TERRY TOBAR V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED : MAY 21, 2009
TO BE PUBLISHED
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2007-SC-000842-DG
V.
ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS
CASE NO . 2006-CA-001314-MR
FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT NO . 05-CR-01640
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE VENTERS
AFFIRMING
Appellant, Terry Tobar, entered a conditional guilty plea to the offense of
failure to comply with sex offender registration, KRS 17.5 10(10) (a), and was
sentenced to a term of one year imprisonment, probated for five years . The
Court of Appeals rejected his claim that the version of KRS 17 .510 in effect
when he pled guilty to this crime was unconstitutionally vague as applied to
him. We granted discretionary review, and now affirm the Court of Appeals .
RELEVANT FACTS
Having been convicted of a sexual offense in the state of Ohio, Appellant
duly registered as a sex offender under Kentucky's Sexual Offender
Registration Act, KRS 17.500, et seq., when he moved to his mother's house in
Fayette County. He subsequently vacated those premises under the terms of a
domestic violence order, and moved to the Hope Center, also located in Fayette
County. In conformance with KRS 17.510(10)(a), he promptly notified his
probation and parole officer of his address change . Unfortunately, Appellant
was expelled from the Hope Center because it has a policy against housing
registered sex offenders. Evidence then indicates Appellant became homeless .'
He failed to report to the proper authorities that he was no longer living at the
Hope Center, and did not otherwise inform his probation officer of his
relocation. He was subsequently indicted for violating KRS 17 .5 10(10) (a) .
Appellant moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the statute was
unconstitutionally vague as applied to him because he was homeless when
charged and therefore unable to register a change in address. Finding KRS
17 .510(10)(a) constitutional, the trial court denied Appellant's motion, and
allowed him to enter a conditional guilty plea, reserving the constitutional
question for appeal.
The Court of Appeals affirmed Appellant's conviction finding that KRS
17.5 10(10) (a) was not void for vagueness as applied to him by emphasizing the
importance of the term "change" as used in the statute. The Court of Appeals
held that KRS 17 .5 10(10)(a) did not criminalize homelessness, but focused on
requiring the sex offender to report any change in residence address. Thus, the
fact that Appellant became homeless was irrelevant to the statute's application .
1 The Commonwealth argues that Appellant's homeless was never conceded or
determined as fact by the trial court . However, we believe there is adequate
evidence in the record to show that Appellant was homeless or at least without a
permanent address when charged with his crime.
What was important was the fact that Appellant's residence address changed
when he left the Hope Center .
KRS 17.510(10)(a) IS NOT VOID FOR VAGUENESS AS APPLIED TO
APPELLANT
Appellant's argument is that KRS 17 .510 is unconstitutionally vague as
applied to him and other similarly situated homeless persons because a
homeless person cannot possibly comply with the requirement to report a
change in their "residence address." Appellant argues that a homeless person
by definition has no "residence" or "address ." Furthering his argument,
Appellant cites to the fact that residence was not defined in the Sex Offender
Registration Act in effect at the time of this case2 and thus he believes the term
is vague . Appellant cites to several portions of the Sexual Offender Registration
Act to show how having an actual residence or address is necessary to comply
with KRS 17 .510 . However, Appellant was effectively charged with violating
only KRS 17 .5 10(10) (a) . Thus, we will only consider whether KRS 17.5 10(10) (a)
is void for vagueness as applied to Appellant. KRS 17 .510(10)(a) states :
If the residence address of any registrant changes, but the
registrant remains in the same county, the person shall register,
on or before the date of the change of address, with the appropriate
local probation and parole office in the county in which he or she
resides.
A statute is vague if "men of common intelligence must necessarily guess
at its meaning ." State Bd. For Elementary and Secondary Educ. v . Howard ,
834 S .W.2d 657, 662 (Ky. 1992) (citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U .S . 601
2 KRS 17.500(7) now defines "residence" as "any place where a person sleeps."
(1973)) . To satisfy the void for vagueness doctrine a statute must: 1) provide
fair notice to those targeted by the statute, "by containing sufficient
definiteness so that ordinary people can understand what conduct is
prohibited" and 2) it must have been drafted in such a way to discourage
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Wilfong v. Commonwealth , 175
S.W.3d 84, 95 (Ky. App . 2004) . A statute is unconstitutionally vague if those
individuals who are affected by it cannot reasonably understand what the
statute requires . Gurnee v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government , 6
S .W.3d 852, 856 (Ky. App. 1999) .
A review of KRS 17 .5 10(10) (a) indicates that it is not void for vagueness
as applied to Appellant. KRS 17 .510 is designed to fulfill a public purpose by
tracking where sex offenders live . The key to fulfilling this purpose is making
sure that registered sex offenders report to the proper authorities whenever
they change their residence address. We agree with the Court of Appeals that
the focus of KRS 17 .510(10)(a) is not that the sex offender have an address, but
that any change in address be reported to the proper authorities . The clear
language of the statute supports such a conclusion . KRS 17.510(10)(a) clearly
provides "[i]f the residence address of any registrant changes, but the registrant
remains in the same county, the person shall register . . . ." Nowhere in the
plain language of the statute does it require that the registrant must have an
actual place he is moving to .
The evidence in this matter indicates that Appellant was aware of the
requirement of KRS 17.510(10)(a) since he reported to the proper authorities
that he moved from Ohio to his mother's house in Lexington . He was again
aware of the KRS 17 .5 10(10) (a) requirement when he subsequently reported
the change in his address when he moved from his mother's house to the Hope
Center. However, the record indicates that Appellant made no attempt to
report to the proper authorities when he moved away from the Hope Center, yet
remained in Fayette County, albeit as a homeless person. There is no reason
why Appellant could not have reported to the proper authorities that he no
longer lived at the Hope Center. Had he done so he might have been able to
assert an impossibility defense based on his lack of new permanent residence
address. But, since Appellant did not report that his address changed by
virtue of being asked to leave the Hope Center, we need not address that issue .
Thus, in this matter, we cannot say that KRS 17 .5 10(10) (a) as written did not
clearly indicate what behavior is prohibited; Appellant was aware that he
needed to report the change in his living situation. Howard, 834 S.W .2d at
662 .
Further, we do not find that KRS 17.510(10)(a) as written causes
arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement . Id . All sex offenders, regardless of
their socioeconomic status, must register with the proper authorities and
report any change in their living address. KRS 17 .5 10(10) (a) does not
criminalize being homeless . It simply criminalizes a failure to register by a
registered sex offender upon a change in their residence address. Even if a sex
offender becomes homeless, there is a clear requirement and expectation that
the change in their living situation be reported to the proper authorities .
Appellant requested that we review KRS 17 .510 in light of the opinions of
other jurisdictions which found their sex offender registry laws void for
vagueness. However, upon review of these cases, we find no reason to follow
their conclusion .
We note further that, since Appellant's offense, the General Assembly
has amended portions of KRS 17 .500 et seq., including the definition of
"residence" . KRS 17 .500(7) . We express in this decision no opinion concerning
the validity of the current versions of the statute .
Thus we find that KRS 17.510(10)(a) is not void for vagueness as applied
to Appellant and we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals .
Minton, C .J., Abramson, Cunningham, Schroder, Scott, and Venters,
JJ., sitting. Minton, C .J., Abramson, Cunningham, JJ., concur. Schroder, J.,
dissents by separate opinion, in which Scott, J., joins. Noble, J., not sitting.
SCHRODER, JUSTICE, DISSENTING : When the Appellant's probation
officer, the trial judge and this Court, individuals I'd like to think are of
common intelligence, have to struggle (as we clearly have) with the question of
whether the statute requires a homeless registrant to register his change of
residence address, then the statute is necessarily void for vagueness as to this
defendant . I have no problem with requiring the registration of a sex offender .
However, the language of KRS 17 .5 10(10) (a) as it existed in 2005 was simply
not definite enough for an ordinary person to understand that a registrant who
becomes homeless must register his change of residence address when, by the
very definition of "homeless", the registrant has no residence or address .
Scott, J., joins .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Samuel N. Potter
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Jack Conway
Attorney General
James Coleman Shackelford
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Criminal Appeals
1024 Capital Center Drive
Suite 200
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601-8204
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