circumstances in
which wholly lawful conduct might justify the suspicion that criminal activity
was afoot." Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S . 438, 441 (1980) (per curiam) (emphasis
added) . Finally, this Court has held that a "police officer may constitutionally
conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable,
articulable suspicion," which "is more than an "unparticularized suspicion or
`hunch.' Bauder v. Commonwealth, 299 S .W.3d 588, 590-91 (Ky. 2009)
(quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27) .
Thus, we must determine whether the Commonwealth carried its
minimal burden by introducing specific and articulable facts indicating that
criminal activity may be afoot thereby justifying the stop of Appellant. We have
no difficulty concluding that objectively, Sutton and Curtsinger had "specific
and articulable facts" justifying the brief seizure .
As stated above, both officers' presence on the scene was in response to a
disturbance call and upon arrival at the late-night party, Curtsinger smelled
the odor of marijuana emanating from the vehicle playing illegally loud musica reason for the disturbance call. Although the stop was the result of multiple
circumstances, this Court has previously stated that "[t]he odor of marijuana
alone can justify the warrantless search of an automobile." King v.
Commonwealth, 302 S .W. 3d 649 (Ky. 2010) (emphasis added) (citing Cooper v.
Commonwealth, 577 S.W.2d 34, 37 (Ky. App. 1979), (overruled on other
grounds by Mash v. Commonwealth, 769 S.W .2d 42 (Ky. 1989))) . Thus, if the
odor of marijuana alone can justify a search, it follows that the odor of
marijuana, in addition to the other factors indicating the potential presence of
illegal activity, enables the officer to make a brief stop to investigate . Therefore,
after a de novo review, we conclude that excessively loud music, the presence of
twenty to thirty people partying and drinking alcohol in public well into the
early morning hours, and the odor of marijuana (all in a high crime area) are
specific and articulable facts which would objectively lead an officer to believe
that criminal activity may be afoot, thereby justifying the Terry "stop."
b. Terry Frisk" or Pat down
We next review the propriety of Lieutenant Sutton's pat down of
Appellant . It is well-established that if a police officer reasonably believes that
the person may be armed and presently dangerous, the officer is entitled to
conduct a pat down in an attempt to discover weapons . Terry, 392 U .S. at 30.
The policy behind the Terry "frisk" is that in certain instances, a carefully
limited pat down is "necessary for the protection of [the police officer] and
others." Id. at 30. We hold that the pat down here was reasonable under the
circumstances in this case .
When judging the reasonableness of a police officer's actions in this area,
we must consider the facts available to the officer at that time . Id. at 21-22 .
Here, Sutton and Curtsinger were dispatched to a high crime area, at 2 :30
a.m., to investigate a disturbance. The officers arrived to an overtly hostile
crowd (Curtsinger was later attacked from behind), that vastly outnumbered
them . After smelling marijuana on his approach to the loud vehicle, Sutton
testified that while conversing with Appellant, Appellant twice reached into his
pocket, despite contrary instruction. During those fleeting moments, Sutton
became concerned for his safety, since he did not know whether Appellant was
reaching for "a cigarette lighter or a gun." The situation forced Sutton "to take
swift measures to discover the true facts and neutralize the threat of harm if it
materialized." Id. at 30. Consequently, he executed a pat down to determine
whether the object Appellant twice reached for was, in fact, a weapon.
In the context of the above circumstances, we conclude that Sutton
reasonably believed Appellant may have been armed and dangerous, thus
entitling him to conduct a pat down in an attempt to discover weapons .
c. Search Incident to Arrest
Although more of a minor point, we lastly review whether the search of
Appellant, following his arrest, was a valid search incident to arrest. Following
a valid arrest, a police officer may search an arrestee incident to that valid
arrest. Agnello v. U.S., 269 U.S . 20, 5 (1925) .
As previously stated above and discussed below, Appellant attempted to
escape from the police; however, he was eventually subdued and arrested . The
evidence that Appellant attempted to escape from Sutton is largely
uncontradicted, with Appellant conceding that he jerked away from Sutton,
which led to the struggle . Therefore, as expanded below, we hold that
Appellant was validly arrested for fleeing or evading police in the second degree,
KRS 520 . 100, and thus, a search of his person incident to arrest was proper.
B. Double Jeopardy
In Appellant's final and unpreserved argument, he contends that his
convictions for both resisting arrest and fleeing or evading police in the second
degree violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, because
these two crimes are "essentially the same ." The resisting arrest statute, KRS
520.090, provides:
(1) A person is guilty of resisting arrest when he intentionally prevents or
attempts to prevent a peace officer, recognized to be acting under color of
his official authority, from effecting an arrest of the actor or another by:
(a) Using or threatening to use physical force or violence against
the peace officer or another; or
(b) Using any other means creating a substantial risk of causing
physical injury to the peace officer or another.
The statute codifying fleeing or evading police, KRS 520. 100, in relevant part,
states
(1) A person is guilty of fleeing or evading police in the second degree
when:
(a) As a pedestrian, and with intent to elude or flee, the person
knowingly or wantonly disobeys a direction to stop, given by a
person recognized to be a peace officer who has an articulable
reasonable suspicion that a crime has been committed by the
person fleeing, and in fleeing or eluding the person is the cause of,
or creates a substantial risk of, physical injury to any person;
The Commonwealth acknowledges that the two crimes are similar, but
asserts that they are not the same. Furthermore, the Commonwealth asserts
that there was testimony at trial alleging that although the arresting officer
initially had control of Appellant, he may have freed himself from the officer's
grip, forcing the officer to re-initiate physical contact. We agree with the
Commonwealth and hold that the two crimes at issue do not violate double
jeopardy.
Initially, we note that we review unpreserved issues under the palpable
error standard of RCr 10 .26. Potts v. Commonwealth, 172 S .W.3d 345 (Ky.
2005) . Under that rule, an unpreserved error may be noticed on appeal only if
the error is "palpable" and "affects the substantial rights of a party," and even
then relief is appropriate only "upon a determination that manifest injustice
has resulted from the error." RCr 10 .26 . In general, a palpable error "affects
the substantial rights of a party" only if "it is more likely than ordinary error to
have affected the judgment ." Ernst v. Commonwealth, 160 S.W .3d 744, 762 (Ky.
2005) . An unpreserved error that is both palpable and prejudicial still does not
justify relief unless the reviewing court further determines that it has resulted
in a manifest injustice, unless the error so seriously affected the fairness,
integrity, or public reputation of the proceeding as to be "shocking or
jurisprudentially intolerable." Martin v. Commonwealth, 207 S .W.3d 1, 4 (Ky.
2006) . However, we generally find palpable error when a conviction
is tainted
by double jeopardy. Cardine v. Commonwealth, 283 S .W .3d 641, 650-51 (Ky.
2009) .
Nonetheless, we hold that the resisting arrest and fleeing or evading
police statutes do not implicate double jeopardy. KRS 520.090 & 520 . 100 .
Pursuant to the Fifth Amendment, incorporated though the Fourteenth
Amendment, and Section Thirteen of the Kentucky Constitution, a person may
not be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.- On the other hand, the
"principles of double jeopardy do not, however, prevent a person from being
charged with multiple offenses arising from the same course of conduct."
Commonwealth v. McCombs, 304 S.W.3d 676, 687 (Ky. 2009) .
In analyzing whether the criminal charges twice place the defendant in
jeopardy, we adopted the Blockburger test, which states that "[doouble jeopardy
does not occur when a person is charged with two crimes arising from the
same course of conduct, as long as each statute `requires proof of an additional
fact which the other does not."' Commonwealth v. Burge, 947 S.W .2d 805, 809
(Ky. 1996) (quoting Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S . 299, 304 (1932)) .
Thus, in order to determine if Appellant was twice placed in jeopardy for the
same offense, we must determine whether resisting arrest and fleeing or
evading police in the second degree "requires proof of an additional fact which
the other does not." Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304.
After examining the elements of each offense we have no trouble finding
that each offense contains an element which the other does not. At its basic
level, two elements comprise resisting arrest:
(i) the person prevents or attempts to prevent a police officer from
effecting an arrest;
(ii) by using or threatening to use physical force .
KRS 520.090 . When simplified, fleeing or evading also contains two elements:
(i) the person knowingly disobeys a police officer's direction to stop;
(ii) while fleeing the person causes, or creates substantial risk of,
physical injury .
KRS 520. 100. Thus, as is evident from the above statutes, each requires proof
of an additional fact which the other does not. Resisting arrest requires proof
of an arrest. Fleeing and evading requires the Commonwealth to prove that the
person disregarded the direction to stop and fled. Accordingly, resisting arrest
requires an arrest, which is not an element of fleeing and evading. Conversely,
fleeing and evading requires the disobedience of a police officer's order to stop
and fleeing or eluding the police officer; neither element is required to sustain a
conviction for resisting arrest.2 Consequently, we do not find that Appellant
2 A person can resist arrest without fleeing. On the other hand, if the person is not
fleeing, the police officer would not give a direction to stop . Clearly, a person
cannot disregard a direction to stop if none is given . Thus each statute requires
was twice placed in jeopardy for the same offenses, as each offense required
proof of a fact that the other did not. Blockburger, 284 U.S . at 304 .
Furthermore, the official commentary to each provision bolsters the
above conclusion by demonstrating the different criminal conduct each section
seeks to proscribe. The official commentary for resisting arrest states that
"[tlhe offense of resisting arrest includes only forcible resistance and excludes
other forms of nonsubmission to authority. Neither flight from arrest nor
passive resistance are punishable under this section ."
On the other hand, the commentary for fleeing or evading states that this
provision is not to criminalize "mere flight from an officer," rather, "it is the
purpose of this provision to punish eluding a peace officer when the nature of
the instrumentality used to accomplish the flight inherently involves the threat
of danger to peace officers ." We glean from this commentary the legislature
intended each provision to prohibit different conduct.3
3
proof of a fact the other does not: arrest to sustain a resisting arrest conviction and
fleeing despite an order to stop to sustain a fleeing and evading conviction.
Within Appellant's double jeopardy argument Appellant concedes that the
Commonwealth's evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction for resisting arrest;
however, he asserts that the evidence was insufficient for a fleeing and evading
conviction. Appellant twice claims that he should not have been convicted of fleeing
or evading in the second degree since he was never out of Officer Sutton's "grasp."
Appellant is attempting to read a control requirement into KRS 520 . 100 . As
detailed in the double jeopardy section, the crime of fleeing or evading in the second
degree contains only two elements: (i) the person knowingly disobeys a police
officer's direction to stop; and (ii) while fleeing the person causes, or creates
substantial risk of, physical injury. KRS 520 . 100 . There is no control element in
this statute; thus, it is irrelevant whether Officer Sutton continuously maintained a
hold of Appellant's arm or clothing .
III. Conclusion
For these reasons, we affirm Appellant's conviction and sentence.
All sitting. All concur .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Karen Shuff Maurer
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Gregory C. Fuchs
Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
Office of Criminal Appeals
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
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