QUINCY OMAR CROSS V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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MODIFIED : MARCH 18, 2010
RENDERED : NOVEMBER 25, 2009
E Pt7BLISHED
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2008-SC-000465-MR
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APPELLAN
QUINCY OMAR CROSS
V.
ON APPEAL FROM HICKMAN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE TIMOTHY C. STARK, JUDGE
NO . 08-CR-00001
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
Appellant, Quincy Omar Cross, was convicted by a Hickman Circuit
Court jury of capital kidnapping, capital murder, first-degree sodomy, firstdegree rape, abuse of a corpse, and tampering with physical evidence. For
these crimes, Appellant received a sentence of life imprisonment without
benefit of probation or parole for capital kidnapping, life imprisonment for
capital murder, life imprisonment without benefit of probation or parole for
first-degree rape, fifty years' imprisonment for first-degree sodomy, five years'
imprisonment for abuse of a corpse, and three years' imprisonment for
tampering with physical evidence. The trial court ordered all sentences to be
served concurrently . Appellant now appeals to this Court as a matter of right.
Ky. Const. § 110.
.
.C
1<_ Cab,k I
.
Appellant asserts seven arguments on appeal: 1) that the Commonwealth
committed prosecutorial misconduct by executing a "document dump" during
discovery; 2) that the jury instructions were confusing and effectively prevent a
defense against double jeopardy; 3) that the trial court erred in denying his
motion for a directed verdict of acquittal on the charges of capital kidnapping
and first-degree rape; 4) that his Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment
rights were violated when it was discovered a juror had a Bible in the jury
room; 5) that the death penalty is a disproportional punishment for the crime
of capital kidnapping and that the capital kidnapping statute is
unconstitutional in light of Kennedy v. Louisiana,
U .S .
, 128 S. Ct.
2641 (2008) ; 6) that his convictions for both capital kidnapping and capital
murder violate double jeopardy; and 7) that his Eighth Amendment rights were
violated when the jury was allowed to consider murder as a death penalty
aggravator for capital kidnapping . For the reasons set forth herein, we now
affirm Appellant's conviction and sentence.
FACTS
Jessica Currin's burned and decomposed body was found on the
grounds of the Mayfield Middle School on the morning of August 1, 2000. The
state medical examiner, Dr. Mark LeVaughn, performed an autopsy on the
body and determined that Currin was murdered by strangulation, based on the
presence of a charred black, braided leather belt found next to the body at the
scene. While Currin's body displayed none of the classic signs of
strangulation, Dr. LeVaughn believed that was either due to the deteriorated
body or the method of strangulation. Currin's body also displayed no physical
signs of rape, again due to the burned and deteriorated condition of her body .
Although Appellant was one of the original suspects in the murder, two
individuals, Jeremy Adams and Carlos Saxton, were initially indicted for
Currin's murder. However, those two indictments were dismissed by the
Graves Circuit Court in 2003 due to discovery violations committed by the
Mayfield Police Department . The case languished until 2005 when two
witnesses, Victoria Caldwell and Vinisha Stubblefield, who had been previously
interviewed by police, changed their stories to implicate Appellant.
At trial, Caldwell and Stubblefield were the Commonwealth's lead
witnesses . Due to inconsistency of their testimony, we will summarize Caldwell
and Stubblefield's testimony separately .
A . Victoria Caldwell's Testimony
Caldwell testified that Currin and Stubblefield came over to her house on
the night of July 29, 2000. Stubblefield told Caldwell to look for a car with
flashing lights to arrive shortly because they were going to "hang-out" with the
driver. The driver of the car was Appellant . Currin, Caldwell, and Stubblefield
got into the car and drove with Appellant to another house . At that house,
Appellant exchanged the blue car for a white car, and then drove the four to
another house where they picked up Tamara Caldwell and Jeff Burton. After
picking them up, Appellant passed out cocaine to the group as they traveled to
Burton's house.
As they traveled, Appellant and Tamara Caldwell began to sexually
harass Currin . Currin told them to stop to no avail. Upon arriving at Burton's
house, Appellant picked up a mini-baseball bat from the floorboard of the car
and hit Currin on the head. Caldwell testified that the blow "knocked" Currin
out. Appellant and Burton carried Currin into a bedroom and placed her on
the bed. Caldwell followed them into the bedroom.
Appellant then attempted to have oral sex with Currin, but her mouth
would not open . Appellant instead masturbated . Burton then began to have
sex with Currin while Tamara Caldwell held Currin's legs . During the sexual
intercourse, Currin began to regain consciousness, to make noises, and to
repeat the name of her infant son . In response, Appellant took a type of
wrench and hit her in the head. Caldwell testified that the blow knocked
Currin out again . Caldwell would later bury the wrench in her sister's yard.
The wrench was recovered by police, and introduced as an exhibit at trial.
After hitting Currin with the wrench, Appellant took off his belt and
began to strangle her. Caldwell described it as a black, braided leather belt.
Currin initially gasped for air but then stopped . Caldwell testified that she
knew at that point Currin was dead .
Appellant then ordered everyone in the room to perform different acts.
Appellant ordered Caldwell to have oral sex with Currin's body, which she
testified she did. Caldwell testified that other people in the room also
performed sexual acts on Currin's deceased body. After performing these acts,
the group took more drugs. Then, the group began to have sex with each
other.
Afterward, Currin's body was taken from the bed, wrapped in a blanket,
and taken to Burton's garage . Later, after the body began to smell, Caldwell,
Stubblefield, Burton, Austin Leech, and Isaac Benjamin took Currin's body to
Mayfield Middle School where they dumped her out and set her on fire.
Caldwell also read at trial several excerpts from a diary she purportedly
kept in 2000 . One entry, dated August 1, 2000, states, "Damn, they found the
body. I hope they don't find out it was us. Fuck men. Q is nowhere to be
found and Jeff don't want to talk to me . This is bullshit. . . Fuck I am out." A
later entry dated August 8 stated, "Man I am so scared . Fuck people keep
staring at me. What am I supposed to do?" The next entry stated, "Vinisha is
looking dumb as hell like she don't know . . . Man, I quit school ."'
Caldwell also admitted on the stand that she previously lied to the police
during their initial investigation, and made false statements which led to the
original indictments against Adams and Saxton. Caldwell testified that she
later moved to California and had no contact with Stubblefield until right
before trial.
1 Appellant notes that the chief forensics chemist for the Secret Service testified at
trial that he could not match the ink used for the journal entries with any known ink
commercially available in the United States in 2000. However, the chemist further
testified that there were numerous reasons that the ink may not have matched a
known formulation, and that it did not mean the journal entries were faked or written
at a later time.
B. Vinisha Stubblefield's testimony
Stubblefield testified that on July 29, 2000, she and Currin started the
night by playing cards at a friend's apartment. Currin later decided to walk
home. After a short time passed, Stubblefield decided to find Currin .
Appellant picked Stubblefield up in a blue car. Stubblefield knew Appellant
from a prior encounter. Appellant and Stubblefield then picked up Caldwell
and drove to a house where they switched to a white car. Appellant,
Stubblefield, Caldwell, Tamara Caldwell, and Jeff Burton then drove around
looking for Currin. Stubblefield testified that all of the people in the car were
using cocaine, pills, and marijuana .
After driving around for a while, the group finally found Currin .
Stubblefield asked Currin if she would like a ride . Currin agreed, but
emphasized that she only wanted to be taken home and nothing else . As soon
as Currin got in the car, Appellant began to sexually harass her. Currin told
Appellant to stop touching her, but Appellant refused. Appellant drove the
group to Burton's house.
Once they got there, Appellant and Currin had a verbal altercation.
Appellant apparently hit Currin and forced her to walk into Burton's back
bedroom. Stubblefield went into the living room. After about twenty minutes
had passed, Stubblefield testified that Burton told her to come to the back
bedroom . Upon entering, Stubblefield saw Currin, unconscious on the bed,
with Appellant pulling on a belt around her neck. It is uncertain from
Stubblefield's testimony whether she believed Currin was dead at this point.
Appellant then got on top of Currin and began to have sex with her. After
Appellant finished, Burton had sex with Currin . Appellant then instructed
Stubblefield to have sex with Currin, which she did.
Like Caldwell, Stubblefield testified that all of the members of the group
then had sex with each other. Afterwards, Appellant and Burton moved
Currin's body to the garage . Later, Caldwell, Stubblefield, Burton, Leech, and
Benjamin disposed of Currin's body at Mayfield Middle School.
C. Other Testimonv
Several other witnesses testified at trial. Graves County Deputy Sheriff
Mike Perkins testified that he arrested Appellant in Mayfield for possession of
cocaine the morning after the murder. Deputy Perkins noted that Appellant at
the time of the arrest had no belt on and continually had to pull his pants up.
Other witnesses testified that after the murder Appellant made statements
which were either admissions of guilt or implicated him in killing Currin.
.
There was also testimony provided by Appellant's friend, Timothy Carr, that
after the murder Appellant told him he had sex with Currin the night she was
murdered . Caldwell's sister, Rosie Crice, testified that Appellant told her he
was present in the room when Currin was killed .2
Crice would later plead guilty to perjury for falsely testifying during trial that
Appellant told her to tell Caldwell he was going to kill her for "running her mouth"
about Currin's murder. Caldwell apparently instructed Crice to tell this fabrication on
the witness stand.
2
Based on the evidence presented, the Hickman Circuit Court jury found
Appellant guilty of all charges, and recommended a sentence of life
imprisonment without benefit of probation or parole. Further facts will be
developed below as necessary.
I. THE COMMONWEALTH'S DISCOVERY TACTICS DID NOT AMOUNT TO A
"DOCUMENT DUMP"
Appellant first argues that the Commonwealth committed intentional
discovery violations to prevent him from developing a proper defense . Prior to
trial, Appellant moved the trial court to dismiss his indictments or, in the
alternative, for a continuance, because the Commonwealth's discovery
constituted what he called a "document dump." Appellant's motion described
the amount of discovery provided by the Commonwealth as:
massive. The documentation is mostly in the form of scanned
documents electronically stored. There have been more than 4800
Bates numbers3 assigned to [sic], but that does not mean that
merely 4800 pages were provided .
Dozens of transcripts of
interviews, tapings, and the like have been provided, and each has
been given only one Bates number regardless of the length of the
transcript, be it 20 pages or more than 100 pages. In addition, the
discovery has included 80 DVDs of interviews and other video
evidence, 405 CDs containing audio interviews, phone calls, and
the like.
Additionally, Appellant's motion complained that the discovery came in stages
and that many of the documents provided were either duplications of evidence
already produced, or irrelevant .
3 Bates numbers are a method of numbering documents provided in discovery.
The trial court denied Appellant's motion, holding that the
Commonwealth's production of thousands of pages of documents was an
attempt to thoroughly comply with discovery requests, not prevent Appellant
from developing a defense. The trial court further believed that the
Commonwealth produced discovery in stages because its investigation into the
murder was on-going, the defense requested some documents be provided in
several different formats, and the Commonwealth had trouble finding some of
the information requested by the defense . Appellant now asks that we find the
Commonwealth's discovery tactics were in fact a "document dump" and that we
vacate his conviction .
The term "document dump" does not appear in Kentuc
case law. A
"document dump" has been described as:
responding to a document request by the opposing party with . . .
as many colorably responsive documents as possible, [which] are
turned over en masse in an effort to bury the opposition in paper,
with the hope that with luck some material documents may be
passed over, or at the very least, raise the cost to the opposition
both in terms of money and time.
Steven Hetcher, The Half-Fairness of Google's Plan to Make the World's
Collection of Books Searchable, 13 Mich . Telecomm. 8v Tech. L. Rev. 1, 43
(2006) . Another scholar describes a "document dump" as where:
the defendant is literally buried in thousands of pages of
documents, many of which . . . are often immaterial or irrelevant to
both the prosecution and the defense. These documents may be
produced in either hard copy or electronic format, leaving the
defendant to sift through hundreds of boxes of documents . . . in
hopes of finding information, as if it were a needle in the haystack.
Morvillo, Bohrer, Balter, Motion Denied: Systematic Impediments to White
Collar Criminal Defendants' Trial Preparation, 42 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 157, 159
(2005) . The practice of "document dumping" seemingly violates the spirit of
Kentucky Rule Criminal Procedure 7 .24, due to the rule's emphasis on
reciprocal and open discovery.
A trial court's ruling on an alleged discovery violation is reviewed for an
abuse of discretion. Penman v. Commonwealth, 194 S.W.3d 237, 249 (Ky.
2006) . Using that standard, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's
denial of Appellant's motions . The record does not indicate that the
Commonwealth intended to commit a discovery violation by "document
dumping." The investigation into Currin's murder took seven years and was
conducted by three different agencies: the Mayfield Police Department, the
Kentucky State Police, and the Kentucky Bureau of Investigations . During this
investigation many witnesses were interviewed numerous times and multiple
indictments were sought. It is reasonable to believe that such a long, in-depth
investigation would turn up a considerable amount of discovery. We also
cannot dispute the trial court's factual finding that Appellant and his codefendants requested some of the evidence be provided in different forms than
originally produced . It is reasonable to believe that the Commonwealth's
copious evidence production was an attempt to avoid a discovery violation for
not producing all evidence required, especially in light of the discovery
violations that ended up in the dismissal of Saxton and Adams's indictments in
2003 . Further, it does appear from the record that the Commonwealth did
make efforts to create indexes and assign Bates numbers to the different
documents provided in discovery to aid Appellant's search. Moreover, the trial
court had already granted Appellant a two-week continuance to review the
Commonwealth's most recent discovery. We thus cannot find that the trial
court abused its discretion by denying Appellant's motion to dismiss his
indictments or his motion for an additional continuance . See Penman, 194
S.W.3d at 249-250.
II. THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS DID NOT VIOLATE APPELLANT'S DUE
PROCESS RIGHTS
Appellant next argues that the jury instructions provided by the trial
court were erroneous . Appellant presents three arguments regarding the
adequacy of the instructions: A) that the wording of the instructions prevents
him from telling what theory of liability he was convicted of and he is thus
prevented from defending himself against double jeopardy; B) that the evidence
presented did not support all theories of liability included in the jury
instructions ; and C) that to the extent the jury instructions allowed a
conviction on the basis of accomplice liability, the jury was never instructed on
how to apply the definition for "complicity." Appellant concedes that his alleged
errors are not preserved, so we review for palpable error. RCr 10.26. Each
argument will be addressed separately .
A. The jury instructions which combined accomplice and principal liability
were proper and do not expose Appellant to subsequent prosecution
Appellant first argues that the jury instructions prevent him from
determining under what theory of liability the jury found him guilty. As
written, the jury instructions for capital murder and first-degree sodomy
provided that the jury could find Appellant guilty of being either the principal
actor, or of being complicit in some manner with Jeffery Burton or Tamara
Caldwell in committing the crime. However, the instructions did not require
that the jury specifically state under which theory of liability they found
Appellant guilty. Appellant therefore argues that he is prevented from
tendering a double jeopardy defense against subsequent prosecution on these
same charges because he is unable to prove whether the jury found him guilty
of being the principal or complicit actor.
Appellant's argument fails because it does not matter for the purposes of
double jeopardy whether the jury found Appellant guilty of being the principal
or complicit actor in the crimes. "KRS 502 .020 does not create a new offense
known as complicity . It simply provides that one who aids, counsels, or
attempts to aid another in committing an offense with the intention of
facilitating or promoting the commission of the offense is himself guilty of that
offense ." Commonwealth v. McKenzie, 214 S.W.3d 306, 307 (Ky. 2007) (citing
Commonwealth v. Caswell, 614 S .W.2d 253, 254 (Ky. App. 1981)). Thus, one
who is convicted of complicity to a crime has the same status, and is guilty of
the same crime, as one guilty of the principal offense. McKenzie , 214 S.W .3d
at 307. Therefore, once Appellant was found guilty of murdering and
sodomizing Currin under either theory of liability, pursuant to the principles of
double jeopardy, the Commonwealth is prohibited from seeking a second
conviction on those charges under a different theory of liability. Appellant has
a double jeopardy defense against future prosecutions .
B . The jury instructions were supported by adequate evidence and the jury's,
verdict was unanimous
Second, Appellant argues that the Commonwealth did not present
adequate evidence at trial to support each of the theories upon which the jury
was instructed, and therefore the jury's verdict was not unanimous. See Davis
v. Commonwealth , 967 S.W .2d 574, 582 (Ky. 1998) ("Unanimity becomes an
issue when the jury is instructed that it can find the defendant guilty under
either of two theories, since some jurors might find guilt under one theory,
while others might find guilt under another. If the evidence would support
conviction under both theories, the requirement of unanimity is satisfied .") .
The jury instructions for murder, first-degree sodomy, and first-degree rape all
allowed a guilty verdict against Appellant if the jury found that he acted alone
or in complicity with Tamara Caldwell and/or Jeffrey Burton. Appellant argues
that the jury instructions violate the concept of unanimity because the
Commonwealth did not present evidence that Burton or Caldwell participated
in Currin's murder, or that Burton or Caldwell engaged in first-degree sodomy
with Currin, or that Appellant raped Currin . 4 A review of the record refutes
Appellant's argument .
First, sufficient evidence was presented that Burton and Caldwell were
accomplices in Currin's murder. Accomplice liability can be based not only on
one singular act, but on a continuum of events. See Mills v . Commonwealth,
44 S.W. 3d 366, 371 (Ky. 2001) ("Thus, complicity liability often will not depend
on a particular act, but on many different acts that occur at different points in
time. Moreover, it may well be that it is only the accumulation of acts that
serves to prove complicity . In other words, no particular act in and of itself
would serve as the defining act . . .") . At trial, evidence was introduced that
Burton assisted Appellant in either carrying or making Currin enter the
bedroom where she was murdered . Caldwell testified that Burton and Tamara
Caldwell were present when Appellant strangled Currin with his belt and that
Burton and Tamara Caldwell participated in many of the acts which Appellant
instructed them to do. Testimony also indicated that Appellant told several
people after the crime that he did not murder Currin, but was present when
others killed her. Looking at all the circumstances surrounding Currin's
murder, the evidence supports a conclusion that Burton and Tamara Caldwell
were part of the continuum of events that led to her death. Id. There is no
unanimity problem with the murder jury instruction .
4 Appellant contends in his brief that there was insufficient evidence presented to
convict him of kidnapping . We will address that argument in Part III.
Second, there was sufficient evidence presented that Burton and/or
Caldwell engaged in first-degree sodomy with Currin. At trial, Stubblefield
testified that she saw Appellant and Burton have sex with Currin while she was
"unconscious." Tamara Caldwell was present in the room during this time.
Caldwell testified that Tamara Caldwell assisted Burton by holding down
Currin's legs so she could not move while he had sex with her. Additionally,
Tamara Caldwell and Burton were present in the bedroom when Appellant
masturbated on Currin. Since the jury was instructed on complicity, a jury
could have reasonably found that Burton and/or Caldwell participated in or
committed deviate sexual acts involving Currin. There is no unanimity
problem with the first-degree sodomy instruction.
Third, there was sufficient evidence presented that Appellant raped
Currin. Stubblefield testified that Appellant engaged in sex with Currin at a
time when she was unsure whether Currin was dead or unconscious .
Additionally, Appellant bragged to his friend Timothy Carr that he had
sex with
Currin on the night she was murdered . This testimony, along with the events
surrounding the night of Currin's murder are enough to support Appellant's
conviction for first-degree rape .
Further, it is clear that the jury could have found Appellant complicit in
all of these crimes by his actions in forcibly bringing Currin to the bedroom
where she was raped, sodomized, and murdered . His complicity was further
demonstrated by the testimony that Appellant rendered Currin helpless on two
occasions by hitting her on the head, enabling Burton and Tamara Caldwell to
commit crimes against her. There are no evidentiary or unanimity problems
with the jury instructions provided .
C . The jury instructions on accomplice liability and complicity were
understandable
Finally, Appellant argues that the jury instructions which allowed the
jurors to return a verdict against him on the basis of accomplice liability were
improper . Appellant argues that the term "complicity" was defined for the
jurors, but that the jurors were never told how to apply that definition . The
"complicity" instruction stated:
[coomplicity means that a person is guilty of an offense
committed by another person when, with the intention of
promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense, he
solicits, commands, or engages in a conspiracy with such other
person to commit the offense, or aids, counsels, or attempts to
aid such person in planning or committing the offense.
Appellant argues that this instruction, coupled with the instruction for firstdegree rape, was incomprehensible for a jury to understand. However, the
complicity definition mirrors the example provided in 1 Cooper, Kentucky
Instructions To Juries (Criminal) , §10.01 (5th ed . 2006) . We find this definition
to be concise and clearly understandable by jurors of ordinary intelligence .
Further, Appellant presents no evidence that the jury did not or could not
understand the instruction or how to apply it in conjunction with the rape
instruction. There is no error here.
III. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED APPELLANT'S DIRECTED
VERDICT ON THE CRIMES OF CAPITAL KIDNAPPING AND FIRST-DEGREE
RAPE
Appellant next argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for
a directed verdict of acquittal on the charges of capital kidnapping and firstdegree rape. "On appellate review, the test of a directed verdict is, if under the
evidence as a whole, it would be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find guilt,
only then the defendant is entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal."
Commonwealth v . Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Ky . 1991) . We will address
Appellant's arguments regarding capital kidnapping and first-degree rape
separately .
A. Appellant was not entitled to a directed verdict because his conduct did not
fall within the kidnapping exception statute, KRS 509 .050 .
Appellant argues that the evidence presented at trial did not support a
conviction for capital kidnapping, but instead falls within the kidnapping
exception statute, KRS 509.050. A three-part test was developed in Griffin v.
Commonwealth , 576 S.W.2d 514, 516 (Ky . 1978), to determine if the
kidnapping exemption applies to a particular defendant. That test is : 1)
whether defendant's criminal purpose was the commission of a criminal offense
defined outside of KRS Chapter 509 ; 2) whether the interference with the
victim's liberty occurred immediately with, and incidental to the commission of
the underlying crimes; and 3) whether the interference with the victim's liberty
exceeded that which is ordinarily incident to the commission of the underlying
crimes . Id . In support of his argument, Appellant states that, according to the
Commonwealth's case, his criminal purpose in this case was to murder and
assault Currin, crimes which are outside of KRS Chapter 509 . Appellant also
argues that any interference with Currin's liberty was incidental to .the
commission of the murder and assault, and that the time Currin was
restrained was no greater than what was necessary to commit the underlying
criminal acts. The evidence presented at trial however, supports the denial of
Appellant's directed verdict of acquittal motion.
Testimony indicated that while Currin voluntarily got into the car with
Appellant, she only did so to receive a ride home. Instead of going to her house
though, there was testimony that Appellant took her to one house, to change
cars, then eventually to Burton's house, which she was in some manner
physically forced to enter against her will. Detaining her during the time taken
to travel from one house to the other exceeded the time needed to murder and
rape Currin. The facts as they are leave considerable doubt as to whether the
Griffin test for applying the exemption was satisfied. As such, the trial court
correctly denied Appellant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal on the
kidnapping charge.
B. Adequate evidence was presented that Appellant committed first-degree ramie
Appellant next argues that the trial court should have granted him a
directed verdict of acquittal on the first-degree rape charge because he does not
believe that the Commonwealth proved that Currin was alive when he had
sexual intercourse with her. However, a review of the record refutes this
argument .
Stubblefield testified that upon entering the bedroom at Burton's house
where Appellant and Currin were located, she saw Currin with a belt around
her neck being held by Appellant. Stubblefield stated that she was unsure if
Currin was deceased at this time . Stubblefield then testified that Appellant
had sex with Currin. Additionally, Appellant told his friend Timothy Carr that
he did in fact have sex with Currin on the night she was murdered . The facts
surrounding Appellant's behavior toward Currin support a conclusion that his
admitted sexual intercourse with her was not consensual . Moreover, the
evidence amply supported a conviction under the rape charge as an accomplice
to Burton's sexual intercourse with Currin at a time she was undeniably alive .
Thus, reviewing all of the evidence, it would not be unreasonable for a juror to
find Appellant guilty of first-degree rape. Looking at the facts in a light
favorable to the Commonwealth, the trial judge correctly denied Appellant's
motion for a directed verdict of acquittal. Benham, 816 S .W .2d at 187.
IV. APPELLANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO A MISTRIAL AND NEW PENALTY
PHASE DUE TO THE PRESENCE OF A BIBLE IN THE JURY ROOM
Appellant next argues that he was entitled to a mistrial and a new
penalty phase due to the presence of a "pocket Bible"5 in the jury room. After
the jury had deliberated for seven and a half hours during the penalty phase of
trial, the Bailiff informed the trial judge that one of the jurors had a "pocket
Bible" and that the jurors had asked for the Bible located on the bench.
Appellant immediately moved for a mistrial and insisted that the "pocket Bible"
be removed from the jury room, presumably because of the concern that the
jury was considering materials outside of the evidence presented in trial. The
Commonwealth agreed that the "pocket Bible" should be removed from the jury
room. The trial judge then had the jurors return to the courtroom, where the
"pocket Bible" was confiscated. The trial judge provided the following
admonishment :
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, I've been advised that there
was a Bible in the jury room. You may have had one with you.
I will admonish you that the only things that you are to
consider are the exhibits and the evidence that's been
presented . The Bible, although useful in some situations, is not
to be considered with the same weight as evidence presented in
this trial . And, you can continue with your deliberations .
Thank you. If you'd return to the jury room.
Appellant did not object to the trial court's admonition, but again moved for a
mistrial after the jurors returned to the jury room. The trial judge determined,
based on the information before him that the jurors had not been influenced by
the presence of the "pocket Bible," and he therefore denied the motion for a
The briefs presented in this case refer to the juror possessing a "pocket Bible." There
is no evidence of whether this was a full Bible, or only contained certain books or
verses. As such, we refer to the book as a "pocket Bible."
5
mistrial. Twenty minutes later, the jury returned a verdict of life imprisonment
without benefit of probation or parole instead of the death penalty.
Appellant now argues that the admonishment failed to cure any error
that occurred due to the presence of the "pocket Bible" in the jury room and
that he should have been granted a mistrial and new penalty phase . We
disagree .
A mistrial "is an extreme remedy and should be resorted to only when
there appears in the record a manifest necessity for such an action or an
urgent or real necessity." Bray v. Commonwealth, 177 S .W.3d 741, 752 (Ky.
2005) . The trial court's denial of a motion for a mistrial will be reviewed for
abuse of discretion . Id . In this matter, there was no such manifest necessity.
In dealing with the presence of outside materials in the jury room, a curative
instruction telling the jury to consider only the evidence presented in trial
frequently addresses the error. United States v. Lara-Ramirez, 519 F .3d 76, 87
(1st Cir. 2008) (explaining that in situations where outside evidence (such as
the Bible) is potentially being considered by a jury, a curative instruction can
"eradicate" the risk of prejudice) . A mistrial is only an appropriate remedy
when the trial judge believes that the jury's exposure to outside evidence is too
great to repair by admonishment . Id , at 82. While the admonishment was not
perfect, we believe it had the effected intent, to make sure the jury knew that
the Bible was not to be considered as evidence in the case. A mistrial was
unwarranted and Appellant is not entitled to a new penalty phase proceeding.
V. THE DEATH PENALTY IS NOT A DISPROPORTIONAL PUNISHMENT FOR
THE CRIME OF CAPITAL KIDNAPPING AND THE CAPITAL KIDNAPPING
STATUTE IS CONSTITUTIONAL
Appellant next argues that the capital kidnapping statute, KRS
509.040(2), is rendered unconstitutional by the recent United States Supreme
Court opinion, Kennedy v. Louisiana,
U.S._, 128 S.Ct . 2641 (2008) .
Appellant argues that Kennedy holds the death penalty is only constitutional
when given to defendants who commit crimes involving the intentional murder
of a victim. Appellant quotes the phrase "we conclude that, in determining
whether the death penalty is excessive, there is a distinction between
intentional first-degree murder on the one hand and non-homicide crimes
against individual persons, even including child rape, on the other" from
Kennedy and insist that the case prohibits the death penalty as a punishment
for crimes leading to non-intentional death . Id . at 2660 . Thus, Appellant
argues that our interpretation of KRS 509 .040(2) in St. Clair v. Roark, 10
S .W .3d 482 (Ky. 2000) is unconstitutional because in that case we held that
the capital kidnapping statute applies whenever a kidnapping leads to the
death of the victim regardless of the defendant's mental state. Id. at 486-487.
Appellant misconstrues Kennedy's holding. Kennedy dealt with the
constitutionality of a Louisiana statute which rendered a defendant death
penalty eligible for a child rape conviction, in which the victim was not killed .
128 S .Ct. at 2647. Kennedv does not affect the constitutionality of applying
the death penalty to crimes which led to the death of the victim, such as capital
kidnapping . In fact, Kennedy states: "[d]ifficulties in administering the [death]
penalty to ensure against its arbitrary and capricious application require
adherence to a rule reserving its use, at this stage of evolving standards and in
cases of crimes against individuals, for crimes that take the life of the victim."
Id . at 2665 . Thus, we find Kennedy has no bearing on our interpretation of the
capital kidnapping statute, KRS 509 .040(2), and our holding in St. Clair is not
unconstitutional.
VI. APPELLANT'S CONVICTIONS FOR BOTH CAPITAL KIDNAPPING AND
CAPITAL MURDER DO NOT VIOLATE DOUBLE JEOPARDY
Appellant next argues that his convictions for capital kidnapping and
capital murder violate double jeopardy. Appellant tenders three arguments,
each of which will be dealt with separately : A) that our ruling in St. Clair , 10
S.W.3d 482, was erroneous; B) that St. Clair does not survive Apprendi v. New
Jersey , 530 U.S . 266 (2000) ; and C) that murder is a lesser-included offense of
capital kidnapping .
A. Our opinion in St. Clair is not erroneous and reflects the current statutory
scheme
Appellant first argues that St. Clair is based on a legal impossibility and
is thus erroneous . St. Clair holds that the offenses of murder and capital
kidnapping do not merge during the guilt phase because the capital kidnapping
statute, KRS 509 .040(2), is only implicated when the kidnapping leads in
someway to the victim's death, while murder "contains an element, i .e . either
intent to kill or aggravated wantonness, which is not required to enhance
kidnapping from a Class A felony to a capital offense ." St. Clair, 10 S .W.3d at
486 . We also found that the two offenses do not merge at the penalty phase
because it is not "double jeopardy to impose a separate penalty for one offense
while using the same offense as an aggravating circumstance authorizing
imposition of capital punishment for another offense." Id. at 487 (citing Witte
v. United States, 515 U.S . 389 (1995)) . Appellant argues that St. Clair is based
on a legal impossibility because it assumes a jury could find that a defendant's
actions in kidnapping a victim led to the accidental death of that victim, but
then also find that the defendant intentionally murdered the same victim. He
argues that a jury could not find that the defendant killed both accidentally
and intentionally.
Appellant, however, misreads St. Clair. St. Clair stands for the
proposition that it is the death of the kidnapping victim that makes kidnapping
a capital offense. St. Clair, 10 S.W.3d at 486 . The jury is not required to
determine the defendant's mental state to find him guilty of capital kidnapping,
only that the victim died as a result of the kidnapping . See KRS 509 .040(2) .
The defendant's intent or mental state is only determined when the jury
determines whether the defendant murdered the victim. Murder then can be
used as an aggravating circumstance which allows the imposition of the death
penalty . KRS 532 .025(2)(a)(2) . Thus, there is no legal impossibility and we
believe that St. Clair comports with the statutory scheme enacted by the
legislature .
B . Apprendi does not render the logic used in St. Clair invalid
Appellant next argues that the United States Supreme Court opinion in
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S . 466 (2000), invalidates the logic used in St.
Clair. Apprendi states that any fact which increases the range of possible
punishments is "the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense
than the one covered by the jury's guilty verdict. Indeed, it fits squarely within
the usual definition of an `element' of the offense ." Apprendi , 530 U .S. at 494,
fn 19 . Appellant uses this language to argue that since murder is a death
penalty aggravator for kidnapping, it is actually an element of capital
kidnapping . Appellant thus believes that St. Clair is invalid since it holds that
capital kidnapping and murder do not merge . St. Clair, 10 S.W.3d at 486-487 .
We disagree with Appellant's argument .
Apprendi only stands for the proposition that circumstances which
enhance a penalty must be found beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury, not by a
preponderance of the evidence and not just to a judge . 530 U .S. at 495 (citing
McMillan v. Pennsylvania , 477 U.S . 79, 88 (1986)) ("When a judge's finding
based on a mere preponderance of the evidence authorizes an increase in the
maximum punishment, it is appropriately characterized as `a tail which wags
the dog of the substantive offense .') Notably, Apprendi does not overrule prior
cases which held that murder could be used as a circumstance to elevate a
punishment to the death penalty. See United States v. Booker, 543 U .S . 220,
240 (2005) (holding that Witte, 515 U.S . 389, is good case law post-Apprendi) .
Additionally, in a post-Apprendi case, we reaffirmed our support for St. Clair.
Jacobs v. Commonwealth , 58 S .W .3d 435, 438 (Ky. 2001) . Apprendi does not
overrule nor affect our ruling in St. Clair.
C . Intentional murder is not a lesser-included offense of Capital Kidnapping
Appellant finally argues that based on his novel interpretation of the
capital kidnapping statute to include murder as a required element of capital
kidnapping, murder becomes a lesser-included offense of capital kidnapping.
However, we again decline to accept Appellant's interpretation of the capital
kidnapping statute . We stand by St. Clair for the proposition that capital
kidnapping is committed when the death of the victim occurs as a result of the
kidnapping, and that murder can be used as a death penalty aggravator .
VII. APPELLANT'S EIGHTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS WERE NOT VIOLATED BY
THE JURY'S CONSIDERATION OF MURDER AS AN AGGRAVATOR FOR
CAPITAL KIDNAPPING
Appellant finally argues that because of Kennedy and his interpretation
of the capital kidnapping statute which requires murder to be an element of
capital kidnapping, the guilty verdict Appellant received for murder could not
be used as a death penalty aggravator for kidnapping . Appellant thus argues
that during his trial, murder was improperly used twice: once as an element of
capital kidnapping, and again as a death penalty aggravator for kidnapping .
Appellant believes he is entitled to a new penalty phase since he contends he
was ineligible for the death penalty.
However, as previously stated, Kennedy does not stand for the
proposition that kidnapping can only be raised to a capital offense if the
defendant intentionally killed the victim. Further, as the statutory scheme
indicates and our holding in St. Clair affirms, it is the death of the victim which
raises kidnapping to a capital offense . 10 S.W.3d at 486. Thus, murder is an
appropriate aggravator, and the jury could consider the death penalty in the
range of penalties for Appellant's crimes . Even if we were to agree that murder
was not an appropriate aggravator, the jury found Appellant guilty of first
degree rape and first-degree sodomy, both of which could have been used to
aggravate the kidnapping to a capital offense. KRS 532.025(2)(a)(2) .
Appellant's Eighth Amendment rights were not violated .
For the above stated reasons, we affirm the conviction and sentence of
the Hickman Circuit Court.
All sitting. All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Jamesa J. Drake
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane Suite 301
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Jack Conway
Attorney General
Jeanne Deborah Anderson, Executive Director
Franklin Todd Lewis, Executive Director
Barbara Maines Whaley, Assistant Attorney General
Jeffrey Ray Prather, Attorney General Special Prosecutions
Susan Roncarti Lenz, Assistant Attorney General
Scott Crawford Sutherland, Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
Office of Criminal Appeals
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601-8204
uyrrntr Courf of ~irufurkV
2008-SC-000465-MR
QUINCY OMAR CROSS
APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM HICKMAN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE TIMOTHY C. STARK, JUDGE
NO . 08-CR-00001
V.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR REHEARING
AND GRANTING MODIFICATION
The Appellant having filed a Petition for Rehearing and modification or
extension of the Memorandum Opinion of the Court, rendered November
25, 2009 ; and the Court being otherwise fully and sufficiently advised;
The Court ORDERS that the Petition for Rehearing is DENIED ; and
that the Petition for Modification is GRANTED, and modifies the
Memorandum Opinion of the Court, rendered November 25, 2009, to
address additional arguments presented on appeal . The attached opinion
is SUBSTITUTED in lieu of the original . Said modification does not affect
the holding.
All sitting . All concur .
ENTERED : March 18, 2010 .
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