LEONEL MARTINEZ V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED."
PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C),
THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
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RENDERED : AUGUST 27, 2009
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2008-SC-000082-MR
LEONEL MARTINEZ
APPELLA
ON APPEAL FROM DAVIESS CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS O . CASTLEN, JUDGE
NO . 06-CR-00601
V
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
Appellant, Leonel Martinez, was convicted by a Daviess Circuit Court
jury of murder, committed by being complicit, and two counts of first-degree
robbery, committed by being complicit. For these crimes, Appellant received a
sentence of twenty-four years for the murder count and ten years on each
robbery count all to run concurrently for a total of twenty-four years'
imprisonment . Appellant now appeals to this Court as a matter of right. Ky.
Const. ยง 110 .
Appellant asserts four arguments on appeal : 1) that the trial court erred
in not granting him a continuance before trial; 2) that the trial court prevented
him from presenting a full and complete defense ; 3) that the trial court erred in
not granting him directed verdicts of acquittal on the complicity charges ; and 4)
that the trial court improperly allowed evidence regarding his invoking of his
right to remain silent and his reaction to the police interview to be heard by the
jury. For the reasons set forth herein, we now affirm Appellant's conviction
and sentence.
On March 23, 2006, an armed robbery occurred at the Jewelry Chest in
Owensboro, Kentucky . Working that day was the store owner, Samuel Garrett,
and manager, Lisa Edge . At about 12 :30 p.m., Edge, who was working in the
back of the store while Garrett was in the showroom, heard the front door open
and saw two Hispanic men enter . She recognized one of the men as a previous
customer who had inquired about selling a bracelet, which later investigation
indicated likely belonged to Appellant. A few seconds later she heard a
commotion in the front of the store and noticed a third and fourth Hispanic
man . The men ordered Edge to the ground and stole a ring from her. They
also stole a chain and watch from the store . While on the ground, Edge heard
continued fighting in the showroom, followed by a single gunshot, and then
silence .
Once she was sure the robbers had left, Edge went to the showroom and
discovered Garrett lying face down on the floor, bleeding. He had been shot in
the chest, but was still alive . Edge locked the front door of the store and called
911 . The police arrived quickly and performed first aid on Garrett, but despite
their efforts, he died .
The police investigation turned up several witnesses to the robbers'
escape. These witnesses all indicated that the robbers escaped from the area
in a teal-colored car. The next day, the car was found in the parking lot of a
local factory. A surveillance tape from the factory showed that after
abandoning the car, the suspects jumped into a white car identified as the
"Latino Taxi" owned and operated by Appellant. Evidence indicated that after
picking up the suspects, Appellant drove them to Portland, Tennessee, and
then returned to Owensboro . As he returned to Owensboro, the police called
Appellant on his cell phone and asked if his taxi service had picked up anyone
matching the description of the suspected robbers. Appellant falsely replied
that he was in Nashville at the time of the robbery.
The police quickly found the robbery suspects: Johnny Gama, Douglas
Herrero, and Miguel Velazquez. Suspicion also focused on Appellant because
of the factory surveillance video of his car picking up the suspects and because
he made several inconsistent statements to the police. All three suspects and
Appellant were indicted for the crime . Prior to Appellant's trial, Gama, Herrero,
and Velazquez pled guilty and agreed to testify against Appellant.
I . THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT ABUSE HIS DISCRETION BY DENYING
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A CONTINUANCE
Appellant first argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion for
a continuance filed November S, 2007, five days prior to the scheduled start of
trial . Appellant's motion argued that he needed a continuance to review the
plea agreements from Herrero and Velazquez which were made in October
2007, and Gama's plea agreement which was to be filed that day. Appellant's
counsel stated that while he had received Herrero and Velazquez's statements a
month earlier, the recordings were of poor quality and partially in Spanish .
Appellant's counsel also argued that he had been out of town during October
and had just recently realized the Commonwealth turned over the statements .
Appellant suggested that his trial be moved to November 26, 2007, which was
scheduled to be the date of Gama's trial. The Commonwealth ultimately joined
Appellant's motion.
The trial judge, in denying the motion, noted that there was already a
prior continuance granted in this trial which gave Appellant's counsel several
additional months to prepare his defense . The trial judge believed that
Appellant's counsel was aware that co-defendants have a propensity to make
plea agreements prior to trial, and could have planned accordingly. Further,
the trial judge said he could suppress any evidence which was provided in
untimely discovery. The trial judge also cited to the fact that translators,
necessary to interpret testimony, were already scheduled for the upcoming trial
date .
On the morning of trial, November 13, 2007, Appellant's counsel renewed
his motion for a continuance on the grounds that due to the late plea
agreements he was not prepared for trial . Appellant's counsel also cited to a
late witness statement he had not adequately reviewed . The trial judge again
denied the motion. Appellant's counsel announced at the beginning of trial
that he was "ready."
Pursuant to RCr 9 .04, "[a] continuance will be granted upon a showing of
sufficient cause ." Snodgrass v . Commonwealth , 814 S .W.2d 579, 581 (Ky.
1991)(overruled on other grounds by Lawson v. Commonwealth, 53 S .W.3d 534
(Ky. 2001)) . A trial judge should consider the following factors when
determining whether to grant a continuance: 1) the length of delay; 2) whether
there have been previous continuances; 3) the inconvenience of the
continuance to the litigants, witnesses, counsel, and the court ; 4) whether the
delay is purposeful or caused by the accused; 5) the availability of competent
counsel, if at issue; 6) the complexity of the case; and 7) whether denying the
continuance would lead to any identifiable prejudice. Id . "The decision to
grant or deny a continuance rests within the sound discretion of the trial court.
Only an abuse of that discretion would justify disturbing the trial court's
ruling." Lovett v. Commonwealth , 858 S .W.2d 205, 208 (Ky. 1993) . "The test
for an abuse of discretion is whether the trial judge's decision was arbitrary,
unreasonable, unfair or unsupported by sound legal principles ."
Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W .2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999) .
In this matter, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by denying
Appellant's motion for a continuance . Appellant's main argument in favor of
the continuance was that he did not have adequate time to review the
statements provided by Herrero, Velazquez, and Gama prior to trial . However,
Herrero and Velazquez's statements had been provided a full month earlier to
Appellant's counsel and Gama's statement was to be turned over by the
Commonwealth that very day. Thus, Appellant's counsel had adequate time to
review these statements prior to trial . Further, even though Appellant
recommended moving his trial date to a date which was reserved for his codefendant's trial, we cannot say with certainty that delaying Appellant's trial
would not have inconvenienced witnesses, counsel, or the court. Additionally,
an earlier continuance had already been granted in this trial. Thus, reviewing
the trial judge's decision under the Snodgrass factors, we find that the trial
judge did not abuse his discretion by denying Appellant's motion for a second
continuance .
II . THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT PREVENT APPELLANT FROM PRESENTING A
FULL AND COMPLETE DEFENSE
Appellant next argues that the trial judge committed two errors which
prevented him from presenting a full and complete defense. The first alleged
error is that the trial judge did not strike a portion of Owensboro Police
Detective Ed Krauwinkel's testimony. Detective Krauwinkel testified that he
believed the "Latino Taxi" sign, usually on Appellant's car, was not on the car
when Appellant picked up his co-defendants after the robbery . Detective
Krauwinkel based his opinion on photos made from the factory surveillance
video . When asked on cross-examination if it was possible the "Latino Taxi"
sign was not visible simply due to the poor quality of the still photo, Detective
Krauwinkel answered no. Detective Krauwinkel eventually admitted during
cross-examination that it was possible that the "Latino Taxi" sign was not
visible due to the photo's quality .
Later that day, Appellant's counsel asked to approach the bench. In the
ensuing bench conference, Appellant's counsel stated that he was concerned
about Detective Krauwinkel's testimony, because it implied that Appellant had
removed the "Latino Taxi" sign to cover up his actions . Appellant's counsel
also was concerned because the Assistant Commonwealth Attorney earlier
indicated to him that the poor picture quality was the reason the "Latino Taxi"
sign did not appear in the photos . Appellant requested pursuant to KRE 1003
to see the original surveillance video footage. The Commonwealth responded
that Appellant's counsel already had the original, undistorted photos, and that
the "Latino Taxi" sign was not visible in those photographs. Appellant then
moved to strike Detective Krauwinkel's testimony or in the alternative asked for
a mistrial because an admonition would not cure any error. The trial judge
denied the motion.
Upon review of the record, we see no reason to conclude that the trial
judge should have declared a mistrial or suppressed Detective Krauwinkel's
testimony regarding the "Latino Taxi" sign. Detective Krauwinkel's testimony
regarding the presence of the "Latino Taxi" sign was responsive to the
questions asked of him. Mills v . Commonwealth , 996 S .W.2d 473, 485 (Ky.
1999) . While the Assistant Commonwealth's Attorney may have believed that
the "Latino Taxi" sign was not present due to pixel distortion in the photos, he
did not speak for everyone who testified at trial. Further, Detective Krauwinkel
admitted during cross-examination that it was possible that distortion caused
the "Latino Taxi" sign to not be visible in the photos . The presence of the
"Latino Taxi" sign was a factual issue for the jury to determine . Appellant
presented sufficient counter-evidence that the sign was visible on Appellant's
car the day of the robbe
There is no error here .
The second alleged error is that the trial judge should have delayed the
trial so that Appellant could further cross-examine Owensboro Police Sergeant
Tim Clothier. Sergeant Clothier testified that Appellant was told during an
interview with police, that the photos from the factory surveillance video
indicated that the "Latino Taxi" sign was not on his vehicle. Sergeant Clothier
stated that upon hearing this, Appellant became angry and accused the police
of doctoring the photos. Subsequently, Sergeant Clothier testified he obtained
an arrest warrant for Appellant.
During Sergeant Clothier's cross-examination, Appellant's counsel asked
him whether he was aware that several witnesses testified that they saw the
"Latino Taxi" sign on Appellant's car the day of the robbery. Sergeant Clothier
stated he had not heard the testimony. Appellant's counsel further asked if he
was aware of testimony that the pixel resolution from the still photos caused
the "Latino Taxi" sign to not appear in the photographs, and that this
testimony meant that Appellant's anger at the police interview may have been
well-founded . The Commonwealth objected to this question as rhetorical and
the trial judge sustained .
On the morning that the jury was to be instructed, Appellant moved that
the trial be briefly recessed so that Sergeant Clothier could be further crossexamined . Appellant's counsel discovered that in the affidavit for the arrest
warrant issued for Appellant, Sergeant Clothier stated that the taxi cab had the
"Latino Taxi" sign on it in the factory surveillance video pictures.
Unfortunately, Sergeant Clothier was out of town and the trial judge denied the
motion to postpone the trial or admit the affidavit . The trial judge believed that
the presence of the "Latino Taxi" sign on the car at the time of the robbery was
a factual issue and that the evidence Appellant already presented adequately
supported his contention .
We agree with the trial judge. The decision to recess a trial is up to the
trial judge's discretion. Brawner v. Commonwealth, 344 S .W .2d 833, 836 (Ky .
1961) (holding that a trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying a
continuance or recess) . Here the trial judge did not abuse his discretion
because the presence of the "Latino Taxi" sign was a factual issue which must
be decided by the jury. A delay for further cross-examination of Sergeant
Clothier was not warranted . There is no error here .
III . THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED APPELLANT'S MOTIONS FOR
DIRECTED VERDICTS OF ACQUITTAL
Appellant next argues that the trial court erred by denying his motions
for a directed verdict of acquittal . Appellant argues that there was insufficient
evidence presented to support his complicity convictions because the only
evidence of his acting in complicity came from his co-defendants' testimony .
Appellant argues that their testimony was inadequate because they received
deals from the Commonwealth in exchange for their testimony. Thus, he
argues the evidence the Commonwealth presented lacks the "atmosphere of
verisimilitude" and fitness to produce a conviction .
"On appellate review, the test of a directed verdict is, if under the
evidence as a whole, it would be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find guilt,
only then the defendant is entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal ."
Commonwealth v . Benham, 816 S .W.2d 186, 187 (Ky. 1991) . The trial judge is
to review all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth.
Id. Reviewing the evidence presented in this case, it would not be
unreasonable for a jury to determine beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant
was guilty. Notably, each and every co-defendant implicated Appellant as part
of the planning and execution of the robbery. The credibility and weight to be
given their testimony was within the province of the jury. Commonwealth v.
Smith, 5 S .W.3d 126, 129 (Ky . 1999) . Even though the evidence provided by
Appellant's co-defendants amply supported the trial court's refusal to grant a
directed verdict, other evidence also linked Appellant to the crimes. He
admitted that the bracelet found at the Jewelry Chest after the robbery
resembled a bracelet that was given to him by his wife. The fact that Appellant
drove the co-defendants to Tennessee after the robbery was not disputed at
trial . The trial court properly denied Appellant's motion for a directed verdict.
IV. THE COMMONWEALTH DID NOT IMPERMISSIBLY INTRODUCE
EVIDENCE OF APPELLANT'S EXERCISE OF HIS RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT
Appellant's last argument is that the Commonwealth improperly
introduced evidence which informed the jury that he exercised his right to
remain silent . Appellant admits that this alleged error is unpreserved, and so
we review under our palpable error standard . RCr 10.26 . During trial,
Owensboro Police Detective Bruce Burns testified about the circumstances
surrounding Appellant's statement to police on March 24, 2007 . Detective
Burns testified that in his opinion Appellant reacted to the police interrogation
in a manner which indicated guilt. The Commonwealth then played a
videotape of the police interrogation, stopping it at the point where Appellant
requested an attorney. Detective Burns later testified that when Appellant
requested an attorney the interview ended .'
Appellant now argues that Detective Burns' opinion testimony and the
playing of the videotape were improper comments on Appellant's invocation of
his right to remain silent . Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U .S. 610 (1976)
However, as the
record reflects, the evidence introduced by the Commonwealth was not of
Appellant's silence, but of his voluntary statements . Since Appellant's
statements were voluntary, the Commonwealth was entitled to use them at
1 Evidence indicates that after Appellant requested an attorney, Detective Burns
stopped the interrogation, however, in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S . 436
(1966), the interrogation was resumed by other officers. The statements gathered
from the illegal interrogation were properly suppressed at trial .
trial . Additionally, the jury was not instructed to draw any negative inference
from Appellant's request to obtain a lawyer . There is no error here .
The admittance of Detective Burns's opinion testimony, however, is error,
but does not rise to the level of. palpable error. Detective Burns's testimony
was effectively lay testimony regarding Appellant's guilt. A witness not
testifying as an expert may testify to matters "'(a) [r]ationally based on the
perception of the witness,' and `(b) [h]elpful to a clear understanding of the
witness' testimony or the determination of a fact in issue ."' Cuzick v.
Commonwealth , 276 S .W.3d 260, 265 (Ky. 2009) (citing KRE 701) . KRE 602
further limits lay testimony to matters of which the witness has personal
knowledge . Here, Detective Burns's testimony that Appellant acted guilty was
not appropriate because he had no personal knowledge that Appellant was
guilty, only a belief, and his belief Appellant was guilty was not useful to
helping the jury understand Appellant's statements . However, no matter how
inappropriate Detective Burns's testimony may have been, we cannot find that
it rose to a manifest injustice. RCr 10 .26. Detective Burns's statements
constituted a small portion of the trial and the evidence presented against
Appellant was substantial. Detective Burns's testimony is not palpable error.
For the above reasons, we affirm the conviction and sentence of the
Daviess Circuit Court jury.
All sitting. All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Emily Holt Rhorer
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane
Suite 302
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Jack Conway
Attorney General
Michael Louis Harned
Assistant Attorney General
William Robert Long, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
Office Of Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601-8204
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