JANET HAMMONS, ET AL. V. ROSA HAMMONS
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JANET HAMMONS
AND
JILLISA HAMMONS
APPELLANTS
ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS
CASE NO. 2007-CA-002312-MR
FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT NO . 06-CI-04029
ROSA HAMMONS
APPELLEE
OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE A13RAMSON
AFFIRMING IN PART AND REVERSING IN PART
Dr. James W. Hammons died testate on August 11, 2006, leaving his
entire estate to his wife, Rosa Hammons (Rosa), for her lifetime . The will vests
Rosa with the power to invade the corpus of the estate whenever the income
from the estate, plus any money or property she individually possesses,
becomes insufficient to provide for her proper maintenance and medical care .
After Rosa's death, any remaining assets in the estate devolve to the testator's
daughters, Janet and Jillisa Hammons (Janet and Jillisa) . In a suit brought by
the daughters, the Fayette Circuit Court held (1) Rosa owns a life estate in all
the property owned by the testator at his death; (2) Rosa has the exclusive right
to occupy and control the property; and (3) Janet and Jillisa are contingent
remaindermen. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision. On discretionary
review, Janet and Jillisa contend (1) they received a vested remainder subject
to divestment and (2) as vested remaindermen, they have accounting rights,
i. e., the right to inspect the property and receive an accounting of both the
estate property held by Rosa and her individual property. We reverse the Court
of Appeals on the first issue because Janet and Jillisa are vested
remaindermen whose interests are subject to divestment, but we affirm on the
second issue because Janet and Jillisa do not have accounting rights .
RELEVANT FACTS
Dr. James Hammons, a physician and resident of Lexington, Kentucky
died on August 11, 2006 . Dr . Hammons provided by will for his wife, Rosa,
and his children by a former marriage, Janet and Jillisa. Rosa received a life
estate in all of Dr. Hammons's property and was appointed and qualified as
executrix . Janet and Jillisa received a remainder interest in their father's
estate . The will provides, in pertinent part :
Item I
All of my estate of whatever kind and description and
wheresoever located, including any devise or bequest
which may lapse or become void, I give, devise, and
bequeath to my wife, ROSA W. HAMMONS, for her
lifetime . My said wife during her lifetime shall have
the right to sell any property received by her under the
terms of this Item and invest and reinvest the proceeds
thereof in other property, real or personal, in her
absolute discretion . Any sale made by my said wife
under the provisions of this Item shall be on such
terms and conditions, including credit, as she may
deem appropriate, and no purchaser of any property
so sold by my wife shall be required to see to the
reinvestment of the proceeds of the sale . My said wife
during her lifetime shall be entitled to all income
realized from this property received under this Item . If
at any time during her lifetime the income from the
property together with such other money and property
which she may have is insufficient to provide for her
proper maintenance and medical care, she shall be
entitled to use so much of the corpus of this devise
and bequest as shall be necessary to provide for such
purposes, or either of them; i .e . she must have
exhausted all property which she has, including
principal and income from her property and the
income from the property left to her under this Item
before she may invade the principal of the property
devised to her under this Item . On the death of my
said wife, I give, devise, and bequeath, absolutely and
in fee simple, all of the assets devised and bequeathed
under this Item then remaining, to my daughters,
JANET P. HAMMONS and JILLISA S . HAMMONS, to be
divided equally between. In the event either of my
daughters should fail to survive me and my said wife
leaving no issue surviving her, then such deceased
daughter's part shall pass to her surviving sibling . In
the event a daughter of mine should fail to survive me
and my wife leaving issue surviving, her part shall
pass as she by will appoints, and in the absence of
such appointment, her part shall pass to the children
of such daughter .
Item II
If my wife does not survive me, then all of my estate of
every kind and description and wherever located,
including any devise or bequest which may lapse or
become void, I give, devise, and bequeath, absolutely
and in fee simple, to by daughters, JANET P .
HAMMONS and JILLISA S . HAMMONS, to be divided
equally between them. In the event either of my
daughters should fail to survive me and my said wife
leaving no issue surviving her, then such deceased
daughter's part shall pass to her surviving sibling. In
the event a daughter of mine should fail to survive me
leaving issue surviving, her part shall pass as she by
will appoints, and in the absence of such appointment,
her part shall pass to the children of such daughter.
Item IV
I make, nominate and appoint my said wife, ROSA W.
HAMMONS, Executrix of this my Will and direct that
no surety be required of her on her bond, and if she
should be unable or unwilling to . so serve, then I make,
nominate, and appoint my daughters, JANET P .
HAMMONS and JILLISA S. HAMMONS, as coexecutrices of this my Will, or either of them, if either
should be unable or unwilling to so serve, and I direct
that no surety be required of them on their bonds as
such.
By amended complaint filed in Fayette Circuit Court, Janet and Jillisa
sought a declaratory judgment that Rosa had only a conditional power to
transfer property and, before doing so, must first provide an accounting of her
assets. Rosa filed a motion for summary judgment, seeking a declaration of
rights and order quieting title. The Circuit Court granted summary judgment
in favor of Rosa, holding (1) Rosa has an unconditional right to sell any and all
estate property and (2) Janet and Jillisa are contingent remaindermen and
have no right to inspect or receive an accounting of Rosa's assets. As noted
above, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Circuit Court's judgment .
ANALYSIS
The proper standard of review on appeal when a trial judge has granted a
motion for summary judgment is whether the record, when examined in its
entirety, shows there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact and the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." CR 56.03 . The trial
judge must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party,
resolving all doubts in its favor. Spencer v.- Estate of Spencer, 313 S .W.3d 534,
537 (Ky. 2010) (quoting Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., 807
S.W .2d 476 (Ky. 1991)) . Because summary judgment does not require findings
of fact but only an examination of the record to determine whether material
issues of fact exist, we generally review the grant of summary judgment
without deference to either the trial court's assessment of the record or its legal
conclusions . Malone v. Kentucky Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 287 S .W.3d 656,
658 (Ky. 2009) (citing Schmidt v. Leppert, 214 S.W.3d 309 (Ky. 2007)) .
Furthermore, it is well established that "[t]he construction as well as the
meaning and legal effect of a written instrument . . . is a matter of law for the
court." Morganfleld Nat. Bank v. Damien Elder & Sons, 836 S .W .2d 893, 895
(Ky . 1992) ; see also Cumberland Valley Contractors, Inc. v. Bell County Coal
Corp., 238 S.W .3d 644, 647 (Ky. 2007) . In such cases, this Court reviews the
issue de novo . Cumberland Valley Contractors, Inc., 238 S .W.3d at 647 .
The "polar star rule" of wills construction provides that the intention of
the testator, if not contrary, to the law, controls. Clarke v. Kirk, 795 S .W.2d
936, 938 (Ky. 1990) . The testator's intention is derived from considering the
will as a whole and no single part may be separated and held up as evidence of
the testator's intent . Id.; Russell v. Johnson, 451 S .W.2d 645, 646 (Ky. 1970) ;
Sherley v. Sherley, 192 Ky . 122, 232 S .W. 53, 56-57 (1921) . Thus, a court's
primary duty is to ascertain and give effect to the testator's intent . This task is
complicated by the fact that there is seldom precedent directly on point . It has
been said no will has a brother, much less a twin . Conlee v. Conlee, 300 Ky .
685, 190 S .W.2d 43, 44-47 (1945) . It is rare for two wills to use the same, or
even substantially similar, language and "a very slight change in the verbiage
calls for a different construction of two wills much alike in other respects." Id.
(quoting Price v. Price, 298 Ky . 608, 183 S .W.2d 652 (1944)) . To aid in the
construction of wills, courts have established canons of construction, which
guide the courts to construe wills in favor of "testacy over intestacy, absolute
over qualified estates, and early vesting as against contingent rights ." Lincoln
Bank & Trust Co. v. Bailey, 351 S.W .2d 163, 165 (Ky. 1961) ; Clore v. Clore, 184
Ky. 83, 211 S .W. 208, 209 (1919) . Courts may use canons of construction only
when doubt exists as to the testator's intent. When a testator employs clear,
definite and unambiguous language, there is no need to resort to canons of
construction . Conlee, 190 S .W.2d at 46 .
I. Janet and Jillisa Hammons Received a Vested Remainder Subject to
Divestment .
Rosa argues Janet and Jillisa received a contingent remainder because
their ability to take is contingent (1) on there being any property left to take,
given Rosa's ability to invade the corpus, and (2) on them either surviving Rosa
or predeceasing her but leaving issue of their own. This interpretation of the
will employs a colloquial, rather than a legal, definition of the word "contingent"
and reflects a misunderstanding of the distinction between a contingent
remainder and a vested remainder.
Whether a testator intended a contingent remainder or a vested
remainder is a relatively common question and our case law includes many
opinions distinguishing these two types of remainders. Conlee, 190 S.W.2d at
47 ("The mere fact that an estate is to take effect and be enjoyed after the
termination of an intervening estate will not prevent both estates from being
vested at the same moment.") ; Montgomery's Ex`r v. Northcutt, 292 Ky. 622, 167
S.W .2d 317, 320 (1942) ("A remainder interest may be a vested one although
the right of possession and enjoyment of the property is made to depend on
some uncertain future event."); Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co . v. Tiffany, 202 Ky.
618, 260 S.W. 357, 359 (1924) ("A vested interest is a present right . . . which
carries with it an existing right of alienation, even though the right to
possession or enjoyment may be postponed to some uncertain time in the
future . . . . A contingent estate is one which gives no present right, but the
vesting of which depends upon some uncertain event in the future, or the
happening of a certain event in the future at an uncertain time . . . .") ;
Williamson v. Williamson, 18 B . Mon . 329 (1857) ("A vested remainder depends
upon an event which must happen. A contingent remainder depends on an
event which is uncertain and may never happen . A vested remainder is to a
person in esse and ascertained . A contingent remainder is to a person not in
esse or not ascertained.") ; see also Phelps v. Sledd, 479 S .W.2d 894, 897 (Ky.
1972) ; Curtis v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co. ofLexington, 318 S .W.2d 33, 35-36
(Ky. 1958) ; Lincoln Bank & Trust Co. v. Lane, 303 S.W.2d 273, 274-75 (Ky.
1957) ; Hurst v. Russell, 257 Ky . 78, 77 S.W.2d 355, 355-56 (1934) ; Slote v.
Reiss, 153 Ky . 30, 154 S .W. 405, 406 (1913) ; Roach v. Dance, 26 Ky. L. Rptr.
157, 80 S .W . 1097, 1098 (1904) .
In Carroll v. Carroll's Ex'r, 248 Ky. 386, 58 S .W.2d 670, 672 (1933), the
testator left his personal assets in a fund for the care of his wife, with any
remaining at her death to his sons, unless "either should die before she does,
leaving living children, [in which case] they will get his share ." The Court held
the sons had a vested remainder in the trust fund, noting the conditional
language, "if either should die before she does, leaving living children . . . ." did
not convert the vested interest into a contingent remainder . Id .
In Conlee, the testator gave to her husband, "all my estate, personal, real
and mixed. To have and to hold during his natural life, to use, occupy and
enjoy as he deems proper, and also grant to him a power to sell and dispose of
the real estate and invest the proceeds thereof" with any remainder after her
husband's death to her children . 190 S .W.2d at 44 . After discussing the
distinctions between contingent and vested remainders, this Court (then
known as the Court of Appeals) held the husband took a life estate and the
children had a vested remainder because they "were capacitated to take
possession of the remainder interest devised to them at any moment after the
termination of the life estate." Id. at 47 .
The law makes a further distinction between a contingent remainder and
a vested remainder subject to divestment.' Unlike a contingent remainder,
which does not vest until the happening or non-happening of a condition
precedent, a vested remainder subject to divestment vests immediately, though
the remaindermen's ability to take possession depends on a condition
subsequent . Bailey, 351 S .W.2d at 164-67 ; Carroll, 58 S.W .2d at 672 ("On a
1 A vested remainder subject to divestment is also referred to as a "defeasible
remainder." Black's Law Dictionary 1295 (7th ed . 1999) .
condition precedent, a title does not pass or vest until it is performed, while a
condition subsequent operates by way of a defeasance of the title that has once
vested .") ; Tiffany, 260 S .W . at 359 ; Fulton v. Teager, 183 Ky. 381, 209 S .W.
535, 536 (1919) .
In Zinsmeister's Trustee v. Long, 250 Ky. 50, 61 S.W .2d 887, 890 (1933),
the Court noted, "The possibility of defeasance does not transform into a
contingent remainder what would otherwise be a vested remainder ." In Lincoln
Bank 8a Trust Co. v. Lane, this Court determined a beneficiary, Francis Ramey,
took a vested remainder subject to divestment under the terms of a trust that
provided the grantors retained the right to sell the family home but, if they died
without doing so, the home passed to their daughter and', upon her death, to
Francis Ramey. 303 S .W .2d at 274 . The Court found the fact that Ramey
could not immediately possess the home did not affect the vested nature of her
interest . Id. Nor was her interest "rendered contingent merely because it
might be divested by the happening of a condition subsequent. The exercise of
the power of disposal by either of the [grantors] would merely divest Frances
[sic] Ramey of her vested estate." Id.
By comparison, this Court has found contingent remainders in cases
where the devisees must reach a certain age before taking or where the
devisees are either unnamed or not yet in existence. In Fidelity & Columbia
Trust Co. v. Tiffany, this Court held the grandchildren of the testator received a
contingent remainder because of the condition precedent that a grandchild
could not receive any income until he reached the age of twenty-two. 260 S.W .
at 359 . In other words, no grandchild received any benefit from, nor had any
vested interest in, the estate until he reached twenty-two years of age . Id. ; see
also Curtis v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co. of Lexington, 318 S .W .2d 33 (Ky. 1958) .
In Hurst v. Russell, 77 S.W.2d at 355-56, the testator gave his daughter a tract
of land for her life, then "to her lawful heirs and assigns forever ." Id. At the
time the suit was brought, the daughter had two sons . Id. The Court held they
were contingent remaindermen because the word "heirs" designated a class of
takers whose members could not be known until the death of their mother (the
testator's daughter) . Id. Thus, the grandchildren's interest was contingent
because it could not vest until the mother died and all the members of the
class could be determined . Id.
In the present case, Janet and Jillisa are to receive all the assets
remaining in their father's estate after Rosa's life estate terminates . Should
either of them predecease Rosa without issue, that daughter's share passes to
her sister. Should either of them predecease Rosa with issue, the deceased
daughter's share passes either according to her will or to her issue . None of
the characteristics of a contingent remainder are- present as to Janet and
Jillisa's interests under their father's will. The estate is not to be withheld from
Janet and Jillisa until they reach a certain age or achieve a certain status, nor
is their remainder to be shared with an unspecified "heir" or with a class with
undetermined members . The remainder was left specifically to "Janet P.
Hammons" and "Jillisa S . Hammons," the born and ascertained daughters of
the testator. The amount Janet and Jillisa, (or their children should either
10
daughter predecease Rosa), receive depends on how much of the corpus of the
estate Rosa consumes to provide for her own proper maintenance and medical
care. These contingencies in the colloquial sense -- that there be something left
in the estate and that Janet and Jillisa either survive Rosa or leave a child - do
not prevent Janet and Jillisa's interest from vesting immediately upon the
death of the testator. They simply create the possibility that Janet and Jillisa
may be divested of their interests. In accordance with the copious law on this
subject, we hold Janet and Jillisa have a vested remainder subject to
divestment.
Construing the will thus is also in keeping with the intention of Dr.
Hammons, the testator. It is clear from the will as a whole that he intended to
care for both his wife and his daughters, to the greatest extent possible . To
that end, he provided for his wife during her life and left whatever remains of
his estate "absolutely and in fee simple" to Janet and Jillisa. In the event his
wife had predeceased him, he left all of his assets to his daughters . And had
his wife been unable or unwilling to serve as executrix, he named his
daughters as co-executrices . These provisions make clear Dr. Hammons
trusted his daughters and wanted to ensure they would be cared for after his
death. Finding he left his daughters a vested remainder is in keeping with this
intent and, accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals on this issue .
II . Rosa Hammons is Not Required to Provide Notice When She Invades
the Corpus or an Accounting of How She Expends the Estate .
The fact that Janet and Jillisa possess a vested remainder does not alter
the nature of Rosa Hammons' life estate or impose on her any duty to account
11
for her use of the property or provide notice when she invades the corpus. A
life estate is a freehold interest in property that continues during the life of the
life tenant, who may be the property owner or some other person. English v.
Carter, 300 Ky. 580, 189 S.W .2d 839, 840 (1945) . The life tenant has the same
interest in the property the remainderman will have in it after it comes into his
possession, except the life tenant may not commit waste . 1d. ; see also Adams
v. Adams, 371 S .W.2d 637, 638 (Ky. 1963) ; Smith v. Harris, 276 Ky. 529, 124
S .W .2d 786, 788 (1939) . In general, a life tenant owns the property during the
life estate and is entitled to the full use and enjoyment of the property,
including the income and profits, though she may not consume any part of the
corpus. Taylor v. Yeager, 261 S .W.2d 638, 639 (Ky. 1953) ; English, 189 S .W .2d
at 840 ("Free enjoyment is the very essence of a life estate .") . Absent a showing
of danger of loss or waste, life tenants are not required to give security for the
protection of the remaindermen . Crutcher v. Elliston's Ex'rs, 299 Ky. 613, 186
S.W .2d 644, 646 (1945) ; Buckman's Trustee v. Ohio Valley Trust Co., 288 Ky.
114, 155 S.W.2d 749, 750 (1941) .
A life tenant has sometimes been referred to as a trustee, quasi-trustee,
or fiduciary in relation to the remainderman, but only in the sense that, like
trustees, life tenants have a duty not to injure or dispose of the corpus of the
estate to the detriment of the remainderman. Miracle v. Miracle, 260 Ky. 624,
86 S .W .2d 536, 538 (1935) ; Superior Oil Corp. v. Alcorn, 242 Ky. 814, 47
S.W .2d 973, 987-88 (1931) . However, unlike the trustee of a pure trust, a life
tenant may use the property for her exclusive benefit, taking the income and
12
profits. Id. This difference, we believe, makes it inappropriate to look to the
accounting duties of trustees to find a similar duty on the part of a life tenant.
Trustees are all the more inappropriate figures of comparison because
the life tenant's duty to not encroach on the corpus of the estate is not
absolute . The life tenant may consume the corpus if the testator explicitly or
implicitly so provides . Louisville Baptist Orphans' Home v. Igleheart's Adm'rs,
223 Ky. 702, 4 S .W.2d 693, 693-94 (1928) . If the language of the will only
implicitly grants the life tenant the power to consume the corpus, the life
tenant may not do so without permission from the court. Kincaid v. Bell, 205
Ky. 487, 266 S .W. 44, 45 (1924) . In these cases, because the testator has not
expressly authorized an invasion of the corpus, the life tenant's ability to
invade the corpus is limited to what is necessary for her support and
maintenance, as determined by a court. Id. Subjecting the life tenant to the
court's advice and control protects the remainderman's interest in the estate.
See, e.g., Trustees Presbyterian Church, Somerset, v. Mize, 181 Ky. 567, 205
S .W . 674, 674-75 (1918) (ordering the life tenant, who had only an implicit
right to invade the corpus for his comfortable maintenance, to report the
property he received, including any disposition, receipts, and disbursements) .
However, if the testator explicitly grants the life tenant the power to consume
the corpus, the life tenant need not petition the court and may invade the
corpus at her discretion, albeit in accordance with the provisions of the will .
Maynard v. Raines, 240 Ky. 614, 42 S .W.2d 873, 873-74 (1931) . In these
cases, the court respects the testator's right to dispose of his estate in the
13
manner he sees fit and the concomitant rights of beneficiaries to exercise the
rights given them by the testator, provided all is within the bounds of the law .
Thus, if a testator intentionally and clearly provides the life tenant may invade
or even exhaust the corpus, the life tenant is free to do so at her discretion .
Whether, in those circumstances, the life tenant must provide notice or an
accounting of his use of the property is a matter of first impression for this
Court. However, courts in other states have considered this issue and have
held, seemingly uniformly, 2 that, absent evidence the life tenant is abusing her
authority, no notice or accounting is required .
The Supreme Court of Iowa held that where a life tenant had the explicit
right to encroach upon the corpus and the remainderman had a vested
remainder subject to divestment, the remainderman is not entitled to an
accounting of the life tenant's use of the property, absent a showing of waste,
improvidence or fraud. Nelson v. Horsford, 208 N .W. 341, 341-43 (Iowa 1926) .
Similarly, the Kansas Supreme Court held that a life tenant who has the power
to dispose of or consume the corpus is not required to "furnish an accounting
for the protection of the remainderman in the absence of a showing of danger of
loss or waste." Matter of Estate of Jud, 710 P .2d 1241, 1248-49 (Kan . 1985)
(citing In re Estate of Lehner, 547 P.2d 365 (Kan . 1976)) . The Kansas Court
reasoned, when such broad power is given to the life tenant by the will, it is
inconsistent with the intent of the testator and overly burdensome on the life
2
No contrary case has been cited to the Court and our research has uncovered no
contrary authority.
14
tenant to require an annual accounting. Id . The Tennessee Supreme Court
ruled a remainderman does not have the right to inspect a life tenant's records
to determine if she is exceeding her rights in the property. Holley v. Marks, 535
S .W.2d 861, 862 (Tenn . 1976) . The Court stated, "Even though a life tenant
has been called a quasi trustee for the remaindermen . . . he has no duty to
account for his use of the property." Id.
In Illinois, a life tenant is not required to provide the remaindermen with
an accounting of the life tenant's disposition or management of the estate .
Thomas v. First Nat. Bank of Chicago, 479 N.E .2d 1014, 1029 (111. App. 1985) .
In Thomas, the remaindermen argued they did not seek an accounting per se,
but rather only as much information as necessary to ensure the life tenant
properly exercised her power over the property. Id. at 1028 . The court refused
to adopt such a distinction and instead affirmed the well-settled law in Illinois,
namely that absent an allegation of fraud, malfeasance, or other similar
misconduct, a life tenant is not required to provide an accounting of his or her
use of the property . Id.
We find the logic and conclusions of these courts consistent with our
duty to give effect to the testator's intent and thus hold that when a life tenant
is explicitly given the right to consume or invade the corpus of the estate,
absent a showing of waste, she may do so at her discretion without need to
petition the court for permission or provide notice of the invasion or an
accounting of her use of the property. To require such a life tenant to provide
notice or an accounting would be overly burdensome and would run counter to
the trust the testator expressly reposed in the life tenant .
In this case, Dr. Hammons explicitly gave Rosa a life estate with the right
to consume the corpus for her proper maintenance and medical care . Item
One of the will provides, "If at any time during her lifetime the income from the
property together with such other money and property which she may have is
insufficient to provide for her proper maintenance and medical care, she shall
be entitled to use so much of the corpus of this devise and bequest as shall be
necessary to provide for such purposes ." The testator does attach a stipulation
that Rosa must have "exhausted all property which she has, including
principal and income from her property and the income from the property left
to her under this Item before she may invade the principal . . . ." This
stipulation does not alter the fact that the will gives Rosa the express right to
consume the corpus when necessary, consistent with the above-referenced
provision regarding exhausting her own property, and indicates she is a
competent judge of that necessity. The provisions of the will clearly indicate
the testator reposed complete confidence in Rosa. He entrusted her with the
care and preservation of his entire estate and, in naming her as sole executrix,
he dispensed with the furnishing of any security. Further, he conferred on her
the power to sell any real estate on terms and conditions as "she may deem
appropriate" and to invest the proceeds "in her absolute discretion ." To require
Rosa to periodically establish that her own personal financial circumstances
justify an invasion of principal would be inconsistent with the testator's evident
16
confidence in her good faith and judgment as well as with the law set forth
above. For these reasons, we affirm the Court of Appeals on this issue .
Finally, we are compelled to note that our decision today does not leave
Janet and Jillisa without remedy or recourse . As a life tenant, Rosa has a duty
not to injure the remaindermen in the exercise of her rights . Adams, 371
S.W .2d at 637-38. Thus, if Rosa is committing waste by improperly invading
the corpus or misusing the estate, as she herself has noted in her brief to this
Court, Janet and Jillisa may bring an action for waste .3 See e.g., Smith v.
Harris, 124 S .W.2d at 786. However, there is currently no allegation of waste .
CONCLUSION
Janet and Jillisa Hammons possess a vested remainder subject to
divestment. The conditions subsequent in the will may divest Janet and Jillisa
of their interest in the estate, but their interests vested upon the death of their
father. Rosa Hammons has a life estate with the right to consume the corpus if
necessary for her proper maintenance and medical care. She need not petition
the court for permission to do so, provide notice when she invades the corpus,
or, absent litigation, provide an accounting of how she expends the property .
3
KRS 381 .350 provides remedies against a life tenant who commits waste : "If any
tenant for life or years commits waste during his estate or term, of anything
belonging to the tenement so held, without special written permission to do so, he
shall be subject to an action of waste, shall lose the thing wasted, and pay treble
the amount at which the waste is assessed."
KRS 381 .360 authorizes remaindermen to maintain an action for waste and recover
any appropriate damages: "The action for waste may be maintained by one who has
the remainder or reversion in fee simple after an intervening estate for life or years,
and also by one who has a remainder or reversion for life or years only, and each of
them shall recover such damages as he has suffered by the waste complained of."
17
As noted, however, a life tenant can be liable for damages if a remainderman
can establish waste .
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm in part and reverse in part the
opinion of the Court of Appeals.
All sitting. All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS:
Reginald Leonard Thomas
P.O . Box 1704
Lexington, KY 40588-1704
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE :
Gerry L . Calvert
115 West Short Streeet
Lexington, KY 40507
Thomas H. Burnett
1329 East Cooper Drive
Lexington, KY 40502
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