KEITH A. OWENS V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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APPELLANT
KEITH A. OWENS
V
ON APPEAL FROM TAYLOR CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DOUGHLAS M. GEORGE, JUDGE
NO . 04-CR-00225
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION OF THE COURT BY CHIEF JUSTICE MINTON
AFFIRMING
The United States Supreme Court has remanded this case to us for
consideration in light of its recent opinion in Arizona v . Gant, l rendered after
the issuance of our original opinion in this case.2 This revised opinion contains
our analysis of Gant, but we have concluded that Gant does not affect the
ultimate outcome of this case .
This appeal requires us to decide whether a police officer working a
traffic stop may exercise discretion to conduct a pat-down search for weapons
, 129 S.Ct. 1710 (April 21, 2009).
U.S.
Our original opinion was rendered January 24, 2008, and may be found at
244 S .W.3d 83 (Ky. 2008) . The United States Supreme Court's order remanding
this matter to us may be found at
U.S.
, 129 S.Ct. 2155 (May 4, 2009).
of a vehicle's passenger, who exited the vehicle to accommodate a search of the
vehicle incident to the driver's arrest, even if the officer has no independent
suspicion that the passenger is guilty of criminal conduct. Analyzing the
automatic companion rule as a matter of first impression in Kentucky, we
conclude that officer safety and public safety demand that the police officer
have discretion to frisk the passenger under these circumstances . This
conclusion leads us to hold that the trial court properly denied the passenger's
motion to suppress evidence of contraband seized from him and to affirm his
conviction.
I . FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY.
Awaiting trial on charges of possession of marijuana, first-degree
possession of a controlled substance, and of being a first-degree persistent
felony offender (PFO 1), Keith Owens filed a pretrial motion to suppress
evidence of illegal drugs seized during an allegedly improper search of his
person. This prompted the trial court to hold a brief suppression hearing at
which the Commonwealth presented the testimony of the arresting officer .
Owens testified at the hearing in his own behalf.
According to the officer's testimony, he stopped a vehicle driven by Chris
Thornton because he believed-correctly it turned out-that Thornton's driver's
license had been suspended. Thornton was arrested on that charge . Once
outside the vehicle, Thornton was searched incident to arrest. The search
yielded a suspected crack pipe, and Thornton was placed in the police cruiser.
Owens was a front-seat passenger in the vehicle .3
The officer decided to search the vehicle at the scene incident to
Thornton's arrest and directed Owens to step out of the vehicle. The officer
asked Owens if he had any weapons . The officer testified that Owens stated
that he had nothing to hide and began removing money from his pockets . The
officer saw a baggie fall out when Owens pulled money from one of his pockets .
That baggie, which the officer testified he immediately suspected contained
contraband as it landed at Owens's feet, contained a marijuana cigarette, some
loose marijuana, and several pills. Two of the pills were later determined to
contain methamphetamine, and three of them were later determined to contain
ecstasy. The officer testified at the suppression hearing that Owens voluntarily
emptied his own pockets and that he had fully completed a Terry-4 pat-down
when Owens emptied his pockets. But the officer also testified, seemingly
contradictorily, that Owens began removing money from his pockets while the
officer was conducting the pat-down . A later search of the vehicle and Owens's
person revealed no other contraband .
At the suppression hearing, Owens's version of the events differed
slightly from the officer's . Owens did not dispute the officer's testimony about
the stop of the vehicle and Thornton's arrest. But Owens testified that the
Apparently, the vehicle was actually Owens's; but Owens did not want to drive
because he had taken prescription codeine for bronchitis .
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) .
officer reached into his pockets to remove the money . Owens also denied that
he possessed the baggie containing the illegal drugs .
The trial court denied the motion to suppress . At trial, the jury found
Owens guilty of all charges and recommended a sentence of twelve months
with a $500 fine for the possession of marijuana conviction, and a twenty-year
sentence for the PFO 1 convictions Owens was sentenced in accordance with
the jury's recommendation, 6 after which he filed this matter-of-right appeal.?
II. ANALYSIS.
Owens does not contest the stop of the vehicle . Nor does he contest the
arrest and eventual search of Thornton . Owens contends that the officers
overstepped constitutional bounds when they frisked him for weapons . We
disagree.
Motions to suppress are governed by Kentucky Rules of Criminal
Procedure (RCr) 9 .78. That rule provides that a court facing a motion to
suppress "shall conduct an evidentiary hearing outside the presence of the jury
and at the conclusion thereof shall enter into the record findings resolving the
essential issues of fact raised by the motion or objection and necessary to
support the ruling." When reviewing an order on a motion to suppress, the
trial court's findings of fact are "conclusive" if they are "supported by
Neither the jury nor the trial court assessed a separate penalty for the possession
of a controlled substance conviction. Owens does not claim error in the failure to
assess a separate penalty for the underlying controlled substance conviction .
The final judgment makes no mention of the possession of marijuana conviction .
See Ky. Const. ยง 110(2)(b) .
substantial evidence ."g Using those facts, this Court then reviews de novo the
trial court's application of the law to those facts to determine whether its
decision is correct as a matter of law.9
Under our settled jurisprudence, "[i]t is fundamental that all searches
.
without a warrant are unreasonable unless it can be shown that they come
within one of the exceptions to the rule that a search must be made pursuant
to a valid warrant." 10 Although the validity of the stop, arrest, and search of
Thornton is not at issue in this appeal, we must address the rationale for that
stop and search because the propriety of the frisk of Owens depends upon the
preceding search and arrest of Thornton .
The officer had a right to stop the vehicle based on his reasonable
suspicion that Thornton's driver's license had expired. I I And the officer had
the authority to arrest Thorntonl 2 and to conduct a search of Thornton
s
9
12
RCr 9 .78.
See Adcock v. Commonwealth, 967 S.W.2d 6, 8 (Ky. 1998) ("When the findings of
fact are supported by substantial evidence, as we conclude they are herein, the
question necessarily becomes, `whether the rule of law as applied to the established
facts is or is not violated [,]"'citing Ornelas v. United States, 517 U .S . 690, 697
(1996), in which the United States Supreme Court stated that the trial court's
determination of reasonable suspicion or probable cause was subject to de novo
review even though findings of fact were supported by substantial evidence.) .
Cook v. Commonwealth , 826 S.W.2d 329, 331 (Ky. 1992) .
See, e.g., Collins v. Commonwealth , 142 S.W.3d 113, 115 (Ky. 2004) (citing
Delaware v. Prouse , 440 U .S. 648, 663 (1979)) .
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 186.620(2) provides that a person shall not
operate a motor vehicle on a suspended license. KRS 186 .990(3) provides that a
person who violates KRS 186 .620 commits a Class B misdemeanor.
KRS 431 .005(1) authorizes a peace officer to arrest a person without a warrant if
that person has committed a misdemeanor in the officer's presence.
incident to that arrest. 13 Once Thornton was lawfully arrested, the officer had
the authority under the facts of this case to search the passenger compartment
of the vehicle Thornton had recently driven .
The Supreme Court previously afforded officers virtual carte blanche to
search an automobile incident to the arrest of a recent occupant of a vehicle,
holding that "[o]nce an officer determines that there is probable cause to make
an arrest, it is reasonable to allow officers to ensure their safety and to
preserve evidence by searching the entire passenger compartment." 14 This
carte blanche has been greatly reduced by Gant, however. According to the
new, far more restrictive rule expressed in Gant, "[p]olice may search a vehicle
incident to a recent occupant's arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching
distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search or it is
reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest ." 15
Otherwise, "a search of an arrestee's vehicle will be unreasonable unless police
obtain a warrant or show that another exception to the warrant requirement
applies." 16
This narrowing of the automobile search requirement will undoubtedly
affect the propriety of the automobile searches incident to arrest in a great
number of cases. But this case is not one of them .
13
14
15
16
See, e.g., Rainey v. Commonwealth , 197 S.W.3d 89, 92 (Ky. 2006) (plurality
opinion), cert. denied,
U.S.
, 127 S .Ct . 1005, 166 L.Ed.2d 713 (2007) (search
incident to arrest is exception to warrant requirement) .
Thornton v. United States, 541 U .S. 615, 623 (2004) .
129 S .Ct. at 1723 .
Id. at 1723-24.
Although Thornton was initially stopped and arrested because of his
suspended driver's license, the search of Thornton incident to that arrest
revealed the presence of a suspected crack pipe . His possession of the
suspected crack pipe gave rise to another reason for Thornton to be arrested .
It was then reasonable for the arresting officer to believe that the vehicle
Thornton was driving contained evidence of the offense of the de facto second
offense giving rise to the arrest (i.e., possession or trafficking in drugs) . The
search of the vehicle, therefore, was permissible, both before 17 and after
Gant. 18
And an officer has the authority to order a passenger to exit a vehicle
pending completion of a minor traffic stop . 19 So it logically follows that an
officer may order a passenger to exit a vehicle while that vehicle is searched
incident to the lawful arrest of the driver. It appears that every important
action taken up to the point where Owens was frisked was constitutionally
permissible.
17
18
19
Thornton , 541 U.S. at 623 .
Gant, 129 S .Ct. at 1714 ("[W]e also conclude that circumstances unique to the
automobile context justify a search incident to arrest when it is reasonable to
believe that evidence of the offense of arrest might be found in the vehicle.") .
Maryland v. Wilson , 519 U.S . 408, 414-15 (1997) ("In summary, danger to an
officer from a traffic stop is likely to be greater when there are passengers in
addition to the driver in the stopped car. While there is not the same basis for
ordering the passengers out of the car as there is for ordering the driver out, the
additional intrusion on the passenger is minimal. We therefore hold that an officer
making a traffic stop may order passengers to get out of the car pending
completion of the stop."). At the suppression hearing, the officer testified that
Owens voluntarily exited the vehicle; but Owens testified that the officer asked him
to exit the vehicle . Since the officer had the authority to order Owens to exit the
vehicle, it is, for purposes of this case, immaterial whether Owens voluntarily
exited the vehicle or whether the officer ordered him to do so .
Here we arrive at the crux of this case : may an officer conduct a patdown search for weapons of a passenger of a vehicle when the driver has been
arrested and the driver possessed illegal narcotics even if there is no
independent suspicion that the passenger is guilty of criminal conduct? 20 This
precise factual scenario appears to be a matter of first impression in Kentucky .
So we turn to other courts for guidance .
Two schools of thought have emerged around this subject. One, known
as the automatic companion rule, holds that "[aIll companions of the arrestee
within the immediate vicinity, capable of accomplishing a harmful assault on
the officer, are constitutionally subjected to the cursory 'pat-down' reasonably
necessary to give assurance that they are unarmed ."21 Numerous state and
federal courts have either expressly adopted the automatic companion rule or
have issued decisions that seem to follow its contours .22 The other school of
20
21
22
The officer did not testify that Owens was acting nervous or was fidgeting with
anything in his pockets ; the officer did not testify that he conducted the frisk
because he feared for his safety, either because he was aware of Owens's lengthy
criminal history or because Owens was wearing baggy clothes that could have
easily concealed a weapon ; and the officer did not testify that the stop of the vehicle
occurred in a high crime area . In short, nothing of substance appears in the
record to justify the frisk of Owens except for the inarguable fact that he was a
passenger in a vehicle driven by someone who possessed a crack pipe . Although
further questioning may have revealed that the officer did have, in fact, articulable
and independent suspicions that Owens was armed or dangerous, those reasons
were not explicitly brought forth during the brief suppression hearing .
United States v. Berryhill, 445 F.2d 1189, 1193 (9th Cir. 1971) .
See, e.g., United States v. Simmons, 567 F.2d 314, 319 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding
that the automatic companion rule as expressed in Berryhill was insufficient to
justify a full-blown search of an arrestee's companion, but the rationale "may be
sufficient where a search is limited to a `pat down. . . . "') ; United States v. Poms ,
484 F.2d 919, 922 (4th Cir. 1973) (voicing agreement with Berryhill) ; State v .
Clevidence , 736 P.2d 379, 382 (Ariz.Ct.App. 1987) (citing Berryhill with approval for
proposition that "[t]he right to a limited search for weapons extends to a suspected
thought, also used by several courts, is the totality of the circumstances rule,
in which the propriety of the frisk is determined considering the totality of the
circumstances . 23 Some courts that have rejected the automatic companion
rule appear to believe that it improperly creates a guilt-by-association scenario
and obliterates the requirement that an officer have a particularized,
reasonable, articulable suspicion that a person is engaging in criminal activity
or is dangerous before subjecting that person to a frisk. 24 Legal scholars have
also entered the debate.25
We have given careful analysis to the well-reasoned thoughts expressed
by both proponents and opponents of the automatic companion rule . We have
23
24
25
criminal's companions at the time of arrest.") ; People v. Myers , 616 N.E.2d 633,
636 (Il1.App .Ct . 1993) (citing Berryhill with approval and holding that "[w]hile a
police officer may not search a person merely because he is with someone who has
been arrested, the officer may conduct a pat-down of the arrested person's
companions to protect himself or others .") ; State v. Moncrief, 431 N.E.2d 336, 342
(Ohio Ct.App. 1980) (citing Berryhill with approval) ; Lewis v. United States ,
399 A.2d 559, 562 (D.C . 1979) (citing Berryhill with approval) . Perry v. State,
927 P.2d 1158, 1163-64 (Wyo. 1996) (citing Berryhill with approval and adopting
automatic companion rule) .
See, e.g., United States v. Bell, 762 F.2d 495, 499 (6th Cir. 1985) (rejecting
adoption of automatic companion rule) ; Eldridge v. State , 848 P.2d 834, 837-38
(Alaska Ct.App . 1993) (same) ; Commonwealth v. N , 649 N.E.2d 157, 158 (Mass .
1995) (same) ; State v. Eggersgluess, 483 N .W.2d 94, 98 (Minn .Ct .App . 1992) ;
United States v. Flett, 806 F.2d 823, 827 (8th Cir. 1986) (same) . We appear to
have utilized the totality of the circumstances test in regards to judging the
propriety of TTe stops . See, e.g., Priddy v. Commonwealth , 184 S.W.3d 501, 511
(Ky . 2005), cent. denied, 549 U .S. 980 (2006) . However, we have not directly opined
on the merits, or lack thereof, of the automatic companion rule.
See, e.g., Eldridge , 848 P.2d at 838; Ng, 649 N.E.2d at 157.
See Kristi Michelle Bellamy, The "Automatic Companion" Rule and Its
Unconstitutional Application to the Frisk of Car Passengers, 27 Am.J.Crim .L. 21 7
(2000) ; David E. Edwards, Suzette M . Nanovic, Francis M. O'Connell 8v Laura A.
Yustak, Case Comment, Criminal Law -United States v. Bell. Rejecting Guilt By
Association in Search and Seizure Cases, 61 Notre Dame L. Rev. 258 (1986) . John .
J. O'Shea, The Automatic Companion Rule: A Bright Line Standardfor the Te
Frisk of an Arrestee's Companion, 62 Notre Dame L. Rev. 751 (1987) .
decided to adopt the automatic companion rule in the narrow realm of cases
involving facts similar to the case at hand .
We find it illogical that rejecting the automatic companion rule would
lead to scenarios whereby an officer could search a vehicle incident to an arrest
of the driver, which necessitates removing any passengers from the vehicle, but
could not take the additional protective step of conducting a Terry pat-down for
weapons of those passengers (unless the officer had independent reasons to
suspect the passengers of being dangerous or of being involved in criminal
activity) . Limiting the right to a make a protective search would increase the
chances that an officer could be harmed by a passenger who had been carrying
a concealed weapon .26 This "compelling"2 7 concern for officer safety is
magnified by the fact that this case, like so many others, involves illegal
narcotics, thereby bringing into play "[t]he indisputable nexus between drugs
and guns[, which] presumptively creates a reasonable suspicion of danger to
the officer."28 Indeed, even the United States Supreme Court has recognized
the safety of officers as a matter of paramount importance .29 And given the
26
Berryhill, 445 F.2d at 1193 ("We think that Terry recognizes and common sense
dictates that the legality of such a limited intrusion into a citizen's personal privacy
extends to a criminal's companions at the time of arrest . It is inconceivable that a
peace officer effecting a lawful arrest of an occupant of a vehicle must expose himself
to a shot in the back from defendant's associate because he cannot, on the spot,
make the nice distinction between whether the other is a companion in crime or a
social acquaintance.") (emphasis added) .
27
28
29
Perry, 927 P.2d at 1164 ("The concern of these courts [who have adopted the
automatic companion rule] for officer safety is a compelling justification .") .
United States v. Sakyi, 160 F.3d 164, 169 (4th Cir. 1998).
See Terry, 392 U .S . at 23-24 ("Certainly it would be unreasonable to require that
police officers take unnecessary risks in the performance of their duties. American
10
small space inside a vehicle and the general presumption that one voluntarily
chooses one's traveling companions for the furtherance of a common goal or
mission,30 it would be unreasonable and dangerous for an officer not to be
concerned about his or her safety with regard to the passengers of a vehicle
after the driver has been arrested . 31
Although a Terry pat-down may be considered an additional intrusion
into the privacy of a passenger, any additional intrusion is minimal-since the
passengers presumably have already been ordered to exit the vehicle-and is
more than counterbalanced by the need to protect both the officers and any
innocent bystanders from harm.32 After all, a protective frisk of a passenger by
an officer is just that : a mechanism designed solely to protect the officers and
any bystanders, not an offensive move designed to result in prosecution of a
passenger.33 So, since the officer's motive in conducting the frisk (safety) is not
improper or designed to circumvent the protections afforded by the Fourth
Amendment, the basic purpose of the exclusionary rule-deterring police
30
31
32
33
criminals have a long tradition of armed violence, and every year in this country
many law enforcement officers are killed in the line of duty, and thousands more
are wounded. Virtually all of these deaths and a substantial portion of the
injuries are inflicted with guns and knives.") . See also Sake, 160 F.3d at 168 ("All
of these cases recognize generally that every traffic stop poses a meaningful level
of risk to the safety of police officers.") .
That general presumption of voluntary traveling together for the furtherance of a
common purpose is heightened in this case by the fact that Owens asked Thornton
to drive Owens's vehicle.
S
i, 160 F .3d at 169 ("They [passengers of a vehicle] are in the restricted space
of the vehicle presumably by choice and presumably on a common mission.") .
See O'Shea, 62 Notre Dame L. Rev. at 759 (citing statistics regarding accidental
shootings by Chicago police and arguing that adoption of automatic companion
rule would reduce those shootings while simultaneously protecting the police) .
See id. at 754 .
misconduct34 -would not be furthered by denying the officer the right to
conduct a brief Terry frisk of a passenger in a vehicle whose driver has just
been arrested . In other words, penalizing the officer for conducting what a
court later determines to have been an improper frisk will have absolutely no
practical deterrent effect, meaning that suppression of the evidence will not
further the aims of the exclusionary rule .3s
Additionally, adoption of the automatic companion rule provides needed
bright line guidance to the bench, bar, law enforcement community, and
citizens across the Commonwealth as to what is constitutionally permissible in
cases such as the one at hand . The United States Supreme Court, along with
commentators, has endorsed bright line rules in dealing with other Fourth
Amendment concerns . 36
34
35
36
See, e .g., Parks v. Commonwealth, 192 S.W.3d 318, 335 (Ky. 2006) ("The
exclusionary rule is designed to deter police misconduct.") .
O'Shea, 62 Notre Dame L.Rev. at 753 ("The officer who fears for his safety is not
concerned with the admissibility of evidence found pursuant to a pat-down search.
Instead, the officer is protecting himself and those around him by conducting a
pat-down search for weapons .") ; Terry , 392 U.S. at 14-15 ("Regardless of how
effective the rule may be where obtaining convictions is an important objective of
the police, it is powerless to deter invasions of constitutionally guaranteed rights
where the police either have no interest in prosecuting or are willing to forgo
successful prosecution in the interest of serving some other goal. . . . Yet a rigid
and unthinking application of the exclusionary rule, in futile protest against
practices which it can never be used effectively to control, may exact a high toll in
human injury and frustration of efforts to prevent crime.") (internal footnote
omitted) .
See, e.g., New York v. Belton , 453 U.S . 454, 459-60 (1981) ("When a person cannot
know how a court will apply a settled principle to a recurring factual situation, that
person cannot know the scope of his constitutional protection, nor can a policeman
know the scope of his authority .") ; LaFave, "Case-By-Case Adjudication" Versus
"Standardized Procedures". The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 S.Ct.Rev. 127, 141
("Fourth Amendment doctrine, given force and effect by the exclusionary rule, is
primarily intended to regulate the police in their day-to-day activities and thus
ought to be expressed in terms that are readily applicable by the police in the
12
We are not unmindful of the powerful protections afforded by the Fourth
Amendment. In no sense should our holding in this case be taken as a license
for law enforcement officers to believe that all frisks of all persons are always
proper. We also. reject any implication that our holding creates a "guilt by
association" mentality. To the contrary, our holding is simply an avenue to
protect the officer working at the point of contact and the public . Toward that
end, our holding is a limited and narrow exception to the exclusionary rule,
designed to apply only in situations in which the driver of a vehicle has been
lawfully arrested and the passengers of the vehicle have been lawfully expelled
in preparation for a lawful search of the vehicle . Only in those limited
circumstances, which are fraught with danger for officers and bystanders alike,
may an officer conduct a brief pat-down for weapons (not a full-blown search)
of the vehicle's passengers, regardless of whether those passengers' actions or
appearance evidenced any independent indicia of dangerousness or suspicion .
Applying our holding regarding the automatic companion rule to the case
at hand leads to the conclusion that the trial court did not err when it denied
Owens's motion to suppress . So we affirm Owens's conviction and sentence .
context of the law enforcement activities in which they are necessarily engaged . A
highly sophisticated set of rules, qualified by all sorts of ifs, ands, and buts and
requiring the drawing of subtle nuances and hairline distinctions, may be the sort
of heady stuff upon which the facile minds of lawyers and judges eagerly feed, but
they may be `literally impossible of application by the officer in the field."') (as
quoted in Belton , 453 U.S. at 458) ; O'Shea, 62 Notre Dame L. Rev. at 760 ("The
[automatic companion] doctrine would provide police officers with a bright line rule
as to when they could search companions. The automatic companion rule, even
though a bright line rule (which historically decreases a police officer's discretion),
would allow police officers some discretion. An officer would not have to frisk every
companion-but he would have that option . He could protect his life by using his
own discretion.").
13
111 . CONCLUSION .
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Taylor Circuit Court is
affirmed.
All sitting. All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Karen Shuff Maurer
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentuc
Perry Thomas Ryan
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
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