KENNETH PATTERSON V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IMPORTANT NOTICE
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED."
PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76 .28(4)(C),
THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER
CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE ; HOWEVER,
UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS,
RENDERED AFTER-JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR
CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED
OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE
BEFORE THE COURT. OPINIONS CITED FOR CONSIDERATION
BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED
DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A COPY OF THE
ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG WITH THE
DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO THE
ACTION.
RENDERED : MARCH 1.8, 2010
J"()41
,*uyrrmr 01/aurf of ,
2008-SC-000236-MR
b&. D.C .
KENNETH PATTERSON
V.
ON APPEAL FROM FULTON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE CHARLES W. BOTELER, JR., JUDGE
NO. 06-CR-00034
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
REVERSING AND REMANDING
Kenneth Patterson appeals as a matter of right from a February 28, 2008
Judgment of the Fulton Circuit Court convicting him of rape in the first degree,
in violation of KRS 510.040, and sentencing him as a second-degree persistent
felony offender to fifty years in prison. The Commonwealth alleged, and the
jury found, that in February or March 2005 Patterson forcibly raped his
girlfriend's then thirteen-year-old daughter. Patterson contends that his trial
was rendered unfair by numerous evidentiary errors, including the admission
of testimony improperly bolstering that of the victim and evidence not properly
admissible under KRE 404(b) as well as the exclusion of evidence tending to
show that the victim had made false allegations of sexual abuse against others .
In addition, he contends that he was subjected to prosecutorial vindictiveness,
that the trial court erred by failing to conduct a competency hearing, that the
Commonwealth failed to provide him with the tape of the grand jury
proceedings, and that he should have been granted a hearing to determine
whether his sex-offender evaluation had been properly prepared. Because we
agree with Patterson that the victim's testimony was improperly bolstered, we
must reverse the trial court's Judgment and remand this matter for additional
proceedings . We will address the other issues Patterson has raised to the
extent that they might bear on a new trial .
RELEVANT FACTS
The record indicates that in late 2004 Patterson became romantically
involved with M.E .S . and that in early 2005 he moved in with, or at least
frequently stayed overnight with, her and her three children, C .A .H . , C .P. , and
S .P. C .A.H . turned thirteen years old in February 2005 . C .P. and S . P. , who
were children of a different father, were several years younger . In 2005, a
Fulton County grand jury indicted Patterson for the abuse of all three children .
When Patterson refused the Commonwealth's proffered plea bargain on those
charges, the prosecutor obtained additional indictments charging Patterson
with complicity in a rape of M.E.S . and with the rape of C .A.H . This last charge
was tried in November 2007 and is the subject of this appeal.
At the trial, C .P. testified that in late February 2005 his Cub Scout troop
held a banquet, and that he, his mother, and S .P. attended the banquet, but
that C .A.H . remained home with Patterson . C .A.H . testified that on the night of
the banquet, which she remembered as having been in March, Patterson
forcibly subjected her to intercourse . She admitted that in June of 2005 she
had initially accused Patterson of a single act of fondling, and that she had not
alleged rape until November of that year. Furthermore, she had not spoken
with a police officer about that allegation until March of 2006, after she had
received a considerable amount of counseling . She testified that she withheld
the more serious allegation because she feared her mother's reaction, but that
counseling and her removal to foster care had enabled her to tell what she had
undergone.
As noted, Patterson was convicted of raping C .A.H . He was sentenced to
twenty years for first-degree rape enhanced to fifty years as a result of his being
a second-degree persistent felony offender.
ANALYSIS
I. The Trial Court Erred By Admitting Evidence Of A Class Habit.
In support of C .A.H .'s testimony and over Patterson's objection, the
police officer who interviewed C .A.H . in both June of 2005 and March of 2006
was permitted to testify that in his experience child sex-abuse victims were
almost always initially reluctant to "give up information," and that commonly
they provided additional details as time went on . Patterson's first contention is
that this testimony about other victims was irrelevant and improperly bolstered
the testimony of C .A.H . We agree .
In Sanderson v. Commonwealth, 291 S .W.3d 610 (Ky . 2009), we recently
reiterated the rule against this sort of class habit testimony and explained that
a party cannot introduce evidence of the habit of a
class of individuals either to prove that another
member of the class acted the same way under similar
circumstances or to prove that the person was a
member of that class because he/ she acted the same
way under similar circumstances .
Id. at 613 (citing Kurtz v. Commonwealth, 172 S .W.3d 409 (Ky. 2005) ; internal
quotation marks omitted) . This rule applies to investigators, Miller v.
Commonwealth, 77 S .W.3d 566 (Ky . 2002), as well as to experts, Sanderson,
and it applies whether the testimony is offered on direct examination of a
witness during the Commonwealth's case in chief or, as it was here, on redirect
examination for the purpose of rebuttal or rehabilitation . Id.; Newkirk v.
Commonwealth, 937 S.W .2d 690 (Ky. 1996) . 1
The trial court erred, therefore, by permitting the class habit testimony,
and because this case turned on the jury's assessment of C.A .H .'s credibility,
we cannot say that testimony improperly bolstering her credibility was
harmless . We are thus obliged to reverse Patterson's conviction and remand
for additional proceedings.
II . The Trial Court Also Erred By Admitting Evidence In Violation Of KRE
404(b).
The propriety of reversing for a new trial is buttressed by two other
obvious evidentiary errors . The first occurred when Charles Johnson,
Patterson's cell mate for a time in the Fulton County Detention Center, was
permitted to testify that Patterson had admitted to him that he had "fondled
with the kids" and "wanted to make their lives a living hell ." Johnson did not
To the extent that Martin v. Commonwealth, 170 S.W.3d 374 (Ky. 2005), holds
otherwise, we regard it as anomalous and subject to reversal on that ground in a
case in which the anomaly is properly raised.
testify that Patterson said anything about the alleged rape of C .A.H ., and his
reference to crimes-the fondling of the "kids,"-for which Patterson was
apparently to be tried separately, was a clear violation of KRE 404's rule
against such collateral crime evidence .
Yet another error occurred with reference to a visitation dispute M.E .S.
had with her ex-husband, the father of C.P. and S .P. Patterson argued that
M.E.S .'s life had been in disarray and that C.A.H . had accused him of rape in
hopes of being removed from her mother's custody. As proof of M.E .S .'s
difficulties, Patterson testified about a dispute M.E .S. had with her ex-husband
over visitation with the two younger children . He admitted that he had gotten
involved in that dispute and had left harassing phone messages on the exhusband's answering machine. During cross-examination, however, he denied
that in those messages he referred to himself as the children's "daddy" and to
the ex-husband as merely their "father." Ostensibly to impeach that testimony,
the Commonwealth was permitted to call the ex-husband as a witness and to
play several minutes worth of the answering machine tape, on which an
obviously drunken and belligerent Patterson spews a series of taunts and
curses . When Patterson objected to the irrelevant evidence, the court
permitted the witness, outside the hearing of the jury, to locate the impeaching
portion of the tape, but by that point the jury had heard the damaging,
irrelevant evidence.
As the trial court itself observed, Patterson's comment to the ex-husband
was completely collateral to the issues being tried, and generally impeachment
is not allowed with regard to collateral matters . Metcalf v. Commonwealth, 158
S.W.3d 740 (Ky. 2005) . Even if the impeachment were allowable---and
Patterson did not object on collateral fact grounds-the impeaching portions of
the tape were only a few seconds long. The long portion of the tape played for
the jury had nothing to do with Patterson's "daddy" remark. It was introduced
not as impeachment, but as collateral evidence of bad character, and thus,
again, clearly violated KRE 404's rule against such evidence .
These evidentiary flaws, the improper bolstering of C .A.H .'s testimony
and the improper evidence of Patterson's other crimes and character, denied
Patterson a fair trial. We thus reverse his conviction and remand the matter
for additional proceedings . We address Patterson's other claims of error only to
the extent that the issues are apt to recur on remand .
III. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Excluding Evidence
Pursuant to KRE 412 and KRE 802.
A. Evidence Of A Sex Crime Victim's Prior Abuse Allegations Is Not
Admissible Unless Shown To Be Demonstrably False.
Patterson contends that the trial court erred by disallowing two lines of
evidence tending to show that C.A.H .'s rape allegation was false. The first line
concerns what Patterson maintains were C.A .H .'s false allegations of abuse
against others . Outside the presence of the jury, C .A.H .'s social worker
testified that she had heard that when C.A.H . was five years old she had
complained that "Waldo" had touched her inappropriately. Waldo had not been
identified or located, however, so apparently the matter had been dropped. The
social worker was also aware that in late 2005 and early 2006, when C .A.H .
was thirteen, she had been hospitalized in psychiatric facilities and that at one
of them she had accused a hospital employee of inappropriately touching her
breast. The social worker had not been involved in the investigation of that
complaint, however, and knew only that the employee had denied the allegation
and that it had not resulted in criminal charges.
The parties also questioned C .A.H. outside the presence of the jury, and
she testified that she had had a dizzy spell at the hospital, following which the
employee had helped her to her room. While in the room, the employee had
reached across her to turn on a light and in doing so had touched her breast .
Unlike a mere brush, his hand had lingered on her breast, C .A.H . believed, in a
manner that made the touch seem deliberate . She admitted that the touch
could have been accidental, but reiterated that it had seemed deliberate to her.
The parties did not question C.A .H . about the "Waldo" incident .
Patterson sought to cross examine the social worker and C .A .H . about
both incidents in front of the jury and argued that both incidents could be
construed as prior false accusations tending to show that the rape accusation
was likewise false. The trial court disallowed that line of questioning, however,
apparently on the ground that the prior allegations had not been shown to be
demonstrably false. Patterson contends either that the trial court misapplied
the demonstrably false standard or that that standard sets the bar of
admissibility too high. We disagree on both counts.
As the parties note, a sex-crime victim's prior or collateral allegations of
abuse implicate KRE 412, the rape shield rule . In Dennis v. Commonwealth,
released this same date, this Court has addressed the proper treatment of false
allegations of abuse in the context of the Kentucky Rules of Evidence and the
defendant's Sixth Amendment confrontation rights. Our discussion and
adoption of the "demonstrably false" standard is dispositive of Patterson's
argument that the standard is too high .
Under these and similar rules, numerous courts,
both federal and state, have held that the credibility of
the complaining witness in a sex crime case may be
attacked by cross-examination concerning a prior false
accusation . This is so notwithstanding the fact that
such an attack implicates KRE 412, the rape shield
rule . Pursuant to that rule, as noted above, evidence
that the alleged victim of sexual misconduct "engaged
in other sexual behavior" is generally not admissible in
any proceeding involving the alleged misconduct .
False allegations of abuse, however, do not involve
"other sexual behavior," and thus evidence of such
false allegations is not barred by the rape shield rule
and may be admitted in accord with the other rules of
evidence . See Lawson, Kentucky Evidence Law
Handbook ยง 2 .30[7] (4th ed. 2003) (noting that drafters
of federal rape shield rule did not intend for it to apply
to false accusations and the federal courts have
interpreted it accordingly) . See also Nancy M. King,
"Impeachment or Cross-Examination of Prosecuting
Witness in Sexual Offense Trial by Showing that Similar
Charges were Made Against Other Persons, " 71 ALR 411-1
469 (1989) . To insure that the rape shield rule is not
circumvented, however, the proponent of such
evidence is required to make a preliminary showing
that the prosecuting witness made a prior accusation
and that the accusation was in fact false . State v.
Guenther, 854 A .2d 308 (N .J . 2004) (collecting cases);
United States v. Kenyon, 481 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2007) .
Courts have differed in the standard of proof the
defendant must satisfy to make this preliminary
showing. Some permit cross examination about the
matter if the defendant establishes the false allegation
by a preponderance of the evidence . Guenther, supra;
Morgan v. State, 54 P.3d 332 (Alaska App. 2002) .
Some have required a showing by clear and convincing
evidence. State v. Bm.m, 923 A.2d 1068 (N .H . 2007) .
Some require "a reasonable probability of falsity."
State v. Barber, 766 P .2d 1.288 (Kan . App . 1.989) .
Some require "strong and substantial proof of actual
falsity." State v. Quinn, 490 S .E .2d 34 (W.Va. 1997).
Others, including our own Court of Appeals, have
required that the prior accusation be shown to be
"demonstrably false ." Capshaw v. Commonwealth, 253
S.W.3d 557 (Ky. App . 2007) (citing Hall v.
Commonwealth, 956 S .W .2d 224 (Ky. App. 1997)) ;
Blair v. State, 877 N .E .2d 1225 (Ind. App. 2007) ; State
v. Casillas, 205 P-3d 830 (N.M . App. 2009) ; State v.
Maxwell, 18 P.3d 438 (Or. App . 2001) .
In Hall, our Court of Appeals justified a
heightened standard of proof by opining "evidence of
this nature is without a doubt extremely prejudicial .
Its admission would undermine the purpose of KRE
412, shifting the focus from the real issues, and
effectively put the victim on trial ." Id. at 227 .
Similarly, at least one commentator has argued that to
further the important purposes of the rape shield rule,
it is fair to require the defendant to establish by clear
and convincing evidence that he is not probing prior
sexual behavior but only prior dishonesty . Bopst,
"Rape Shield Laws and Prior False Accusations of
Rape: The Need for Meaningful Legislative Reform," 24
J. Legis. 125 (1998) . We recently noted the Hall
"demonstrably false" standard in Kreps v
Commonwealth, 286 S .W.3d 213 (Ky. 2009), but
without considering the propriety of that standard
emphasized that evidence of false prior accusations
remains subject to KRE 403's probative valueprejudicial effect balancing test and held that the
prior-accusation evidence in that case was properly
excluded under this latter rule.
The Hall panel did not attempt to define
"demonstrably false" beyond saying that prior
allegations could not be inquired about unless they
were "proven" or "admitted" to be false. 956 S.W .2d at
227 . The Court of Appeals did not indicate what proof
of falsity would suffice, but it did hold in the case
before it that the alleged perpetrators' denials of the
allegations and the decision by the investigating
agency (and apparently the victim herself] not to press
charges were by themselves insufficient. Numerous
courts have similarly held that an alleged perpetrator's
self-serving denial and a merely inconclusive
investigation are not sufficiently probative of falsity to
remove a prior allegation from the strictures of the
rape shield rule . King, supra, 71 ALR 4", 469 .
The standard of proof question is complicated,
moreover, by the fact that evidence of an alleged
victim's prior false accusations implicates not just the
evidence rules but also the defendant's right under the
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the
United States Constitution to subject the witnesses
against him to meaningful cross-examination. The
rules of evidence, of course, may not be construed so
as to usurp that right, and thus, although the United
States Supreme Court has emphasized that state and
federal rule makers have broad latitude "to establish
rules excluding evidence from criminal trials," United
States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S . 303, 308 (1998), and that
trial judges enjoy wide latitude "to impose reasonable
limits on cross-examination based on concerns about,
among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion
of the issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation that
is repetitive or only marginally relevant," Delaware v.
Van Arsdall, 475 U .S . 673, 679 (1986), the Court has
also declared that that latitude has limits: "Whether
rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment or in the Compulsory Process
or Confrontation Clauses of the Sixth Amendment, the
Constitution guarantees criminal defendants a
meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.
. . . This right is abridged by evidence rules that
infringlel upon a weighty interest of the accused and
are arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes they
are designed to serve ." Holmes v. South Carolina, 547
U .S . 319, 324 (2006) (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted) .
"Arbitrary" rules, the Court explained in Holmes,
are those "that exclude[] important defense evidence
but that d[o] not serve any legitimate interests ." Id. at
325. In determining whether an exclusion is
"disproportionate," other courts have weighed "the
importance of the evidence to an effective defense,
[and] the scope of the ban involved," White v. Coplan,
399 F.3d 18, 24 (1st Cir. 2005) (citing Davis v. Alaska,
415 U.S . 308 (1974) and Van Arsdall, supra), against
any prejudicial effects the rule was designed to guard
against. Barbe v. McBride, 521 F.3d 443 (411, Cir.
2008) ; LaJoie v. Thompson, 217 F.3d 663 (90 Cir.
2000) .
1
Under this "arbitrary or disproportionate"
standard, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has held
that the exclusion of prior allegation. evidence where
the only proof of falsity was the alleged perpetrator's
denial did not run afoul of the defendant's
constitutional rights . Quinn v. Haynes, 234 F.3d 837
(4 t h Cir. 2000) . In White v. Coplan, supra, on the other
hand, the First Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
exclusion of prior-allegation cross examination did
violate the federal constitutional rights of a defendant
convicted of sexually assaulting two sisters, ages eight
and twelve, where these was evidence of falsity beyond
the alleged perpetrators' denials . Both girls had
previously accused a neighbor of assaulting them and
ultimately the neighbor had been acquitted by a jury.
In addition, the older girl had accused a cousin of
assault but had subsequently recanted those
allegations, allegations which the police had.
investigated and found inconsistent with "background
facts". Id. at 22 . Finally, the younger sister had made
an allegation against a man named "Mac" who was
never identified or located in an ensuing investigation .
Evidence of these allegations was not admitted
because although the New Hampshire Supreme Court
found them false to a "reasonable probability" they did
not meet the state's higher "demonstrably false"
standard . Although the First Circuit, on habeas
corpus review, made clear that in its view a heightened
standard of proof in these prior-allegation cases is not
unconstitutional per se, it held that a "demonstrably
false" standard could be unconstitutional in a
particular application as it was on "the peculiar facts"
of that casc .2 Id. at 26. The White Court noted the
vital importance of impeachment in a case that turned
2
The threejudge panel specifically noted that in Ellsworth v. Warden, 333 F-3d 1, 6
(2003), the First Circuit sitting en banc held that a constitutional challenge to the
demonstrably false standard would be "an uphill struggle", noting "the
confrontation clause objection is pretty well limited to extreme cases where the
state restriction is patently unreasonable ." 399 F .3d at 26.
almost entirely on the alleged victims' credibility, and
opined that the evidence of prior falsity (at least as to
the allegations of which the neighbor was acquitted
and the allegations against the cousin which were
recanted and unsubstantiated by investigation) was
substantial enough that cross-examination concerning
it "could easily have changed the outcome ." Id. at 25 .
Cf. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U .S . 673, 680
(holding that the Confrontation Clause was violated
where the defendant was denied cross examination
from which "[a] reasonable jury might have received a
significantly different impression of [the witness's]
credibility . . . .") .
With this constitutional background in mind, we
turn again to KRE 412 . Rape shield rules, the United
States Supreme Court has recognized, serve the
legitimate purpose of protecting the victims of sex
crimes "against surprise, harassment, and
unnecessary invasions of privacy." Michigan v. Lucas,
500 U .S . 145, 150 (1991) (upholding against
constitutional challenge the application of a 10-day
notice provision in Michigan's rape shield law to
preclude the accused from presenting evidence of his
prior sexual relationship with the accuser) . They also
enhance the fairness of trials by excluding irrelevant
character evidence highly apt to distract and confuse
the jury. We agree with the Court of Appeals in Hall
that to prevent these important purposes from being
undermined or circumvented, evidence, including
cross examination, concerning an alleged sex-crime
victim's allegations of sexual impropriety against
another is not admissible at trial unless the proponent
of the evidence establishes at a KRE 104 hearing that
the prior accusation was demonstrably false. To meet
that standard, the proponent must show beyond a
preponderance of the evidence that there is a distinct
and substantial probability that the prior accusation
was false . This heightened standard of proof is meant
to exclude the evidence where the proponent's only
proof of falsity is the alleged perpetrator's denial
and/or an inconclusive investigation of the allegation .
Self-serving denials and investigations that do not
exonerate but merely fail to substantiate are not .
sufficiently probative of falsity to justify breaching the
alleged victim's shield. Applying the shield and
excluding the evidence where there is no proof that the
12
prior allegations were "demonstrably false" is neither
arbitrary nor disproportionate .
This demonstrably false standard should be
applied so as to balance the Commonwealth's and the
victim's interest in excluding collateral character
evidence against the defendant's interest in
confronting the victim with evidence genuinely and
significantly bearing on his or her credibility . So
applied, the standard the Court adopts today does not
create an impassable barrier for prior-allegation
evidence . For example, the victim's recantation of the
prior allegation, an investigation which establishes
pertinent facts wholly inconsistent with the allegation,
or circumstances strongly suggesting that the victim
had a motive to fabricate the prior and current
allegations are all instances potentially justifying
confrontation on this issue . We reiterate, however, as
we explained in Kreps, supra, that even if the prior
allegation is demonstrably false and thus not barred
by KRE 412, the evidence is still subject to other
evidence rules, including KRE 608 and KRE 403, and
may be limited or excluded as those rules require,
consistent, of course, with constitutional restraints .
Dennis,
S .W .3d
(Ky. [March 18, 2010]) .
In this case, the trial court did not misapply the demonstrably false
standard . As noted above, Patterson did not attempt to demonstrate even the
content of the supposed "Waldo" allegation, much less its falsity, and in
support of his contention that C .A.H .'s allegation against the hospital employee
was false, he relied exclusively on the employee's denial and on the apparent
fact that the investigation into the incident did not result in charges . That
evidence is not sufficient to demonstrate falsity under the principles outlined in
Dennis . If the evidence at retrial is no different, the trial court should again
disallow any inquiry into C.A.H .'s prior allegations.
B. The Trial Court Properly Disallowed Hearsay Testimony
Concerning C.A.H's Therapy.
Patterson also contends that he should have been permitted to question
C .A.H .'s social worker about concerns raised by C .A.H .'s therapist to the effect
that during group therapy C .A.H . seemed to mimic other members of the group
and may have falsely claimed to have been abused in ways other members
described . Apparently, the therapist discussed her concerns with the social
worker, who then referred to them in her case notes. Patterson sought: to
question the social worker about the therapist's concerns or to have her read
the pertinent portion of her notes into evidence. The trial court disallowed the
evidence on the ground that the therapist's out-of-court statements were
hearsay, disallowed by KRE 802 . Patterson contends that the evidence was
admissible under either of two exceptions to the hearsay rule: the so-called
state-of-mind exception, KRE 803(3), and the exception for business records,
KRE 803(6) . Neither exception, however, entitles Patterson to relief.
By its own terms, KRE 803(3) does not aid Patterson, as pertinent to this
case, because the exception does not apply to statements "of memory or belief
to prove the fact remembered or believed ." Moseley v. Commonwealth, 960
S.W .2d 460 (Ky. 1997) . The state of mind exception thus does not apply to the
therapist's belief that C.A.H. may have mimicked other girls during group
therapy .
KRE 803(6) is no more availing. That rule allows for the introduction of
records kept in the ordinary course of business by a person with a business
duty to make or contribute to the record . In Prater v. Cabinet for Human
14
Resources, 954 S .W .2d 954 (Ky. 1997), we held that KRE 803(6) applies to case
records prepared by social workers, but we explained that the rule does not
render admissible opinions or hearsay statements (contained in those records,
which are otherwise inadmissible under the rules . Here, Patterson failed to
establish that the therapist was qualified to render an opinion concerning
C .A.H .'s purported mimicry, and he failed to identify an exception to the
hearsay rules which would allow for admission of the therapist's hearsay . Even
were there such an exception, moreover, this evidence would still have been
subject to the KRE 403 balancing test, and the trial court might well have
determined that absent an opportunity for cross examination to flesh out this
topic, the prejudicial effect of its introduction substantially outweighed its
probative value . In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion under the
evidence rules by disallowing the purported group therapy evidence .
Nor did Patterson establish that the excluded evidence had sufficient
probative value to implicate his constitutional rights . Patterson has not shown
that the rape allegation against him occurred after C .A .H .'s group therapy, and
even if it did there is no suggestion in the record that C.A.H . mimicked her rape
allegation or that her therapist thought she night have . On the contrary, the
social worker testified in limine that the therapist's concerns did not relate to
the alleged rape . In these circumstances, exclusion of the group therapy
evidence did not amount to an arbitrary or disproportionate application of the
rule against hearsay.
IV. The Trial Court Did Not Admit Irrelevant Evidence .
Finally, Patterson maintains that the trial court abused its discretion by
admitting evidence of a medical exam performed ten months after the alleged
rape and by admitting evidence that immediately before and after the alleged
rape Patterson played a recording of one of his favorite songs. Both items of
evidence, he insists, were irrelevant. We disagree.
A. The Medical Exam Ten Months After The Alleged Rape Was
Not Without Probative Value.
The examining physician testified that C.A.H .'s vaginal lining bore a
small, well-healed cleft of indeterminate age . The cleft was compatible, he
testified, with a penetrating injury. On cross examination, he conceded that
the cleft could have been caused by a tampon . Although it may well be that
the probative value of a gynecological exam diminishes with delay following the
alleged sexual contact, that value does not vanish where, as here, the exam
reveals an abnormality potentially the result of sexual misconduct . Delay in
that case goes to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility . The trial
court did not abuse its discretion, therefore, by permitting the physician's
testimony and allowing the defendant full cross-examination on the issue .
B . Evidence That Patterson Played His Favorite Song Before
and After The Rape Was Relevant .
Nor did the court abuse its discretion by permitting M.E.S . to identify two
of Patterson's favorite songs and then allowing C .A.H. to testify that he played
one of them, "Jokerman", immediately before and after the rape . Although the
probative value of this evidence was not great, the fact that Patterson played
the music was properly admitted as part of C.A.H .'s testimony regarding the
details of the rape including Patterson's demeaning attitude toward her. C .A.H .
testified to being humiliated by Patterson's demands of her, which included
requiring her to remove her clothes and dance for him prior to the assault .
M.E.S.'s evidence tended to show that that particular song was significant to
Patterson, a detail that jurors could deem relevant, albeit perhaps marginally,
in assessing C .A .H .'s testimony regarding the circumstances surrounding the
rape and Patterson's attitude toward it . Because, moreover, Patterson has
identified no unduly prejudicial effect from that evidence, the trial court cannot
be said to have abused its discretion by admitting it.
V. Patterson Did Not Establish That He Was Prosecuted Vindictively .
The last issue we address is Patterson's claim that he was prosecuted
vindictively. As noted above, Patterson was initially indicted for abusing all
three of M.E .S .'s children . The prosecutor offered a plea bargain on those
charges, and, when Patterson declined the deal, the prosecutor followed
through on his threat to bring additional charges of rape . Patterson contends
that the rape charges were pursued vindictively to punish him for exercising
his right to be tried for the alleged abuse .
As Patterson correctly notes, the Due Process Clauses of the United
States Constitution prohibit judges and prosecutors from proceeding
vindictively against criminal defendants for exercising their rights . United
States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368 (1982) . Vindictiveness may be either actual or
presumptive . Id; Dickerson v. Commonwealth, 278 S .W.3d 145 (Ky . 2009) . The
United States Supreme Court has held, however, that no presumption of
vindictiveness arises when a prosecutor adds charges after plea negotiations
fail. As the Court explained, "in the `give-and-take of plea bargaining, there is
no . . . element of punishment or retaliation so long as the accused is free to
accept or reject the prosecution's offer." Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U .S. 357,
363(1978) .
Patterson was obliged, therefore, to show that the prosecutor in this case
actually proceeded against him not in the legitimate furtherance of his
prosecutorial duties but merely in order to punish Patterson for choosing to go
to trial. He has made no such showing. He quotes his former attorney as
having said that the prosecutor was "pissed off," but even if that remark were
true it would not establish that the prosecutor sought to punish Patterson as
opposed, say, to seeking to maintain a reputation for no-nonsense plea
bargaining or to maximize the public benefit from bringing Patterson to trial .
Because there is no presumption of vindictiveness in these circumstances, and
because Patterson made no showing of actual vindictiveness, the trial court
correctly declined to dismiss Patterson's indictment for the rape of C.A.H .
Patterson also complains that the trial court failed to conduct a
competency hearing, that the Commonwealth failed to disclose in a timely
manner the recording of the Grand Jury proceeding, and that he was not
provided with an appropriate sex-offender evaluation . We need not address
these issues as the alleged terrors are either moot or not likely to recur on
remand . That is not to imply, of course, that Patterson is precluded on remand
from revisiting the issue of his competence if there is reason to do so .
CONCLUSION
In sum, in a case that turned almost entirely on the jury's estimate of the
credibility of Patterson and C .A .H ., respectively, the improper admission of
class habit testimony tending to bolster C .A .H .'s credibility, together with the
improper admission of evidence attributing other crimes to Patterson and
casting his character in a bad light require that Patterson's conviction be
reversed and the matter remanded for additional proceedings . In the event of a
new trial, the Commonwealth will be allowed to introduce the results of
C.A.H .'s medical exam and testimony concerning Patterson's favorite songs.
Patterson, absent a showing that they are demonstrably false, will not be
permitted to introduce evidence or to cross-examine C .A.H . concerning
allegations of sexual abuse she may have made against others, nor will he be
permitted to introduce hearsay statements by C .A.H .'s therapist concerning
C .A.H .'s possible mimicry of others during group therapy. In accord with the
above, the February 28, 2008 Judgment of the Fulton Circuit Court is hereby
reversed and the matter is remanded to that Court for additional proceedings
consistent with this Opinion .
Minton, C.J . ; Abramson, Noble, Schroder, Scott, and Venters, JJ .,
concur. Cunningham, J ., not sitting.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Samuel N . Potter
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Jack Conway
Attorney General
James Hays Lawson
Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
Office of Criminal Appeals
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.