SHAWN WINDSOR V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
CORRECTED : SEPTEMBER 20, 2010
RENDERED : AUGUST 26, 2010
TO BE PUBLISHED
,iuyrrutr . C~vurf of ~irufurkV
2008-SC-000383-MR
SHAWN WINDSOR
APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE MARTIN F. MCDONALD, JUDGE
NO . 04-CR-000001
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE CUNNINGHAM
AFFIRMING
Appellant, Shawn Windsor, appeals a judgment of the Jefferson Circuit
Court imposing two death sentences . Windsor entered an unconditional guilty
plea to two counts of murder, one count of felony theft, and one count of
violating a protective order. Windsor admitted that he murdered his wife, Betty
Jean, and their son, Corey, by stabbing them with a kitchen knife and beating
them with a dumbbell .
Following Windsor's arrest some six months after the crimes, the case
initially proceeded towards trial. On July 7, 2006, the day that the trial was
scheduled to commence, Windsor took an overdose of prescription medication.
He was taken to the hospital for treatment and later released. In light of
Windsor's suicide attempt, the trial court conducted a competency hearing on
July 13, 2006 . Windsor was present.
Two psychiatrists testified at the hearing. Dr. Tim Allen, a Kentucky
Correctional Psychiatric Center (KCPC) psychiatrist, examined Windsor after
his suicide attempt. Dr . Allen testified that he had reviewed three prior KCPC
mental evaluations, all of which concluded that Windsor was competent to
stand. trial . Following his own evaluation of Windsor, Dr. Allen likewise
concluded that he was competent to stand trial.
Dr.. Walter Butler, a psychiatrist at Louisville Behavioral Health Service,
also examined Windsor and concluded that he was still suffering from the
after-effects of the prescription drug overdose . Accordingly, Dr . Butler found
Windsor incompetent to stand trial at that time and recommended further
testing. The trial court ruled the following day, determining that Windsor was
competent to stand trial.
Three days later, on July 17th, Windsor announced that he wished to
enter a plea of guilty and accept a sentence of death. A Boykin hearing was
conducted. In addition to the colloquoy required by Boykin v. Alabama, 395
U .S. 238 (1969), the trial court inquired about Windsor's health, prior mental
health issues, current medication, and drug use . Windsor accepted complete
and unqualified responsibility for the charged crimes. He verbally repeated his
desire to plead guilty at least five times in open court, in addition to signing
AOC Form 491 .1 (Commonwealth's Offer on a Plea of Guilty) and AOC Form
491 (Motion to Enter Guilty Plea) . The trial court made a finding on the record
that the plea was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made, and then
accepted the guilty plea. However, the trial court denied Windsor's request to
be sentenced immediately.
A two-day sentencing hearing was conducted in October 2006. The trial
court found the existence of two statutory aggravating circumstances beyond a
reasonable doubt: that Windsor intentionally caused multiple deaths; and that
a valid protective order was in effect against Windsor at the time he murdered
his wife . Against Windsor's repeated objections, defense counsel presented
evidence in mitigation, including the testimony of a psychiatrist, a psychologist,
and a mitigation specialist . The trial court ultimately sentenced Windsor to
.
death for the murders of his wife and son, five years imprisonment for theft,
and twelve months imprisonment for violation of a protective order.
Windsor now appeals as a matter of right. Ky . Const. ยง 110(2)(b) .
Further facts will be developed as necessary.
Subsequent Competency Hearing
Windsor first argues that the trial court erred by failing to postpone the
proceedings until a subsequent, thorough competency hearing could be held.
The claim is preserved by his RCr 8.06 motion "to stay proceedings pending a
determination of Defendant's competency in light of his request for the Court to
impose the death penalty." The trial court denied the motion, stating that it
had not been presented with any indication that Windsor's competency had
changed since the competency hearing held just four days earlier.
RCr 8 .06 provides that all proceedings against a criminal defendant
shall be postponed when "there are reasonable grounds to believe that the
defendant lacks the capacity to appreciate the nature and consequences of the
proceedings against him or her, or to participate rationally in his or her
defense ." See also KRS 504 . 100 . The standard of review of a trial court's
decision to conduct a competency hearing is whether a reasonable judge
should have experienced doubt with respect to competency to stand trial. Gray
v. Commonwealth, 233 S.W.3d 715, 718 (Ky. 2007) . It is within the trial court's
sound discretion to determine whether "reasonable grounds" exist to question
competency, though once such grounds do exist, a competency hearing is
mandatory . Id. We note that "there is no heightened standard of competency
required in order to enter a guilty plea." Chapman v. Commonwealth, 265
S.W .3d 156, 174 (Ky. 2007) .
It must be emphasized that Windsor does not challenge the trial court's
initial determination of competency following the July 13th competency hearing .
Rather, Windsor asserts that the trial court erred in not revisiting the issue of
competency after he indicated his desire to plead guilty on July 17th and accept
the death penalty for the two murders . Thus, the issue before this Court is
whether Windsor's stated desire to plead guilty and accept the death penalty
creates reasonable grounds, within the meaning of KRS 504 .100(1), to question
his competency.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that
reasonable grounds did not exist to revisit the issue of Windsor's competency.
The trial court found Windsor competent following a full hearing only four days
before the RCr 8 .06 motion was made . No evidence was presented with the
motion indicating that Windsor's mental health had deteriorated since the July
13th competency hearing. See Harston v. Commonwealth, 638 S .W.2d 700, 701
(Ky. 1982) ("[Rule 8.06] does not place upon the trial court a duty to hold
hearing after hearing in the absence of some appearance of change in the
defendant's condition since the ruling on competency .") . Rather, defense
counsel presented a letter from Dr . Butler, who restated his opinion that
Windsor was incompetent to stand trial based on his severe depression .
However, Dr. Butler's letter was not the result of a new evaluation of Windsor,
but simply a reiteration of the professional opinion he gave at the competency
hearing. Furthermore, during the plea proceedings, the trial court questioned
Windsor directly after defense counsel made the motion to stay proceedings .
He stated that he felt fully competent and felt no residual effects from the
overdose . The video record of the competency hearing reveals that Windsor's
demeanor, responses, and affect in the courtroom were appropriate and
coherent. Cf. Hunter v. Commonwealth, 869 S.W .2d 719, 724 (Ky. 1994) (citing
defendant's "bizarre behavior" and "inappropriate laughter" as factors in
warranting RCr 8 .06 stay of proceedings) .
In essence, Windsor points only to his intention to plead guilty and
accept the death penalty as a basis for a new competency hearing. In
Chapman, we specifically rejected the notion that a defendant who seeks to
plead guilty and receive the death penalty is inherently incompetent. 265
S .W.3d at 175. In light of these circumstances, we do not believe that the trial
court abused its discretion in denying the RCr 8 .06 motion. Windsor had been
found competent just four days prior, and no new circumstances were
presented to the trial court that would constitute "reasonable grounds" to
question Windsor's competency anew. See Jacobs v. Commonwealth, 58
.
S .W.3d 435, 443 (Ky . 2001) (trial court did not abuse discretion in denying
second competency hearing where no evidence was presented that defendant's
mental state had changed since prior adjudication) .
Determination of Appropriate Punishment
Windsor next argues that the trial court failed to find beyond a
reasonable doubt that death was the appropriate punishment . The issue is
unpreserved for appellate review . Nonetheless, we consider the claim in light of
the penalty imposed and pursuant to KRS 532 .025(2) .
According to Windsor, the requirement set forth in KRS 500 .070(1) that
the Commonwealth must prove "every element of the case beyond a reasonable
doubt" applies to the capital punishment provisions of KRS 532 .025 . Thus,
Windsor argues that the sentencing body - here, the trial court - must be
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that death is the appropriate penalty.
Windsor claims that the trial court in this case failed to make such a finding.
KRS 532.025(3) requires that the sentencing jury or judge find beyond a
reasonable doubt that at least one aggravating circumstance exists before a
capital sentence may be imposed . There is no requirement in the plain
language of the statute that the sentencing jury or judge must also make a
determination beyond a reasonable doubt that capital punishment is
appropriate . A majority of this Court has recently reaffirmed that Kentucky's
capital sentencing scheme does not require the jury to find that death is the
appropriate penalty beyond a reasonable doubt. Brown v. Commonwealth,
S.W.3d
, n.2 (Ky. June 17, 2010) . See also Skaggs v. Commonwealth, 694
S.W .2d 672, 680 (Ky. 1985) ("There is no requirement that the jury be
instructed to find that death is the appropriate punishment beyond a
reasonable doubt.") .
Waiver of Jury Sentencing in Capital Case
Windsor claims that KRS 532 .030(4) requires jury sentencing in capital
cases, and that this requirement cannot be waived by the defendant . "Clearly,
under Kentucky law a criminal defendant has a statutory right to have his
sentence set by a jury ." Wilson v. Commonwealth, 765 S .W.2d 22 (Ky. 1989) .
In Chapman, we considered whether this right may be waived when a capital
offense is charged :
[W]e decline to declare that a defendant may not waive
his right to have a jury fix his sentence. Such a
holding would appear to be in conflict with RCr 9.26,
as well as our previous recognition that a defendant
has the concomitant right to waive a trial by jury. We
have not been cited to any authority that moves us to
find that a defendant loses the right to waive jury
sentencing simply because that defendant has pleaded
guilty to a capital offense .
265 S.W.3d at 177 .
Windsor has presented no persuasive reason to revisit this recent
holding.
Constitutionality of Judge Sentencing in Capital Case
Where, in the previous argument Windsor argued that jury sentencing
cannot be waived under our statutory scheme, he next makes an identical
argument under the Kentucky Constitution. Windsor asserts that Section 11
of the Kentucky Constitution prohibits the imposition of a sentence by a trial
judge . Section 11 declares that no one can "be deprived of his life, liberty or
property, unless by the judgment of his peers or of the law of the land ."
Windsor argues that to the extent KRS 532 .025(3) relegates the sentencing jury
to an "advisory role" - and that the jury's sentencing recommendation is not
binding on the trial court - it is unconstitutional .
However, Kentucky confers no constitutional right to jury sentencing .
"The constitutional right to trial by jury extends to the trial of the issue of guilt
or innocence where a. plea of not guilty has been entered and does not extend
to the fixing of the penalty." Williams v. Jones, 338 S .W.2d 693, 694 (Ky.
1960) . See also Ward v. Hurst, 300 Ky. 464, 189 S .W .2d 594 (1945) ;
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 910 S .W .2d 229, 230 (Ky. 1995) (recognizing in
death penalty case that Kentucky constitution "fails to secure any right of jury
sentencing") . For this reason, Windsor's claim that KRS 532 .025(3) infringes
upon a constitutional right is without merit.
Record on Appeal
KRS 532 .075 mandates review by this Court whenever the death penalty
is imposed . Subsection (1) of the statute requires that the review be conducted
"on the record" and orders the circuit clerk to "transmit the entire record and
transcript to the Supreme Court" for purposes of the review. Windsor argues
that the review required by KRS 532 .075 cannot be conducted unless and until
the circuit court prepares a written transcript of the proceedings in this case .
Windsor further claims that the failure to consider a written transcript
precludes attachment of our jurisdiction to conduct the required review .
KRS 532 .075 does not require that a transcript be prepared, nor does it
require this Court's review to be conducted only on a written transcript of the
proceedings. The plain language of the statute is that our review be conducted
"on the record ." Video recordings of the proceedings, along with the clerk's
written record, constitute the official record on appeal . CR 98(3) . A video
recording of the proceedings satisfies the requirements of KRS 532.075.
We have also considered Windsor's request that the trial court's KRS
532 .075 report be "disregarded" by this Court. This argument is vague and it
is not entirely clear what relief is being requested . Suffice it to say, the report
is required by statute and the trial court, in this case, satisfied its statutory
duty.
_
Re-sentencing
In his final claim, Windsor asks that his sentence be vacated pursuant to
KRS 532.075(5)(b), which permits this Court to set aside a death penalty based
on "the record and argument of counsel." In support of this request, Windsor
points to the Commonwealth Attorney's refusal to consider a sentence other
than death. He also urges that his sentence be vacated so that, upon remand,
the sentencing judge or jury may be provided with comparison information in
the form of similar criminal cases . Finally, Windsor reiterates his argument
that his competency at the time of his guilty plea was questionable and
warrants re-examination . As an aside, Windsor notes that he no longer wishes
to be sentenced to death.'
Windsor has presented no circumstance that would require reversal of
his sentence . The Commonwealth enjoys broad discretion in its consideration
of plea bargains and in its decisions with respect to the charging of crimes and
the request for certain penalties . "The Commonwealth is under no duty to
accept an offer of a plea in exchange for - a sentence less than death." Moore v.
Commonwealth, 983 S .W.2d 479, 487 (Ky. 1998) . The mere fact that the
Commonwealth insisted on seeking the death penalty in this case is not an
indication of prosecutorial misconduct or arbitrariness.
There is no statutory authority for the proposition that the sentencing
judge or jury must consider the comparative information described in KRS
' There is nothing in the current record on appeal that substantiates this sentiment.
Regardless, even if such a request was of record, it bears no relevancy to the issues
presently raised.
532 .075(5)(b) prior to sentencing. The plain language of the statute is clear
that the comparative information be provided to the lower court when
re-sentencing is ordered.
For these reasons, we do not believe that re-sentencing is warranted in
this case.
IRS 532.075(3) Review
As required by KRS 532 .075(3), we have reviewed the record and
conclude that the sentence of death was not imposed under the influence of
passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor. The evidence supports the
judge's finding that two statutory aggravating factors exist in this case.
Specifically, Windsor admitted that he intentionally committed a double
murder and that he murdered his wife while a protective order on her behalf
was in effect. See KRS 532 .025(2)(a)(6) ; KRS 532.025(2)(a)(8) .
Having considered both the crimes and the defendants in similar cases,
particularly those involving multiple murders, we cannot conclude that
Windsor's punishment is disproportionate or excessive . Windsor admitted to
the murders of his wife and eight-year-old son. Their deaths were the result. of
multiple stab wounds and bludgeoning inflicted by a dumbbell . The only
appropriate characterization of Windsor's crimes is brutal, senseless, and
exceedingly heinous. The penalty was not disproportionate or excessive in
relation to Windsor's crimes or in relation to other defendants who have
committed similar crimes. See Johnson v. Commonwealth, 103 S.W.3d 687
(Ky . 2003) (noting particularly brutal nature of murder) ; Chapman, 265 S.W .3d
at 156 (involving murder of two children) ; Parrish v. Commonwealth, 121
S.W .3d 198 (Ky. 2003) (involving murder of adult woman and her ten-year-old
son) ; Hodge v. Commonwealth, 17 S .W.3d 824 (Ky. 2000) (involving murder of
husband and wife) .
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court is
affirmed.
Minton, C.J. ; Noble, Schroder and Scott, JJ ., concur. Abramson and
Venters, JJ., concur except as to the issue of whether the appropriateness of
the death penalty must be determined beyond a reasonable doubt . On that
issue, Abramson and Venters, JJ., dissent for the reasons stated in Justice
Abramson's separate opinion in Brown v. Commonwealth,
June 17, 2010), in which Venters, J., joined .
S.W.3d
(Ky.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Daniel T. Goyette
Louisville Metro Public Defender
200 Advocacy Plaza
719 West Jefferson Street
Louisville, KY 40202
James David Niehaus
Deputy Appellate Defender
Office of the Louisville Metro Public Defender
200 Advocacy Plaza
719 West Jefferson Street
Louisville, KY 40202
Shawn Windsor
Inmate #182955
Kentucky State Penitentiary
P. O. Box 5128
Eddyville, KY 42038
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE :
Jack Conway
Attorney General
James Hays Lawson
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Criminal Appeals
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601
David A. Smith
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
6*uyrrmv~ Courf of ~irufurkv
2008-SC-000383-MR
SHAWN WINDSOR
APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE MARTIN F. MCDONALD, JUDGE
NO . 04-CR-000001
V.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
ORDER OF CORRECTION
On the Court's own motion, the Opinion of the Court rendered August 26,
2010, is hereby corrected by substituting the entire opinion as attached hereto .
Said correction does not affect the holding of the original opinion as originally
rendered.
ENTERED : September 2-0 , 2010 .
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.