ANGELYNNA YOUNG (A/K/A ANGELYNNA YOUNG-HOWE) V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IMPORTANT NOTICE
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED ."
PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C),
THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER
CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE ; HOWEVER,
UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS,
RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR
CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED
OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE
BEFORE THE COURT. OPINIONS CITED FOR CONSIDERATION
BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED
DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A COPY OF THE
ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG WITH THE
DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO THE
ACTION .
RENDERED : AUGUST 27, 2009
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
,*Uyrrmr (~Vurf of ~fi
2007-SC-000524-MR
ANGELYNNA YOUNG
(A/K/A ANGELYNNA YOUNG-HOWE)
V
911-2/0-1
.v_ K.IGibch-A C,
~
APPELLAN
ON APPEAL FROM GRANT CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE STEPHEN L . BATES, JUDGE
NO . 07-CR-00023
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
Angelynna Young appeals as a matter of right from a July 5, 2007
Judgment of the Grant Circuit Court convicting her of obtaining a controlled
substance by fraud, possession of a controlled substance in the first degree
(two counts), possession of marijuana (three counts), possession of a controlled
substance in the second degree, possession of drug paraphernalia, assault in
the first degree (two counts), and wanton endangerment in the first degree
(fifteen counts) . After Young pled guilty to these twenty-five counts, the trial
court sentenced her to a total of twenty-two years' imprisonment in accordance
with the Commonwealth's recommendation . Young's sole argument on appeal
is that the trial court erred in refusing to permit her to withdraw her guilty
plea. Convinced that the trial court correctly determined that Young's guilty
plea was made knowingly and voluntarily and that the court acted within its
discretion in denying Young's motion to withdraw her plea, we affirm.
RELEVANT FACTS
On January 17, 2007, Angelynna Young, a Grant County school bus
driver, commenced her job of transporting students from their respective
houses to Grant County Middle School. While en route to the school, at
approximately 8 :00 a.m ., Young drove off the right side of the road onto the
shoulder, overcompensated, drove back across both lanes of traffic, and hit a
light pole on the left side of the road . All seventeen children on the bus were
injured in some way, but the two children seated closest to the light pole's
point of impact suffered critical injuries . Cody Shively, age twelve, suffered
facial fractures and severe injuries to his brain and spine. Cody was
hospitalized in an intensive care unit for one month and spent three months at
Children's Hospital in Cincinnati . Jacob Clise, age fourteen, was thrown
through the bus window as a result of the impact. Jacob was airlifted to
Children's Hospital in Cincinnati after the bus crash and he ultimately lost his
left eye and both his sense of smell and taste.
Following the wreck, Young was transported to St. Elizabeth's Hospital
South, where she was treated and released later that morning. While being
treated, hospital personnel collected blood and urine samples from Young. The
hospital lab performed a urine-based toxicology screening, which revealed the
presence of Fioricet, Darvocet, cocaine, Valium, and marijuana in Young's
system . The hospital also tested Young's blood for alcohol, but the test
After
produced a negative result.l
she was released from the hospital, Young
traveled to the Grant County "bus barn," where she was interviewed by
Kentucky State Police Detective Kevin Flick. Young told Detective Flick that
she was currently taking several medications, including Valium, Zomig,
Percocet, and Darvocet. Young also revealed that the right before the accident,
she had gone to bed around 12 :30 a .m ., and woke up at approximately 5 :00
a.m. The Commonwealth notes in its brief that Young's cell phone records
indicate a call made from that phone at 2 :17 a.m. the morning of the accident;
that Young had ingested at least four different drugs that night; that Young
had told her boyfriend she had "snorted cocaine" that morning "to get her
going" ; and that Young had told her children's babysitter that she had been up
all night and had not slept .
The day after the wreck, on January 18, 2007, Detective Flick obtained a
search warrant for Young's apartment. In the course of the search, Detective
Flick found cocaine, hydrocodone, marijuana, and drug paraphernalia in
Young's residence. On February 14, 2007, a Grant County Grand Jury
indicted Young with one count of obtaining a controlled substance by fraud,
two counts of possession of a controlled substance (cocaine) in the first degree,
The hospital lab used all of Young's urine sample in conducting its tests . The
remaining portion of Young's blood sample was obtained by the Kentucky State
Police on January 19, 2007, and transported to the Kentucky State Police
Laboratory in Frankfort, Kentucky, for further testing. However, a subsequent
testing of Young's blood sample showed none of the drugs that had previously been
present in her urinalysis. The Commonwealth explained the conflicting results by
contending that Young's blood sample was improperly stored at the police lab in a
red-top container without the necessary preservatives.
one count of possession of a controlled substance (hydrocodone) in the second
degree, three counts of possession of marijuana, one count of possession of
drug paraphernalia, two counts of assault in the first degree, and fifteen counts
of wanton endangerment in the first degree . On that same day, Young entered
a plea of not guilty to the twenty-five counts .
In the next six months, Young filed several motions with the trial court,
including a motion to sever counts of the indictment, a motion to reconsider an
adverse ruling on that motion, a motion in limine, a motion to suppress the
items found in Young's home, a motion to suppress urinalysis results, a motion
to suppress Young's statement, and a motion to transfer venue . In addition to
motion hour appearances, there were two pre-trial conferences. Young also
submitted numerous discovery requests to the Commonwealth in preparation
for trial and ultimately over 1000 pages of discovery were filed in the record .
After the trial court denied the majority of Young's pre-trial motions, on
June 20, 2007, Young appeared before the Grant Circuit Court in order to
enter a guilty plea. However, after Young informed the judge that she was not
satisfied with how her attorneys2 had investigated her case and that she did
not believe she was guilty of the charges being brought against her, the trial
court abandoned the plea colloquy in order to give Young more time to reflect
on her decision and to consult with counsel.
The transcripts of the court proceedings on June 20, 2007, June 22, 2007, and
July 5, 2007, reflect that Young was represented by three attorneys, all of whom
were present on her behalf.
Two days later, on June 22, 2007, Young appeared again before the trial
court and pled guilty to all twenty-five charges. During this plea colloquy, the
prosecutor reviewed each of Young's charges and the corresponding sentencing
recommendations . The trial judge then asked Young a series of questions,
including whether she had reviewed the plea agreement with her attorney;
whether she had questions for him, the judge, about the plea; whether her
decision was impaired because of drugs or alcohol; whether she understood
that she was giving up certain specific constitutional rights by pleading guilty;
whether anyone had forced her to plead guilty ; and whether she was guilty of
the charges to which she was pleading. The trial court then accepted Young's
guilty plea and set a date for her sentencing hearing .
On July 5, 2007, before the trial court entered Young's final judgment
and sentence, Young read a statement to the court and the families of the
children involved in the wreck, many of whom were present for the sentencing.
Young stated that she was "not guilty of extremely [sic] difference [sic] to these
children's lives" and that she was "here to say that I am not guilty and I
withdraw my guilty plea." Quoting from the Bible, she expressed a desire to
leave the matter in God's control and to relieve her own children of the belief
that she was guilty. During a bench conference, Young's counsel informed the
court that this was the first time she had learned of Young's desire to withdraw
her guilty plea. The court then called a recess so that Young could speak with
her attorneys. Upon returning, the trial court heard arguments from both
sides regarding Young's motion to withdraw her plea.
Young's counsel stated that Young had been struggling with this decision
all along and that she simply did not. believe she was guilty as charged . The
Commonwealth responded that Young had knowingly, voluntarily, and
intelligently pled guilty to all twenty-five counts at her previous court
appearance approximately two weeks earlier, and it would be inappropriate to
allow Young to withdraw her guilty plea now. Young then made another
statement to the court, in which she apologized for previously pleadin guilty,
explained that she had been told that taking the plea would be her only
chance, and reiterated that she now wanted to withdraw her plea and "put my
faith in God and go from there." The trial court then orally denied Young's
motion to withdraw her plea and entered a written order finding that her "plea
of guilty was knowingly and voluntarily made and with an understanding of the
nature of the charges ." Subsequently, the trial court adopted the plea
agreement reached by Young and the Commonwealth and sentenced Young to
twenty-two years' imprisonment . This appeal followed .
ANALYSIS
I. The Supreme Court Is the Proper Court In Which To Bring This Appeal.
Before reaching the merits of Young's appeal, the Commonwealth asks
this Court to address whether the matter should be addressed first to the
Court of Appeals . The Commonwealth contends that because Young is
appealing from the trial court's order denying her motion to withdraw her guilty
plea and not from a judgment, it is not clear that her appeal should proceed
directly to this Court pursuant to Section 110(2)(b) of the Kentucky
Constitution, which states only that "[apppeals from a judgment of the Circuit
Court imposing a sentence of death or life imprisonment or imprisonment for
twenty years or more shall be taken directly to the Supreme Court." (Emphasis
added) . However, appeals raising this precise type
of
trial court error have
consistently been brought to this Court when the defendant has been
sentenced to twenty years or more imprisonment . See, e.g., Ed.monds v.
Commonwealth , 189 S.W.3d
558, 561 (Ky. 2006)
(defendant appealed the final
judgment entered pursuant to his guilty plea arguing that the trial court erred
in overruling three separate motions, one
of
his guilty plea) ; Bronk v. Commonwealth ,
58 S.W. 3d 482, 484 (Ky. 2001)
which was his motion to withdraw
(defendant appealed from a final judgment and sentence, alleging only that the
trial court erred when it denied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea) ;
RodriRuez v. Commonwealth , 87 S .W.3d 8 (Ky.
2002)
(defendant appealed after
final judgment was entered, arguing only that the trial court erred in not
granting his motion to withdraw his guilty plea) . All of the above-mentioned
cases were properly heard and decided by the Kentucky Supreme Court, as
appeals from the judgment entered after the trial court denied the defendant's
motion to withdraw the guilty plea . Similarly, although Young is alleging that
her conviction and sentence should be vacated because of the trial court's error
in denying her motion to withdraw her plea, this action is ultimately an appeal
from a judgment and is properly before this Court as a matter of right . Ky.
Const . ยง 110 (2)(b) .
II. Based On the Totality of Circumstances, Young's Guilty Plea Was Made
Knowingly, Voluntarily, and With An Understanding of the Nature of the
Charges and the Trial Court Did Not Err In Denying Her Motion to
Withdraw Her Plea.
Before a trial court may accept a criminal defendant's guilty plea, it must
first determine that the plea is made voluntarily and with an understanding of
the nature of the charges. RCr 8.08. In order to ensure the defendant is aware
of the consequences of pleading guilty, including the constitutional rights he is
waiving, a trial court is required to conduct a hearing on the record in order to
verify that the defendant's plea is made knowingly and voluntarily. Boykin v .
Alabama , 395 U .S . 238, 241-42 (1969) . RCr 8 .10 provides that a defendant
may withdraw his guilty plea with the permission of the court any time before
final judgment is entered .
If a defendant moves to withdraw his guilty plea because it was made
involuntarily, the court should conduct a hearing to determine whether the
plea was voluntary. Rodriguez, 87 S .W .3d at 10 . If the court concludes that
the guilty plea was involuntary, the defendant's motion to withdraw must be
granted . Id . If the court concludes based on the totality of the circumstances
that the plea was voluntary, it has the discretion either to grant or deny the
defendant's motion to withdraw . On appeal, a trial court's determination to
deny a defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea is reviewed for clear
error, which means the decision will be upheld if it is supported by substantial
evidence . Edmonds , 189 S .W.3d at 566.
"A plea may be involuntary either because the accused does not
understand the nature of the constitutional protections that he is waiving, or
because he has such an incomplete understanding of the charge that his plea
cannot stand as an intelligent admission of guilt." Henderson v . Morgan , 426
U.S . 637, 645 n.13 (1976) (internal citations omitted) . "A guilty plea is
intelligent if a defendant is advised by competent counsel regarding the
consequences of entering a guilty plea . . . . is informed of the nature of the
charge against him, and is competent at the time the plea is entered ."
Edmonds, 189 S.W .3d at 566 .
Here, Young contends that her plea. was neither intelligent nor voluntary
primarily because the trial court did not discuss with her during the plea
colloquy the facts supporting each of her charges or the evidence the
Commonwealth intended to present at trial . 3 Although Young is correct that
this practice is preferable and that the trial court in Edmonds, supra, did
review the Commonwealth's evidence prior to accepting the defendant's plea,
Young misstates the law by contending that a review of this evidence "is a
critical part of any Bo kin hearing." In Bo kin, 395 U.S. at 243, the U .S .
Supreme Court identified three federal constitutional rights that a trial court
should discuss with a defendantthe right against self-incrimination, the right
3
Young also briefly complains that the trial court should have asked her more
questions to ensure that she understood the full range of penalties she was facing.
As will be evident in this Court's subsequent discussion, however, the
Commonwealth described the different charges in Young's plea agreement and the
sentencing recommendation associated with each separate count. Also, the plea
agreement, which Young signed, specified the class of each felony and misdemeanor
to which she was pleading and the applicable penalty range for each . Thus, even
though the trial court may not have orally reviewed the sentencing options for each
offense with Young, a detailed discussion of her twenty-two year prison sentence
was part of Young's plea colloquy and the written agreement plainly informed her of
the relevant penalty ranges on each offense .
to a jury trial, and the right to confront one's accusers-but did not specifically
instruct trial courts to review the underlying facts of the charges .
Reviewing the facts on which each of the charges is based is always the best
practice. However, a trial court's failure to review the underlying facts does not
automatically make a defendant's plea involuntary if the totality of the
circumstances indicates otherwise. In this case, because of the extensive pretrial proceedings prior to her guilty plea, the plea documents themselves which
incorporated the indictment, and the nearly 1000 pages of discovery provided
by the Commonwealth prior to her plea, we disagree that the trial court's
failure to review the specific facts underlying each of her charges or the
evidence the Commonwealth intended to present rendered her guilty plea
involuntary or unintelligent. Thus, the trial court did not err in refusing to
permit Young to withdraw her guilty plea .
Young's plea colloquy began with the Commonwealth describing the
twenty-five counts in Young's indictment. The prosecutor explained that these
counts included eighteen Class D felonies, five Class A misdemeanors, and two
Class B felonies . The Commonwealth identified its sentencing recommendation
for each different count, including whether Young's sentences should run
concurrently or consecutively . In addition, the prosecutor specified that
Young's sentences for the two Class B felonies would be served in accordance
with the eighty-five percent parole eligibility rule . The prosecutor explained
that this was due to the two children on the bus who were seriously injured
and stated that Young would be acknowledging that parole limitation in her
10
plea. The Commonwealth concluded that the effect of the plea would be a
twenty-two year prison sentence.
The trial court then asked both Young's counsel and Young herself if the
Commonwealth's description matched their understanding of the plea
agreement. Both Young and Young's counsel answered yes. The trial court
then began its plea colloquy with Young . The trial judge asked Young whether
she had reviewed the plea agreement with her attorneys; whether she had any
questions for the trial court about anything in the agreement; whether she was
under the influence of drugs or alcohol that would affect her ability to
understand what she was doing; whether she understood that by pleading
guilty she was giving up her constitutional right to a trial by judge or jury, to
confront and cross-examine whoever testified against her, to subpoena people
to make them come to court to tell her side of things, and to not testify or
incriminate herself; whether she had had enough time to speak with her
attorneys so that she felt comfortable entering a plea of guilty; whether she was
satisfied with her attorneys ; whether anyone made any kind of threat or
promise to force her to plead guilty against her will; and whether she was
pleading guilty because she was guilty of the charges against her. Young's
responses to these questions indicated that she understood the rights she was
waiving and the substance of her plea agreement, acknowledged that she was
guilty of the charges being brought against her, and did not have any further
questions about pleading guilty.
The trial court also asked Young's counsel if he knew of any indication
that Young was impaired by drugs or alcohol, whether he believed Young
understood her charges and her constitutional rights, whether Young would be
able to assist him in her defense if that became necessary, whether he knew of
any reason why she should not accept this plea, and whether the plea was
being made knowingly, voluntarily, and understandingly with a factual basis.
The trial court also asked all the parties whether they were acknowledging for
the record that there was a serious physical injury with regard to two victims of
the bus wreck. The trial court also made a statement to Young about a
conversation they had had earlier in the week when Young first attempted to
enter a guilty plea. The trial judge stated,
I spoke with you briefly off the record in court on Wednesday,
stepped back in the presence of your counsel and the
Commonwealth, and explained at that time, of course, if you
wanted to plead guilty you are welcome to do so but would have to
answer these questions in a certain fashion to do that. If you
wanted to proceed with the jury trial, I would be happy to do that
for you. Is that the substance of our conversation at that time?
Young responded, "Yes, sir."
As evident from the record, the trial court specifically informed Young of
her constitutional rights and ensured that she had a thorough understanding
of the rights she was waiving by entering a guilty plea. As noted above,
reviewing on the record the facts supporting a defendant's charges is the
preferred practice when a trial court accepts a guilty plea. Although that did
not occur in this case, Young's participation in extensive pre-trial proceedings,
the written plea agreement, and Young's assurances on the record that she had
12
been thoroughly advised by counsel and was pleading guilty intelligently and
voluntarily, demonstrate that her guilty plea was entered knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily.
Notably, this is not a case where a defendant is indicted and then quickly
enters a guilty plea without time to understand adequately the facts underlying
each of his charges . In those cases, a failure to review the factual predicate for
each charge during the plea colloquy could well be sufficient basis for
establishing the plea was not intelligently and knowingly entered. Here, given
the totality of the circumstances, this Court is hard-pressed to conclude that
after six months of extensive trial preparation, Young did not understand the
facts on which her charges were based. Thus, even though the trial court
should have reviewed the facts on the record prior to accepting Young's guilty
plea, its failure to do so did not prevent Young's plea from being an intelligent
admission of guilt with a complete understanding of the factual basis of her
charges . Because there is substantial evidence in the record to support the
trial court's determination that Young's guilty plea was entered knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily, Edmonds , 189 S .W.3d at 566, the court did not
err in denying Young's motion to withdraw her plea.
Young also argues that in considering whether to grant her motion to
withdraw, the trial court did not conduct an adequate hearing to determine if
her plea was truly voluntary . Young contends that the trial court should have
determined on the record why Young had such a difficult time entering her
plea. However, case law is clear that upon a defendant's motion to withdraw a
13
guilty plea, a trial court may refer to its prior Boykin hearing in concluding that
the defendant's plea was entered voluntarily . Edmonds , 189 S .W.3d at 566 .
Here, during the brief hearing on Young's motion to withdraw her plea, the trial
court stated in open court that it would "make an exhibit" of the June 22, 2007
transcript of Young's plea colloquy and agreed that it would consider this
transcript when deciding whether Young's plea was voluntary . After Young
made her own statement regarding her religious and personal reasons for
wanting to withdraw her plea and both sides made their arguments as to
whether that unexpected motion should be granted, the trial court orally
denied her motion and subsequently entered a written order finding that
Young's guilty plea was "knowingly and voluntarily made and with an
understanding of the nature of the charges ." The trial court properly relied on
its prior Bo kin colloquy in concluding that Young's plea had been voluntary
and was not required to further inquire into why Young later wanted to
withdraw it, particularly given the fact that her stated reasons were purely
personal and had no bearing on the voluntary, knowing and intelligent nature
of her plea two weeks earlier.
CONCLUSION
The better practice for trial courts accepting guilty pleas is to recite the
underlying facts on which the charges are based . However, in this case, there
was substantial evidence in the record indicating that Young's guilty plea was
nonetheless made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Therefore, the trial
court was not clearly erroneous in concluding that Young's plea was voluntary
14
and did not err in denying Young's motion to withdraw her guilty plea . The
July 5, 2007 Judgment of the Grant Circuit Court is hereby affirmed .
All sitting. All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Shelly R . Fears
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302
Frankfort, KY 40601-1133
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Jack Conway
Attorney General
Perry Thomas Ryan
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
102,4 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
