JOHNNY PHILLIPS V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: JUNE 17, 2010
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JOHNNY PHILLIPS
V.
APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM LAUREL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOHN KNOX MILLS, JUDGE
NO . 07-CR-00266
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
Appellant, Johnny Phillips, appeals as a matter of right' from a judgment
of the Laurel Circuit Court convicting him of wanton murder . Pursuant to the
jury's recommendation, he was sentenced to thirty years' imprisonment.
On appeal, Phillips raises the following claims: (1) that the trial court
erred by instructing the jury on wanton murder ; (2) that the trial court erred by
denying his motion for a directed verdict on the murder charge; (3) that the
trial court erred by admitting into evidence graphic postmortem photographs of
the victim ; and (4) that error occurred during the sentencing phase when the
probation officer incorrectly stated Phillips's parole eligibility under the violent
offender statute. Finding no error, we affirm .
I . FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
' Ky. Const . ยง 110(2)(b) .
Phillips and victim Phillip Glodo were friends . On October 18, 2007, they
traveled together to Tennessee to get a boat license . Afterward, they returned
to Phillips's home. At some point Phillips made a comment which Glodo
construed as accusing him of stealing $50 .00 from Phillips . Glodo became
upset at Phillips because of the comment, and remained so until the shooting
later that evening.
Phillips and Glodo had a mutual friend, Randy Capps, who testified at
trial . Capps testified that when he first saw Phillips and Glodo at his residence
on October 18, 2007, it appeared to him that both men had been drinking.
After a short time the two left to get the boat license . Later that same day,
Glodo called Capps . Capps said that Phillips was blaming him for stealing
$50.00, and that he was going to "kick [Phillip's] ass ." After Capps returned
home, he received another phone call from Glodo in which Glodo threatened to
sic his two Great Danes on Phillips . Glodo also made several calls to Phillips
that day.
Later that evening, Phillips returned to the Capps residence . A few
minutes before 10:00 p .m., Glodo arrived at the residence and began to argue
with Phillips . Because Capps's children were home, Phillips suggested that
they take their argument elsewhere.
Phillips and Glodo both got into their trucks to leave. As Phillips
prepared to pull away Glodo yelled "I'll ram your ass ." The two then drove off
in the direction of Phillips's residence .
As Phillips drove down the narrow road he came upon a truck pulling a
horse trailer coming in the opposite direction . In order to let the truck by,
Phillips pulled over into a church parking lot. Glodo pulled in behind him.
The two men got out of their vehicles, and, ultimately, Phillips shot Glodo in
the back of the head with a twelve-gauge shotgun .
As further discussed below, following the shooting Phillips gave a
statement to the police in which he claimed, inconsistently, that the shooting
was both accidental and done in self-defense .
On November 16, 2007, Phillips was indicted for Glodo's murder.
Following a jury trial, Phillips was convicted of wanton murder, and the jury
recommended a sentence of thirty years' imprisonment. On September 28,
2009, the trial court entered final judgment consistent with the jury's verdict
and sentencing recommendation . This appeal followed.
II . THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GAVE A WANTON MURDER INSTRUCTION
Phillips first contends that the trial court erred by instructing the jury on
wanton murder. He argues that the evidence as a whole only supports the
theory that the shooting was intentional - and was done so in self-defense .
Because, following the shooting, Phillips claimed in his statement to police that
the shooting was accidental, we disagree.
"In a criminal case, it is the duty of the trial judge to prepare and give
instructions on the whole law of the case, and this rule requires instructions
applicable to every state of the case deducible or supported to any extent by the
testimony." RCr 9 .54(1) ; Taylor v. Commonwealth, 995 S .W .2d 355, 360 (Ky.
1999) . Further, intentional murder and wanton murder are the same offense
under Kentucky law and, if supported by the evidence, it is proper to instruct
the jury on both alternate theories of liability. Evans v. Commonwealth, 45
S .W.3d 445, 447 (Ky. 2001) (citing Ice v. Commonwealth, 667 S.W .2d 671, 677
(Ky. 1984)) ; KRS 507.020 .
The wanton murder provisions contained in KRS 507 .020(1)(b) provide as
follows:
(1) A person is guilty of murder when :
(b) Including, but not limited to, the operation of a motor vehicle
under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human
life, he wantonly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of
death to another person and thereby causes the death of another
person.
(emphasis added) .
Thus, the culpable mental state for wanton murder is wantonness,
except that to fall under the wanton murder statute the wanton conduct must
also involve the statutory aggravating factors of (1) manifesting extreme
indifference to human life, and (2) the creation of grave risk of death to another
person . 2 KRS 501 .020(3) defines "wantonly" as follows:
"Wantonly" - A person acts wantonly with respect to a result or to a
circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when he is
aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that the result will occur or that the
circumstance exists. The risk must be of such nature and degree
that disregard thereof constitutes a gross deviation from the
standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the
situation . A person who creates such a risk but is unaware thereof
solely by reason of voluntary intoxication also acts wantonly with
respect thereto .
The term "wantonly" as used in KRS 507.020(b) was clarified in Elliott v.
Commonwealth, 976 S .W.2d 416 (Ky. 1998) . "The definition[ ] of 'wantonly' . . .
make[s] no reference to the defendant's state of mind with respect to his
conduct, but refer[s] only to his state of mind with respect to the result of that
conduct or to the circumstance which prompted the conduct." Id. at 419 . So,
[e]ven though he did not intend to kill, if he was aware of and
consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk that
his conduct would result in the death of another person, he is
guilty of second-degree manslaughter or, if accompanied by the
statutory aggravating circumstances, wanton murder.
As noted, following the shooting, Phillips gave a statement to police in
which, among other things, he claimed that the shooting was an accident. For
example, in the statement Phillips said :
2 Causing the death of another with a wanton mental state without the aggravating
factors contained in the wanton murder statute is second-degree manslaughter .
KRS 507 .040 provides, in relevant part, as follows : "(1) A person is guilty of
manslaughter in the second degree when he wantonly causes the death of another
person, including, but not limited to, situations where the death results from the
person's : (a) Operation of a motor vehicle ; or (b) Leaving a child under the age of
eight (8) years in a motor vehicle under circumstances which manifest an extreme
indifference to human life and which create a grave risk of death to the child,
thereby causing the death of the child." In this proceeding, the jury was also
instructed on second-degree manslaughter and reckless homicide .
5
It was an accident . . . . It really was an accident. The gun went
off prematurely.
I used it [the shotgun] to push him away from me and it went off. .
. . He was standing like this at me and had something in this
hand . . . . When he come at me . . . . He rushed my truck, he
rushed to the side of my truck, I pushed him away from the truck
with my truck door, know what I mean . . . He come up to my
truck. I was watching him in the mirror and they weren't moving
quick enough for me to go on the horses and stuff coming down
that hill . . . . I pushed him off, basically used my door to get some
room to get out of the truck, and as I come out of the truck I come
with the gun, I pulled a shotgun out beside me. I was trying to
scream at him get back in your damn truck, get the hell away from
me and leave me alone and he was coming like this and his hand
was at his side . In this hand right here is the one he had had the
knife in, all I could see was shiny chrome and he carries a .44 that
long . . . . in that hand cause he was coming at me like this, know
what I mean, with this arm extended, with his forearm like
extended . . . .
That's when he come at me with his forearm, I didn't know if he
was going to try and push me . . . . I raised that gun up cause he
had that thing in his left hand when I raised the gun up. He was
coming at me and I took the gun and give it that and he didn't
move four inches and the gun went off.
I swear on my mother's grave I didn't mean to shoot that man .
As reflected by his statement, Phillips straightforwardly claimed that the
shooting was an accident. An accidental act is the opposite of an intentional
act . Thus, contrary to Phillips's argument, the evidence as a whole supports
not only the theory that his shooting of Glodo was intentional and was done so
in self-defense, but also that the shooting was not intentional, but, rather, was
an "accident ." The question then becomes if the jury believed the shooting was
unintentional, whether Phillips's conduct satisfies the elements of wanton
murder .
The evidence presented regarding the unintentional shooting theory is
that Phillips pointed a loaded shotgun at Glodo, and pushed him away with the
weapon while, it may be inferred (the shotgun fired), his finger was on the
trigger. Unquestionably the foregoing conduct could be found by a jury to be
wanton because of the high likelihood the shotgun could fire under the
circumstances described. Moreover, we believe it is self-evident that a
reasonable jury could conclude that pointing a loaded shotgun at a person and
prodding him with it with a finger on the trigger manifests an extreme
indifference to human life and creates a grave risk of death .
Thus, sufficient evidence was presented for a reasonable jury to conclude
that the elements of wanton murder were satisfied. Harris v. Commonwealth,
793 S .W. 2d 802, 804 (Ky. 1990) (A trial judge properly instructs the jury on
wanton murder where the evidence shows that the defendant was carrying a
loaded, cocked pistol and he admits an intent to point it at the victim but not
an intent to cause her death.) "The decision as to whether the aggravating
circumstances (extreme indifference to human life and grave risk of death to
another) were present is best left to the jury to decide ." Cook v.
Commonwealth, 129 S.W .3d 351, 363 (Ky . 2004) . (citations omitted.)
Thus, since the evidence supported a wanton murder instruction, the
trial court did not err by presenting the question to the jury. RCr 9 .54(1) .
III . PHILLIPS WAS NOT ENTITLED TO A DIRECTED VERDICT
Phillips next contends that he was entitled to a directed verdict of
acquittal on the murder charge because, based upon the evidence presented at
trial, "the prosecution failed to meet their burden of proof that [he] did not act
in self-defense ." Phillips alleges that it would be clearly unreasonable for a jury
to conclude that he did not act in self-defense . As explained above, sufficient
evidence was presented to support a jury verdict that Phillips engaged in
wanton murder . Moreover, because Glodo was shot from behind, a jury issue
was presented upon the issue of self-defense .
On motion for directed verdict, the trial court must draw all fair and
reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the
Commonwealth . If the evidence is sufficient to induce a reasonable
juror to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is
guilty, a directed verdict should not be given . For the purpose of
ruling on the motion, the trial court must assume that the evidence
for the Commonwealth is true, but reserving to the jury questions as
to the credibility and weight to be given to such testimony.
On appellate review, the test of a directed verdict is, if under the
evidence as a whole, it would be clearly unreasonable for a jury to
find guilt, only then the defendant is entitled to a directed verdict of
acquittal.
. . . [T]here must be evidence of substance, and the trial court is
expressly authorized to direct a verdict for the defendant if the
prosecution produces no more than a mere scintilla of evidence.
Commonwealth v. .Benham, 816 S.W .2d 186, 187-188 (Ky. 1991) (citations
omitted) .
It is uncontroverted that Glodo was shot in the back of the head. While
not determinative, a shot from behind, for obvious reasons, raises a jury
question concerning whether Phillips, in fact, was acting in self-defense . The
difficulties of an attack by a victim while faced away from the defendant are
clear. Commonwealth v. Yanoff, 690 A.2d 260, 265 (Pa. Super. 1997) ("The fact
that Appellant shot the victim in the back clearly undermines his claim of selfdefense .") Thus, a jury question was presented upon the issue of whether
Phillips shot Glodo in self-defense .
`Rarely is a defendant relying upon self-defense entitled to a directed
verdict .' Only in the unusual case in which the evidence
conclusively establishes justification and all of the elements of selfdefense are present is it proper for the trial court to direct a verdict
of not guilty. Similarly, in Taul v. Commonwealth, 249 S .W .2d 45
(Ky. 1952), it was held that a defendant's statement that he acted in
self-defense or his description of events which show such to be the
case need not be accepted at face value where the jury may
reasonably infer from his incredibility or the improbability of the
circumstances that one or more of the elements necessary to qualify
for self-defense is missing. In Townsend v. Commonwealth, 474
S .W .2d 352 (Ky. 1971), we held that if the evidence relied upon to
establish self-defense is contradicted or if there is other evidence
from which the jury could reasonably conclude that some element of
self-defense is absent, a directed verdict should not be given .
While the Commonwealth always bears the burden of proving every
element of the crime charged, a defendant relying upon self-defense
bears the risk that the jury will not be persuaded of his version of
the facts. Collins v. Commonwealth, 309 Ky. 572, 218 S .W.2d 393
(1949) .
West v. Commonwealth, 780 S .W .2d 600, 601 (Ky. 1989) .
While much of the evidence presented in this case was circumstantial,
we have no reluctance in holding that sufficient evidence was presented to
justify submitting the issue of whether Phillips acted in self-defense to the jury.
Wills v. Commonwealth, 502 S .W .2d 60 (Ky. 1973) ; Pruitt v. Commonwealth,
490 S .W.2d 486 (Ky. 1972); West, 780 S .W .2d at 601 . Thus, Phillips was not
entitled to a directed verdict because there was sufficient evidence to support a
jury verdict of guilt on either of the Commonwealth's theories regarding the
murder charge . Benham, 816 S.W.2d at 187-188 .
IV. THE POSTMORTEM PHOTOGRAPHS WERE PROPERLY ADMITTED
Phillips next argues that the trial court erred by permitting the
Commonwealth to introduce autopsy photographs depicting the wound to the
back of Glodo's head . He contends that the photographs should not have been
admitted because the fact that the victim was shot in the back of the head was
uncontested, and therefore the photographs were not necessary to prove any
element of the prosecution's case . He also alleges that evidence concerning the
wound could have been presented without the use of the photographs, and that
the overly graphic nature of the photographs prejudicially inflamed the
passions of the jury.
In determining admissibility of the photographs, we must first consider
whether the photographs are relevant . Relevant evidence is defined as
"evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence." KRE 401 . The autopsy photographs of
Glodo's fatal injuries were relevant to demonstrate that he was, indeed, killed
by gunshot wounds as stated in the indictment . Hunt v. Commonwealth, 304
S .W.3d 15, 40-41 (Ky. 2009) . Moreover, the position of the wound in the back
of Glodo's head was relevant to refute Phillips's claim of self-defense .
Next, the admissibility of photos must be examined under KRE 403,
which states: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice, confusion
of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence ." KRE 403 (emphasis added) .
Thus, we must discern whether the photographs were sufficiently gruesome so
as to find the probative value "substantially outweighed" by the prejudicial
effect .
As a general rule, photographs do not become inadmissible simply
because they are gruesome . Foley v. Commonwealth, 953 S.W.2d 924, 935 (Ky.
1997) . Such evidence loses its admissibility when the photographs depict a
body that has been "materially altered by mutilation, autopsy, decomposition
or other extraneous causes, not related to commission of the crime, so that the
pictures tend to arouse passion and appall the viewer ." Clark v.
Commonwealth, 833 S .W.2d 793, 794 (Ky. 1991) .
While the autopsy photographs in this case may have been gruesome,
the threshold is much higher than mere gruesomeness for a photo to be
inadmissible . For example, a photograph of a young child victim, where his
scalp was pulled back to show there was an intent to kill, was not gruesome
enough to preclude the photo evidence from the jury. Quarels v.
Commonwealth, 142 S.W .3d 73, 85 (Ky. 2004) . In another case, a videotape of
the murder scene showing burned bodies of victims, as well as numerous
photographs depicting the same, were an accurate description of the crime
scene and were properly admissible . McKinney v. Commonwealth, 60 S.W .3d
499, 509 (Ky. 2001) .
Thus, the autopsy photographs were properly admitted because they
were relevant to show Glodo's injuries and were not so gruesome as to create
undue prejudice. Hunt, 304 S .W.3d at 41 .
V. THE PROBATION OFFICER'S MISSTATEMENT OF PAROLE
ELIGIBILITY WAS TIMELY CORRECTED BY THE TRIAL COURT
Phillips next argues that error occurred during the sentencing phase as a
result of misstatements made concerning Phillips's parole eligibility. The
Commonwealth concedes that the applicable rule was misstated. While the
probation and parole officer, Pam Handy, did indeed, misstate the applicable
parole eligibility rules for a violent offender, the trial court timely corrected the
misstatement and admonished the jury concerning the correct principle of law,
thereby negating the error.
Pursuant to the violent offender statute, KRS 439 .3401,3 a violent
offender, under all circumstances, must serve eighty-five percent of his
3
KRS 439 .3401(3) provides "(3) A violent offender who has been convicted of a capital
offense or Class A felony with a sentence of a term of years or Class B felony who is
a violent offender shall not be released on probation or parole until he has served at
least eighty-five percent (85%) of the sentence imposed." KRS 439 .3401(4) provides
"(4) A violent offender may not be awarded any credit on his sentence authorized by
KRS 197 .045(1), except the educational credit . A violent offender may, at the
discretion of the commissioner, receive credit on his sentence authorized by KRS
197 :045(3) . In no event shall a violent offender be given credit on his sentence if the
credit reduces the term of imprisonment to less than eighty-five percent (85yo) of the
sentence." (emphasis added) .
12
sentence before he is eligible for parole . During her testimony, Handy
incorrectly indicated that there may be factors which may reduce parole
eligibility period to below eighty-five percent. She was under the impression
that various credits may produce this result, but was unable to explain how
this would occur in practice . We are cited to no authority in support of
Handy's theory .
After an unsuccessful attempt to have Handy correct herself, trial
counsel approached the bench and asked the trial court to take judicial notice
of the statute regarding the rigid eighty-five per cent requirement and instruct
the jury accordingly . The trial court agreed, and addressed the jury as follows:
Members of the jury, the Court has taken judicial notice and you
will accept as evidence in your deliberations of the sentence that
the statute would require the defendant to take or to serve eightfive percent of any sentence you may, at least eighty-five percent of
any sentence you would impose .
"The trial court's admonition put this issue to rest. A jury is presumed
to follow an admonition to disregard evidence and the admonition thus cures
any error." Johnson v. Commonwealth, 105 S .W.3d 430, 441 (Ky. 2003) . As
such, we must presume that the jury followed the trial court's admonition
concerning the correct parole rule under the violent offender statute, thereby
negating Handy's misstatement . Moreover, Phillips received all the relief that
he requested . If a party fails to move for a mistrial after objecting and receiving
an admonition from the trial court, such failure indicates that party's
satisfaction with the admonition . West, 780 S .W.2d at 602 . As Phillips took
no further action after the trial court's admonition, he is presumed to be
satisfied with the remedy. Thus, no error occurred.
VI. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons the judgment and sentence of the Laurel
Circuit Court is affirmed .
All sitting. All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Brenda Popplewell
307 West Mt . Vernon Street
Somerset, Kentucky 42501
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Jack Conway
Attorney General
Michael John Marsch
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Criminal Appeals
Attorney General's Office
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
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