FRANCIS G. PAYNE V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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APPELLA T
ON APPEAL FROM HANCOCK CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE RONNIE C. DORTCH, JUDGE
NO. 08-CR-00020
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING IN PART AND REVERSING IN PART
On June 5, 2008, Anna Conner and her husband rented a trailer that
Appellant, Francis G. Payne, owned on Highway 144 in Hancock County,
Kentucky . The Connors had lived in the trailer for approximately two months,
but they were planning on moving out and into a house later that month . That
morning, Mrs. Conner saw Appellant working on a deck behind an old grocery
store nearby and approached to inform him that she and her husband would
be moving out of the trailer in two weeks. According to Mrs . Conner's
testimony, as she stepped onto the deck where Appellant was working, he
grabbed her and kissed her twice on the mouth . Despite Mrs. Conner's
protests, Appellant proceeded to pull her inside the grocery store building,
backing her up against a bar in the kitchen area and locking the door.
D.C .
Once inside the grocery store, Mrs . Conner testified that Appellant
shoved his right hand under her shirt and bra and began to squeeze her
breast . Again, Mrs . Conner asked Appellant to stop . Moments later, Appellant
attempted to undo her shorts, though she was able to pry one of her hands
loose and stop him from so doing. Eventually, Appellant was able to work his
hand underneath the leg of Mrs. Conner's shorts and insert his finger into her
vagina. After a period of approximately twenty minutes, Appellant unlocked
the door and told Mrs . Conner that she "was free to go." At this time, Mrs .
Conner ran back to her trailer. Approximately ten minutes later, Appellant
knocked on her door and asked to come in, stating that he wanted to see her in
a bathing suit and wanted to see how she "tasted." Mrs . Conner refused to let
Appellant enter the trailer.
After this encounter, Mrs. Conner called her sister-in-law, Tammy
McManaway. While on the phone with Mrs . McManaway, Appellant loudly
knocked on the door and tried to turn the door knob. Mrs. McManaway could
hear these sounds and told Mrs. Conner to stay away from the windows and
hide inside the closet. She also informed Mrs . Conner to call law enforcement.
Mrs . McManaway then proceeded to drive to the trailer. As she
approached, she saw Appellant pulling out in his truck, passing her as she
drove by. Once inside the trailer, Mrs . McManaway saw Mrs. Conner inside,
visibly upset. Within a matter of minutes, Hancock Deputy Sheriff Ken
Eubanks arrived. Sheriff Eubanks testified that Mrs . Conner appeared "very
distraught" and "very scared ."
Appellant was charged with two counts of first-degree sexual abuse, one
count of false imprisonment, and one count of kidnapping . After a jury trial,
Appellant was convicted of the two sexual abuse counts and the kidnapping
count . The jury sentenced Appellant to 5 years on each of the sexual abuse
counts and 15 years on the kidnapping count. The two 5-year sentences were
ordered to run concurrent to one another and consecutively to the 15-year
sentence for a total of 20 years. He now appeals the final judgment entered as
a matter of right, Ky. Const. § 110(2)(b) .
Appellant alleges two errors on appeal: (1) that he was entitled to a
directed verdict on the kidnapping charge, as prosecution was precluded under
the kidnapping exemption statute of KRS 509 .050; and (2) that he was entitled
to a directed verdict on the sexual abuse charges, as the Commonwealth failed
to present sufficient evidence from which a reasonable juror could have found
him guilty.
Directed verdict under kidnapping exemption of KRS 509.050
Appellant contends that he should have been granted a directed verdict
as to the kidnapping charge because of the applicability of the kidnapping
exemption statute, KRS 509 .050 . According to Appellant, the restraint of Mrs.
Conner did not go beyond that which occurred incidental to the sexual abuse
and, therefore, a conviction for kidnapping cannot stand. We agree.
KRS 509 .050 provides, in part:
A person may not be convicted of unlawful
unlawful
imprisonment
in
the
first degree,
imprisonment in the second degree, or kidnapping
when his criminal purpose is the commission of an
offense defined outside this chapter and his
interference
with the victim's liberty occurs
immediately with and incidental to the commission of
that offense, unless the interference exceeds that
which is ordinarily incident to commission of the
offense which is the objective of his criminal purpose .
This Court employs a three-prong test to determine when. the kidnapping
exemption statute applies . Griffin v. Commonwealth, 576 S.W .2d 514 (Ky.
1978) . First, the underlying criminal purpose must be the commission of a
crime defined outside of KRS 509 . Second, the interference with the victim's
liberty must have occurred immediately with or incidental to the commission of
the underlying intended crime. Third, the interference with the victim's liberty
must not exceed that which is ordinarily incident to the commission of the
underlying crime. Id. at 516 . Essentially, "the appellant must jump through
three hoops and the failure to jump through any one of the three hoops is a
failure to establish his entitlement to the benefit of the exemption statute ." Id.
Application of the kidnapping exemption statute is determined on a case-bycase basis . Gilbert v. Commonwealth, 637 S .W.2d 632, 635 (Ky. 1982) .
In conjunction with the kidnapping charge, Appellant was charged with
first-degree sexual abuse. First-degree sexual abuse is outside of the statute .
See KRS 510.110 . Therefore, Appellant satisfies prong one .
To satisfy the second prong, "the interference with victim's liberty must
have been concomitant to the commission of the underlying crime ." Hatfield v.
Commonwealth, 250 S.W.3d 590, 599 (Ky. 2008) . Mrs. Conner testified that,
as soon as she approached Appellant and began speaking with him, he
grabbed her and kissed her. At this point, the initial act of sexual abuse
occurred. However, Appellant then proceeded to drag Mrs. Conner inside the
old grocery store building and locked the door, presumably so the second act of
sexual abuse could be "perpetrated in a more clandestine manner." Id. at 600 .
Mrs . Conner was not restrained to achieve any separate objective. In addition,
the restraint occurred "immediately with or incidental to" the commission of
first-degree sexual abuse . Accordingly, Appellant satisfies the second prong .
Lastly, interference with the victim's liberty must not go beyond that
which would normally be incidental to the commission of the underlying crime.
This Court has interpreted the third prong to be read in conjunction with the
second.
When read together it seems evident that the intent of
the latter two prongs is to ensure that the means of
restraint effectuated in committing the underlying
crime are of such a nature that they are a part of, or
incident to, the act of committing the crime itself and,
as such, temporally coincide with the commission of
the crime . If the deprivation of liberty segues into a
more pronounced, prolonged, or excessive detainment,
then such restraint should no longer be within the
confines of the exemption statute and the accused
should be held separately accountable for those
actions.
From a review of the evidence, the grocery store building was a short
distance-approximately five to ten feet-from the deck where the initial
encounter occurred . In addition, Mrs. Conner testified that she was in the
grocery store building for a period of about twenty minutes. Thus, it appears
that the restraint was both brief in distance and close in time from the
commission of the underlying offense. See Timmons v. Commonwealth, 555
S .W.2d 234 (Ky. 1977) . The movement and restraint of Mrs. Conner occurred
in order to commit another act of sexual abuse and did not go beyond the
scope of attempting to achieve that objective. Appellant satisfies the third
prong of the test and, thus, qualifies for the kidnapping exemption under KRS
509 .050 .
Because Appellant qualified for the exemption, it was unreasonable for
the charge to have been placed before the jury. Thus, we find the trial court
abused its discretion when it overruled Appellant's motion for a directed verdict
on the charge of kidnapping pursuant to KRS 509 .050 . Therefore, we reverse
that conviction .
Directed verdict on sexual abuse counts due to insufficient evidence
Finally, Appellant contends that he was entitled to a directed verdict on
the sexual abuse counts, as the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient
evidence for a reasonable juror to find him guilty. This Court has long held
that "[o]n appellate review, the test of a directed verdict is, if under the evidence
as a whole, it would be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find guilt, only then
the defendant is entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal." Commonwealth v.
Benham, 816 S .W.2d 186, 187 (Ky. 1991) (citing Commonwealth v. Sawhill, 660
S .W .2d 3, 4-5 (Ky. 1983)) .
The crux of Appellant's argument is that the time frame for the alleged
sexual abuse, approximately from 9 :30 a.m. to 10 :00 a.m ., makes it impossible
for the abuse to have occurred . Specifically, Appellant contends that during
this time he had left the property to go home and retrieve an extension wrench.
Additionally, Appellant states that two extension cords were running from the
inside of the building to the outside, meaning the door could not have been
locked. Due to this, Appellant contends that he was entitled to a directed
verdict. We disagree.
From the evidence introduced at trial, it is clear that it was not
unreasonable for the jurors to find Appellant guilty of the crimes charged . Mrs.
Conner's testimony alone constituted adequate evidence upon which a jury
could determine Appellant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. "The testimony
of even a single witness is sufficient to support a finding of guilt, even when
other witnesses testified to the contrary if, after consideration of all of the
evidence, the finder of fact assigns greater weight to that evidence ."
Commonwealth v. Suttles, 80 S .W .3d 424, 426 (Ky. 2002) .
In order, to sustain a conviction for sexual abuse in the first-degree, the
evidence must show that the perpetrator "subjects another person to sexual
contact by forcible compulsion ." KRS 510.110(1) (a) . In Combs v.
Commonwealth, 198 S .W .3d 574 (Ky. 2006), this Court stated :
"Sexual contact" is defined as "any touching of the
sexual or other intimate parts of a person done for the
purpose of gratifying the sexual desire of either party."
KRS 510 .010(7) . The 1974 Commentary to KRS
510 .010(7) explains that "sexual contact" includes
"such acts as the manipulation of the genitals, digital
penetration of the vagina, and non-consensual
fondling of a woman's breast." Professors Lawson and
Fortune
assert
matter-of-factly
that
"[diggital
penetration of the vagina . . . is sexual abuse ." Robert
G . Lawson 8v William H . Fortune, Kentucky Criminal
Law § 11-6(a) (1), at 437 (1998) .
Id. at 578.
Accordingly, the actions taken by Appellant, to which Mrs. Conner
testified, were sufficient to constitute first-degree sexual abuse . Further, her
testimony was not so "contradictory, or incredible, or inherently improbable" to
defy belief. Garrett v. Commonwealth, 48 S .W.3d 6, 10 (Ky. 2001) . As such,
Appellant was not entitled to a directed verdict.
Based on the foregoing, Appellant's convictions for the two counts of
first-degree sexual abuse are hereby affirmed . However, Appellant's conviction
for kidnapping is reversed . Thus, we remand this matter to the Hancock
Circuit Court for re-sentencing.
All sitting. All concur .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Albert William Barber, III
225 St. Ann Street
Owensboro, KY 42303
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Jack Conway
Attorney General
Michael Louis Harned
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
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