DON EARL SMITH V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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APPELLANT
DON EARL SMITH
V.
ON APPEAL FROM MCCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE R . JEFFREY HINES, JUDGE
CASE NO . 05-CR-00317
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
Don Earl Smith appeals as a matter of right from a November 7, 2006
Judgment of the McCracken Circuit Court convicting him of rape, sodomy,
sexual abuse, possession of a controlled substance, and being a persistent
felony offender in the second degree . Smith's convictions are based on the
sexual assault of his seven-year-old granddaughter, S .S . S.S . testified at trial
that Smith had made her watch pornographic movies with him, rub lotion on
his "private area," and have sexual intercourse and oral sex with him. After the
jury found Smith guilty of all charges and recommended sentences on each
charge, Smith was sentenced to life imprisonment . Smith now alleges that the
trial court erred by permitting the Commonwealth to engage in flagrant
prosecutorial misconduct and by refusing to grant a taint hearing to determine
a .C .
whether the victim's testimony was the product of suggestion . Having found
that neither of Smith's claims of error warrants a new trial, we affirm.
RELEVANT FACTS
In October 2004, S.S ., her father E.S., and her younger brother C .S.,
moved in with Don Smith, E .S .'s father. S .S . was seven years old when she
began living with Smith, her grandfather . After staying with Smith for
approximately three months, E.S . and his children moved out . The following
summer, S .S . traveled to Georgia to visit her mother, K .B ., who had recently
completed a drug rehabilitation program and had been released from prison .
While staying with her mother, S.S . revealed that while she had been living
with "Papaw Don," he had done "bad things" to her. S.S. told her mother that
Smith had made her watch pornographic movies with him and rub lotion on
his genitals, that he touched her private area, that he inserted his penis into
her vagina, and that he made her put her mouth on his penis. S .S .'s mother
then called E.S ., who in turn reported Smith to the McCracken County Police.
Upon receiving the report, McCracken Police Detective Rob Estes along with
Detective Nathan Young went to Smith's house and escorted him back to the
police station for questioning.
Although Smith initially denied any abuse of S.S., he eventually
confessed to Detective Estes that S. S. had "jacked him off' once and that it was
possible that he had engaged in sexual intercourse with S.S . Smith explained
that on one occasion, while S. S. was rubbing lotion on his hand, she touched
his penis and before he knew it, he had ejaculated. Also, Smith revealed that
he had memories of waking up in his bed and finding S .S . on top of him trying
2
to have sex with him. Based on these statements, the police obtained a search
warrant for Smith's house . The search revealed two pornographic movies as
well as drug paraphernalia . The police then arrested Smith .
On August 5, 2005, the McCracken County Grand Jury indicted Smith
on two counts of first-degree sexual abuse, first-degree rape, first-degree
sodomy, second-degree possession of a controlled substance, possession of
drug paraphernalia, and persistent felony offender (PFO 2d) . Smith's trial
began on August 14, 2006. The Commonwealth presented evidence of Smith's
guilt through the testimonies of S.S., S .S.'s mother and father, Detective Estes,
and Dr. Deanna St. Germain, the physician who examined S.S. In his defense,
Smith called three women with whom he had previously lived . These women
testified that they had never witnessed Smith engaged in inappropriate sexual
behavior with children and that they were surprised by the allegations against
him .
Following the presentation of evidence, the jury found Smith guilty of all
charges. On November 7, 2006, the trial court imposed the jury's
recommended sentence of life imprisonment on both the rape and sodomy
charges, ten years for the two counts of sexual abuse (enhanced by the PFO
2nd
charge), and five years for possession of a controlled substance. The trial court
determined that Smith's sentences should run consecutively for a total
sentence of "two life sentences ." This appeal followed .
ANALYSIS
I . Although the Prosecutor Acted Improperly During Smith's Trial, Smith
Did Not Suffer Manifest Injustice Warranting a New Trial.
Smith alleges several instances of prosecutorial misconduct, claiming
that the prosecutor made misstatements during his voir dire of the jury
members; his guilt phase opening statement and closing argument ; his direct
examination of S .S .'s father, S.S .'s mother, S.S., and Detective Estes; and his
penalty phase opening statement and closing argument . This Court has held
that "[a]ny consideration on appeal of alleged prosecutorial misconduct must
center on the overall fairness of the entire trial ." Partin v . Commonwealth , 918
S .W .2d 219, 224 (Ky. 1996), overruled on other grounds by Chestnut v.
Commonwealth , 250 S .W.3d 288 (Ky. 2008) . After first determining that a
prosecutor did engage in misconduct, this Court will reverse a defendant's
convictions and grant him a new trial
only if the [prosecutor's] misconduct is `flagrant' or if each of the
following three conditions is satisfied :
(1) Proof of defendant's guilt is not overwhelming ;
(2) Defense counsel objected ; and
(3) The trial court failed to cure the error with a sufficient
admonishment to the jury.
Matheney v. Commonwealth, 191 S .W.3d 599, 606 (Ky. 2006) (citing United
States v. Carroll, 26 F .3d 1380, 1390 (6th Cir. 1994) . Although Smith contends
that the prosecutor acted improperly on many occasions throughout his trial,
he only objected to the alleged misconduct twice-once after the prosecutor's
opening statement and once during his closing argument . After having
reviewed the record, we find that the prosecutor did not act improperly in
either instance .
During the Commonwealth's opening statement, the prosecutor stated
that he knew it was his responsibility to try Smith for these crimes and he
intended "not to drop the ball ;" that Smith's confession to the police was "the
most disturbing thing" he had ever read in his time practicing law ; that of all
the cases he has tried as a prosecutor, this case kept him up at night; that
the forensic interviewer who met with S .S . had been trained to talk to
children and not to lead them; that Smith's explanation that he woke up to
find S .S . on top of him trying to have sex did not make sense; that what the
doctor will say in her testimony is consistent with S . S .'s story; and that if the
evidence showed Smith committed the crimes, the jury should find him
guilty because "that is your job." At the close of the Commonwealth's
opening, Smith objected to the "whole opening statement," arguing that the
prosecutor had argued the case before any evidence had been presented and
had improperly told the jury that it was their job to return a guilty verdict .
Following his objection, however, Smith's counsel neither requested an
admonishment from the trial judge nor moved for a mistrial. The trial court
overruled Smith's objection.
Counsel is allowed "wide latitude" in opening statements, "may draw
reasonable inferences from the evidence," and may outline "why the evidence
supports their particular theory of the case." Wheeler v . Commonwealth,
121 S .W.3d 173, 180-81 (Ky. 2003) . Here, the prosecutor's comments
regarding the forensic interviewer and the examining doctor simply outlined
how the evidence would support the Commonwealth's theory of the case and
did not constitute improper conduct . In addition, although it would be
5
improper for a prosecutor simply to tell a jury that it was their job to return
a guilty verdict, in this case, the prosecutor's comment taken in its context
was permissible . Near the end of his opening statement, the prosecutor
stated
If the evidence shows this man committed those
crimes, a lot of attorneys get up there and say I really
hope you find him guilty. I don't hope you do
anything. You better. That is your job.
As read in context, the prosecutor merely stated that if the evidence proves
Smith committed the crimes charged, the jury should find him guilty.
Although certainly awkwardly worded, this statement simply informs the
jury of their responsibility and does not amount to prosecutorial misconduct .
Furthermore, the prosecutor's opening comments that he did not
intend to "drop the ball" and that Smith's theory of the case did not make
sense were also proper . In stating that he did not intend to "drop the ball,"
the prosecutor was telling the jury that he knew he had the burden of
proving Smith committed the crimes charged and he intended to meet it . In
stating that Smith's explanation did not make sense, the prosecutor was
appropriately commenting "on evidence" and "as to the falsity of a defense
position." Slaughter v . Commonwealth , 744 S .W.2d 407, 412 (Ky . 1987) .
Thus, the prosecutor did not engage in any improper conduct during his
opening statement.
Smith's second objection came during the prosecutor's closing
argument . During his closing, the prosecutor commented that Smith's
6
explanation for how S .S . had "jacked him off' was a lie. The prosecutor
stated
I'm telling you that if there were such a thing as a b. s.
flag, I'm tossing it. It doesn't work that way. It has
never worked that way. And that too is a lie . And you
know how I know that is a lie?
At this point, Smith's counsel objected, arguing that the prosecutor was
injecting his own personal opinion into the case . The trial judge ordered the
prosecutor to rephrase his statement, which he agreed to do . Smith did not
request any additional relief, and the prosecutor continued with his argument .
This Court has previously held that "failure to move for a mistrial following an
objection and an admonition from the court indicates that satisfactory relief
was granted ." West v. Commonwealth, 780 S .W .2d 600, 602 (Ky. 1989) .
Because Smith did not request any specific admonition or mistrial and
appeared to be satisfied with the prosecutor's agreement to rephrase his
statement, this claim of error is not properly preserved for appellate review . Id .
However, because Smith has requested that any unpreserved allegation
of prosecutorial misconduct be reviewed for palpable error, we also note that
the prosecutor did not act improperly in making this statement. During a
closing argument, "[a] prosecutor may comment on tactics, may comment on
evidence, and may comment as to the falsity of a defense position ." Slaughter,
744 S .W .2d at 412 . Here, the prosecutor argued to the jury that Smith's
explanation did not make sense and that it was a lie. Based on previous cases
where this Court rejected a claim of misconduct, the prosecutor in Smith's case
did not act improperly simply by arguing to the jury that Smith's theory for
7
how S.S. "jacked him off" was false . See Stopher v . Commonwealth , 57 S .W.3d
787, 806 (Ky. 2001) (where the prosecutor classified the defense theory as
"stupid") ; Luttrell v. Commonwealth, 952 S .W .2d 216, 218 (Ky. 1997) (where
the prosecutor labeled defense witnesses' testimony as a "story") ; Slaughter,
744 S.W.2d at 412 (where the prosecutor criticized defense counsel for "pulling
a scam") .
Smith's remaining allegations of prosecutorial misconduct were not
objected to during trial and are raised for the first time on appeal. If these
allegations are determined to constitute misconduct, we note that the three
conditions listed in Mathenev , supra, do not apply because Smith did not
object to these instances at trial . Thus, in order to be entitled to a reversal,
Smith must show that the prosecutor's misconduct was "flagrant ." Mathenev ,
191 S .W.3d at 606 . Furthermore, because these claims of error are
unpreserved, Smith must also demonstrate that he has suffered manifest
injustice pursuant to RCr 10 .26 in order to warrant a new trial . Id . at 607 n.4 .
Smith claims that on several occasions throughout his trial the
prosecutor improperly expressed his own personal opinion about the case and
about the credibility of certain witnesses. During the Commonwealth's voir
dire, the prosecutor asked the potential jury members if they thought "a child
would lie about this and put themselves through all of this and continue [to] lie
for a year and a half now?" The prosecutor also told the jury pool that he
believed the evidence was so overwhelming against Smith, that no reasonable
person would be able to determine that he is innocent .
During the Commonwealth's closing argument, the prosecutor said that
although not everyone who goes to prison is evil, this case is different ; that to
believe Smith in this case, you would have to believe that S .S . is a pathological
liar, even though the social workers, police, and prosecutor all believe her; that
if a seven-year-old had come to him and said she was having sex, he would
have taken her to her parents or the police and would not have used her to
gratify his needs like Smith did ; that the doctor's testimony was reasonable
and she had no reason to lie; and that he took pride in removing people from
society who hurt others .
Lastly, during the Commonwealth's penalty phase opening statement,
the prosecutor said that he had been paranoid and frightened during the guilt
phase, but that as far as he is concerned, the work was done; that it had been
hard for him to "look at good people and talk about bad things ;" that he hoped
that he would never have to prosecute cases like this again, but he would if he
had to because he believed it was that important. Furthermore, when the
prosecutor explained the parole eligibility guidelines to the jury during the
penalty phase, he asked the jury to sentence Smith to two counts of life in
prison. He stated, "by my calculation, that makes S. S . twenty-nine years old . .
. Quite frankly, I think that is too early. But that is the least I think would be
an appropriate sentence."
Although Smith is correct that it is improper for a prosecutor to give his
personal opinion about a witness's character, Moore v. Commonwealth, 634
S .W.2d 426, 438 (Ky. 1982), it is appropriate for a prosecutor to comment on
the weight of the evidence and demonstrate how it implicates the defendant's
9
guilt. Woodall v. Commonwealth, 63 S .W .3d 104, 125 (Ky. 2001) . Here, during
his voir dire of the jury members, the prosecutor simply emphasized his theory
that the evidence would overwhelmingly show that Smith was guilty of sexually
abusing S . S. This comment did not amount to misconduct . In addition, the
unpreserved allegations of misconduct during the prosecutor's closing
argument were not improper . In referencing the testimonies of the social
worker, the police, the nurse, and the doctor, the Commonwealth referenced
the evidence supporting its theory that S .S . was telling the truth and Smith
was lying . As noted above, a prosecutor is entitled to comment on "the falsity
of a defense position ." Slaughter, 744 S .W.2d at 412; Soto v. Commonwealth ,
139 S.W .3d 827, 873 (Ky. 2004) . Furthermore, the prosecutor's comment
revealing how he would have responded to S. S .'s sexual admission highlighted
the suspicious way Smith reacted, which was additional evidence probative of
his guilt.
Lastly, the prosecutor's comments during the penalty phase were not
improper . Although not necessarily relevant to the jury's sentencing
recommendation, the prosecutor's statements referencing how difficult this
case had been and how he did not want to encounter a similar case were not so
erroneous to rise to the level of prosecutorial misconduct . The prosecutor's
comment recommending what he thought would be an appropriate sentence
was also not improper .
Smith's next allegation of misconduct involves the prosecutor's questions
during his direct examination of witnesses . Smith argues that the prosecutor
improperly elicited testimony that resulted in witnesses vouching for the
10
credibility of other witnesses. During S .S .'s father's direct testimony, he stated
that he believed his daughter's allegations of sexual abuse because of "what
she had told me about the circumcision ."' During S. S .'s mother's testimony,
she stated that E.S. had told her he believed every word of S .S .'s allegations .
S. S.'s mother also testified that S . S.'s story of the abuse had always been
consistent . During S . S .'s direct testimony, she stated that Smith was lying
when he told the police that it was all her idea; that what she had told her
mother was the truth ; and that she was being honest when she answered all
the prosecutor's questions .
Detective Estes testified on direct examination that part of their
investigation process involves conducting a forensic interview and then
determining if the victim is making a true allegation . Detective Estes also
stated that the police corroborated S .S .'s story by asking Smith certain
questions and by going to Smith's house ; that Smith's statements were similar
to what S. S. had told the police; that Smith was lying and not being honest
during the police interrogation ; that S .S .'s explanation for what happened was
more credible than Smith's; and that if someone asked him if he had sex with a
seven-year-old, he would adamantly deny it instead of reacting as Smith did.
Smith is correct that it is improper for a witness to vouch for the
truthfulness of another witness . See Stringer v. Commonwealth , 956 S.W.2d
E.S. testified that when he first talked to S. S . about her allegations, he had asked
her what the difference was between her brother's "pee-pee" and her grandfather's
"pee-pee", knowing that Smith had never been circumcised but that S. S.'s younger
brother had . E . S . testified that S . S . had told him that Papaw Don's pee-pee had
more skin over the end of it.
883, 888 (Ky. 1997) . Furthermore, "a witness should not be required to
characterize the testimony of another witness . . . as lying ." Moss v .
Commonwealth , 949 S.W .2d 579, 583 (Ky. 1997) . Here, the prosecutor
repeatedly asked different witnesses their opinion on who was telling the truth
about S. S.'s allegations of sexual abuse, resulting in testimony that
characterized S. S . as being truthful and Smith as lying. This conduct was
plainly improper and the prosecutor should not have engaged in this type of
direct examination .
Smith's next allegation of prosecutorial misconduct involves the
erroneous admission of victim impact testimony during the guilt phase of
Smith's trial. During E.S.'s direct testimony, E .S. testified that his daughter
needs "closure," but that she will not be able to move past this experience until
the trial is over. During S .S.'s mother's testimony, she testified that S .S . is
now very touchy, she wants people to notice her, and she thinks she has done
something wrong if people don't pay attention to her. In addition, during the
Commonwealth's closing argument, the prosecutor stated that S .S . was a
trouper to go through the trial and that she would be fine just to spite Smith.
In Bennett v . Commonwealth, 978 S .W.2d 322, 325-326 (Ky . 1998), this Court
reiterated that victim impact evidence should not be introduced during the
guilt phase of a trial, but rather should be reserved for the penalty phase.
Here, we agree with Smith that the prosecutor's questions elicited testimony
about S .S . that was not relevant during the guilt phase of Smith's trial . Thus,
the prosecutor's conduct in this instance was again improper .
12
Lastly, Smith alleges that the prosecutor improperly ridiculed Smith's
counsel during one of the Commonwealth's objections. While Smith's counsel
was cross-examining S .S ., the prosecutor objected to one of the defense
counsel's questions and said, "I know you are not trying to trick her. That was
never said . If you show me a document that says that, I will eat it." Although
the Commonwealth is granted latitude in presenting its argument and raising
objections, the prosecutor must nonetheless "stay within the record and avoid
abuse of defendants and their counsel." Whitaker v. Commonwealth, 298 Ky.
442, 183 S.W.2d 18, 18 (1944) . Although the misstatement by the prosecutor
was relatively minor in this instance, the fact remains that he should not have
made such a remark to Smith's counsel and his conduct was improper .
Having found that the prosecutor acted improperly by eliciting testimony
resulting in witnesses vouching for the victim's credibility, by admitting victim
impact testimony during the guilt phase, and by making an improper comment
during an objection, we now must determine if the prosecutor's improper
behavior constitutes flagrant misconduct.2 Four factors are balanced to
determine whether a prosecutor's misconduct is flagrant:
(1) whether the remarks tended to mislead the jury or to prejudice
the accused;
(2) whether they were isolated or extensive ;
(3) whether they were deliberately or accidentally placed before the
jury; and
(4) the strength of the evidence against the accused .
As noted above, the three-step analysis from Mathengy , 191 S .W .3d at 606,
does not support Smith's claim because he objected to only two instances of
misconduct at trial and the prosecutor did not act improperly in either
instance.
13
Carroll , 26 F.3d at 1385 . Regarding the first factor, although the prosecutor's
misconduct during Smith's trial may not have misled the jury, it certainly
prejudiced Smith. The prosecutor elicited testimony that resulted in several
witnesses stating that they believed S .S . was telling the truth in her allegations
of sexual abuse. In addition, the witnesses' testimonies about how S .S . was
dealing with the difficult circumstances could have resulted in the jury being
more sympathetic towards S . S . Secondly, the prosecutor's comments were not
isolated---his misstatements occurred throughout his direct examination of
several witnesses, during one of his objections, and during his closing
argument.
Although there is no evidence that the prosecutor knowingly and
deliberately acted improperly during Smith's trial, the fact remains that he
intended to elicit testimony from several witnesses that resulted in improper
vouching . It is unlikely that the prosecutor would have accidentally asked
numerous witnesses to comment on the truth of S .S .'s allegations. This line of
questioning appears to have been planned by the Commonwealth, and thus, to
have been deliberately placed before the jury. Lastly, although the evidence
against Smith may not have been overwhelming, the Commonwealth's case was
strong. Smith did not necessarily confess to all the charges during his
interview, but he made several statements that implicated his involvement in
sexually abusing S. S ., such as admitting that S . S. "jacked him off" and that he
may have engaged in sexual intercourse with S.S . In addition, the testimonies
of S .S., S.S .'s mother and father, as well as Detective Estes were particularly
14
damaging to Smith's case and strongly probative of his guilt. Finally, while the
physician who examined S .S . was not able to say definitively that sexual abuse
occurred, the physician testified that she found a scar on S. S.'s anus, evidence
that S .S . had suffered a "blunt trauma," and other physical evidence in her
vaginal area that was "concerning for abuse ."
Overall, three of the four factors used to determine whether the
prosecutor's misconduct was flagrant favor Smith's contention . The
prosecutor's misstatements were prejudicial towards Smith, the improper
comments were not isolated, and the misconduct was certainly intentional, if
not deliberate . However, because the evidence against Smith was strong, the
fourth factor heavily supports the Commonwealth . Although whether the
prosecutor's misconduct during Smith's trial was flagrant or not is a close call,
because Smith has failed to show that he suffered manifest injustice, he is not
entitled to a new trial .
A defendant may be granted a new trial based on an unpreserved claim
of error only if it is shown that there would be a "probability of a different result
or error so fundamental as to threaten a defendant's entitlement to due process
of law." Martin v. Commonwealth, 207 S .W .3d 1, 3 (Ky. 2006) . In this case, if
the prosecutor had acted properly throughout Smith's trial, there is still not a
probability that the jury would have acquitted Smith. During S. S.'s testimony,
she confidently revealed that Smith had sexually abused her. S . S . testified
that Smith made her watch pornographic movies with him, gave her money to
do "bad stuff' with him, and made her put lotion on his "boy part;" that she
saw "boy stuff' come out of the end of his "boy part;" and that he put his penis
15
inside her and she put her mouth on Smith's penis . In addition, the jury heard
a tape of Smith's interview with the police, where he admitted that S .S . had
"jacked him off' once and stated that it was possible that he had engaged in
sexual intercourse with S.S. Because there is no probability that the jury
would have reached a different result if the prosecutorial misconduct had not
occurred, Smith did not suffer manifest injustice and is not entitled to a new
trial. Furthermore, despite Smith's contention, the cumulative effect of the
prosecutor's misconduct did not threaten Smith's right to due process.
11. The Trial Court Did Not Err By Denying Smith's Request for a Taint
Hearing.
In a pre-trial motion, Smith requested that the trial court hold a "taint
hearing" in order to investigate the tactics used to interview the child-victim,
S .S . Smith argued that because S.S . had been subjected to so many
interviews, her testimony could be the product of suggestion and not reliable
The trial court, however, denied Smith's motion, explaining that according to
Pendleton v. Commonwealth, 83 S .W .3d 522 (Ky. 2002), taint hearings are
unnecessary. The trial court then held a competency hearing and determined
that S.S . was competent to testify at trial . Smith argues on appeal that this
Court should overrule Pendleton , supra, and require trial courts to hold taint
hearings when the defendant presents sufficient evidence that the victim's
testimony may be the product of suggestion .
In Pendleton , the defendant moved in a pre-trial motion to disqualify the
child-victim's testimony regarding the defendant's sexual abuse of her, arguing
that it was the product of the social worker's coercion. Id . at 525 . The trial
16
court denied this motion and determined instead that the victim was
competent to testify. Id. On appeal, the defendant alleged that the trial court
erred by not holding a hearing to determine whether the victim's testimony was
reliable . This Court disagreed and held that because the trial judge had
properly found the victim to be competent, because the victim was able to
identify her perpetrator and disclose details about the abuse at trial, and
because the defendant was able to challenge the victim's credibility on crossexamination, no error occurred . Id. at 526. Similarly, in Smith's case, the trial
court first determined that S .S . was competent to testify at trial . After this
finding of competency, S . S . testified at trial, naming Smith as her abuser and
disclosing the details of the abuse . In addition, Smith was able to explore his
belief that S .S .'s testimony was coerced during his cross-examination of S .S . at
trial .
This Court finds the reasoning in Pendleton, supra , to be persuasive and
sees no need to overrule its holding. As stated in Pendleton , it is within a trial
court's discretion to determine whether a witness is competent to testify, and
there is no need to require a second hearing to scrutinize the reliability of a
witness's testimony once competency has been established . See Id . at 525 .
Thus, the trial court did not err in denying Smith's motion for a taint hearing.
CONCLUSION
Although the prosecutor engaged in several instances of improper
conduct during Smith's trial, Smith did not suffer manifest injustice from such
misconduct. Even if the prosecutor had acted properly throughout Smith's
trial, there is not a probability that the result of Smith's proceeding would have
17
been different. Therefore, Smith is not entitled to a new trial . Furthermore,
this Court declines to overrule Pendleton , supra, and instead, finds that the
trial court did not err in refusing to hold a taint hearing to question whether
the victim's testimony was the product of suggestion. Having determined that
Smith is not entitled to a new trial, the November 7, 2006 Judgment of the
McCracken Circuit Court convicting Smith of rape, sodomy, sexual abuse,
possession of a controlled substance, and PFO 2d is affirmed .
Minton, C .J . ; Abramson, Cunningham, Scott, and Venters, JJ ., concur.
Schroder, J ., dissents by separate opinion in which Noble, J., joins.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Emily Holt Rhorer
Assistant Public Advocate
Appellate Division
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane
Suite 302
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE :
Jack Conway
Attorney General
Jeffrey Allan Cross
Criminal Appellate Division
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601
RENDERED : FEBRUARY 19, 2009
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
$uVrPmr (~Vurf -of ~irufurh~
2006-SC-000896-MR
DON EARL SMITH
V.
APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM MCCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE R. JEFFREY HINES, JUDGE
CASE NO . 05-CR-00317
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
DISSENTING OPINION BY JUSTICE SCHRODER
I believe the prosecutor's misconduct in this case, in particular his
questioning of Detective Estes, combined with Detective Estes' improper
testimony itself, was so egregious as to rise to the level of palpable error.
As to the taint hearing issue, I believe the reasoning in Pendleton
is flawed, as it confuses the concepts of competency and credibility, with
reliability. Because taint (suggestibility) calls into question the reliability
of evidence, it implicates the gatekeeping function of the trial court .
Noble, J ., joins this dissenting opinion.
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