BROCK BOWLING V. HONORABLE OSCAR GAYLE HOUSE, JUDGE 41ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT, ET AL.
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IMPORTANT NOTICE
NOT TO BE PUBLISH ED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED."
PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C),
THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER
CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE ; HOWEVER,
UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS,
RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR
CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED
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BEFORE THE COURT. OPINIONS CITED FOR CONSIDERATION
BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED
DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A COPY OF THE
ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG WITH THE
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RENDERED : AUGUST 27, 2009
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2008-SC-000892-MR
BROCK BOWLING
V.
ON APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
NO . 2008-CA-000593
CLAY CIRCUIT COURT NO .04-CR-00165-001
HONORABLE OSCAR GAYLE HOUSE,
JUDGE 41 ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT, ET AL.
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
Appellant, Brock Bowling, appeals as a matter of right from a November
2008 Court of Appeals order denying him intermediate relief against Appellee,
Clay Circuit Judge Oscar Gayle House . Appellant requests the writ to prohibit
Appellee from retrying him for the murder of Jimmy Mills . Appellant contends
that a second trial would subject him to double jeopardy. For the reasons set
forth herein, we now affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals to deny
Appellant's petition for a writ of prohibition.
Appellant, Timothy Finley, Shannon Finley, and Dennis Bowling' were all
indicted for murdering Mills . The indictment charged each of the four with
murdering Mills, or conspiring to murder Mills, or being an accomplice to his
murder. At the conclusion of the Clay Circuit Court trial, three instructions
' Dennis Bowling received a directed verdict of acquittal on all counts at the
conclusion of the trial.
were given to the jury on the murder charge . One instruction allowed a guilty
verdict if the jury believed that defendant was the principal actor in killing
Mills. The second instruction allowed a guilty verdict if the jury believed that
defendant acted as an accomplice to killing Mills. The third instruction was as
follows :
If you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant,
, is guilty under one of the other of
instructions
, MURDER-PRINCIPAL or MURDERACCOMPLICE, but are unable to determine whether he acted as a
principal or accomplice in the murder of Jimmy Mills, you will find
guilty under this instruction and will not fix his
punishment, but shall say so in your verdict and return the verdict
to the Court without deliberating on the question of fixing the
punishment .
The jury found Appellant, Timothy, and Shannon guilty under the third
instruction --- that they all acted as either the principal actor or an accomplice
in Mills' murder.
Appellant, Timothy, and Shannon appealed that verdict to this Court as
a matter of right. Our opinion, rendered April 19, 2007, found that there was
insufficient evidence presented by the Commonwealth to find Timothy or
Shannon guilty of murder as either a principal actor or accomplice. Their
murder convictions were vacated. However, we found that there was sufficient
evidence to find Appellant guilty of murdering Mills under a theory that he was
the principal actor, but not as an accomplice . Since Appellant's conviction was
predicated on a combined jury instruction which required sufficient evidence
that he acted as either the principal actor or accomplice, the jury's verdict was
not unanimous. Halvorsen v. Commonwealth, 730 S.W.2d 921, 925 (Ky.
1986) . We thus, reversed his murder conviction and remanded the matter to
the Clay Circuit Court for further proceedings. The Clay Circuit Court
reassigned the murder charge for trial.
Appellant then moved Senior Judge R. Cletus Maricle, of the Clay Circuit
Court, to set aside the trial date and dismiss the indictment as barred by
double jeopardy . Senior Judge Maricle heard and denied the motion on
October 1, 2007. Appellee was subsequently elected and sworn in as a Clay
Circuit Court Judge. Appellant renewed his motion before Appellee . On March
17, 2008, Judge House signed a written order denying the motion .
Appellant then petitioned the Court of Appeals for a writ of prohibition to
prevent Appellee from retrying the case . The Court of Appeals denied the writ.
The Court of Appeals held that since the reversal of Appellant's conviction was
based upon a faulty jury instruction, and not a lack of proof, there was no
Constitutional bar to retrying Appellant for murder, and no double jeopardy
claim. See Hobbs v. Commonwealth , 655 S.W.2d 472, 474 (Ky . 1983) . We now
affirm the Court of Appeals decision.
A writ of prohibition will be granted only in the most exceptional of
circumstances . Shobe v. EPI Corp. , 815 S .W.2d 395, 397 (Ky. 1991) . A writ of
prohibition may be granted :
upon a showing that (1) the lower court is proceeding or is about to
proceed outside of its jurisdiction and there is no remedy through
an application to an intermediate court; or (2) that the lower court
is acting or is about to act erroneously, although within its
jurisdiction, and there exists no adequate remedy by appeal or
otherwise and great injustice and irreparable injury will result if
the petition is not granted .
Hoskins v. Maricle, 150 S .W.3d 1, 10 (Ky . 2004) . A double jeopardy claim is an
appropriate subject for a writ of prohibition . St. Clair v. Roark, 10 S.W .3d 482,
485 (Ky. 1999) .
Appellant's main argument is that the jury's failure to return a verdict on
the principal actor instruction indicated that the Commonwealth failed to prove
that he was the principal actor in Mills' murder. Thus, Appellant argues that
he cannot be retried under that theory without violating double jeopardy .
Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U .S . 31, 41 (1982) ("[The] Double Jeopardy Clause forbids
a second trial for the purpose of affording the prosecution another opportunity
to supply evidence which it failed to muster in the first proceeding") . However,
"[t]he failure to return a verdict [on a jury instruction] does not have collateral
estoppel effect [in double jeopardy cases] . . . unless the record establishes that
the issue was actually and necessarily decided in the defendant's favor ."
Schiro v. Farley , 510 U.S. 222, 236 (1994) . In this matter, while the jury did
not choose to convict Appellant under the principal actor instruction, they did
choose to convict him under the combined instruction which included the
theory that he was the principal actor. Thus, we cannot say that the jury
found in favor of Appellant on the charge that he acted as the principal actor in
Mill's murder. Since Appellant's conviction was overturned due to an
instructional error regarding the combined instruction, he may be retried
without violating double jeopardy principles . See Griffin v . United States, 502
U.S . 46 (1991) .
Appellant has cited to several cases in his brief to support his argument
that the jury's failure to return a verdict on the principal actor instruction
invokes double jeopardy on retrial. Green v. United States, 355 U .S . 184
(1957) ; Terry v. Potter, 111 F.3d 454 (6th Cir. 1997) ; Saylor v. Cornelius , 845
F.2d 1401 (6th Cir. 1988) . However, these cases are distinguishable because
in them the jury's intent to not convict under a certain theory of the case, or
the prosecution's failure to prove a case, is clear. Neither situation is present
in this case because the jury convicted Appellant under an instruction which
included the principal actor theory and sufficient evidence was presented by
the Commonwealth in the original trial to find Appellant guilty of being the
principal actor.
Thus, since Appellant's conviction was reversed due to an instructional
error, and it is not clear that the jury intended to acquit Appellant based on
him serving as the principal actor in the murder, we deny his petition for a writ
of prohibition.
For the above stated reasons, the opinion of the Court of Appeals is
affirmed.
All sitting. All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Stephan Charles
304 Bridge Street
Manchester, Kentucky 40962
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE :
Hon . Oscar Gayle House,
Judge 41 St Judicial District
316 Main Street, Ste 320
Manchester, Kentucky 40962
Edwin A. Logan
Logan and Gaines, PLLC
114 W. Clinton Street
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601-1949
COUNSEL FOR COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
AND HON . GARY GREGORY, COMMONWEALTH ATTORNEY, 41 ST JUDICIAL
DISTRICT
REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST
Jack Conway
Attorney General
Susan Roncarti Lenz
Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601-8204
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