JOHN SIZEMORE V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED : NOVEMBER 25, 2009
IS f;D
,;vuyrrmr Courf of
JOHN SIZEMORE
V
ON APPEAL FROM CLAY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE OSCAR G. HOUSE, JUDGE
NO . 07-CR-00104-001
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
Appellant, John Sizemore, was found guilty by a Clay Circuit Court
jury of complicity to murder . Appellant was sentenced to thirty (30)
years imprisonment . He now appeals his conviction as a matter of right.
Ky. Const. ยง 110(2)(b) .
I. Background
In the summer of 2007, Gerald Sizemore was living in Clay County,
Kentucky, and married to his second wife, Bobbie Cheryl Clarkson .' At
approximately 9 :45 p.m. on the evening of August 19, 2007, the couple's
son, Dillon, called to tell his father that he was on his way home from
Cincinnati . Yet, when Dillon arrived home at about 11 :00 p .m., Gerald
was not there. One of Gerald's other children, April, arrived home at
1 There is no evidence that Gerald and Appellant were closely related .
about 12 :00 a.m. and when their father was still not home, the two
began to worry. Dillon and April placed some phone calls and drove
around looking for Gerald, all without success.
Shortly after returning home at about 2 :00 a.m., Dillon and April
heard what sounded like a car crash. Standing close to the door, the
two saw Gerald enter the front yard so badly beaten and covered with
blood that he was nearly unrecognizable . When he reached the house,
April began to render aid and asked Gerald who had done this to him .
He responded, "Starr's boyfriend,"3 and then added that it was April's
boyfriend, Gary Becknell . When Gerald's wife, Cheryl, entered the room,
Gerald exclaimed, "It's that goddamn bunch you fool with."4 Though
Gerald did not want anyone to call the police or EMS, April called 911
after finding a wound under his shirt.
Gerald was taken by ambulance to the Manchester hospital before
being airlifted to the University of Kentucky hospital in Lexington.
Surgery, however, was unsuccessful and Gerald was declared brain
dead. Life support was discontinued and Gerald died . The cause of
death was determined to be blunt impacts to the head resulting in a six-
2 Gerald's car was later found to have hit a light pole .
3 Gerald repeated the statement approximately thirty minutes later when
police arrived on the scene, though it appeared nonsensical. Starr would
later testify that she did not have a boyfriend and that her husband, Mark
Kidd, was working in Virginia at the time .
4 April testified at trial that Gerald's comment was directed at Cheryl.
inch brain laceration and significant hemorrhage .5 There were several
bruises and abrasions on his face and both sides of his body, indicating
that he had been dragged on the ground at some point . He had two
broken ribs and injuries to his extremities consistent with defensive
wounds.
The Manchester City Police Department immediately began
investigating Gerald's whereabouts on the night of August 19th, but
developed no leads. However, after asking for tips on a local T.V. station,
the investigating officer, Marion Spurlock, received an anonymous phone
call informing him that the caller had last seen Gerald's car in
Appellant's driveway . Acting on this information, Spurlock and other
officers went to Appellant's home to further investigate . They first visited
the home of Appellant's brother, Eugene Sizemore, which was located
next to Appellant's. Eugene and Appellant's nephew, Michael Sizemore,
both indicated that there had been a fight at Appellant's home . The
officers then proceeded to Appellant's home and noticed broken glass on
the driveway, blood on the porch, and a bleach bottle in the yard.6
Appellant answered the door and invited the officers inside. He
consented to a search of his home, several items were seized, and the
5 In spite of the injury, the medical examiner believed that Gerald could have
had lucid intervals for a few hours, but that he could also suffer from erratic
behavior.
6 The officers testified that they could smell the odor of bleach in the
driveway and later testimony would reveal that chlorine bleach can be used
to degrade DNA and prevent analysis .
officers noticed that Appellant had bruising around his eyes and various
scratch marks. He agreed to accompany the officers to the police station
and make a statement. Therein, Appellant stated that he had known
Gerald all of his life, but had not seen him in several years . Appellant
admitted that he was an alcoholic and had been drinking prior to Gerald
coming to his house on the night of the 19th . Appellant stated that
Gerald came to his home already bleeding and stated that he had been
involved in an altercation . Appellant stated that Gerald was drinking
and snorting Xanax pills.7 Ten to fifteen minutes later, however, Gerald
"went crazy", started calling Appellant the name "Cheryl", and began
hitting and attacking Appellant. Appellant claimed that he managed to
push Gerald out of the door before locking him out . Gerald then
allegedly got into his car and drove away. Appellant stated that he had
been hurt in the altercation and that there was blood all over him. By
the end of the interview, however, Appellant stated that he was not really
sure what had happened because he was intoxicated .
The next morning, police obtained an arrest warrant for Appellant
and a search warrant for his home . More items were seized, including
glass ashtrays (one of which appeared to have been recently washed) and
a twenty-pound barbell. After his arrest, Appellant was interviewed
again . He recounted that Gerald had arrived at his home sometime after
midnight, already bleeding. Gerald immediately began drinking and
ingesting pills . The two talked and, at some point thereafter, Gerald
7 At the hospital, Gerald's blood alcohol level was 0 .12 .
4
became agitated, called him the name "Cheryl," and attacked Appellant .
In this statement, however, Appellant added that he was afraid no one
could come to his defense and so he defended himself by grabbing
anything he could get a hold of and began to strike Gerald, "splitting his
brains out." When asked what he used, Appellant stated that it was an
ashtray or a barbell. He managed to shove Gerald out of the front door,
but did not recall going out of the house with Gerald . Appellant claimed
that he did not know of any attempts to clean blood from the scene .
After interviews with Eugene and Michael, the police still believed
that Appellant was not disclosing all that he knew. Appellant thereafter
gave a third and final recorded statement. In this lengthier interview,
Appellant disclosed that he was suffering from liver cancer and had just
gotten out of prison in Minnesota (at some point prior to or during 2007) .
His version of events was largely consistent with prior interviews, but
differed in some significant respects . Notably, Appellant added that
when Gerald attacked him, Appellant called out for help from Eugene
and Michael . Eugene unsuccessfully tried to remove Gerald from
Appellant before Michael and another individual, Nathan McDaniel, came
to his aid. Appellant stated that Michael and Nathan beat Gerald both
inside and outside of the house with some objects and "stomped the shit"
out of Gerald's body for "don't know how long" as he lay in the driveway
and over Appellant's pleas for them to stop . Appellant admitted that he
struck Gerald with a glass ashtray during the altercation and stated that
Michael later used bleach to clean blood from the scene in the early
morning light .
Appellant, Eugene, Michael, and Nathan were indicted by a Clay
County Grand Jury for murder and complicity to murder, but Appellant's
trial was severed from the co-defendants' . At trial, Appellant's three
police interviews were played for the jury. Other evidence included the
testimony of Roderick Steadman, who shared a cell with Appellant while
both were incarcerated in Lexington, Kentucky prior to trial (in March of
2008), wherein he claimed that Appellant confessed to the crimes .
Appellant only presented one witness in his defense, his sister. At the
conclusion of trial, Appellant was found guilty of complicity to murder
and was sentenced in accordance with the jury's recommendation, thirty
(30) years imprisonment .
On appeal, Appellant raises four principal allegations of error in
his underlying trial: 1) that references to his prior imprisonment
constituted impermissible character evidence; 2) that the trial court
failed to exclude a prosecution witness ; 3) that the evidence did not
reasonably support the murder instructions ; and 4) that the prosecutor
for the Commonwealth engaged in misconduct . For the reasons that
follow, we affirm Appellant's conviction .
II. Analysis
A. References to Prior Imprisonment
Appellant first argues that this Court should reverse his conviction
because the trial court improperly admitted references to past
6
imprisonment, representing impermissible character evidence pursuant
to KRE 404(b) . He challenges the admission of such references revealed
at trial through both the testimony of Roderick Steadman as well as a
statement Appellant made in his second police interview. ' We review each
separately.
1 . Steadman's Testimony
Prior to trial, Appellant contended that the testimony of Roderick
Steadman would possibly reveal that Appellant was incarcerated in
March of 2008 in a federal prison in Lexington, Kentucky . The
Commonwealth countered that such references were necessary to
provide context to Appellant's confession and that omission of the
references could mislead the jury . We agree and do not believe that the
trial court erred.
At trial, the Commonwealth presented the testimony of Roderick
Steadman. Steadman testified that Appellant confessed to the crime
while the two were "in a special housing unit," sharing the same "cell" in
a Lexington, Kentucky prison . Appellant allegedly told Steadman that he
and Gerald were at his trailer snorting Xanax and drinking whiskey
when Gerald began calling Appellant "Cheryl." Appellant stated that he
and Cheryl had an ongoing drug and physical relationship and that
Gerald began accusing him of "messing around with his wife ." A fight
broke out and Appellant held Gerald down as Eugene and Michael beat
him . They eventually killed Gerald with a lamp (or some similar object)
and Appellant claimed that blood had gotten on nearly everything . The
7
group then put Gerald in his car, drove him off their property, and put
him behind the wheel somewhere else to make it appear as though
Gerald was in a car wreck. In closing argument, the Commonwealth
referenced (albeit mistakenly, discussed infra) Steadman's testimony and
Appellant's imprisonment at the time of the confession, though never
identifying the underlying offense.
As Appellant argues, it is generally true that KRE 404(b) prohibits
the use of evidence of crimes other than those charged "to prove that an
accused is a person of criminal disposition," Drumm v. Commonwealth ,
783 S.W .2d 380, 381 (Ky. 1990) .8 Yet, it is also true that such evidence
may be admissible where the evidence is "so inextricably intertwined with
other evidence essential to the case that separation of the two could not
be accomplished without serious adverse effect on the offering party."
KRE 404(b)(2) (emphasis added) . Moreover, it is well-established that
evidence of other crimes may be admitted "[i]f offered for some other
purpose ." KRE 404(b)(1) .
Here, the Commonwealth rightly argued that exclusion of the
confession's context - within prison, to a fellow cell mate - could
potentially thwart a complete presentation of essential evidence to the
case, as well as mislead the jury. Indeed, the surrounding
circumstances were critical to a proper understanding of the confession
as well as Steadman's veracity. Moreover, the fact of Appellant's
8 Drumm has been superseded in part due to the adoption of KRE 803(4) .
See Garrett v. Commonwealth, 48 S.W.3d 6, 10-11 (Ky. 2001).
8
imprisonment with Steadman was in no way offered to show his
propensity to commit the charged crime . Accordingly, we do not think
the brief and isolated references to Appellant's imprisonment with
Steadman within the context of his purported confession amounted to
error. Cf. Major, 177 S .W.3d at 708 ("[T]he evidence of his incarceration
in Kentucky . . . provides the setting and context within which he called
and confessed to his father of the murder of Marlene.") ; Chumbler v.
Commonwealth , 905 S.W .2d 488, 494 (Ky. 1995) (harmless error where
statements did not represent confession) .
2 . Appellant's Statement
Appellant also sought to prevent the introduction of his admission
to police that he had just gotten out of a Minnesota prison prior to or
during 2007 . Reference to his Minnesota imprisonment was made at
trial when the statement was played for the jury and when mentioned in
the Commonwealth's closing argument . Though the statements may
have been admissible as an admission pursuant to KRE 801A(b)(2), we
believe it was, nonetheless, error for the trial court to admit Appellant's
statement from his interview. The fact of Appellant's Minnesota
imprisonment had absolutely nothing to do with the crime charged,
offered the Commonwealth no necessary context, and was not
inextricably tied to essential evidence in the case. As such, it was,
pursuant to KRE 401, irrelevant and the trial court should have simply
redacted any such reference .
This error notwithstanding, because we cannot say that "`the error
itself had substantial influence"' upon Appellant's trial such that it
"substantially swayed" his conviction, the error was harmless . Winstead
v-. Commonwealth , 283 S-.W .3d 678, 688-89 (Ky. 2009) (quoting
Kotteakos v . United States, 328 U.S . 750, 765 (1946)) ; see also RCr 9 .24 .
The Commonwealth did not draw great attention to Appellant's
Minnesota imprisonment . It was mentioned briefly by Appellant in his
statement and the prosecutor for the Commonwealth only referenced it
(mistakenly) as the setting of Appellant's confession to Steadman . The
underlying offense was never identified and it was not used to establish
Appellant's criminal character. Moreover, independent evidence at trial notably Appellant's confession to Steadman and his multiple police
interviews - so strongly pointed to Appellant's guilt that the error could
not have had substantially swayed his conviction .
B. Failure to Exclude Prosecution Witness
Appellant's next argument on appeal is without merit and warrants
little attention . He contends that the trial court improperly allowed
Gerald Sizemore's brother, Larry, to sit at the prosecution's table and
remain in the courtroom after he had testified.
KRE 615 provides, in part, that "[a]t the request of a party[,] the
court shall order witnesses excluded so that they cannot hear the
testimony of other witnesses and it may make the order on its own
motion." KRE 615 . This Court has explained that "the purpose of [KRE
615] is to ensure the integrity of the trial by denying the witness an
10
opportunity to alter testimony in the light of that presented by other
witnesses." Epperson v. Commonwealth , 197 S .W.3d 46, 58 (Ky. 2006)
(citing Smith v. Miller , 127 S.W .3d 644 (Ky . 2004)) .
Here, however, it is readily apparent that Larry Sizemore was the
first witness to testify - a fact that Appellant does not contest. As such,
there was no violation of KRE 615 and thus the trial court properly
denied Appellant's motion .
Though Appellant also suggests that it was, nevertheless, somehow
error for the trial court to permit Larry Sizemore to be present at the
prosecution table, we have rejected similar contentions before :
This practice is neither new nor unusual. It is so well
established that there is no need for a citation of authority
and, as a matter of fact, it has been the law of this
Commonwealth for so long that the mind of man runneth
not to the contrary that in a criminal case the trial judge, in
his discretion, may allow one witness to remain in the
courtroom to aid the Commonwealth's Attorney.
Brewster v. Commonwealth, 568 S.W .2d 232, 236 (Ky. 1978) . Here, the
Commonwealth merely desired Larry Sizmore's presence at its table as a
representative and Appellant makes no argument that he engaged in any
improper conduct or was similarly used while seated . The trial court did
not abuse its discretion in this matter.
C. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Appellant also argues that his conviction should be reversed
because the trial court, in denying his motion for a directed verdict,
permitted his conviction for complicity to murder on insufficient evidence
and, in so doing, denied him due process pursuant to Jackson v.
11
Virginia, 443 U .S . 307 (1979) . Having reviewed the record, we cannot
agree.
In Jackson, the United States Supreme Court held that "an
essential" protection "of the due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment" is that "no person shall be made to suffer the onus of a
criminal conviction except upon sufficient proof - defined as evidence
necessary to convince a trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt of the
existence of every element of the offense ." Jackson, 443 U .S . at 316 .
While "the critical inquiry on review of the sufficiency of the evidence . .
must be . . . to determine whether the record evidence could reasonably
support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt," it "does not
require a court to `ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the
trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."' Id . at 318-319
(quoting Woodby v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 385 U.S.
276, 282 (1966)) (emphasis in original) . "Instead, the relevant question is
whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Id . at 319 (citin
Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S . 356, 362 (1972)) .
The above principles are reflected in our familiar standard of
review for the denial of a directed verdict:
[T]he trial court must draw all fair and reasonable inferences
from the evidence in favor of the Commonwealth . If the
evidence is sufficient to induce a reasonable juror to believe
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty, a
directed verdict should not be given. For the purpose of
12
ruling on the motion, the trial court must assume that the
evidence for the Commonwealth is true, but reserving to the
jury questions as to the credibility and weight to be given to
such testimony.
Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S . W.2d 186, 187 (Ky. 1991) . For our
purposes, "the test of a directed verdict is, if under the evidence as a
whole, it would be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find guilt." Id .
(citing Commonwealth v. Sawhill, 660 S .W.2d 3 (Ky. 1983)) . Therefore,
"there must be evidence of substance, and the trial court is expressly
authorized to direct a verdict for the defendant if the prosecution
produces no more than a mere scintilla of evidence ."
Here, the jury was instructed pursuant to KRS 502 .020(1) . 9 "In
the context of criminal homicide, a defendant can be found guilty by
complicity of an intentional homicide [KRS 507 . . . under KRS
.020(1)(a)]
502 .020(1) only if there is evidence that he/she either [1] actively
participated in the actions of the principal . . . [2] with the intent that the
victim's death . . . would result." Tharp v . Commonwealth , 40 S .W .3d
356, 361 (Ky. 2000) (emphasis in original) (citing Skinner v.
Commonwealth , 864 S .W .2d 290, 300 (Ky. 1993) and Gilbert v.
Commonwealth , 838 S .W .2d 376, 380 (Ky. 1991)) .
9 The relevant portions of KRS 502 .020, "Liability for the conduct of another ;
complicity," read as follows:
(1) A person is guilty of an offense committed by another person
when, with the intention of promoting or facilitating the
commission of the offense, he:
(a) Solicits, commands, or engages in a conspiracy with such other
person to commit the offense ; or
(b) Aids, counsels, or attempts to aid such person in planning or
committing the offense . . .
13
Drawing all fair and reasonable inferences from the evidence in
favor of the Commonwealth but reserving to the jury questions of witness .
credibility, we hold that there was sufficient evidence presented for the
jury to convict Appellant of complicity to murder .
By Appellant's own
admission, Gerald was with Appellant and at his home the night Gerald
was fatally attacked .
In his first interview, Appellant stated that he
fought with Gerald ; in his second interview, Appellant stated that he
"split his brains out" with "anything he could get a hold of" ; in his third
interview, Appellant again stated that he struck Gerald with an ashtray,
that Michael and Nathan "beat the hell out of Gerald" and stomped on
his body in the driveway, and that Michael cleaned the scene with
bleach. Steadman's testimony corroborated many of these statements,
wherein Appellant also admitted to holding Gerald down as the others
attacked him, before they killed him with a large object. In light of such
evidence, it was not clearly unreasonable for the jury to find guilt .
D. Prosecutorial Misconduct
Finally, Appellant alleges that he was substantially prejudiced by
the Commonwealth's improper closing argument . This Court will
"reverse for prosecutorial misconduct in a closing argument only if the
misconduct is `flagrant' or if each of the following three conditions is
satisfied : (1) Proof of defendant's guilt is not overwhelming ; (2) Defense
counsel objected; and (3) The trial court failed to cure the error with a
sufficient admonishment to the jury." Matheney v. Commonwealth , 191
S .W .3d 599, 606 (Ky . 2006) (emphasis in original) (citing Barnes v.
14
Commonwealth , 91 S.W .3d 564, 568 (Ky. 2002)) . Appellant concedes,
however, that he did not object at trial . We, therefore, "need only
evaluate whether the prosecutor's [conduct] was `flagrant"' and do not
believe it so. Id.
Appellant first claims that it was misconduct for the prosecutor to
state that Appellant was "a liar" in his closing argument . We cannot
agree . A prosecutor "is entitled to draw reasonable inferences from the
evidence, to make reasonable comment upon the evidence and to make a
reasonable argument in response to matters brought up by the
defendant." Hunt v. Commonwealth, 466 S .W. 2d 957, 959 (Ky. 1971) .
Appellant conducted three interviews with the police and all accounts
differed materially . Moreover, prior to the Commonwealth's closing,
defense counsel for Appellant conceded the Commonwealth's point in his
closing:
I can say that after listening to the Commonwealth's case,
that it would be easy to be convinced beyond a reasonable
doubt that [Appellant] was not entirely honest to the [police
officer] when he talked to him . . . . The Commonwealth has
convinced you that [Appellant] lied, and I understand that.
The prosecutor's remarks were, therefore, proper and Appellant's
contentions otherwise lack merit.
Similarly unpersuasive is Appellant's contention that the
prosecutor for the Commonwealth improperly characterized Appellant's
defense as trying "pull one over on you [the jury] ." As we have previously
explained, "[g]reat leeway is allowed to both counsel in a closing
argument . It is just that - an argument . A prosecutor may comment on
15
tactics, may comment on evidence, and may comment as to the falsity of
a defense position ." Slaughter, 744 S .W.2d at 412 (emphasis in original) .
Appellant's final claim of prosecutorial misconduct, though
ultimately unconvincing, merits greater discussion . In recounting
Appellant's confession to Steadman and its implications, the prosecutor
mistakenly stated that the confession occurred while the two were
imprisoned together in a Minnesota prison . While it is true that
Appellant had been in a Minnesota prison prior to the crimes at some
point prior to or during 2007, Steadman's testimony placed the two in a
Kentucky prison at the time of Appellant's confession in March of 2008 .
Upon this clear mistake of fact, 10 the prosecutor further argued that
Appellant likely confessed in Minnesota because the two were
significantly removed from any pending investigation in Clay County,
Kentucky .
We, however, do not believe that the prosecutor's mistaken
argument was, by any means, flagrant. Cf. United States v. Carroll, 26
F.3d 1380, 1389-90 (6th Cir. 1994) ("[T]hese improper remarks were
isolated, and there is no indication that they were deliberate.") (emphasis
added) . A vigilant juror would have immediately recognized the
prosecutor's mistaken geography based upon the similar evidence
presented at trial . As a result, the prosecutor's additional faulty
to A review of the record demonstrates that the prosecutor was apparently
under this mistaken assumption for some time . He earlier indicated that
Appellant and Steadman were incarcerated together in a Minnesota prison
during a bench conference on a separate matter.
16
inference could not have been accorded significant weight in bolstering
Steadman's testimony . i 1
III. Conclusion
., Therefore, for the above stated reasons, we hereby affirm
Appellant's sentence and conviction .
All sitting. All concur .
i l Even if the conduct were flagrant, "we would also have to find that
Appellant suffered `manifest injustice' before we could grant any relief to
which he might have been entitled as to the unpreserved error." Matheney,
191 S .W.3d at 607 n.4 (noting proper analysis) ; see RCr 10 .26; Brooks v.
Commonwealth , 217 S .W.3d 219, 225 (Ky. 2007) ("To prove palpable error,
Appellant must show the probability of a different result or error so
fundamental as to threaten his entitlement to due process of law.") (citing
Martin v. Commonwealth , 207 S .W .3d 1 (Ky. 2006)) . While the prosecutor's
mistake may have been error, it was not so grave as to render Appellant's
entire trial fundamentally unfair .
17
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Hon . Emily Holt Rhorer
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Jack Conway
Attorney General
Kenneth Wayne Riggs
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Attorney General
Office of Criminal Appeals
1024 Capital Center Dr.
Frankfort, KY 40601
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