ONDRA LEON CLAY V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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MODIFIED : AUGUST 27, 2009
RENDERED : _DECEMBER 18, 2008
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2007-SC-000377-MR
ONDRA LEON CLAY
V.
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APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PAMELA GOODWINE, JUDGE
NO . 05-CR-00946
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE NOBLE
AFFIRMING
Appellant Ondra Leon Clay was convicted of wanton murder and firstdegree sodomy, and was sentenced to life without parole for twenty-five years
on the murder and twenty years on the sodomy, to run concurrently . On
appeal, Appellant raises- a Batson challenge, a failure to grant a defense motion
to strike a juror for cause, a failure to properly qualify expert testimony, and an
invalid use of judicial notice . Because these issues were either not objected to
or were improperly objected to and do not rise to the level of palpable error or
are without merit, Appellant's conviction is affirmed .
I. Background
E . S .'s body was found in her Lexington apartment on May 7, 2005 . The
medical examiner, Dr . John Hunsaker III, found the cause of death to be
suffocation by strangulation. The marks on the victim's neck were indicative of
both ligature strangulation (by a rope, cord, or necklace) and manual
strangulation (by the hands), but Dr. Hunsaker thought that manual
strangulation was the most likely cause of death . There were also marks from
injuries to the victim's head and there was some damage to the victim's anus.
No semen was found on or in the victim, though semen from someone else was
found inside the toilet at her apartment. Though neither Appellant's hair nor
his fingerprints were found at the scene, his DNA was found on the victim's
necklace and her fingertips .
Appellant did not testify at trial . Instead, a recording of his phone call
with the homicide detective was played multiple times, and it served as his
entire statement before the jury about what happened that night. In the phone
call, Appellant admitted he had known the victim for four or five years. He
claimed that on the night of the murder she bought him a treat at an ice cream
truck about 8 p.m., and that she rubbed his bald head. One witness, Barry
Hall, testified at the preliminary hearing that he saw the Appellant and the
victim at the ice cream truck and he saw her rub her fingers over his bald
head, calling it a "crystal ball ." However, at trial two years later he testified
that he had been confused at the preliminary hearing and that he did not see
physical contact between them.
Appellant presented an expert, Dr. Ronald Acton, who testified that the
Kentucky State Police (KSP) crime lab had relatively low standards for
analyzing DNA evidence . Basically, Dr. Acton supported the defense's theory
that Appellant's DNA could have been on the victim's hands from earlier in the
evening and later secondarily transferred to her necklace. Dr. Acton testified
2
that the "mix" of DNA found on the victim's necklace and fingertips could
actually be partly from an entirely different person, and thus the KSP crime
lab's conclusions were overly simplified . This contention was significantly
undercut when the trial court took judicial notice that Dr. Acton could have
had access to the "raw data" even though he did not take advantage of this
option . This, however, was not the sole basis of the Commonwealth's case .
Two fellow inmates also testified that while in custody Appellant confessed to
them that the victim had consented to sexual intercourse with him, and that
he had killed her accidentally while trying to keep her quiet during sex.
After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted and sentenced to a life
sentence without parole for twenty-five years. He appeals to this Court as a
matter of right. Ky. Const. § 110(2)(b) .
II. Analysis
A. Batson Challenge
Appellant's first claim of error is that the Commonwealth made a racebased peremptory strike of one African-American juror, Juror 3487, leaving an
all-white jury in a case where Appellant is African-American, in violation of
Batson v. Kentucky , 476 U.S . 79 (1986), and its progeny. Specifically,
Appellant argues that the answers given by the African-American juror were
substantially similar to those of several white jurors who were not struck by
the Commonwealth, which is sufficient to establish a Batson violation under
Snyder v. Louisiana, - U.S . -, 128 S .Ct. 1203 (2008), and Miller-El v. Dretke,
545 U.S. 231 (2005) .
During individual voir dire, the trial court initially asked Juror 3487
some broad questions, followed by the Commonwealth, and finally by the
defense. Both the trial court and the Commonwealth asked questions
concerning the penalty phase and whether Juror 3487 could apply mitigating
and aggravating factors . The defendant then asked Juror 3487 hypothetically,
"[If you were] on a jury on a case and you and your fellow jurors had decided to
find a defendant guilty of murder, with an aggravating circumstance, such as
has been explained to you today, no matter what the facts of that case were,
would you still be interested in hearing something about the defendant's life?"
Juror 3487 responded that she would. The defense attorney then asked Juror
3487, "Do you think it would be important enough to perhaps, I mean, could it
possibly change your opinion about what a recommended verdict should be?
Do you think it's that important?" (Emphasis added .) Juror 3487 responded,
"Yes ."
Here, the Commonwealth concedes that the other major topic discussed
during the individual voir dire of Juror 3487, specifically her position on the
death penalty, was not the reason for peremptorily striking her. Thus, the sole
reason the Commonwealth gave for striking Juror 3487 was that her mitigation
statements caused it to believe that she would be less likely to render an initial
verdict of guilty, rather than affecting a mitigated sentence only at the penalty
stage .
The U .S . Supreme Court has approved of the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals' conclusion in United States v. Vasquez-Lopez , 22 F.3d 900, 902 (9th
Cir. 1994), that "the Constitution forbids striking even a single prospective
4
juror for a discriminatory purpose ." Snyder, 128 S .Ct . at 1208 . Under Batson ,
possible race-based peremptory challenges by the prosecution are addressed
under a three-step test, which has been described as follows:
First, a defendant must make a prima facie showing that a
peremptory challenge has been exercised on the basis of race[;
second, if that showing has been made, the prosecution must offer
a race-neutral basis for striking the _juror in question[; and third,
in light of the parties' submissions, the trial court must determine
whether the defendant has shown purposeful discrimination .
Id. at 1207 (quoting Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U .S . at 277 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted) . In this case, when defense
counsel realized the jury was entirely white and questioned the strikes, the
Commonwealth immediately began discussing Juror 3487 since it had struck
her . I Therefore, under Batson, the Commonwealth waived the first step of the
Batson inquiry and moved immediately to step two,2 the offer of a race-neutral
basis .
Since the crux of the Commonwealth's race-neutral argument for striking
Juror 3487 was that it thought she was talking about the guilt phase and not a
later penalty recommendation, the prosecutor explained, "[Juror 3487] stated
when talking about mitigation evidence, mitigation evidence could change her
mind about what a verdict should be. So, we took that about she thinks
whether you're guilty or not; not as just opposed to mitigation. I felt this was a
1 The trial court noted that one African-American juror had been struck by the
defense, and two others simply did not make the random draw.
2 The trial court did not have to determine step one of the Batson inquirywhether there was a prima facie case of discrimination-because the prosecutor
offered a racially neutral reason for the strike without prompting. Hernandez v. New
York, 500 U.S. 352, 359 (1991) .
very strong statement." Additionally, Juror 3487 admitted this was enough to
"possibly change [her] opinion about what a recommended verdict should be."
Further, on appeal, the Commonwealth elaborated that Juror 3487's answer
was the only answer which it could interpret to mean mitigation evidence could
actually change her verdict in the guilt phase.
Because no mitigation evidence would be offered until there had been a
finding of guilt, the Commonwealth was mistaken in its belief that the juror
was saying that mitigation evidence would affect a finding of guilt. However, a
mere mistake by the Commonwealth about what Juror 3487's statements
meant does not require this Court to conclude that the trial court erred in
finding this to be a race-neutral reason, especially since the trial court knew
the Commonwealth did not strike three other African-American jurors . "[A]
trial court's denial of a Batson challenge will not be reversed unless clearly
erroneous." Chestnut v. Commonwealth, 250 S.W .3d 288, 302 (Ky. 2008) ;
Hernandez , 500 U .S . at 369; Washington v. Commonwealth, 34 S .W .3d 376,
380 (Ky. 2000) . This Court cannot say that the trial court was clearly
erroneous in its finding that the Commonwealth had stated a racially neutral
reason for striking Juror 3487 .
After the Commonwealth offered its race-neutral explanation, the Batson
challenge then moved to step three where Appellant needed to produce
evidence of intentional discrimination . Gray v . Commonwealth, 203 S .W .3d
679, 690 (Ky. 2006) ; see also Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S . 765, 768 (1995) ("[T]he
ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with, and never
shifts from, the opponent of the strike .") ; Coker v. Commonwealth , 241 S.W .3d
6
305, 309 (Ky. 2007) ; Thomas v . Commonwealth, 153 S .W.3d 772, 777 (Ky.
2004) . Appellant, however, only objected that there were no longer any
African-American jurors remaining. He did not attempt to compare juror
responses to show evidence of discrimination, as allowed under Miller-El and
Snyder, or offer any other example of purposeful discriminatory behavior by the
Commonwealth . Therefore, this Court is once again "not persuaded that the
Appellant met his subsequent burden to provide further evidence on which the
trial court could determine the Commonwealth's peremptory strike to be
discriminatory ." Gray, 203 S.W .3d at 691 .
Even though Appellant did not attempt to make these juror comparisons
to the trial court, he now claims on appeal that there were four white jurors
who gave similar answers to Juror 3487, but who were not peremptorily struck
by the Commonwealth . The United States Supreme Court has warned
appellate courts that "a retrospective comparison of jurors based on a cold
appellate record may be very misleading when alleged similarities were not
raised at trial ." Snyder, 128 S . Ct. at 1207 . However, in Snyder, supra, the
Supreme Court nonetheless engaged in such juror comparisons because the
jurors' responses, or "shared characteristics," had been thoroughly explored
and made part of the record by the trial court . Here, although the better
practice would have been for Clay to present the trial court with proof of the
Commonwealth's differing treatment of Juror 3487 and the white jurors,
because the record is fully developed regarding the Commonwealth's questions
about mitigation evidence, this Court can compare the responses given by
Juror 3487 and the four white jurors who were not struck for cause .
7
Having reviewed the responses of the white jurors, however, this Court is
not convinced that the Commonwealth's race-neutral reason it provided for
striking Juror 3487 was a pretext or that it was based on racial discrimination .
Although the four white jurors stated that they would want to hear all the
mitigation evidence before deciding on a penalty, none indicated that mitigation
evidence would change their opinion about what the verdict should be .
Further, the white jurors' responses indicated that they were discussing how
mitigation evidence would affect the penalty phase and not the guilt phase . In
addition, the trial court made this ruling knowing that the Commonwealth had
not moved to strike the three remaining African-American jurors . Therefore,
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in accepting the Commonwealth's
explanation for striking Juror 3487 and in concluding that the Commonwealth
did not act with a discriminatory intent.
B. Failure to Strike Juror for Cause
Appellant's second claim of error is the trial court's failure to strike Juror
3049 for cause. Juror 3049 was a secretary in the Fayette County
Commonwealth's Attorney's Office from 1974 to 1981 under the former
Commonwealth Attorney, and she served as a witness in a case prosecuted by
the current Fayette County Commonwealth's Attorney when he was appointed
as an outside special prosecutor (before he became the Commonwealth's
Attorney) . She also retained a friendship with a member of the office's
administrative staff that still worked there . Appellant argues that even though
this juror said she could be fair, she should have been struck for cause
because of her "close relationship" with the Fayette County prosecutor's office .
8
Juror 3049, however, did not have a "close relationship" with the office or with
the current Commonwealth's Attorney at the time of this trial.
"The decision whether to excuse a juror for bias lies within the sound
discretion of the trial court." Cook v. Commonwealth , 129 S .W .3d 351, 357
(Ky . 2004) . This Court reviews a trial court's determination regarding the
exclusion of a juror for cause for an abuse of discretion . Fugett v.
Commonwealth , 250 S .W.3d 604, 613 (Ky. 2008) . Also, "the decision to
exclude a juror for cause is based on the totality of the circumstances, not in
response to any one question ." Id. Specifically, "[t]he test for determining
whether a juror should be stricken for cause is `whether, after having heard all
of the evidence, the prospective juror can conform his views to the
requirements of the law and render a fair and impartial verdict ."' Thompson v .
Commonwealth ,
147
S .W .3d 22,
51 (Ky. 2004)
(quoting Mabe
v.
Commonwealth , 884 S .W .2d 668, 671 (Ky . 1994)) ; RCr 9 .36(1) . "[T]he party
alleging bias bears the burden of proving that bias and the resulting prejudice ."
Cook, 129 S .W.3d at 357. Once this is shown, "[t]he court must weigh the
probability of bias or prejudice based on the entirety of the juror's responses
and demeanor ." Shane v . Commonwealth , 243 S .W.3d 336, 338 (Ky. 2007) .
Here, the Appellant did not prove bias in the first instance, much less prejudice
resulting from bias .
Appellant argues Juror 3049's bias should be implied because of her
previous employment three decades ago, her serving as a witness for the
current Fayette County Commonwealth's Attorney (who did not try this case)
before he was elected to the position, and her continuing friendship with an
9
administrative staff member in the current Commonwealth's Attorney's Office .
These connections, however, are far too tenuous to constitute the "close
relationship" required to presume bias or prejudice. Montgomery v.
Commonwealth , 819 S.W .2d 713 (Ky. 1991) ; see also Marsch v.
Commonwealth , 743 S .W .2d 830, 833 (Ky. 1987) (close relationship existed
where two potential jurors were married to victim's second and third cousins,
visited funeral home to express condolences to victim's family, and one juror
had known victim since he was a teenager and worked with him in church) .
Since a close relationship was not established, and Juror 3049 testified that
she could be fair to both sides, under the totality of the circumstances there is
nothing in the record to indicate that she would be biased or prejudiced against
Appellant . The trial court's decision not to strike Juror 3049 was not an abuse
of discretion.
C. Expert Testimony
Appellant's third claim of error is the testimony of Sexual Assault Nurse
Examiner (SANE) program manager Anita Capillo regarding the pre-death
behavior of strangulation victims . Capillo testified that because they try to free
their necks in order to get a breath, DNA can be expected to be found on
victims' fingertips from scratching the hands that are strangling them . On
appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court should have conducted a
Daubert/ Kumho Tire hearing to determine whether Capillo was qualified to be
offering such opinions. However, even though defense counsel did object at
trial, it was not an objection to the failure to qualify Capillo as an expert, and
thus it was the wrong objection. See Mondie v. Commonwealth, 158 S.W.3d
10
203, 212 (Ky . 2005) (error unpreserved where defense counsel objected to
witness's testimony as that of a lay witness, but did not object to failure to
qualify witness as an expert and did not request a Daubert hearing) ; Love v.
Commonwealth , 55 S.W .3d 816, 822 (Ky. 2001) (issue of failure to conduct
Daubert hearing unpreserved where Appellant's objection was premised on
relevancy under KRE 401 and not on scientific reliability under KRE 702) .
Unpreserved errors must be reviewed under the palpable error standard.
Since Appellant did not object and request a hearing under Daubert v .
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc . , 509 U .S. 579 (1993), Appellant is
essentially arguing that the trial court should have conducted a sua sponte
Daubert hearing. In Tharp v . Commonwealth , 40 S .W .3d 356, 367 (Ky . 2000),
however, this Court "decline[d] to speculate on the outcome of an unrequested
Daubert hearing, or to hold that the failure to conduct such a hearing sua
sponte constitutes palpable error." Id. at 368 . In this case, in addition to
Capillo's testimony, there was DNA evidence and testimony from two fellow
inmates who claimed Appellant had confessed. This claim was unpreserved
and there was no palpable error.
D. Judicial Notice
Appellant's fourth claim of error is the trial court's judicial notice of the
law regarding discovery of underlying test data. Contrary to what counsel for
Appellant claims in her brief, the record reveals that no objection was made
contemporaneously with the trial court's taking of judicial notice as required by
RCr 9 .22 . Thus, this Court must review this claimed error under the palpable
error rule.
First, the trial court should not have taken judicial notice of debatable
law. KRE 201 (a) allows for a court to take "judicial notice of adjudicative facts ."
"A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute"
because it concerns a matter "[g]enerally known" or a matter "[c]apable of
accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot
reasonably be questioned ." KRE 201(b) . Only the latter is at issue in this case
under what has been deemed the "authoritative sources" test. Robert G .
Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook § 1 .00[3][c], 10 (4th ed ., 2003)
[hereinafter Lawson, Kentucky Evidence ] (quoting Evidence Rules Study
Committee, Kentucky Rules of Evidence-Final Draft, p. 16 (Nov. 1989)) .
Under this test, "[a]nything which can be `looked up' in an authoritative source
is a candidate for this type of judicial notice. The judge should ask two
questions : (1) Does the source provide the precise fact to be noticed; and (2) Is
the source accurate?" Id . (quoting Evidence Rules Study Committee, Kentucky
Rules of Evidence-Final Draft, p. 16 (Nov . 1989)) (emphasis added) .
In this case, the trial court took judicial notice of a defendant's right to
obtain the "raw data" used to draw a conclusion by the state lab. However, the
law regarding availability of raw data to a testifying expert was not a fact to be
determined, and thus it could not be judicially noticed as it was here .
During direct examination, defense expert Dr. Ronald Acton testified
about the methods used at the Kentucky State Police (KSP) crime lab. He
discussed the higher standards at his own lab, the possibility of an error
regarding the KSP lab's analysis of a "mixed" DNA sample, and the possibility
12
of Appellant's DNA being on the victim's necklace from a secondary transfer
after she touched his head earlier in the day.
On cross-examination, the Commonwealth sought to impeach Dr.
Acton's credibility by getting him to admit he would not sign off on a DNA
report in his own lab if he had not looked at the raw data. The Commonwealth
asked him if it was "important to look at the raw data." Dr. Acton responded
that he could still examine the "veracity of the [KSP crime lab's] interpretation"
without raw data because he was critiquing the way the KSP lab analyzes its
results once they've been obtained, not its handling of the DNA.
In a somewhat combative tone, the Commonwealth responded, "You're
aware, under the law, that the defense is entitled to get the raw data?" Dr.
Acton responded that he was not aware of the laws in Kentucky . The
Commonwealth then asked, "You could have all the data you needed, couldn't
you?" Dr. Acton once again responded that he was unsure . The
Commonwealth continued, "So you could even go
look
at the data" and "under
Kentucky law you could even do your own independent testing if there's any
reason to challenge it, couldn't you?" Once again, Dr. Acton responded that he
did not know the law in Kentucky . At this point, the Commonwealth asked the
trial court to take judicial notice "that that is the law in Kentucky ."
Immediately, the trial court replied by taking discretionary judicial notice
under KRE 201(c) :3 "The court takes judicial notice of the fact that that is the
law in Kentucky ; that defendants do have the opportunity and ability to
receive, obtain, and analyze any raw data that is received by the
Commonwealth ."
In so doing, the trial court failed to analyze whether the law it was being
asked to give judicial notice to was an "adjudicative fact." KRE 201 (a) only
allows a court to take "judicial notice of adjudicative facts ." Though the
Kentucky Rules of Evidence do not define "adjudicative fact," Federal Rule of
Evidence 201 is nearly identical to KRE 201 and its drafters provide the
following definition : "When a court or an agency finds facts concerning the
immediate parties-who did what, where, when, how, and with what motive or
intent-the court or agency is performing an adjudicative function, and the
facts are conveniently called adjudicative facts. . . ." Lawson, Kentuc
Evidence § 1 .00[2][b], at 6 (quoting Fed . R . Evid. 201, Advisory Committee's
Note to Subdivision (a)) . Here, the trial court explicitly said that it was taking
judicial notice of what "is the law in Kentucky ." It did not take judicial notice
of a fact at all . When the Commonwealth asked the question about whether
Dr. Acton knew he was entitled to "raw data," it was not trying to prove that the
doctor could access the raw data, but rather was attempting to attack his
credibility by suggesting that his criticisms of the state lab report weren't valid
because he had not seen the underlying data. The doctor responded that he
did not need the data itself to criticize the methods used by the lab, which he
did know . Whether he was entitled to see the raw data was not a fact at issue
in the case, and thus was not an adjudicative fact subject to judicial notice .
3 The notice is discretionary because the moving party, the Commonwealth, did
not supply the trial court with any necessary information as required for mandatory
14
In addition, there is not an "authoritative source" that discusses a
defendant's right to receive raw data. The law regarding raw data is not certain
in this case, making it debatable as to when and how Dr. Acton could be given
the raw data. As such, the trial court's statement on what Kentucky law is in
regard to the availability of raw data can reasonably be questioned, and thus
the statement of the trial court is not an authoritative source . Instead,
Professor Lawson notes that "[t]he kinds of `unimpeachable sources' that might
be used to support judicial notice under th[e] [authoritative sources] test would
include encyclopedias, calendars, maps, medical and historical treatises,
almanacs, and public records." Id . § 1 .00[3][c], at 10 . These are sources
anyone can look to for a relevant fact. For example, a trial court could take
judicial notice that "Father's Day in 1979 was on June 17 ." Id . § 1 .00[3][c], at
11 (citing Allen v. Allen, 518 F. Supp . 1234, 1235 (E .D . Pa. 1981)) .4 Anyone
can look at a calendar to determine that this is a certain fact.
Further, since it is debatable whether defendants even have a right to
receive, obtain and analyze "raw data" in Kentucky, the danger of taking
judicial notice of "the law" is demonstrated . The Commonwealth points to KRE
705, which allows an expert to testify "without prior disclosure of the
underlying facts or data," but which allows the expert to "be required to
disclose the underlying facts or data on cross-examination ." The
Commonwealth claims that Appellant, on cross-examination of Marcie Atkins
judicial notice under KRE 201(d) .
4 It should be noted that "[t]he [Kentucky] Supreme Court has rendered few
decisions under KRE 201 ." Lawson, Kentucky Evidence § 1 .00[3][b], at 9 n.24.
15
(a KSP crime lab forensic specialist) the day before Dr . Acton testified, could
have asked for the underlying data upon which she based her conclusions, and
that therefore Dr. Acton could have reviewed the data. The possibility of
obtaining data upon which conclusions are based is not, however, the same as
obtaining "raw data." There is not a simple rule regarding "raw data" and the
parties rightly dispute its meaning at great length in their briefs .
In addition, RCr 7 .24 does not explicitly provide for independent testing .5
In fact, Green v. Commonwealth, 684 S .W .2d 13 (Ky. App. 1984), specifically
notes that "the right to [independent] testing is implicit under RCr 7.24 ." Id . at
16 (emphasis added) . As evidenced by the parties' lengthy discussion in their
briefs, what exactly constitutes "raw data"-whether it is the way a lab
analyzes its results or the DNA sample itself-is subject to dispute, and it is
not explicitly mentioned in KRE 705 or RCr 7.24 . Therefore, in addition to the
subject of this judicial notice not being an adjudicative fact, it was also not
precise .
Generally, the Kentucky Rules of Evidence contain no provision for
judicial notice of the law. Lawson, Kentucky Evidence § 1 .00[6] at 22 .
Previous statutes on judicial notice of the law were repealed upon adoption of
the evidence rules, with the Rules' specific emphasis only on "adjudicative
facts." Obviously, a court could still take judicial notice of a law, if that law
5 RCr 7 .24(1)(b) provides, "Upon written request by the defense, the attorney for
the Commonwealth shall . . . permit the defendant to inspect and copy or photograph
any relevant results or reports of physical or mental examinations, and of scientific
tests or experiments made in connection with the particular case, or copies thereof,
that are known by the attorney for the Commonwealth to be in the possession,
custody or control of the Commonwealth ."
16
constituted an adjudicative fact in a particular case. An example of this would
be proving the legal drinking age if there was a dispute as to what that age is,
or any other time that it might be necessary to prove what the law is as a
question of fact. Otherwise, taking judicial notice of "the law" during the
course of a trial is tantamount to instructing the jury prior to the close of the
evidence.
Nonetheless, though the trial court's taking of judicial notice was
improper, Appellant did not object to the trial court. Appellant argues on
appeal that since judicial notice was taken immediately, there was no time for
an objection . Perhaps there was not enough time to object before judicial
notice was taken, but this fact does not affect the contemporaneous objection
requirement of RCr 9 .22 . 6 Appellant still could have-and was required toobject after judicial notice was taken in order to preserve this error for appeal.
This Court cautions counsel for Appellant to be certain of the record when
claiming that an error is preserved . Because this alleged error was not
preserved for appellate review, this Court can reverse only if the error
constitutes palpable error under RCr. 10.26 .
A palpable error is one that "affects the substantial rights of a party" and
will result in "manifest injustice" if not considered by the court. Schoenbachler
v. Commonwealth , 95 S .W.3d 830, 836 (Ky. 2003) (quoting RCr 10 .26) .
6 Even though RCr 9.22 does not require an objection to be made "if a party has
no opportunity to object to a ruling or order at the time it is made," Appellant could
have objected after the trial court took judicial notice before the Commonwealth's
cross-examination of Dr. Acton continued. KRE 201 (e) provides, "A party is entitled to
be heard as to the propriety of taking judicial notice and the tenor of the matter
17
Recently this Court clarified that the key emphasis in defining such a palpable
error under RCr 10.26 is the concept of "manifest injustice." Martin v .
Commonwealth , 207 S.W.3d 1, 3 (Ky. 2006) . "[T]he required showing is
probability of a different result or error so fundamental as to threaten a
defendant's entitlement to due process of law." Id. Having reviewed
Appellant's argument, the Court concludes that there was no manifest injustice
because Appellant was able to present evidence regarding the reliability of the
DNA testing through Dr. Acton and there was testimony from two of his
cellmates that he had confessed. Thus, the erroneous taking ofjudicial notice
was not "shocking or jurisprudentially intolerable" and it cannot be considered
palpable error grounds for reversal. Id . at 4.
III. Conclusion
In conclusion, Appellant has not pointed to any preserved errors that
require reversal. First, Appellant did not carry his burden on his Batson claim
because defense counsel failed to make a showing of purposeful discrimination
at trial ; a bare observation that all of the selected jurors were white was
insufficient . Second, the trial court did not err in failing to strike another juror
for cause because she was too far removed, both temporally and in terms of her
remaining contacts, from the Fayette County Commonwealth's Attorney's Office
and the Fayette County Commonwealth's Attorney . Third, Appellant did not
request a Daubert hearing regarding the qualifications of the SANE program
director; the objection to speculation was insufficient . Fourth, the trial court's
noticed. In the absence of prior notification, the request may be made after judicial
notice has been taken ."
18
taking judicial notice of the law governing raw data was error, but it was
unpreserved and does not constitute palpable error.
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant's conviction and the judgment of the
Fayette Circuit Court are affirmed .
All sitting. All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Susan Jackson Balliet
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair oaks Lane, Suite 302
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Jack Conway
Attorney General
James Coleman Shackelford
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Criminal Appeals
Attorney General's Office
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
'$UyrQxrrQ (burf of ~rufurhv
2007-SC-000377-MR
ONDRA LEON CLAY
V.
APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PAMELA GOODWINE, JUDGE
NO. 05-CR-00946
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR REHEARING
AND GRANTING MODIFICATION
The Petition for Rehearing, filed by the Appellant, of the
Opinion of the Court rendered December 18, 2008, is DENIED.
The Opinion of the Court rendered on December 18, 2008, is
MODIFIED by substitution of the attached Opinion in lieu of the original
Opinion . Said modification does not affecting the holding of the Opinion
as originally rendered .
All sitting. All concur regarding the denial of rehearing . Minton,
C .J. ; Abramson, Schroder, Scott, and Venters, JJ ., concur regarding the
modification . Cunningham and Noble, JJ ., dissent and would not modify
the original Opinion .
ENTERED : August 27, 2009 .
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