COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY V. WANDA COMBS
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PUBLISHED
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2009-SC-000143-DG
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
V.
APPELLANT
ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS
CASE NO. 2008-CA-000181-MR
BREATHITT CIRCUIT COURT NO. 07-CR-00064
WANDA COMBS
APPELLEE
OPINION OF THE COURT BY CHIEF JUSTICE MINTON
REVERSING
This case asks us to determine whether a trial court may properly
instruct a jury on complicity to first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance
and on first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance as the principal actor
when the defendant has been formally charged with only complicity to firstdegree trafficking in a controlled substance . We hold that if the evidence at
trial would support a finding of guilt under both complicity and principal actor
theories, the answer is yes.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY.
In a controlled drug buy, an informant approached a car occupied by
Wanda Combs and a passenger. The informant gave Combs money, and
Combs handed the informant an oxycodone (Oxycontin) tablet . The informant
was unsure if Combs ultimately gave the passenger the money or if the
passenger had handed the pill to Combs to give to the informant.
Combs was indicted for one count of first-degree trafficking in a
controlled substance. On Friday before trial was scheduled to begin on
Monday, the Commonwealth sought to amend the indictment to charge Combs
only with complicity to first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance with
"Debbie Last Name Unknown . . . ." Combs objected to the proposed
amendment . On the day the trial was set to begin, the trial court held a
hearing on the motion to amend, during which the Commonwealth stated that
it had only recently discovered the identity of Debbie Bach, the passenger in
the car with Combs during the controlled drug buy.'
The trial court ordered the trial to proceed and asked the Commonwealth
which indictment should be read to the jury.2 Despite Combs's protests that
she was not prepared for a trial based on a complicity theory, the trial court
complied with the Commonwealth's request by reading to the jury the
indictment charging guilt by complicity.
After the Commonwealth presented its case-in-chief, Combs moved for a
directed verdict based upon her contention that the Commonwealth had not
proven the existence and guilt of a principal actor, which Combs believed was a
The Commonwealth's belated discovery of Bach's identity is curious, at least on
first impression, because the record reflects that Combs had subpoenaed Bach as
a witness approximately three weeks before trial. We note that the subpoena spells
Bach's surname as "Back."
This question is puzzling because there was only one indictment against Combs,
the only difference being whether that one-count indictment charged Combs with
guilt by complicity or guilt as a principal actor.
prerequisite for her to be convicted of guilt by complicity . The trial court
denied the motion for directed verdict. Combs then called Bach and another
witness to testify on Combs's behalf, but both witnesses invoked their Fifth
Amendment rights and declined to testify. Combs then rested, and the
Commonwealth elected not to call any rebuttal witnesses . Combs's renewed
motion for a directed verdict was denied, after which a discussion of jury
instructions ensued.
The Commonwealth tendered jury instructions based on both principal
actor and complicity theories of guilt. Combs objected, arguing that the
amended indictment charged her only under a complicity theory of guilt.
Nevertheless,, the trial court submitted both principal actor and complicity
instructions to the jury. The jury found Combs guilty of trafficking in a
controlled substance under the principal actor theory and recommended a
sentence of eight years' imprisonment . The trial court sentenced Combs in
accordance with the jury's recommendation, after which Combs filed a matterof-right appeal with the Kentucky Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals held that it was not error for the trial court to
permit the Commonwealth to amend the indictment to charge Combs with
being guilty under a complicity theory . But the Court of Appeals held that
Combs was "substantially prejudiced" and "was never permitted the
opportunity to defend herself as a principal because she was not charged as a
principal once the indictment was amended ." So the Court of Appeals reversed
Combs's conviction and remanded the matter to the circuit court "for a new
trial."3
We granted the Commonwealth's motion for discretionary review in order
to consider whether a trial court may instruct a jury on theories of both
principal actor and complicity when the evidence would support either theory
of guilt, but the defendant is formally charged only with guilt by complicity .
Having fully considered the issue, we hold that dual instructions are proper
under those circumstances .
II. ANALYSIS .
As stated previously, Combs was originally indicted for first-degree
trafficking in a controlled substance by "KNOWINGLY AND UNLAWFULLY
SELLING OXYCONTIN, A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE CLASSIFIED IN
SCHEDULE II ."4 Before trial, the Commonwealth successfully asked to amend
the indictment to charge Combs with complicity to first-degree trafficking in a
Of course, an appellate court may not absolutely require a new trial to be held on
remand . A new trial is among the permissible dispositions of the case after a
remand to the trial court. An appellate court should merely remand a case for
further proceedings consistent with its opinion.
See Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 218A.1412 (1) ("A person is guilty of
trafficking in a controlled substance in the first degree when he knowingly and
unlawfully traffics in : a controlled substance, that is classified in Schedules I or II
which is a narcotic drug . . . .") . Although it does not appear to be specifically
listed in KRS 218A.070's list of Schedule II controlled substances, oxycodone is
specifically listed as being a Schedule II controlled substance in 902 Kentucky
Administrative Regulations (KAR) 55 :020 ยง 4(14) . In fact, we have referred to
oxycodone as a Schedule II substance. Commonwealth v. Welch, 864 S.W.2d 280,
280 (Ky. 1993) ("Connie Welch was arrested on November 7, 1989, when police,
while executing a warrant at the home of a suspected drug dealer, found Welch in
possession of oxycodone, a Schedule II narcotic . . . .") .
controlled substance "by aiding, counseling, or attempting to aid, Debbie
[Bach], in selling Oxycontin . . .
."5
This first amendment of the indictment was proper. Kentucky Rules of
Criminal Procedure (RCr) 6.16 provides that an indictment may "be amended
any time before verdict or finding if no additional or different offense is charged
and if substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced ." It is clear under
our precedent that "amending the indictment to include an allegation that the
defendant is guilty of the underlying charge by complicity does not constitute
charging an additional or different offense ."6 This is true because, as we have
explained, "KRS 502 .020 does not create a new offense known as complicity.
[O]ne who is found guilty of complicity to a crime occupies the same status as
one being guilty of the principal offense."7
Regardless of her protests to the contrary, we conclude that Combs was
not improperly prejudiced by this amendment. The essential facts of the
complicity offense were the same as those underlying the principal actor
offense, and Combs was already obviously aware of Bach's existence because
Combs had subpoenaed Bach to testify at trial.
Having determined that the amendment was proper, we now turn our
attention to whether the trial court properly instructed the jury on both
See KRS 502 .020(1) (providing, in relevant part, that a person is guilty of
complicity to an "offense committed by another person when, with the intention of
promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense, he . . . (b) [a]ids, counsels,
or attempts to aid such person in planning or committing the offense . . . . ") .
Commonwealth v. McKenzie, 214 S .W.3d 306, 307 (Ky. 2007) .
Parks v. Commonwealth, 192 S .W.3d 318, 326-27 (Ky. 2006) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted) .
principal and complicity theories of guilt. Although better practice would likely
have been for it to seek leave of Court to do so, the Commonwealth did not seek
to amend the indictment at the close of the evidence to conform to the proof.$
So the real question before us is whether the jury instructions were at variance
with the proof presented at trial.
"[U]nder modern rules the essential question when examining variance
between the indictment and the proof is whether the defendant in fact had fair
notice and a fair trial."9 Although the Court of Appeals mistakenly seized upon
this point, we have abandoned any presumption that a defendant is unduly
prejudiced when an indictment is amended to charge guilt by complicity. 10 Of
s
10
Such a second amendment could have charged Combs with guilt as a principal
actor or guilt by acting in complicity with Bach . Cf. Fields v. Commonwealth,
219 S.W.3d 742, 746-47 (Ky. 2007) (finding no error in amending indictment at
close of evidence to reflect complicity theory of guilt) . As will be discussed,
however, the Commonwealth's failure to seek a second amendment of the
indictment, although procedurally deficient, does not afford Combs relief.
Robards v. Commonwealth, 419 S.W .2d 570, 573 (Ky. 1967) ("The indictment could
and should have been amended at the conclusion of the testimony, but it cannot
reasonably be held that a failure in that respect affected the defendant's
substantial rights.") . As we recently held in an analogous unpublished case, an
instruction permitting a jury to find a defendant guilty under an alternative theory
not contained in the indictment was not a palpable error because the jury
instruction "was a de facto or constructive amendment of the indictment, which
would not be erroneous so long as the conditions for a formal amendment existed ."
Evans v. Commonwealth, No. 2006-SC-000912-MR, 2009 WL 1451935, at *4 (Ky.
May 21, 2009) . Although the issue is better preserved in this case, we come to a
similar conclusion because the lack of conclusive evidence regarding Bach's role in
the drug transaction provided the conditions for a formal amendment of the
indictment .
Johnson v. Commonwealth, 864 S .W.2d 266, 272 (Ky. 1993) .
McKenzie, 214 S .W.3d at 308 .
course, it must be borne in mind that "[t]he jury must be instructed on all
theories which are deducible from the evidence ." 11
In the case at hand, since there was no definitive evidence regarding
whether Bach was the principal actor or a complicitor assisting Combs, there
was ample evidence from which a reasonable juror could have concluded that
Combs was guilty of trafficking in a controlled substance as either a principal
actor or as a complicitor with Bach. 12 The trial court acted properly by
conforming the jury instructions to the proof. Although not cited by the Court
of Appeals, we recently reiterated in Pate v. Commonwealth that our precedent
holds that "where evidence is sufficient to support a conviction as either an
accomplice or as a principal, an instruction in the alternative is proper."13 This
case falls squarely within our holding in Pate.
And we conclude that Combs had a fair trial. Again, the operative facts
were the same regardless of whether the Commonwealth's theory of the case
involved complicity . In fact, Combs was ultimately convicted of the same
Commonwealth v. .Duke, 750 S.W.2d 432, 433 (Ky. 1988) .
13
Again, the informant testified at trial that he gave the money to Combs and
received the oxycodone tablet from her. The informant testified that Combs and
Bach were engaged in some sort of activity, but the informant was unsure if Combs
gave Bach the money or Bach gave Combs the pill since the informant could not
see all of the interaction between Combs and Bach. But Combs admits in her brief
that the video of the transaction shows the passenger (Bach) counting the money
received from the informant. And the informant testified at trial that Bach and
Combs seemed to confer when the informant asked if he could call a certain third
person if he needed more pills. So a juror could certainly have concluded that
Bach took the lead role in the drug transaction or that Bach took a role in which
she merely assisted Combs. In fact, a jury could have found under these facts that
both Bach and Combs were principal actors .
243 S .W. 3d 327, 334-35 (Ky. 2007) .
offense and the same method of committing that offense for which she was
originally indicted, trafficking in a controlled substance in the first degree
under a principal actor theory .
Combs's argument is unavailing that she was prejudiced and her trial
rendered unfair by the principal actor jury instruction . First, to reiterate,
trafficking in a controlled substance, like other offenses, is an offense capable
of being committed as either a principal actor or as a complicitor. After all, a
person who is "guilty of complicity to a crime occupies the same status as one
being guilty of the principal offense ." 14 So the shifting from principal actor to
complicity theories of guilt and back again is not as radical a change in the
Commonwealth's theory of the case despite Combs's argument . We recently
held in an analogous unpublished case that a trial court did not commit
palpable error when it instructed a jury on both a principal actor and
accomplice theory when a defendant had only been indicted under a complicity
theory of guilt. 15 Although the issue in this case is better preserved, we reach
the same conclusion - the defendant is not entitled to relief.
Next, Combs is unable to point to any identifiable prejudice she suffered
in this case . Although a defendant should be aware beforehand whether the
Commonwealth seeks to convict based upon a complicity theory alone, a
principal actor theory alone, or an either-or combination theory, the fact
remains that the underlying criminal offense is the same . A defendant in need
Wilson v. Commonwealth, 601 S.W.2d 280, 286 (Ky. 1980) .
15 Evans, 2009 WL 1451935 at *4-5 .
14
of clarification of the Commonwealth's theory of guilt may file a motion for a bill
of particulars .
16
Importantly, in the case at hand, the operative facts
underlying both theories of guilt were the same .
Combs contends that the flip-flop in the Commonwealth's theory of guilt
was prejudicial because she relied to her detriment upon her belief that the
Commonwealth had failed to prove that another person committed the offense
(i.e., identified the principal actor) in order to convict her of guilt by complicity.
Combs generically argues in her brief that if she "had received notice she was
also being charged as a principal, she would have called witnesses and put on
a defense to that charge ." Likewise, during oral argument, Combs's counsel
merely said that she could "only speculate" as to what would have been done
differently at trial if she had had more notice that the Commonwealth would be
seeking a jury instruction on a principal actor theory of guilt.
17
But Combs has not detailed what new defense she would have mounted
or which specific witnesses she would have called. 18 A vague claim that some
unspecified evidence could have been presented to defend against a principal
actor theory of guilt is insufficient to show demonstrable prejudice . As the
16
1. 7
18
See RCr 6 .22.
At oral argument, Combs's counsel referred to "other witnesses" who could have
been called if Combs had known sooner that she would be charged under both
principal and complicity theories ; but counsel demurred at making any specific
references to these witnesses as being an improper reference to matters outside the
record. Combs's counsel is correct in stating that attorneys at oral argument
should refrain from discussing matters outside the record. But the only reason the
specifics of this alleged additional evidence are outside the appellate record is
Combs's failure to inform the trial court in detail what additional evidence Combs
could present to defend the principal actor theory of guilt.
The only subpoena in the record was directed to Bach.
Commonwealth astutely notes, since Combs "had prepared to defend her case
as a principal until the morning of trial, it is hard to imagine what additional
evidence she would have presented ." Combs's claim that she was unable to
present some unspecified new evidence is at odds with the fact that she did not
even specifically ask the trial court to re-open the proof. 19
The Commonwealth did present evidence sufficient for a reasonable juror
to conclude that another person - Bach - was guilty of being a principal
actor. Intent of course, may be inferred from the relevant circumstances . 20
And, as explained before, a reasonable juror could have, contrary to Combs'
argument, found under these circumstances that Combs was guilty of
complicity to trafficking in a controlled substance when Combs acted as a
conduit between Bach and the informant as they exchanged the money for the
Oxycontin pill. So even under a complicity theory, the Commonwealth satisfied
its "burden of proving the commission of the charged offense by another person
and of proving that the defendant participated in that offense ."21 A jury
instruction on a complicity theory of guilt was proper.
19
20
21
Combs contends that asking for a continuance is the equivalent of asking for a reopening of proof because "[w)hen a continuance is granted . . . additional evidence
may be introduced ." To the contrary, a mere continuance only delays the
proceedings; it does not necessarily change the procedural stance of the case. In
other words, had a continuance alone been granted, the trial would have begun at
the same precise procedural point after the continuance ended (i.e., presentation of
closing arguments) . So if she really wanted to present more evidence, Combs
should have asked the trial court for leave to re-open the proof.
Commonwealth v. Wolford, 4 S.W.3d 534, 539 (Ky. 1999) .
Harper v. Commonwealth, 43 S . W.3d 261, 265 (Ky. 2001) .
10
We also reject Combs' contention that she is entitled to relief under our
holding in Wolbrecht v. Commonwealth. 22 In Wolbrecht, the defendants were
charged with complicity to murder ; and the indictment specified that one of the
defendants was the murderer . Five days into trial, the trial court permitted the
indictment to be amended to charge that the murderer was an unknown
person . Deeming this amendment to be a "dramatic, 180[-]degree turn in the
case[,]" we reversed because the defendants "were unduly and unfairly
surprised near the conclusion of the Commonwealth's case with a new charge
that they each had engaged in a conspiracy with some anonymous coconspirator . . . . 1123
There was no similar "dramatic, 180[-]degree turn" in the case against
Combs because, as stated before, "amending the indictment to include an
allegation that the defendant is guilty of the underlying charge by complicity
does not constitute charging an additional or different offense."24 The
Commonwealth's theory was always that the cooperating witness handed
Combs money and received Oxycontin in return . Unlike in Wolbrecht, no
mystery offender was interjected into the case during trial.
In summary, although it is one offense, trafficking in a controlled
substance can be committed as either a principal actor or as a complicitor.
Combs was originally indicted as a principal actor, and the jury was instructed
22
955 S.W .2d 533 (Ky. 1997).
23
Id . at 537 .
24
McKenzie,
214 S.W .3d at 307 .
on that method of committing the offense . Combs's amended indictment
charged her under a complicity theory of guilt, and the jury was instructed on
that method of committing the offense. Both the complicity and principal actor
theories of guilt were supported by the evidence. So the trial court fulfilled its
obligation to instruct the jury in accordance with the evidence. Accordingly,
under these facts, Combs's trial was fundamentally fair; and she was not
unfairly prejudiced when the trial court instructed the jury on both principal
actor and complicity theories of guilt. 25
Ill . CONCLUSION .
For the foregoing reasons, the opinion of the Court of Appeals is
reversed; and the judgment of conviction entered by the trial court is
reinstated .
All sitting. All concur.
25
The parties argue over the proper standard of review. Admittedly, our precedent on
the proper standard by which we review jury instruction-related issues seems to be
inconsistent . Compare Ratliffv. Commonwealth, 194 S.W.3d 258, 274 (Ky. 2006)
("We review a trial court's rulings regarding instructions for an abuse of
discretion.") with Skaggs v. Commonwealth, No . 2007-SC-000007-MR, 2009 WL
1830807 at *4 (Ky. June 25, 2009), citing Hamilton v. CSX Transportation, Inc.,
208 S.W.3d 272, 275 (Ky.App. 2006) ("alleged errors regarding jury instructions are
questions of law and must be examined using a de novo standard of review.") . But
we need not resolve the apparent inconsistency in this case because we would
reverse the Court of Appeals and reinstate the judgment of the trial court under
either standard .
12
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
James Coleman Shackelford
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Criminal Appeals
1024 Capital Center Drive
Suite 200
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601-8204
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Barbara Anderson
400 Court Square Building
269 West Main Street
Suite 200
Lexington, Kentucky 40507
F. J . Anderson
269 West Main Street
Suite 400
Lexington, Kentucky 40507
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