PHILLIP LEROY WINES V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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Sixpremt 01,vurf of
2007-SC-000081-MR
- A"
PHILLIP LEROY WINES
V.
0
APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM DOUGLAS KEMPER, JUDGE
NOS . 05-CR-001921 AND 06-CR-001838
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
Phillip Wines appeals as a matter of right from a December 22, 2006
Judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court convicting him of murder, seconddegree assault, and tampering with physical evidence. Wines was sentenced as
a second-degree persistent felony offender to enhanced, consecutive terms of
imprisonment totaling forty-five years . At Wines's trial in late October and
early November 2006, the Commonwealth alleged and the jury found that in
April 2005 Wines assaulted Micah Brashear by hitting him in the head with a
pair of nunchuka karate sticks and that in June 2005 Wines murdered James
Hamilton by stabbing him to death with a pocket knife . The jury also found
that Wines tampered with evidence of the murder when, after the stabbing, he
washed off the knife . On appeal, Wines contends that the trial court erred (1)
by refusing to sever the assault and the murder charges; (2) by inadequately
instructing the jury with respect to the defense of extreme emotional
disturbance; (3) by refusing to apply to Wines's trial recent amendments to
KRS Chapter 503 regarding self defense ; (4) by admitting evidence of a
witness's prior consistent statement; and (5) by admitting expert testimony
regarding blood spatter and cast off. Finding no reversible error, we affirm .
RELEVANT FACTS
Micah Brashear testified that he and Wines had grown up in the same
Louisville neighborhood and had been friends for more than thirty years .
During the months leading up to the alleged assault, they had frequently
socialized over the weekends . According to Brashear, their socializing often
included smoking marijuana together, and Brashear claimed that Wines
sometimes sold small quantities of marijuana to him and to others . During the
afternoon of April 14, 2005, Brashear phoned Wines and asked if he and one
Brian Langan could come to the house Wines rented on Cannons Lane in
Louisville to visit and to purchase a couple of marijuana cigarettes . According
to Brashear, Wines became irate, accused Brian Langan of being a "narc," and
told Brashear to stay away. Later that evening Brashear and Langan were
visiting Brashear's sister, who lived only a few doors from Wines, and another
friend, who lived across the street from her. As they were leaving the friend's
house to return to the sister's, Brashear, who admitted that he had consumed
several beers in the course of the evening, heard Wines call to him from the
front porch of Wines's house . Brashear testified that Wines was calling him
names and daring him to fight . He walked down the street to Wines's house,
and exchanged insults. Wines came to the end of his driveway, Brashear
testified, and dared Brashear to step on Wines's property . Brashear claimed
that he remained standing in the street, but that finally, when their insults
became heated, Wines stepped forward and struck him on the side of the head
with what later proved to be a pair of nunchuka sticks . The blow stunned him,
Brashear testified, and caused a cut that was later treated at University
Hospital. Police were summoned, Wines was arrested and charged with
assault, and he was held for several days in jail. He posted bond on April 26,
2005 . The matter was referred to the May Jefferson County Grand Jury, which
declined to indict . There the matter stood until June 2005 .
During Wines's stay in jail, he wrote a letter to James Hamilton, the man
he was later accused of killing. Hamilton was a neighbor who lived in an
apartment just around the corner from Cannons Lane on Ephraim McDowell .
In the letter Wines advised Hamilton of two friends whom he had "handled" for
years and implied that they might need "handling" during his incarceration . To
one friend he attached the numbers, "50, 100," and to the other, "60, 100."
The letter also sought Hamilton's aid caring for a pet and raising bond money.
Hamilton, several witnesses testified, was a drug dealer who for a few years had
lived with a young woman named Angela Nelson . Nelson became the
Commonwealth's principal witness concerning Hamilton's murder .
Nelson testified that Hamilton had supported the two of them by selling
drugs and that at some point in early 2005 he had arranged with Wines to
keep his "supplies" at Wines's house . Wines gave Hamilton a key to his house
and received drugs in exchange . Wines, too, according to Nelson, dealt drugs,
primarily marijuana and prescription pills, but on a smaller scale than
Hamilton . Nelson testified that her relationship with Hamilton had always
been somewhat stormy, and that it became strained in late April 2005 when
she learned that he had infected her with HIV. She began to spend increasing
amounts of time with Wines, who before had been merely an acquaintance, and
in early May commenced a sexual relationship with him . According to Nelson,
however, she never intended to end her relationship with Hamilton, and from
mid-May through early June divided her time between the two men . Jealousies
arose from that situation . Twice during the later part of May, Hamilton entered
Wines's house unannounced and choked Nelson. On another occasion he
pushed in the screen on Wines's bedroom window. Finally, at about 2 :00 a.m .
on June 12, 2005, Hamilton stopped his car outside Wines's house, honked his
horn repeatedly, and yelled for Nelson to come out and talk with him . Wines
summoned the police, but before they arrived Hamilton had left. When the
police had gone, according to Nelson, Wines confronted her with an ultimatum:
one man or the other. When Nelson said that she would never leave Hamilton,
Wines allegedly grew furious and declared that he would kill his former friend.
At about 4 :00 that same morning, Hamilton again honked in front of
Wines's house and yelled for Nelson to join him. Nelson testified that she tried
to go out to him, but that Wines prevented her from leaving the house .
Hamilton came up on Wines's porch, and seeing that Wines had armed himself
with a knife, Nelson screamed at Hamilton to run . He ran down the street
toward a friend's apartment, but when Wines, instead of chasing him, took the
keys from Hamilton's car, Hamilton returned, and the two men confronted each
other in the street. Nelson described Wines stabbing Hamilton several times .
The autopsy examiner testified that there were eight principal wounds caused
by seven separate stabs, one of which caused two wounds by both entering and
exiting. Two of the stabs reached Hamilton's heart. After the assault, Wines
washed the blood from the knife and called the police . Nelson frantically
sought aid for Hamilton, who had collapsed in a yard nearby. Emergency
personnel soon came and transported Hamilton to the hospital, but he was
pronounced dead upon arrival.
Wines was taken into custody, and during its June 2005 term, the grand
jury indicted him for Hamilton's murder, for tampering with evidence, and also
for the April assault upon Micah Brashear . Later Wines was separately
indicted for being a persistent felony offender in the second degree . Prior to
trial, Wines moved to have the assault charge severed from the murder charge,
and his first claim on appeal is that the trial court abused its discretion by
denying that motion .
ANALYSIS
I . Wines Was Not Unduly Prejudiced By The Joinder Of The Assault And
Murder Charges.
As the parties correctly note, RCr 6.18 allows for the joinder of offenses
in separate counts of an indictment provided that "the offenses are of the same
or similar character or are based on the same acts or transactions connected
together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan ." A liberal rule of
joinder furthers the important interest courts, parties, and witnesses all have
in the economy of a single trial. Under RCr 9 .16, however, "[i)f it appears that
a defendant or the Commonwealth is or will be prejudiced by a joinder of
offenses . . . in an indictment, . . . the court shall order separate trials of
counts . . . or provide whatever other relief justice requires." Thus, even if
joinder is permissible under RCr 6.18, if the defendant makes a timely motion
for severance under RCr 9.16 and shows prejudice, the court should grant
separate trials or provide otherwise appropriate relief. "Prejudice," in this
context, means more, of course, than mere hurt or disadvantage . Romans v .
Commonwealth , 547 S.W.2d 128 (Ky. 1977). Separate trials are required only
if the joinder would result in an unreasonable disadvantage for the defendant .
Id. We review the denial of a motion to sever for abuse of discretion . Ratliff v.
Commonwealth , 194 S .W.3d 258 (Ky. 2006) .
As we have often observed, a significant factor in identifying the
prejudice that calls for separate trials "is the extent to which evidence of one
offense would be admissible in a trial of the other offense ." Id. at 264 .
Generally, if evidence of joined offenses would be mutually admissible even
were the charges severed, then joinder of the offenses will not be prejudicial.
Otherwise, of course, evidence of unrelated crimes is likely to be significantly
prejudicial, a concern embodied in KRE 404(b) . Under that rule, evidence of
crimes other than the one charged is not admissible merely as evidence of the
defendant's character or disposition, but only for some substantial, legitimate
purpose such as showing "motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident." KRE 404(b) (1) .
Evidence of other crimes may also be admitted if inextricably intertwined with
evidence of the crime charged . KRE 404(b)(2) . The trial court ruled that
severance was not required here because under KRE 404(b) evidence of both
the assault and the murder would be admissible at separate trials of the other
offense. We agree.
Wines claimed self-defense in both cases, each of which ended with an
unarmed "friend" of Wines either injured or dying within feet of Wines's
residence. In the assault case he asserted that during his verbal altercation
with Brashear, Brashear kept one hand in his pocket where Wines believed he
carried a knife . When the argument reached its climax, he claimed, Brashear
lunged toward him onto his property, and Wines struck out with the nunchuka
sticks to protect himself from what he feared was a potentially deadly threat.
In the murder case, contrary to Nelson's testimony, Wines asserted that
Hamilton not only came up on his porch, but forced his way through the front
screen door and began to beat Wines . It was Wines's testimony that seven
thrusts of his knife were required to deter Hamilton's assault.
In both cases, however, there was evidence tending to show that Wines
planned to use self-defense as a pretext for a premeditated attack . Brashear
testified that Wines, angry at Brashear for having allegedly brought: a "narc" to
Wines's home earlier that day, taunted him and tried to induce him to come
onto Wines's property, where a self-defense claim might appear more credible .
In the days leading up to Hamilton's death, furthermore, and also following the
first honking incident just two or three hours prior to the killing, Wines called
the police to report Hamilton's disturbances . Nelson testified that Wines told
her he was lodging the police complaints to make Hamilton look like the
aggressor, so that when he finally did kill Hamilton he would get off. Both
crimes, therefore, reflected a common scheme and each provided evidence that
the other crime had been similarly planned to appear as an act ofjustified selfdefense. Thus evidence of each alleged act of self-defense would have been
admissible under KRE 404(b) in a separate trial of the other. Given this
mutual admissibility, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying
Wines's motion to sever.
II. The Trial Court's Failure To Give A Presumption-Of-Innocence
Admonition That Incorporated Wines's EED Claim Did Not Amount To
Palpable Error .
In addition to asserting self-defense, Wines claimed that his attack
against Hamilton was carried out under the influence of an extreme emotional
disturbance . The trial court agreed that there was evidence in support of EED
mitigation, and so instructed the jury, in pertinent part, that it was to find
Wines guilty of intentional murder if and only if it believed beyond a reasonable
doubt that "he caused the death of James Hamilton . intentionally, and not
while acting under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance." The court
did not, however, include in its generic presumption of innocence/ reasonable
doubt instruction the admonition that if the jury would otherwise find Wines
guilty of intentional murder but had a reasonable doubt as to whether at the
time of the killing he was acting under the influence of extreme emotional
disturbance, then it should find him guilty only of first-degree manslaughter .
As Wines correctly points out, if properly requested and supported by the
evidence, such an admonition is required. Sherroan v. Commonwealth, 142
S .W.3d 7 (Ky. 2004) (citin g Commonwealth v. Hager, 41 S.W.3d 828 (Ky.
2001)) . The question here is whether Wines preserved this issue by properly
requesting that admonition.
As we explained in Pollini v . Commonwealth, 172 S.W.3d 418 (Ky. 2005),
[flor adequate preservation of exceptions to jury
instructions, the Kentucky Rules of Criminal
Procedure [RCr 9 .54] require evidence on the record of
either (1) a specific objection or (2) the tendering of an
instruction in . . . a manner which presents the party's
position "fairly and adequately" to the trial judge . . . .
"In many cases. . . . counsel submit a raft of tendered
instructions, any one of which may be overlooked by
the trial court. The failure to instruct upon a matter
which would have been surely instructed upon if the
oversight had been called to the attention of the court
by counsel is not error."
Id. at 428 (quoting from RCr 9 .54(2) and from Grooms v. Commonwealth, 756
S .W.2d 131 (Ky . 1988)) . To preserve a claim of error, it is counsel's duty "to
object with specificity so that the trial judge will be advised on how to instruct."
Gibbs v. Commonwealth, 208 S.W .3d 848, 854 (Ky . 2006) .
In this case, Wines tendered some sixteen pages of proposed instructions
with respect to the murder and tampering charges . While it is true that his
proposed "presumption of innocence" instruction included the EED admonition
our case law has required, it also included a provision concerning reasonable
doubt with respect to the degree of the offense, which we have held is not
required. Butts v. Commonwealth , 953 S.W .2d 943 (Ky. 1997) (citing Carwile
v. Commonwealth, 656 S .W .2d 722 (Ky. 1983)) . When the trial court presented
counsel with the instructions it had prepared, Wines's only comment was a
blanket objection to every deviation from his te ndered instructions. He did not
call the trial court's attention to the EED admonition in particular or even to
the "presumption of innocence" instruction. Although a tendered instruction
that "fairly and adequately" presents the party's position to the trial judge may
be sufficient to preserve the issue for appeal, Sand Hill Energy, Inc. v. Smith,
142 S.W.3d 153 (Ky. 2004), the blanket, partially incorrect instructions
tendered here and counsel's blanket objection to any and all deviations
therefrom amounts precisely to the circumstances Pollini held do not give the
trial court adequate notice of the party's position. The alleged error, therefore,
was not properly preserved . We have held, furthermore, that where, as here,
the murder instruction correctly includes EED as a negative element, "the
failure to include the additional [EED] admonition in the presumption of
innocence/ reasonable doubt instruction d[oes] not adversely affect Appellant's
substantial rights," and thus does not provide grounds for relief as palpable
error under RCr 10 .26 . Sherroan , 142 S.W.3d at 23 .
III. The Trial Court Correctly Determined That Wines Was Not Immune
From Prosecution And That Substantive Changes To KRS Chapter 503 Did
Not Apply Retroactively To Wines's Case .
Effective July 12, 2006, after Wines's alleged 2005 crime but before his
October/ November 2006 trial, the Kentucky General Assembly extensively
amended the self-defense provisions of KRS Chapter 503 . The new
legislation-Senate Bill 38-created presumptions that one "unlawfully and by
force" entering a dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle does so with the
intent to commit an unlawful act involving force or violence, KRS 503 .055(4),
and that a person encountering such an intruder reasonably fears death or
great bodily injury. KRS 503.055(1) . It expanded the circumstances in which
the use of deadly force is justified to include those instances when one
reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent the commission of a
felony involving the use of force. KRS 503 .050(2) . The bill also expressly
provided that the right to use force, including deadly force, in defense of self or
others is not contingent upon a duty to retreat. See, e.g. KRS 503 .050(4), KRS
503.070(3) . And it declared that one who justifiably used defensive force "is
immune from criminal prosecution," including arrest, detention, charge, or
prosecution in the ordinary sense . KRS 503 .085(l) .
Wines moved for application of the new legislation to his case . In
particular he sought dismissal of the murder and assault charges on the basis
of the new immunity provision, and he sought jury instructions incorporating
the new statutory presumptions and the new provisions declaring that there is
no duty to retreat. The trial court ruled that Wines was not entitled to
immunity because the self-defense evidence in both cases was conflicting, and
it ruled that the other provisions of the new law did not apply retroactively to
Wines's case and so ought not to be reflected in the jury instructions . Wines
challenges both of those rulings.
In Rogers v. Commonwealth , 2007-SC-000040-MR, released this same
day, we addressed virtually identical claims based on the new self-defense
provisions . We concluded in Rogers that, aside from the immunity statute, all
of the 2006 amendments to KRS Chapter 503, including the "no duty to
retreat" provisions, are substantive in nature and thus do not apply
retroactively to crimes committed before the new law's effective date . Nor, we
held, was a "no duty to retreat" instruction required by pre-existing law or by
the constitutional right to present a defense . The trial court did not err in this
case, therefore, when it rejected Wines's tendered self-defense instructions .
The new immunity provision, we held in Ro ers, is procedural, and so
does apply retroactively to cases pending as of or arising after June 12, 2006 .
We held, however, that KRS 503 .085
contemplates that the prosecutor and the courts may
. . . be called upon to determine whether a particular
defendant is entitled to . . . immunity . Regardless of
who is addressing the immunity claim, we infer from
the statute that the controlling standard of proof
remains "probable cause ." Thus, in order for the
prosecutor to bring charges or seek an indictment,
there must be probable cause to conclude that the
force used by the defendant was not fully justified
under the controlling provision or provisions of KRS
Chapter 503. Similarly, once the matter is before a
judge, if the defendant claims immunity the court
must dismiss the case unless there is probable cause
to conclude that the force used was not legally
justified.
Although the trial court in this case did not apply this precise standard, we are
convinced that the Commonwealth's proffered proof satisfied it. Brashear's and
Nelson's statements to the police alone suggested evidence that would support
a finding of probable cause . We are also convinced that the "conflicting
evidence" standard the court did apply was at least as favorable to Wines as
the probable cause standard announced in Ro ers and thus any discrepancy
did not affect Wines's substantial rights. RCr 10.26 . Wines, therefore, is not
entitled to relief based on the 2006 amendments to KRS Chapter 503 .
IV. The Trial Court Did Not Err By Admitting Nelson's Initial Statement
To Investigators As An Excited Utterance .
Wines next contends that the trial court erred when it permitted the
Commonwealth to play, for the jury the portion of the tape-recorded statement
Nelson gave to one of the investigating officers in which she described the
events of June 12 leading up to the fatal encounter. That statement was
hearsay, of course, but the trial court ruled that the statement was admissible
as an excited utterance. We review that determination for clear error. Young v.
Commonwealth, 50 S .W . 3d 148 (Ky. 2001) . Because there is substantial
evidence supporting it, we uphold the trial court's ruling.
Kentucky Rule of Evidence 803(2) provides that the hearsay rules do not
exclude "[a] statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the
declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition ."
We have identified eight factors to be considered in determining whether a
statement was an excited utterance :
(i) lapse of time between the main act and the
declaration, (ii) the opportunity or likelihood of
fabrication, (iii) the inducement to fabrication, (iv) the
actual excitement of the declarant, (v) the place of the
declaration, (vi) the presence there of visible results of
the act or occurrence to which the utterance relates,
(vii) whether the utterance was made in response to a
question, and (viii) whether the declaration was
against interest or self-serving .
Souder v. Commonwealth, 719 S .W.2d 730, 733 (Ky. 1986) (quoting from
Lawson, Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook, 8 .60(B) (2d ed. 1984)) . In Thomas
v. Commonwealth , 170 S .W .3d 343 (Ky. 2005), we explained that
[t]emporal proximity to the "startling event" is only one
factor to consider in determining whether a statement
was "made while the declarant was under the stress of
excitement caused by the event. . . ." KRE 803(2)
(emphasis added) . "For an out-of-court statement to
qualify for admission under KRE 803(2), it must
appear that the declarant's condition at the time was
such that the statement was spontaneous, excited, or
impulsive rather than the product of reflection and
deliberation ." . . . "Spontaneity, as opposed to mere
proximity in time, is a most important consideration.
Id. at 350 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) .
Here, Louisville Metro Police Detective Michael Sherrard testified that he
interviewed Nelson in the back of his police vehicle at the scene of the stabbing
at approximately 6:30 am, or about two hours after Nelson had witnessed the
assault and had applied her own shirt to Hamilton's wounds in an attempt to
stop his profuse bleeding. According to Detective Sherrard, she was crying and
hysterical . That testimony was borne out by the recording, on which Nelson is
audibly very upset. Her description of the entire incident was induced by
nothing more than the detective's request that she tell him "what happened."
Contrary to Wines's argument, moreover, there is no suggestion that Nelson's
statement was self-serving . Wines maintains that Nelson had a motive to
minimize her own involvement in the tragedy and to curry favor with the police
due to an outstanding drug-possession charge . We fail to see, however, how
her statement can be construed as doing either. Nelson made no attempt to
deny or hide her relationships with both men and admitted during her
testimony that jealously undoubtedly contributed to the animosity between
them . At the time of her statement, moreover, she had no reason to think that
the police were interested in any version of events but the true one, and thus
could not have thought that she would "curry favor" by lying. The evidence
was substantial, in sum, that only about two hours after an extremely
traumatic event Nelson remained distraught, and that her description of the
event was a spontaneous outpouring under the influence of her distress . The
trial court did not clearly err, therefore, by admitting her hearsay statement
into evidence pursuant to the excited utterance hearsay exception .
V. The Trial Court Did Not Err By Admitting The Medical Examiner's
Testimony Concerning Cast Off Blood.
A. The Blood-Cast-Off Testimony Was Within The Examiner's Expertise .
Finally, Wines contends that the trial court erred by permitting the
medical examiner to testify regarding cast off blood . The medical examiner
described Hamilton's wounds, explained how they had caused Hamilton's
death, and noted how they were consistent with the particular features of the
knife which Wines himself surrendered to the police and admitted using . Over
Wines's objection, the medical examiner was also permitted to testify that in
cases of multiple blood-letting injuries, such as this one, blood tends to
accumulate on the weapon and to be cast off onto the surrounding
environment. Wines contends that this later testimony exceeded both the
medical examiner's expertise and the scope of her testimony as disclosed prior
to trial. We disagree .
Kentucky Rule of Evidence 702 permits a qualified expert to testify in the
form of an opinion or otherwise with respect to scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge, provided that the testimony is scientifically reliable and
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue . Faced with the proffer of scientific testimony, the trial judge must make
a preliminary determination that the testimony will satisfy these reliability and
relevancy requirements . A finding that the testimony is scientifically reliable is
reviewed for clear error. Ragland v . Commonwealth, 191 S .W.3d 569 (Ky.
2006) . A finding that the evidence will assist the trier of fact is reviewed for
abuse of discretion . Id. Wines contends that the Commonwealth failed to
establish an adequate foundation for the medical examiner's alleged expertise
in blood cast-off, and thus that the trial court clearly erred by deeming the
blood-cast-off testimony reliable .
Generally, of course, the reliability of expert testimony has been assessed
in terms of the factors identified in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc . , 509 U.S . 579 (1993) and Mitchell v . Commonwealth , 908 S.W .2d 100 (Ky.
1995), such factors as whether the theory can be and has been tested, whether
it has been subjected to peer review, whether there is a potential or known
error rate for such tests, and whether it enjoys acceptance within the relevant
scientific community. The Commonwealth did not ask the medical examiner to
relate her blood-cast-off testimony to any of these factors . She testified only
that in addition to her medical training and experience as an autopsy
examiner, she had attended a week-long course concerning blood-spatter
phenomena: the different ways in which blood can be expelled or released from
the body and the different patterns such blood typically leaves in the
environment . Her training had included, she testified, instruction in the fact
that in the course of repeated blood-letting injuries, blood typically
accumulates on the weapon and is cast off onto surrounding surfaces .
In Ratliff v. Commonwealth, 194 S.W.3d 258 (Ky. 2006), we noted that
[t]he inquiry into reliability and relevance is a flexible
one . The factors enumerated in Daubert and
Mitchell . . . are neither exhaustive nor exclusive. A
trial court may apply any or all of these factors when
determining the admissibility of any expert
testimony. . . . The United States Supreme Court has
clarified the import of the Daubert factors, stating : The
factors identified in Daubert may or may not. be
pertinent in assessing reliability, depending on the
nature of the issue, the expert's particular expertise,
and the subject of his testimony. . . . Kumho Tire Co . v.
Carmichael, 526 U .S . 137, 150 . . . (1999) .
Id. at 270 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) .
Given this flexibility, the trial court did not clearly err by deeming the
medical examiner's blood-cast-off testimony sufficiently reliable . The subject of
her testimony-the very general observation that weapons repeatedly brought
into contact with blood will tend to accumulate blood and transfer it to
surrounding surfaces-was not far removed from common sense and common
experience, and was surely within the competence of someone as familiar with
blood in general and as specifically trained in blood-spatter phenomena as the
medical examiner . This general testimony, therefore, did not require a more
extensive foundation than the one provided, as might have been the case, for
example, had the medical examiner opined that a particular blood pattern was
the result of cast-off.
B. The Blood-Cast-Off Testimony Did Not Constitute A Discovery
Violation.
For similar reasons, we are not persuaded that the medical examiner's
blood-cast-off testimony amounted to a discovery violation. Wines complains
that the autopsy report with which he was provided made no mention of blood
cast-off and that otherwise the Commonwealth provided no notice that the
examiner would be questioned on that topic. He correctly notes that RCr 7 .24
requires the Commonwealth, upon request, to disclose "results or reports of
physical or mental examinations, and of scientific tests or results or reports of
physical or mental examinations, and of scientific tests or experiments made in
connection with the particular case," and argues that under this rule notice of
the examiner's blood-cast-off testimony was required.
We have held, however, that where an expert's disclosed report includes
all the underlying facts upon which her testimony is based and where that
testimony addresses only matters naturally and clearly suggested by the
report, RCr 7 .24 does not require that the expert's report specify her testimony
in detail. Milburn v. Commonwealth, 788 S .W.2d 253 (Ky. 1989) . In Milburn ,
a ballistics expert reported prior to trial that his testing had found traces of
lead on the murder victim's hair. At trial he testified that the lead residue on
the hair indicated a gunshot within close proximity to the victim's head .
Although the expert's report had not mentioned his conclusion about the
gunshot, we held that that testimony was so clearly suggested by the report as
not to violate RCr 7.24. Similarly here, the autopsy report detailing eight stab
wounds, two of which reached Hamilton's heart, plainly suggested that
Hamilton's bleeding was a most important fact and clearly foreshadowed
questions concerning how the blood may have been spread. Because the
medical examiner's blood-cast-off testimony cannot, therefore, be deemed to
have unfairly surprised Wines, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
admitting that testimony over Wines's discovery objection .
CONCLUSION
In sum, Wines is not entitled to relief. The trial court did not abuse its
discretion by trying the murder and assault charges together. It did not run
afoul of the new immunity statute by concluding that Wines's self-defense
claims were sufficiently controverted to render him subject to prosecution, and
it correctly instructed the jury based on the substantive law of self-defense that
existed at the time of Wines's offenses. In the absence of a more specific
objection on the issue, the trial court adequately instructed on the defense of
extreme emotional disturbance. Finally, the court did not err by admitting into
evidence Nelson's initial excited utterance to Detective Sherrard or the medical
examiner's testimony concerning cast off blood. Accordingly, we affirm the
December 22, 2006 Judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court.
Minton, C .J . ; Abramson, Cunningham, and Venters, JJ., concur. Noble,
J ., concurs in part, concurs in result in part, and dissents in part by separate
opinion. Schroder, J ., concurs in result only. Scott, J ., concurs in result only
by separate opinion .
NOBLE, JUSTICE, CONCURRING IN PART, CONCURRING IN RESULT IN
PART, AND DISSENTING IN PART :
I cannot entirely agree with either Justice Abramson or Justice Scott, but
I do concur with the majority on all but two issues.
In my view, the immunity provision of KRS 503 .085 is not procedural . In
fact, the statute grants a new status, under certain circumstances, that did not
exist before its enactment. This can only be a substantive change in the law.
As such, this provision can have no retrospective application . While I
otherwise agree with Justice Abramson's excellent discussion on how the
immunity issue is to be determined, I do not believe it is appropriate to reach
that issue in this case. However, she concludes that in fact the trial court
conducted an adequate immunity hearing, and consequently the majority
holding has no effect on the judgment in this case'. Therefore, I concur in
result .
On the other hand, the concept of "no duty to retreat" is not a
substantive change in the law. Our case law has long recognized that "a
Kentuckian never runs . He does not have to." Gibson v . Commonwealth, 23 7
Ky. 33, 34 S .W.2d 936, 936 (1936) . This Court, in Hilbert v. Commonwealth,
162 S .W.2d 921 (Ky. 2005), discussed at length that "no duty to retreat" is a
part of the law in Kentucky, but concluded that it was not necessary to include
this language in an instruction on self defense . While clearly a part of the law,
that notion had never been made a specific element of a statute until the 2006
amendments to the statutes . The majority states that whether this language
must now be included in an instruction is not a question before the Court, but
does say that the added language is a substantive change in the law. Given the
reasoning applied to the immunity provision by the majority, it naturally
follows that under that view it must be included prospectively.
The inclusion of the "no duty to retreat" concept in the 2006
amendments does nothing more than to state what the law has always been,
and thus can only be procedural, from the standpoint of whether this language
should be included in the instruction . Since I believe it should always have
been included, and that this Court missed a good opportunity to correct that
omission in Hilbert, I would reverse to require the inclusion of "no duty to
retreat" in the self-defense instruction.
SCOTT, JUSTICE, CONCURRING IN RESULT:
I concur in result with the majority opinion herein, because unlike
Rodgers v. Commonwealth, --- S .W.3d ---, 2007-SC-000040-MR (Ky. 2009), the
"no duty to retreat" instruction was not applicable . Here, Wines was not
defending himself, he waited for Brashear at Brashear's car and then waylaid
him. That's not self-defense . Thus, I concur in result.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Daniel T. Goyette
Louisville Metro Public Defender
200 Advocacy Plaza
717-719 West Jefferson Street
Louisville, KY 40202
Elizabeth B . McMahon
Assistant Public Defender
Office of the Jefferson District Public Defender
200 Advocacy Plaza
717-719 West Jefferson Street
Louisville, KY 40202
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Jack Conway
Attorney General
James Coleman Shackelford
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Criminal Appeals
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601
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