LARRY THOMAS JONES AND GERALD HENLEY V. CALLOWAY COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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MODIFIED : SEPTEMBER 23, 2010
RENDERED : APRIL 22, 2010
TO BE PUBLISHED
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2007-SC-000922-DG
LARRY THOMAS JONES
AND GERALD HENLEY
V.
APPELLANTS
ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS
CASE NOS . 2006-CA-001792-MR AND 2006-CA-000897-MR
HICKMAN CIRCUIT COURT NO . 00-CR-00001
AND CALLOWAY CIRCUIT COURT NO. 01-CR-00128
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE SCHRODER
REVERSING
Before this Court are two consolidated cases from the Court of Appeals
with the same issue : whether KRS 532 .043(5) violates the separation of powers
doctrine of Sections 27 and 28 of the Kentucky Constitution by giving the
judicial branch, rather than the executive branch, the power to revoke
conditional discharge imposed after a period of incarceration .' We agree that
the statute violates the separation of powers doctrine by impermissibly
"Conditional discharge" under KRS 532.043 is a special form of post-sentence
conditional release, which applies only to those convicted of certain sex offenses . It
is not to be confused with conditional discharge under KRS Chapter 533, which is
imposed in lieu of incarceration .
conferring an executive power to the judiciary. Therefore, we reverse the
revocations in both cases .
KRS 532 .043 provides:
In addition to the penalties authorized by law, any
person convicted of, pleading guilty to, or entering
an Alford plea to a felony offense under
KRS Chapter 510, 529 .100 involving commercial
sexual activity, 530.020, 530 .064(1) (a), 531 .310, or
531 .320 shall be subject to a period of conditional
discharge following release from:
(a) Incarceration upon expiration of sentence; or
(b) Completion of parole.
(2) The period of conditional discharge shall be five (5)
years.
During the period of conditional discharge, the
defendant shall:
(a) Be subject to all orders specified by the
Department of Corrections; and
(b) Comply with all education, treatment, testing,
or combination thereof required by the
Department of Corrections.
(4) Persons under conditional discharge pursuant to
this section shall be subject to the supervision of
the Division of Probation and Parole.
If a person violates a provision specified in
subsection (3) of this section, the violation shall be
reported in writing to the Commonwealth's
attorney in the county of conviction . The
Commonwealth's attorney may petition the
court to revoke the defendant's conditional
discharge and reincarcerate the defendant as
set forth in KRS 532 .060 .[2 1
Emphasis added.
(6)
The provisions of this section shall apply only to
persons convicted, pleading guilty, or entering an
Alford plea after July 15, 1998.
Both Appellants served out their initial sentences. Upon release,
Appellants were placed on three years conditional discharge3 and referred to
the Division of Probation and Parole for supervision . Both Appellants violated
the conditions of conditional discharge and were brought back to their
respective sentencing courts for a revocation hearing. Appellants each argued
to their trial court that the revocation procedure established by KRS 532 .043(5)
violated the separation of powers doctrine . Both trial courts disagreed and
revoked Appellants' conditional discharge, and the Court of Appeals affirmed in
both cases.
Both Appellants have served out their period of reincarceration, and the
issue is now moot . However, this Court has granted discretionary review,
realizing that the underlying dispute is one capable of repetition, yet evading
review, because of the short duration of conditional discharge and the length of
time required to fully litigate the issue . 4
Before we address the merits of Appellants' argument, we will address
the Commonwealth's claim that the issue was not preserved because the
Attorney General received no notice of this constitutional challenge as required
3
Prior to 2006, the period of conditional discharge was three years. See 2006 Ky.
Acts ch . 182, § 42 .
4
See Philpot v. Patton, 837 S.W.2d 491, 493 (Ky. 1992) ; Lexington HeraldLeader Co.,
Inc. v. Meigs, 660 S.W.2d 658, 661 (Ky. 1983) ; Commonwealth v . Deweese,
141 S.W.3d 372, 375 (Ky.App . 2003) .
by KRS 418 .075 . The trial court addressed the constitutionality of the statute
without notice and the Court of Appeals addressed the constitutionality
without commenting on the failure to give notice . The Court of Appeals held
that the statute in question was constitutional and the Appellants filed their
motions for discretionary review without the Commonwealth filing a protective
cross-motion for discretionary review .
This Court has made it plain that strict compliance with the notification
requirement of KRS 418 .075 is required, and failure to give notice leaves the
constitutional challenge unpreserved . 5 Unpreserved error can be reviewed only
for palpable error, 6 which Appellants have requested in this case. Palpable
error is that which affects the substantial rights of a party and may be
considered by an appellate court on appeal, even though not preserved, if there
is a determination that manifest injustice has resulted from the error.? In this
particular case, we opine that Appellants have shown manifest injustice, i.e.
the probability of a different result so fundamental as to threaten their
entitlement to due process of law.8
A certain amount of background is necessary on the various alternatives
to incarceration: probation, conditional discharge (as that term is used apart
from KRS 532 .043), parole, and "shock probation." We address each of these
to properly frame the issue of conditional discharge under KRS 532 .043 .
5
6
Benet v. Commonwealth, 253 S .W.3d 528, 532 (Ky. 2008) .
RCr 10 .26 .
Id.
.
See Martin v. Commonwealth, 207 S.W.3d l, 3 (Ky. 2006) .
"Probation, under KRS 533.010, is to be considered [by the court] at the
time of sentencing, and starts with the process of probation or conditional
discharge, moving toward imprisonment only if certain justifications exist to
deny probation or conditional discharge ."9 With probation, the trial court
(judicial branch) first decides on a sentence of imprisonment, but then imposes
conditions for release and supervision-in lieu of implementation of
incarceration-at sentencing. Probation
is the suspension
of the imposition of
a sentence of incarceration. 10 Supervision, however, is turned over to the
Division of Probation and Parole (the executive branch) . The terms of probation
and supervision are authorized by statute and implemented by the court at the
time of sentencing ." Upon breach of a condition of probation, the probation
officer seeks revocation . A hearing is held before the sentencing court, with
appeals proceeding through the judicial branch .
Conditional discharge, as that term is used apart from KRS 532 .043, is a
judicial function of the trial court at sentencing. 12 It is similar to probation,
with the trial court setting the terms and conditions of release at the time of
sentencing . But unlike probation, traditional conditional discharge is
unsupervised . 13 Upon breach of a condition, the Commonwealth seeks
revocation and the trial court conducts the hearing to determine whether
Mullins v. Commonwealth, 956 S.W.2d 222, 223 (Ky .App . 1997), abrogated on other
grounds by Commonwealth v. Merriman, 265 S.W.3d 196 (Ky. 2008) .
to Prater v. Commonwealth, 82 S.W.3d 898, 904 (Ky. 2002) .
1 i See KRS 533.030 .
12
KRS 533 .010(1) .
13
KRS 533 .020(3) ; Pedigo v. Commonwealth, 644 S .W.2d 355, 358 (Ky.App . 1982) .
revocation is appropriate . Although KRS 532.043 speaks in terms of
"conditional discharge," the statutory scheme is more akin to parole or an
extension of parole . 14
With parole, the Parole Board (executive branch) sets the conditions of
release, as well as the terms of supervision, after a prisoner has been
sentenced by the court and has begun serving his or her sentence . 15 Parole
suspends the execution of a sentence . 16 "Parole recognizes those justifications
[for incarceration] existed at sentencing and there now exists a change of
circumstances or a rehabilitation of a prisoner."17 "[T]he power to grant parole
is a purely executive function." 18 Upon breach of a condition of parole, the
parole officer seeks revocation. An administrative hearing is held before the
Parole Board . Appeals are then made to the Circuit Court, as with other
executive, administrative appeals.
The concept of "shock probation" under KRS 439 .265 is an anomaly. It
is a legislative creation "which allows the court to reacquire jurisdiction for this
one consideration ."' 9 For a limited time after sentencing,20 the sentencing
court may "suspend the further execution of the sentence and place the
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
See generally Huggins v. Caldwell, 3 S .W. 2d 1101, 1103 (Ky. 1928), for a discussion
of substance over name.
See KRS 439 .340.
Prater, 82 S.W.3d at 904.
Mullins, 956 S.W.2d at 223 (citing KRS 439 .340).
Prater, 82 S.W.3d at 902 (citing cases so holding) .
Mullins, 956 S.W.2d at 223 .
For felonies, not earlier than 30 days nor later than 180 days after defendant begins
serving his or her sentence. KRS 439 .265(1).
defendant on probation upon terms the court determines ."21 In
Commonwealth v. Williamson, our predecessor court held that the legislative
enactment of shock probation did not encroach upon the executive power,
because it created only a short, limited extension of the trial court's
jurisdiction.2 2 It was reasonable for the legislature to extend the trial court's
jurisdiction for a short period to make a final determination regarding
probation. 2 3
The statute in question in this case, KRS 532.043, also mixes the roles of
the judicial and executive branches of government . Under KRS 532 .043, the
General Assembly added a period of conditional discharge to the sentence of
incarceration of persons convicted of certain offenses . The three-year (now fiveyear) period of conditional, discharge is to be served beginning upon the
person's final release from incarceration or parole . The conditions and
supervision of the felony conditional discharge are set by the executive
branch. 24 Violations, however, are reported to the judicial branch (the court in
the county of conviction) by the Commonwealth Attorney, for revocation (as
opposed to an appeal of a decision by the Parole Board). 25 Thus, the statute
imposes upon the judiciary the duty to enforce conditions set by the executive
branch.
21
22
23
24
25
Id.
492 S.W.2d 874, 875 (Ky. 1973) .
Id.
KRS 532.043(3) and (4).
KRS 532.043(5) .
This statutory mixture of the role of the judiciary within the role of the
executive branch is fatal to the legislative scheme . Section 27 of the Kentucky
Constitution creates three distinct branches of government, and Section 28
precludes one branch from exercising any power belonging to the other
branches . Thus, we recognize that the legislature makes the laws, deciding
what is a crime and the amount of punishment to impose for violations
thereof.26 The judiciary determines guilt and selects or implements a sentence
within the legislative range. 27 The executive branch is vested with the
execution of the sentence, including executions, incarceration, parole, and
clemency . To this extent only, the three branches have a shared sentencing
responsibility . 28
It is generally recognized that the trial courts have jurisdiction over a
defendant's case for ten days after sentencing,29 and at any time for clerical
errors .3° In unusual cases, where there exists newly discovered evidence,
fraud, or other extraordinary circumstances, a court may reacquire
jurisdictional on the theory that the sentence imposed was not a valid
Wilfong v. Commonwealth, 175 S.W.3d 84, 92 (Ky.App . 2004) . Wilfong dealt with
the constitutionality of the additional period of conditional discharge and the
conditions thereof in KRS 532 .043. The case did not address the issue of
revocation, which is the issue in the instant case .
27 Id.
28 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S . 361, 364-65 (1989) (discussing the similar
shared sentencing responsibility in the federal system) .
29 See RCr 10 .02(2).
30 CR 60 .01 .
31 CR 60.02.
26
sentence .3 2 For a short period of time after sentencing, we even allow trial
courts to maintain jurisdiction to consider shock probation . 33
If the trial court imposes an additional sentence at the time of original
sentencing, there is no separation of powers issue because "the legislature has
the power to designate what is a crime and the sentences for violations
thereof."34 However, under KRS 532 .043(5), the court is given jurisdiction over
revocation of conditional discharge after all of the following have occurred: a
sentence of incarceration has been imposed, the sentence has become final, the
defendant has been transferred to the custody of the Department of
Corrections (the executive branch) for execution of the sentence, the defendant
has served his or her period of incarceration or has been paroled (at or near the
end of the sentence), and the defendant has been released subject to the
conditions of the Department of Corrections and supervision by the Division of
Probation and Parole .
The General Assembly can, consistent with the separation of powers
doctrine, create a form of conditional release with terms and supervision by the
executive branch. However, the statutory scheme runs afoul of the separation
of powers doctrine when revocation is the responsibility of the judiciary. Once
a prisoner is turned over to the Department of Corrections for execution of the
sentence, the power to determine the period of incarceration passes to the
32
33
34
See Commonwealth v. Gross, 936 S .W.2d 85, 88 (Ky. 1996) (applying to criminal
cases the civil case analysis of Potter v. Eli Lilly & Co., 926 S .W.2d 449 (Ky. 1996)) .
KRS 439.265 ; KRS 439.267 (for misdemeanors) .
Mullins, 956 S.W.2d at 223 .
executive branch.35 Only on appeal of an administrative action should the
judicial branch become involved in the executive branch's legitimate exercise of
its power to execute sentences .
Finally, we note that our ruling is limited to KRS 532 .043(5) . Only the
revocation procedure established by this subsection is unconstitutional .
Because subsection (5) is severable from the remainder of the statute, the
statute's other provisions remain in force .36
KRS 532 .043(5) violates Section 27 and Section 28 of the Kentucky
Constitution by impermissibly conferring an executive power to revoke a postincarceration or post-parole conditional release upon the judiciary.
Accordingly, the judgments of the Court of Appeals are reversed, and the cases
are remanded to their respective circuit courts with instructions to dismiss the
revocation proceedings .
All sitting. Minton, C .J. ; Abramson, Cunningham, and Noble, JJ .,
concur. Venters, J . dissents by separate opinion in which Scott, J., joins.
VENTERS, J., DISSENTING : I disagree with the majority's
conclusion that KRS 532 .043(5) is unconstitutional. Certainly, the concept of a
term of release and re-incarceration following the . completion of a lengthy
prison sentence is a novel and unconventional approach to criminal
punishment. But, I find nothing in our Constitution's separation of
powers doctrine that expressly or inherently bars the General Assembly from
35
36
See Prater, 82 S.W.3d at 903-04 .
See KRS 446 .090 (Severability) .
re-vesting the judicial branch with jurisdiction to adjudicate alleged violations
of the kind of conditional discharge created by KRS 532 .043 . 1 see nothing in
the inherent powers of the executive branch that compels it to adjudicate such
violations, or that prohibits the judicial branch from doing so under legislative
authorization . 1, therefore, respectfully dissent . Scott, J., joins .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS :
Donald H. Morehead
10351 Linn Station Road
Louisville, Kentucky 40223
Jamesa J. Drake
Assistant Public Advocate
Department Of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Jack Conway .
Attorney General of Kentuc
David W. Barr
Courtney J. Hightower
Assistant Attorneys General
Office of Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601-8204
'SuprrWr (~Vurf of ~irnfurhv
2007-SC-000922-DG
LARRY THOMAS JONES
AND GERALD HENLEY
APPELLANTS
ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS
CASE NOS. 2006-CA-001792-MR AND 2006-CA-000897-MR
HICKMAN CIRCUIT COURT NO . 00-CR-00001
AND CALLOWAY CIRCUIT COURT NO . 01-CR-00128
APPELLEE
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR REHEARING
AND SUBSTITUTING MODIFIED OPINION
The Appellee having filed a Petition for Rehearing of the Opinion of
the Court by Justice Schroder, rendered April 22, 2010 ; and the Court
having reviewed the record and being otherwise fully and sufficiently
advised ;
The Court ORDERS that the Appellee's petition is DENIED. On the
Court's own motion, the Opinion of the Court by Justice Schroder,
rendered April 22, 2010, is MODIFIED on its face ; and the attached
opinion is substituted therefor . The modification does not affect the
holding of the case .
All sitting . Minton, C.J. ; Abramson, Cunningham, Noble, and
Schroder, JJ ., concur. Scott and Venters, JJ., would have granted the
Petition for Rehearing.
ENTERED : September 23, 2010 .
CHIEF JUSTICE
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