DAWAN FRANK MARTIN V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINIONIS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED."
PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C),
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RENDERED : JUNE 17, 2010
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
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DAWAN FRANK MARTIN
V.
APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM MCCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE CRAIG Z. CLYMER, JUDGE
NO. 08-CR-00398
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
This is an appeal from a judgment in which Appellant was convicted of
second-degree assault and PFO II for shooting the victim outside a nightclub.
Appellant argues that his trial was tainted by the erroneous admission of
hearsay and irrelevant evidence . We adjudge there was no error in the
admission of the evidence in question. Hence, we affirm .
During the early morning hours of February 20, 2008, Tomago Daniels
was walking out of The Brickhouse, a social club in Paducah, when he saw a
white pickup truck pull up with Appellant, Dawan Martin, inside . Martin
exited the truck and he and Daniels began talking. The conversation escalated
into an argument, and Martin pulled out a semi-automatic pistol. Daniels
began running, and Martin fired the gun at him. three times . After the third
shot, Daniels fell to the ground . According to Daniels, Martin walked up to him
and said, "What's happening now, nigger?" Daniels responded, "Go on and do
what you're going to do ." At that point, Martin shot Daniels three times in the
leg at point blank range .
Daniels survived the shooting and was taken to a local hospital. He
remained in the hospital for two weeks because of blood clots in his leg that
developed as a result of the gunshots .
Martin fled the scene and ended up in Chicago, Illinois . Illinois police
located Martin's sister, Felicia Drake, and went to talk to her about Martin's
whereabouts . While at Drake's home, police used her phone to call Martin .
During that phone call, Illinois State Police Sergeant Anthony Hoop informed
Martin that there was a warrant for his arrest. Martin acknowledged there was
"some drama" when he was in Kentucky the previous day at The Brickhouse .
However, Martin stated that he "was not the person who did what they said [he]
did." Martin made arrangements to turn himself in to Sergeant Hoop later that
evening, but never did. Five months later, in July of 2008, Martin was
apprehended by Illinois police and extradited to Kentucky .
Martin was indicted for first-degree assault and being a second-degree
persistent felony offender (PFO II) . The case proceeded to a jury trial in which
Martin was found guilty of second-degree assault and PFO II . The jury
recommended a ten-year sentence which was enhanced to twenty years for the
PFO 11 conviction. The trial court sentenced Martin in accordance with the
jury's recommendation .
DETECTIVE SMITH'S TESTIMONY
During Martin's cross-examination of Tomago Daniels, the defense
elicited from Daniels the fact that when Detective Matt Smith first interviewed
Daniels at the hospital after the shooting, Daniels told Detective Smith that he
did not know the name of the person who shot him. Defense counsel then
asked Daniels if it was true that Detective Smith specifically asked him if the
shooter's name was "Dawan Martin." Daniels testified that Detective Smith
had indeed asked him that question and that, despite his initial claim that he
did not know the name of the shooter, he had answered Detective Smith's
question in the affirmative.
During the direct examination of Detective Smith, who was called as a
witness immediately after Daniels, the Commonwealth questioned Detective
Smith as follows:
Commonwealth : Based on the way the question was
asked by [defense counsel] of Tomago Daniels when he
was on the stand, you specifically directed a question
to Mr. Daniels, "Was it Dawan Martin?"
Smith: I did.
Commonwealth : You knew to ask him that question,
"Dawan Martin", and you knew to ask him that
because you had already talked to Mr . Daniels' lady
friend, Lola?
Defense Counsel: Again, I am going to object . . .
Smith: Correct.
Defense Counsel: . . . because that particular aspect
is clearly hearsay.
Commonwealth : It explains the circumstances .
A bench conference then ensued on Martin's objection to the hearsay
testimony that Daniels' girlfriend, Lola Wilkes, told Detective Smith that
Daniels had told. her the shooter was Dawan Martin. The Commonwealth
argued that it was entitled to ask how Detective Smith knew to ask Daniels if
the shooter was Dawan Martin because defense counsel's questioning of
Daniels insinuated that Detective Martin was a renegade cop suggesting the
identity of the shooter to Daniels . The trial court overruled Martin's objection
and allowed the following testimony :
Commonwealth : You recall [defense counsel] asked
Mr. Daniels whether he at first identified to you the
name of the person who had shot him?
Smith: Correct.
Commonwealth : And you recall [defense counsel] then
asked Mr. Daniels, "Did Detective Smith say the
shooter's name was Dawan?" He said, "yes ."
Smith : Correct.
Commonwealth : And then, "Did Detective Smith then
say the shooter's name was Dawan Martin?" Mr.
Daniels, on the stand, said "yes ."
Smith : Correct.
Commonwealth : My question is why, Detective Smith,
were you able to ask Mr. Daniels at the hospital those
questions?
Smith: Because I had spoken with Lola Wilkes first,
who is his significant other or his girlfriend. And, uh,
she had given me an explanation of how things had
transpired. And I knew that he was reluctant based
on what Captain McManus had already told me, so I
was just trying to get the facts .
Commonwealth : I don't want to get into what
McManus told you.
Smith: Okay.
Commonwealth : But before talking to you, Mr.
Daniels had identified to his lady, Lola, that the
shooter was Ta-Dowl?
Smith : Correct.
Martin argues that the trial court erred in allowing Detective Smith's
hearsay testimony regarding what Lola Wilkes had told him. The
Commonwealth contends that said testimony was allowed as an "investigative
verbal act" pursuant to Chestnut v. Commonwealth, 250 S .W.3d 288, 294 (Ky .
2008) .
In Chestnut, this Court recognized that, while investigative hearsay is
disallowed, there are limited circumstances where a police officer may testify to
statements made to him :
"The rule is that a police officer may testify about
information furnished to him only where it tends to
explain the action that was taken by the police officer
as a result of this information and the taking of that
action is an issue in the case ." Sanborn [v.
Commonwealth], 754 S .W.2d [534,] 541 . Such
testimony is then admissible not for proving the truth
of the matter asserted, but to explain why a police
officer took certain actions. Young v. Commonwealth,
50 S.W.3d 148, 167 (Ky.2001) .
1 At trial, it was established that Ta-Dow was Martin's nickname .
250 S .W.3d at 294 .
The Commonwealth argues that the defense opened the door to this
testimony by insinuating that Detective Smith was suggesting to Daniels the
identity of the shooter. The Commonwealth maintains that it was necessary for
Detective Smith to testify that Lola Wilkes had told him that Daniels had
identified Martin as the shooter to explain why Smith had asked Daniels if the
name of the shooter was Dawan Martin. According to the Commonwealth, if
the trial court had not allowed Detective Smith to testify about what Lola
Wilkes told him, it would have unfairly allowed the defense to create the false
impression that Detective Smith had told Daniels who to say the shooter was.
We agree with the Commonwealth that the defense's implication that
Detective Smith had planted the name "Dawan Smith" with Daniels opened the
door for allowing the Commonwealth to present what would otherwise be
inadmissible hearsay testimony. The testimony about what Lola Wilkes told
Detective Smith was admitted, not for the purpose of proving the truth of the
statement (the identity of the shooter), but to explain how Detective Smith
knew to ask Daniels if the shooter was Dawan Martin. The issue of why
Detective Smith asked Daniels the question the way he did became an issue in
the case only when the defense implied that Detective Smith suggested on his
own the identity of the shooter to Daniels . See Gordon v. Commonwealth, 916
S.W.2d 176 (Ky. 1995) (holding that testimony by police officer that defendant
had become a suspect in a county-wide drug trafficking investigation was
properly admitted to avoid implication that defendant had been unfairly singled
out) . Accordingly, the trial court did not err in overruling Martin's objection at
trial.
BLOOD CLOT EVIDENCE
At trial, Daniels' treating physician, Dr. Sue Ellen Petty, testified via
deposition . She testified that as a complication from the gunshot wounds,
Daniels developed dangerous blood clots in his leg. She stated that she was
concerned that one of the blood clots would break off, go to Daniels' heart or
lung, and kill him. Dr. Petty testified that the clots created a substantial risk
of death to Daniels during the first forty-eight hours, and diminished somewhat
after that time . During Dr. Petty's testimony, the Commonwealth also
introduced into evidence diagrams depicting the effect of a blood clot on the
heart. Fortunately, Daniels' blood clots did not travel to his heart or his lungs.
Martin filed a motion in limine to prohibit admission of the diagrams,
arguing that they depicted a hypothetical situation that did not materialize in
this case. Thus, Martin contended that the exhibits were not relevant to the
actual injury sustained by Daniels and would be unduly prejudicial. The trial
court denied the motion. At trial, Martin renewed his motion to exclude the
testimony of Dr. Petty regarding the danger that the blood clots posed to
Daniels in the event they broke off and went to his heart or lungs . The trial
court again denied the motion to exclude the evidence.
Martin argues that the trial court erred in allowing the admission of
evidence of the potential danger posed by the blood clots, when that risk never
materialized in this case. "When a trial court's evidentiary rulings as to
relevancy are challenged, we review these rulings under an abuse of discretion
standard ." Johnson v. Commonwealth, 231 S .W .3d 800, 807 (Ky. App. 2007)
(citing Love v. Commonwealth, 55 S .W.3d 816, 822 (Ky. 2001)) . To convict
Martin of first-degree assault, the Commonwealth was Tequired to prove that
he intentionally caused "serious physical injury" to Daniels. KRS
.
.010(1)(a)
508 "Serious physical injury" is defined in KRS 500 .080(15) as
"physical injury which creates a substantial risk of death, or which causes
serious and prolonged disfigurement, prolonged impairment of health, or
prolonged loss or impairment of the function of any bodily organ."
Dr. Petty's testimony regarding the risk of death from the blood clots was
relevant in this case because "serious physical injury" is defined in terms of
whether the injury "creates a substantial risk of death," not in terms of what
the actual outcome was. (emphasis added) . Thus, the trial court properly
admitted Dr. Petty's testimony and the diagrams explaining how the blood clots
could have killed Daniels .
UNREDACTED DEPOSITION
Prior to trial, the parties agreed to take the deposition of Dr. Petty
because she was unavailable for trial. During the playing of the deposition at
trial, defense counsel moved to have the CD of the deposition fast-forwarded
through various objections and legal arguments made by defense counsel,
contending that the objections could be prejudicial. The trial court stated that
it did not recall anything inherently prejudicial in the video and denied the
motion .
Martin argues that it was error to permit the unredacted version of the
deposition to be played because it allowed the jurors to see defense counsel in
a posture of antagonism towards the trial court and likely eroded the jurors'
view of Martin's defense . In viewing Dr. Petty's deposition played during the
trial, we do not see anything in the defense's objections or legal arguments that
was prejudicial to Martin. Accordingly, although it is generally the better
practice to redact any exchanges between counsel and the trial court regarding
objections, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to redact
those portions of the deposition in this case.
For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the McCracken Circuit
Court is affirmed.
All sitting. All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Erin Hoffman Yang
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Jack Conway
Attorney General
Bryan Darwin Morrow
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601
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