STANLEY STOKES V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED : DECEMBER 18, 2008
TO BE PUBLIS
F-1
Q
,;VixyrkWr
Caurf of
2007-SC-000006-MR
STANLEY STOKES
V.
APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM MCCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE CRAIG Z. CLYMER, JUDGE
NO . 05-CR-00496
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE NOBLE
AFFIRMING
Appellant, Stanley Stokes, was convicted of two counts of sodomy and
sentenced to thirty years in prison . On appeal, he claims the trial court erred
by allowing the definition of a medical term to be read into evidence outside the
context of an expert witness's testimony, and by answering a jury question
during penalty phase deliberation . Finding no error requiring reversal,
Appellant's conviction and sentence are affirmed .
I. Background
Appellant's son, Kevin Stokes, and his wife, Tracey, had custody of the
minor child involved in this case, H. B ., a twelve-year-old girl who was Tracey's
adopted sister. On September 3, 2005, Kevin took H. B ., her older sister, and
his biological daughter to visit Appellant at his home. While the other two girls
mowed the lawn, H. B. gave Appellant's dog a bath . Kevin and a friend, Ronnie
Gibson, were working on a scooter in the garage, and Appellant was with them .
Appellant later followed H. B. into the house and did not immediately come
back out. Kevin then looked through a window to see where they were, and he
testified at trial that he saw H. B. sitting in a chair with Appellant standing in
front of her. Kevin opened the door and asked what was going on, at which
time Appellant jumped back and Kevin saw Appellant pull his penis out of H.
B.'s mouth . Appellant claimed that he was merely hugging the child, and
indicated that it could be nothing more because he suffered from erectile
dysfunction. When H. B . confirmed what Kevin had seen, Kevin beat
Appellant, until Appellant nodded that he had acted as the child claimed, and
Gibson dragged Kevin off Appellant.
H. B. claimed that Appellant had made her perform sex acts three or four
times previously, and that the first time he had slapped her and threatened to
force her if she did not do as he demanded. She claimed that Appellant held a
knife to her throat and told her that if she told anyone, he would kill her and
did
jeopardize her family . Further, she testified that Appellant
have an erection
during the July incident.
Consequently, Appellant was charged with one count of first-degree
sodomy and one count of second-degree sodomy . At trial, Kevin, H . B . and
Gibson testified to the above events. Appellant testified in his own behalf, and
raised as his defense that he could not get an erection due to impotence, and
placed into evidence his medical records concerning this health problem, which
indicated that he had been seeing a urologist for this condition off and on since
1994. Those records indicated that no physical cause for Appellant's
2
dysfunction could be found, and that the doctor thought the problem was
probably "psychogenic ." The records also indicated that, on occasion,
Appellant was able to function sexually . Appellant, however, claimed that by
1996, he could not achieve an erection at all.
During rebuttal, the Commonwealth asked to be allowed to read the
definition of "psychogenic" from an unnamed medical dictionary as a learned
treatise pursuant to KRE 803(18) . Defense counsel objected that under the
rule, a learned treatise must be introduced through an expert witness. In
response, the Commonwealth replied that the trial court could simply take
judicial notice of the definition .
The trial court ruled that no expert would be required if it took judicial
notice that the dictionary was a learned treatise, to which defense counsel
again made proper objection and moved for a mistrial, which was overruled .
The trial court then informed the jury that it was recognizing "this book," which
still remained unidentified, as a learned treatise, and that what the
Commonwealth was going to read was reliable and could be considered during
deliberations. The Commonwealth then defined psychogenic as "produced or
caused by psychological factors."
In closing, the Commonwealth argued that Appellant's dysfunction
"related to a psychological type of problem, in his head," as there was nothing
physically wrong with Appellant, including his testosterone levels. The
Commonwealth pointed out that the medical records indicated that as of
February 1995, Appellant had had intercourse three or four times and, "Gets
good erections when he is able to have intercourse." The prosecutor then
3
argued that Appellant was dysfunctional "because adult women do not sexually
him
arouse
. . . . He is aroused by little girls ." The defense objected that there
was nothing in the medical records to support this argument, nor had there
been any testimony to that effect. Nonetheless, the trial court ruled, over the
defense's objection, that this statement was "a rational, reasonable inference."
On further complaint, the trial court then told the jury it could "draw any
reasonable inference from the evidence that's been presented . . . . That's for
you to decide, you make the decision yourself."
Appellant was convicted of both charges, and the jury recommended the
maximum sentence on each. The trial court imposed a sentence of twenty years
on first-degree sodomy and ten years on second-degree sodomy, and ran them
consecutively for a total of thirty years . This appeal followed as a matter of
right.
II. Analysis
A. Learned Treatise and Judicial Notice
Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by taking
"judicial notice" of a medical dictionary as a "learned treatise ." While there is
much confusion of terms here, the trial court committed no error when it
allowed the Commonwealth to read a definition of "psychogenic" into the
record .
Under KRE 803(18), known as the learned treatise rule, statements from
such a document are not excluded by the hearsay rules, even though the
declarant is not available as a witness, when these statements are used in
questioning an expert witness, either on direct or cross, if the statements are
4
established as a reliable authority either by the witness, other expert
testimony, or by judicial notice . The judicial notice used in this rule goes only
to whether the document is a reliable authority, not that the statements read
are adjudicative facts. As always, the weight of the authority must be
determined by the Crier of fact .
Judicial notice under KRE 201, however, concerns only adjudicative
facts. KRE 201(a) . If a fact is judicially noticed under this rule, the jury must
be instructed to accept such fact as conclusive . KRE 201(g) . To be properly
judicially noticed, the fact must not be subject to reasonable dispute, because
it is generally known or can be determined by resort to sources whose accuracy
cannot be reasonably questioned. KRE 201(b) .
Here, Appellant was allowed to introduce his medical records regarding
his treatment over a number of years for erectile dysfunction, by which he
bolstered his defense that H.B. was lying, that he was incapable of an erection,
and that he had only been giving her a hug. The records, however, also
indicated that he had been able to occasionally have intercourse with an
erection, and that his problem was probably psychogenic. What the
Commonwealth wanted to do, though it couched its request as recognition of a
learned treatise, was ask the court to take judicial notice of the definition of
"psychogenic" and to read the definition to the jury as an adjudicative fact to
establish that Appellant's dysfunction was psychological rather than physical.
A trial court may take judicial notice of the definition of a word as an
adjudicative fact where the definition of a term is indisputable, that is, where it
is "capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose
5
accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned ." KRE 201 (b) (2) . Essentially, KRE
201 allows judicial notice to be taken of "facts `which can be determined from
unimpeachable sources.' Robert G. Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law
Handbook §1 .00[3][c], at 10 (4th ed . 2003) (quoting 1 Christopher B. Mueller &
.
Laird C . Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence § 51 (2d ed . 1994)) . As Professor
Lawson has noted, such sources include general authorities such as
"encyclopedias, calendars, maps, medical and historical treatises, almanacs,
and public records ." Id . Beyond doubt, dictionaries fall within the same class
of "unimpeachable sources,"- and thus the definitions contained in them may
be judicially noticed, so long as they are indisputable . See Comerica Bank v.
Lexington Ins. Co ., 3 F.3d 939, 944 (6th Cir. 1993) (holding that district court
was within its discretion to take judicial notice of the dictionary definition of a
word) ; B .V.D . Licensing Corp. v. Body Action Design, Inc ., 846 F.2d 727, 728
(Fed. Cir. 1988) ("Courts may take judicial notice of . . . dictionaries .") ; Richard
H . Underwood &, Glen Wissenberger, Kentucky Evidence 2005-2006 Courtroom
Manual 44 (2005) ("Judicial notice is taken of the English language . . .
Representative authoritative sources for verification [of facts] include such
materials as historical works, science and art books, language and medical
journals and dictionaries, calendars, encyclopedias - . . ." (emphasis added));
see also Werk v. Parker, 249 U.S . 130, 132-33 (1919) ("We deem it clear,
beyond question . . .that the court was justified in taking judicial notice of facts
that appeared so abundantly from standard works accessible in every
considerable library .") ; Samuel A. Thumma and Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, The
Lexicon Has Become a Fortress: The United States Supreme Court's Use of
6
Dictionaries ,
7 duff. L. Rev. 227, 248 (1999) (noting that "by 1920, the
[Supreme] Court had decided that taking judicial notice of dictionary
definitions unquestionably was proper"), Indisputability of a definition can be
buttressed by cross-referencing the definition with other dictionaries or
authorities. Specifically, judicial notice may be taken of the definitions of
medical terms from a medical dictionary, Campbell v.
elt n, 727 N.E .2d 495,
502 (Ind.Ct.App . 2000), and those definitions are admissible into evidence in a
jury trial, assuming of course that the other requirements of the judicial notice
rude are met:
We are mindful that there is a distinction between referring to a
dictionary in a factfinding setting for the purpose of judicially
noticing the meaning of a word, on one hand, and consulting such
a source upon appellate review to discern the meaning of a term
for purposes of, for example, statutory construction . . . Nevertheless, the preceding; authority reflects that our courts
generally regard dictionaries as `sources whose accuracy cannot
reasonably be questioned.' See Evid. R. 201(a) . We conclude,
therefore, that a court may take judicial notice of a dictionary
definition of a surd, so long as the other conditions set out in Evid.
R. 201 are met.
Id. at 501 .
No suggestion has been made that the definition read to the jury in this
case was not accurate, and the Appellant did not object to the content of the
definition, only to the medical dictionary being treated as a learned treatise .
The trial court intended to take judicial notice of the meaning of the term
"psychogenic," and found a medical dictionary to be an indisputable source of
the definition . Since the accuracy of the definition was readily ascertainable,
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing it to be read to the jury.
Whether it was appropriate for this evidence to be introduced during rebuttal is
7
perhaps another matter, but this has not been raised on appeal, and does not
rise to the level of a palpable error.
The Appellant also takes issue with the use the Commonwealth made of
this definition in closing argument . Since it was appropriate for the trial court
to take judicial notice of the definition of "psychogenic," it follows that it was
appropriate for the Commonwealth to comment on that definition in closing
argument, provided its inferences were reasonable . It is true that there was no
specific testimony before the jury that stated Appellant could not be aroused by
adult women, but only little girls. However, Appellant testified that he could
not get an erection for intercourse by 1996, while H . B . testifle that he in fact
did have an erection during at least the July episode. From this, it could be
inferred that due to the psychological nature of his dysfunction, he could only
achieve an erection with a child. While the -Commonwealth did state this
factual claim definitively, rather than couching it in the language of possibility,
it did so in the context of argument . There was evidence to support the
assertion as a reasonable inference, and not mere speculation . The argument
was thus not improper, and certainly did not rise to the level of prosecutorial
misconduct. There was no error.
B. Penalty Phase Deliberations
Appellant also complains that during penalty phase deliberations, the
trial
court gave the jury additional factual and legal information to which it was
not entitled .
In the penalty phase, under truth in sentencing, the Commonwealth
informed the jury that Appellant had previously been convicted of second8
degree sexual abuse . On the record, but outside the hearing of the jury, the
Commonwealth indicated that it would not send the certified copy of the prior
conviction back with the jury because Appellant had previously been charged
under a higher degree of the offense. In (losing, the Commonwealth
specifically referenced
this
offense, stating that it was not Appellant's "first
time" and directed the jury to consider what Appellant had done in the past in
recommending a sentence . The jury then retired to deliberate.
A few minutes into the deliberations, the jury sent out this question : "We
want to know if the prey . conv. was on a child?" The Commonwealth first
argued that the judge could do this because the arrest warrant in the prior
case stated that the Appellant committed first-degree sexual abuse against a
minor less than 12 years of age. When defense counsel objected, the trial court
researched the issue, and determined that pursuant to Robinson v,
Commonwealth, 926 S.W.2d 853 (Ky. 1996), he could read to the jury the
elements of second-degree sexual abuse. The defense attorney objected that
this was new evidence that had not been presented during the
Commonwealth's penalty phase case, and that all the trial court could do at
that point was decline to answer and tell the jury to follow the instructions .
The Commonwealth actually agreed that the trial court should not tell the jury
that the victim of that offense was a child.
Nonetheless, the trial court stated that since the prosecutor could have
told the jury the victim was a child, the question was whether it now should tell
them. Concluding that since the matter involved truth in sentencing, he
determined to tell the jury that the prior offense involved subjecting a person
9
less than 14 years of age to sexual contact, and that he would define sexual
contact as "any touching of the sexual or other intimate parts of a person done
for the purpose of gratifying the sexual desire of either party." Over continuing
defense objection, he did so, and within five minutes, the jury fixed the
maximum sentences on both counts before them, and recommended that they
run consecutively for a total of thirty years.
All that is properly allowed under Robinson is a general description of the
crime. In that case, the trial court allowed the victim of the prior crime to
testify at length as to the specifics of the assault against her. Defense counsel
objected that this resulted in the defendant being in effect tried again for that
offense, and this Court agreed. To clarify, this Court held that all that is
necessary for truth in sentencing is "a general description of the crime ." Id . at
855 . To illustrate what would be appropriate in the Robinson case, the Court
stated, "In this case, it would be sufficient to introduce the judgment with
testimony that defendant assaulted the woman with whom he had been living."
Id. In a later case, Hudson v. Commonwealth,, 979 S .W-2d 106 (Ky . 1998), this
Court specified that the factual circumstances in the warrants or uniform
citations could not be read to the jury. What is permissible thus lies
somewhere between the rules stated in these two cases.
Here, the trial court gave no more than a general description of the prior
offense such as would be allowed under Robinson, including that the crime
had been committed against a person under the age of fourteen, but then went
farther by defining what sexual contact meant. This is considerably more than
the limit set in Robinson, in that the definition falls into the language typically
10
used in warrants and indictments, and gives more specifics than is necessary
for the jury to know to ascertain the nature of the offense. Possibly, the, sword
cuts both ways here, because the term "sexual contact" could be construed as
worse than it actually is. Thus, defining terms in other offenses creates the
very kinds of collateral issues this Court disfavored in Robinson . Despite this,
the definition the trial court read was simply a statement of the statutory
definition of the term sexual contact as the word would be defined if given in a
jury instruction. Thus, in this case, even though it is better practice not to be
too specific in the "general statement" of what occurred, any error is harmless .
The greater problem here is how to treat the introduction of additional
evidence after the case has been submitted and the jury has begun
deliberations. No timely motion to reopen was made; instead, the judge
introduced new evidence in response to a question from the jury as to whether
the victim of the prior offense was a child. Those facts were given weight by
being delivered by the trial court. Appellant had no opportunity to introduce
possible corrective evidence, and was given no opportunity to argue to the jury
regarding the additional evidence. The Commonwealth had closed, and had
concerns about the court telling the jury the age of the victim in the prior case.
Generally, courts are reluctant to reopen proof after a case has been
closed, but trial courts do have the discretion to do so. RCr 9 .42(e) (giving court
discretion to allow evidence-in-chief after a side has closed its proofl ; Marshall
v. Commonwealth, 625 S .W.2d
581, 583 (Ky. 1-9131) .
The test generally is
whether an injustice is likely to result if the new evidence is not put before the
jury. See RCr 9 .42(e) (allowing such new proof only "for good reason in
furtherance of justice") .
However, there is very little authority about reopening proof after the
case has been submitted to the jury and it has begun its deliberations . One
case which does frame the issue squarely, but that has facts different from this
one, is Henry v. United States , 204 F. 2d 817, 821 (6th Cir. 1953) . In Henry,
after the jury
deadlocked, it requested the court to allow it to rehear the
testimony of some of the witnesses . Over defense objection, the court allowed
the testimony of two witnesses to be played back for the jury. In particular, the
defense objected to replaying the testimony of one witness that had so annoyed
the judge with his evasive answers that the judge took over the questioning and
castigated the witness. In reversing, the Sixth Circuit pointed out that
replaying testimony where the judge projected a negative view of the witness's
credibility overemphasized that testimony to the point of unfairness . In
reaching its decision, however, the Sixth Circuit reviewed Kentucky law in
regard to reopening and communication with the jury and concluded: "There is
no iron-bound, copper-fastened, double-riveted rule against the admission of
evidence after both parties have rested upon their proof and even after the jury
has entered upon it deliberations. Considerable latitude in discretion is vested
in the trial judge in this respect" A at 820 (emphasis added) . The Sixth
Circuit . did recognize that as a general practice, the parties must consent or the
evidence must relate to some non-controversial matter essential to complete
the record before evidence may be introduced after jurors have begun
deliberations. Id . at 820-21 .
12
RCr 9 .74 specifically says, "No information requested by the jury or any
juror after the jury has retired for deliberation shall be given e cept in open
court in the pre
ce of the defendant (unless the defendant is being tried in
absentia) and the entire jury, and in the presence of or after re sonable notice
to counsel for the parties." (Emphasis added.) Had the sentence ended after
the word "given" the rule would clearly proscribe giving additional proof to the
jury after deliberations have begun. With the addition of the "except" language,
the only reasonable inference is that such proof can be given, provided the
qualifiers are met. Though it is rare, such a procedure is not unheard of in
Kentucky law. See Elkins v. Commonwealth , 245 Ky. 199, 53 S .W.2d 358
(1932) (holding that court abused discretion in not allowing defendant to call
impeachment witness after jury began deliberations) ; Easterling v.
Commonwealth, 201 Ky. 485, 257 S.W . 28, 29 (1923) ("While trial courts have
the power to reopen a case after submission and before verdict, for the purpose
of receiving further evidence, the matter is one that addresses itself to their
sound discretion . . . .") ; Burk v. Commonwealth, 28 Ky. (5 J .J.Marsh) 675
(183 1) (allowing reexamination of a witness after the jury began deliberations) .
Some cases under Section 249 of the old Criminal Code of Practice,' the
predecessor to RCr 9.74 appear superficially to counsel against this
understanding. For example, in Houston v. Commonwealth, 270 Ky. 125, 109
S .W.2d 45 (1937), during deliberations, the jury asked the court what effect a
1 At the time, Section 249 read: "After the jury retires for deliberation, if there
be a disagreement between them as to any part of the evidence, or if they desire to be
informed on a point of law, they must require the officer to conduct them into court.
Upon their being brought into court, the information required must be given in the
presence of, or after notice to, the counsel of the parties."
13
conviction would have under the Habitual Criminal Act o the defendant
obtaining a pardon . The judge told them the conviction would not affect
obtaining a pardon . The Court, in reversing, held that this was a question on a
point of law not involved in the case, and indicated that the judge should have
said only that he was required to give the jury the law of the case, that he had
done so, and that that w, s all he was allowed to tell them . Taking this as a
model, this has become the standard approach trial courts make to most jury
questions . But Houston was premised on giving the jury evidence or legal
instruction to which it was not entitled, not on finding the trial court's
responding to the jury's question to be per se improper . The case does not
mean that under certain circumstances, it may not be proper to introduce new
evidence after jury deliberations have begun.
Certainly, those instances should be rare and very carefully thought out.
As the Sixth Circuit pointed out in Henry, "After the jury has reported its
inability to agree upon a verdict, it is, in our opinion, incumbent upon the trial
judge to exercise extreme care in reopening the case for the introduction of
further testimony or in permitting any evidence to be restated or re-read to the
jurors . Unless restraint is exercised by the judge, it may well be that he would
permit undue emphasis to be placed upon portions of the testimony, if such
for
portions were called
by the jury." 204 F. 2d at 821 . This caution applies
even more when the jury is not in disagreement over the testimony in the
record but is looking for additional evidence.
In this case, the judge's answer to the jury question did apply to facts
and a point of law that is relevant to the case . The purpose of truth in
14
sentencing is to allow jurors to consider a criminal defendant's history in
assessing his likelihood of re-offending and what the appropriate level of
punishment for the current offense K It is certainly relevant to this
determination that Appellant had previously committed a sexual offense
against a minor. While it would be inappropriate to introduce evidence of
character to prove propensity in the guilt phase of the trial, character and
propensity are at the heart of sentencing.
It may be arguable that there was no necessity to give the jury this
additional evidence during deliberations; on the other hand, it may be arguable
that injustice would occur if the trial court did not do so. That determination
is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and this Court cannot say that
there was an abuse of that discretion .
The remaining question then is whether giving the additional information
unduly emphasized that portion of the testimony" the primary concern in
HenKy. Undoubtedly, the evidence was given weight by being delivered by the
trial court; Appellant had no opportunity to introduce corrective evidence or to
challenge the evidence before the jury; Appellant was given no opportunity to
argue to the jury about this evidence; and the Commonwealth had concerns
about the judge telling the jury the age of the child in the prior offense.
However, given that the Commonwealth could have presented this same
evidence to the jury had it chosen to do so during its case-in-chief (and would
be able to present it at retrial were the sentence reversed by this Court), the
deciding factor must be whether the mere presentation of this evidence by the
judge is sufficient to create a fundamentally unfair trial by placing undue
15
emphasis on the evidence. This Court does not believe that it does, and thus
finds no error.
Ill. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the McCracken Circuit Court
is affirmed.
All sitting. All concur. Abramson, J., also concurs by separate opinion .
Cunningham, J ., concurs because the information given to the jury was only
the uncontroverted definition of an offense already introduced, not new "proof,"
and was therefore not error -- harmless or otherwise.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Emily Holt Rhorer
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane
Suite 302
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Jack Conway
Attorney General
Julie Renae Scott
Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601-8204
RENDERED : DECEMBER 18, 2008
TO BE PUBLISHED
,;vupremt (~vurf of ~6ufurh~
2007-SC-000006-MR
STANLEY STOKES
V.
APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM MCCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE CRAIG Z. CLYMER, JUDGE
NO. 05-CR-00496
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
CONCURRING OPINION BY JUSTICE ABRAMSON
I concur because I cannot fault the majority's analysis of the issue raised
by the trial judge's provision of information to the jury after they had retired for
deliberations in the penalty phase. However, I am compelled to state even
more emphatically that the trial judge is not, and should not be viewed, as a
safety net for counsel, standing ready to supply what they have inadvertently
omitted. Information conveyed by a trial judge typically is accorded heightened
respect by jurors and the potential for undue emphasis is great. Only in the
rarest of instances will this practice, in my view, pass muster.
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.