ROGER L. WHEELER V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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ROGER L. WHEELER
V.
APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LISABETH HUGHES ABRAMSON, JUDGE
NO. 97-CR-002621
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
Appellant, Roger L . Wheeler, was convicted of two murders and was
sentenced to death in 2000. This appeal stems from an RCr 11 .42 postconviction collateral attack on his sentence in which he alleges that he received
ineffective assistance of counsel during his murder trial and that some
improper evidence was introduced during the penalty phase. The circuit court
denied the motion and upheld Appellant's sentence. This Court affirms .
I. Background
At trial, evidence was introduced that the bodies of the two victims were
found in their apartment by a man named Shannon Calloway on October 2,
1997 . Police were called to the crime scene. The male victim had been stabbed
nine times, two of which were fatal. According to the testimony of the medical
examiner, blood spatters on the floor, walls, furniture, and appliances
indicated that the victim and his killer had struggled with each other, moving
from the kitchen to the hallway of the apartment. The female victim had been
strangled to death, but the killer had also stabbed her neck with a pair of
scissors, which were left in place, and left her body covered by a blanket.
Calloway and a group of people approached Appellant the next morning.
Appellant testified that Calloway asked him to remove his shirt . The group saw
a fresh wound on Appellant's arm and chased him into his mother-in-law's
house . The police then came and took Appellant into custody.
Wheeler denied killing the victims, but his account of the night of the
murders changed several times as new evidence was found . He originally
denied having set foot in the victims' apartment at all on the night of the
murders, but later admitted having been there . However, he then claimed that
the male victim had already been stabbed and that he did not see the female
victim . He also claimed that the real killer-a man wearing a mask and
fatigues--was still in the apartment and attacked him and that they fought,
resulting in the wounds to Appellant. Despite claiming that he came upon the
crime scene, Appellant never called the police to report the murders or the
alleged attack against him.
Evidence against Appellant at trial also included the presence of his
blood in the apartment on the female victim's thigh, a sheet, a newspaper and
in the Appellant's car (as shown by DNA evidence) ; testimony from a clerk at a
local market who saw Appellant the night of the murders and stated that she
saw blood on his head and neck; and cuts on Appellant's hands and arms
consistent with knife wounds .
The jury found Appellant guilty of two counts of intentional murder. In
the penalty phase, the jury found an aggravator of multiple murders and
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recommended a sentence of death, which the trial court then imposed.
Appellant's conviction and sentence were affirmed by this Court on direct
appeal in Wheeler v. Commonwealth, 121 S . W.3d 173 (Ky. 2003) .
Appellant filed his RCr 11 .42 motion with the Jefferson Circuit Court in
February 2005 . In it, he alleged. that he received ineffective assistance of
counsel during the guilt phase and penalty phase of his trial. The circuit court
declined to hold an evidentiary hearing and on October 25, 2006 denied
Appellant's RCr 11 .42 motion.
Appellant appeals to this Court as a matter of right. Ky . Const. ยง
110(2)(b) . He now claims that the circuit court erred in not conducting an
evidentiary hearing and in its conclusions about ineffective assistance of
counsel.
II. Analysis
A. Legal Standards
Most of Appellant's arguments in his brief include a claim both that he
was at least entitled to an evidentiary hearing at the circuit court to resolve the
factual allegations in his RCr 11 .42 motion and that his trial counsel was
ineffective, as demonstrated by his factual allegations. Though these legal
issues are present throughout Appellant's claims, only a single recitation of the
applicable legal standards is necessary.
1. Evidentiary Hearing
Most parts of Appellant's argument allege that the circuit court
improperly refused to hold an evidentiary hearing to resolve the factual
disputes raised by his RCr 11 .42 motion . However, "[e]ven in a capital case, an
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RCr 11 .42 movant is not automatically entitled to an evidentiary hearing."
Stanford v. Commonwealth, 854 S .W.2d 742, 743 (Ky. 1993) . Whether an RCr
11 .42 movant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing is determined under a twopart test. First, the movant must show that the "alleged error is such that the
movant is entitled to relief under the rule ." Hodge v . Commonwealth , 68
S .W .3d 338, 342 (Ky. 2001) . The court must assume that factual allegations in
the motion are true, then determine whether there "`has been a violation of a
constitutional right, a lack ofjurisdiction, or such a violation of a statute as to
make the judgment void and therefore subject to collateral attack."' Id. (quoting
Lay v. Commonwealth , 506 S .W .2d 507, 508 (Ky. 1 974)) . "If that answer is yes,
then an evidentiary hearing on a defendant's RCr 11 .42 motion on that issue is
only required when the motion raises `an issue of fact that cannot be
determined on the face of the record .' Id. (quoting Stanford v. Commonwealth,
854 S.W.2d 742, 743-44 (Ky. 1993)) . To do this, the court must "examin[e]
whether the record refuted the allegations raised," and not "whether the record
supported the allegations, which is the incorrect test." Id .
2. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
The core of most of Appellant's allegations is that his trial lawyers were
ineffective. As noted above, for an evidentiary hearing to be required, the RCr
11 .42 motion must show entitlement to relief (for example, a constitutional
violation) and raise an issue of fact that is not refuted by the record . Ineffective
assistance of counsel is such a claim of a constitutional violation . McMann v .
Richardson , 397 U.S. 759, 771 n .14 (1970) ("It has long been recognized that
the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.") .
4
Ineffective assistance of counsel is evaluated under the standard
established in Strickland v. Washington ,
466 U .S.
668, 687 (1984), adopted by
this Court in Gall v. Commonwealth, 702 S .W .2d 37 (1985) . Strickland first
requires that Appellant "must show that counsel's performance was deficient."
468 U.S . at 687 . This is done by "showing that counsel made errors so serious
that counsel was not functioning as the `counsel' guaranteed the defendant by
the Sixth Amendment," id . , or "that counsel's representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness ." Id . at 688, 104 S .Ct. at 2064 . In
applying the Strickland test, the Court noted, "Judicial scrutiny of counsel's
performance must be highly deferential. . . . [A] court must indulge a strong
presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance ; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption
that, under the circumstances, the challenged action "might be considered
sound trial strategy." Id. at 689 . Appellant is not guaranteed errorless counsel
or counsel that can be judged ineffective only by hindsight, but rather counsel
rendering reasonably effective assistance at the time of trial . Id. , see also
Hai ht v. Commonwealth , 41 S.W .3d 436,
442 (Ky. 2001) .
Next, Appellant "must show that the deficient performance prejudiced
the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to
deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable ." Strickland,
466 U .S . at
687 .
Or, as noted later in Strickland , "The defendant must show
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."
5
Id. at 694. A reviewing court must consider the totality of the evidence before
the jury and assess the overall performance of counsel throughout the case to
determine whether the specifically complained-of acts or omissions are
prejudicial and overcome the presumption that counsel rendered reasonable
professional assistance . Id . at 695; see also Foley v. Commonwealth, 17 S.W.3d
878, 884 (Ky. 2000) .
Finally, "[u]nless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said
that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the
adversary process that renders the result unreliable ." Strickland , 466 U .S . at
687 .
B. Blood Evidence
As Appellant noted in his RCr 11 .42 motion, one of the key pieces of
evidence against him was that his blood was found on the female victim's leg.
His own testimony included no explanation for this, since he claimed never to
have seen her that night, though he did admit he was cut and bled elsewhere
in the apartment . He claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
explain how evidence got on the victim's leg.
As an alternate theory, he now claims that the police must have mixed
up the blood samples . He supports this claim by noting that it is the most
logical explanation, assuming of course that he did not commit the crimes, and
by pointing out that all of the many blood samples taken at the crime scene list
the same collection time-12 :37p.m., when the collection team arrived-which
he claims could not have happened (and which he admits his trial counsel
pointed out to the jury) . Because the exact collection time is unknown, it is
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impossible to know if the sample was taken before the body was moved by the
medical examiner (which was recorded in a crime scene video) . Thus, he
argues it is possible that the blood could have been transferred to the thigh
and cross-contaminated the other blood during the moving of the body and
thus any blood sample taken after that time would have incorrectly implied
that he bled on the victim.
The circuit court denied this claim by noting that evidence at trial refuted
it. The court cited to the testimony of the medical examiner that the shape of
the blood spatter on the victim's thigh indicated it was dropped there, as
opposed to a transfer by touch, which would show a different shape . The
medical examiner stated that the "drop" pattern was visible as soon as the
blanket covering her was removed ; photographs taken at that time were also
introduced into evidence. Based on this evidence, the court concluded, "While
the blood samples obviously were not simultaneously collected and the
collection times could have been more precisely stated, there was no credible
factual basis for a cross-contamination theory to explain Wheeler's blood on
the female victim's thigh ."
The circuit court was entirely correct in this regard . The medical
examiner's testimony refuted the theory Appellant now proffers, which is
couched entirely in speculative terms. Had any transfer blood been present on
the victim's thigh, then his argument would make more sense. But his factual
assertions about the timing of the blood collection simply do not change the
fact that only "drop" blood was present on the victim's thigh . At most they laid
the framework for what could be a colorable claim of ineffective assistance if
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other facts had also been alleged; however, without the crucial factual
allegation that the blood on the thigh was the result of a transfer (as opposed
to speculation that it could be), the claim is incomplete . See Stanford v.
Commonwealth, 854 S .W.2d 742, 748 (Ky. 1993) (noting that 11 .42 requires a
specific statement of the facts on which a movant relies in support of a claim) .
Appellant further claims that the circuit court's conclusion that there
was no factual basis for a cross-contamination theory simply belies the fact
that his trial counsel did not sufficiently investigate the issue. This, however,
assumes that there was a reasonable cross-contamination theory to
investigate . Again, that assumption was contradicted by the evidence at trial.
Appellant's argument as presented in his brief and 11 .42 motion is built
in part on a logical fallacy, namely that his trial counsel could and should have
offered an alternative account of the blood on the victim's thigh because the
blood could not have gotten there the way the Commonwealth alleged since he
was innocent of the crime. It assumes the conclusion that Appellant is
innocent (and that an alternative blood theory exists), rather than looking at
the available facts and deriving a conclusion from them. If that were a
sufficient basis for a claim of ineffective assistance, then every claim could be
successful.
A successful 11 .42 movant must allege specific facts that either clearly
demonstrate entitlement to relief or call for an evidentiary hearing because they
raise factual questions that cannot be resolved from the record . Appellant has
done neither here. The standard of Strickland simply has not been met in this
situation. Appellant has not shown that his counsel's failure to offer a theory
8
that was clearly refuted by the evidence at trial was unreasonable, especially
since he currently offers no concrete account of his alternate theory . This also
means that the circuit court was correct in denying an evidentiary hearing on
this issue.
C. Failure to
all Earl Ricketts as a Witness
Appellant also claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
call Earl Ricketts as a witness to contradict the testimony of enise Mumsford,
who claimed Appellant appeared to have had blood "poured" on him the night
of the murder . Mumsford testified that Appellant had come into the grocery
store where she worked and had so much blood on his head and clothes that it
looked like it had been "poured" on him. Ricketts worked in the same grocery
as
a security guard and stated in an interview with the police that he saw
Appellant that night and that he had some blood on him but not a lot. Ricketts
was not called to testify at trial to contradict Mumsford's description of the
amount of blood on Appellant. Instead, Appellant's counsel tried to impeach
Mumsford by showing that she was connected to the victims.
Appellant argues now that Ricketts's statements about a lesser amount
were consistent with his claim that he had been attacked and did not commit
the murders, since that version of events would have resulted in less blood on
him. The circuit court denied this claim by noting that Ricketts's proposed
testimony simply would have buttressed Mumsford's testimony about the
presence of blood on Appellant and that it would not have been subject to the
same impeachment, thus undercutting the impeachment strategy employed by
trial counsel.
This issue is easily resolved by reference to the second factor of
Strickland. Even assuming that Appellant's trial counsel was deficient in not
calling Ricketts (which is not at all certain since it was a product of trial
strategy), the failure was not prejudicial. In light of the strong blood evidence
tying Appellant to the crime scene and specifically to the female victim, this
Court concludes there is no "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different."
Strickland, 466 U.S . at 694. Appellant's claim simply does not "undermine
confidence in the outcome ." Id . With no showing of prejudicial deficiency, no
hearing was necessary.
D. Shoe Evidence
When Appellant was arrested, he was wearing a pair of sneakers . During
trial, he told his counsel that the shoes in question, which had been included
in his personal property at the jail, were the ones he wore the night of the
murder when he went to the victims' apartment. Appellant's trial counsel then
gave notice to the prosecution and attempted to introduce the shoes into
evidence in support of Appellant's theory that someone else committed the
did
murder . The idea was that the shoes
not match bloody- shoe prints found
at the scene of the crime, meaning those prints showed that someone else was
in the apartment . The trial judge excluded the shoes on the grounds of
inadequate notice, which came in the middle of trial, and lack of a chain of
custody. Appellant testified about the shoes by avowal, however. On direct
appeal, this Court held :
[1]f he could show that the shoes he was wearing while he was in
the apartment at the crucial time did not match the shoe prints
found at the crime scene, the shoes would have tended to support
his
theory of the case. But Wheeler did not testify that he was
wearing the shoes while he was in the apartment the right the
victims were slain . Nor did the defense offer any other evidence to
link the shoes to the crime scene . Rather, Wheeler testified on
avowal that he was wearing the shoes when he was arrested the
next day. The mere fact that Wheeler owned a pair of shoes that
may or may not have matched the shoe prints found at the crime
scene did not tend to make the defense theory more probable. They
were not relevant. The trial judge made the right ruling for the
wrong reason .
Wheeler, 121 S .W.3d at 182 (citation omitted) .
Appellant now claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
ask if the shoes were the ones he wore when he went to the apartment and for
failing to retain an expert witness to testify that the shoes could not have made
the shoe prints found at the crime scene . The circuit court found that the
shoes would not have changed the outcome of the trial and that Appellant's
trial counsel was not deficient in failing to get an expert, having learned of the
shoes at such a late time.
Appellant is correct that under this Court's opinion in the direct appeal,
his counsel could easily have gotten the shoes admitted at trial. Appellant
claims that common sense then would have shown his theory to be correct and
that an expert was not even needed, since a layperson could have compared
the shoes to the shoeprints. However, there simply is no reasonable probability
that the result of the proceeding would have been different. In light of the
blood evidence and Appellant's shifting account of the events of the right of the
murder, it is unlikely that any reasonable jury would have swallowed his
theory, especially since it was premised solely on his own claim that the shoes
were the ones he was wearing on the night of the murder. I
The same goes for the lack of a shoe expert . Appellant included with his
11 .42 motion an affidavit from a so-called shoe expert (the owner of a local
shoe store) who looked at photocopies of the bottoms of the shoes and copies of
the shoeprints from the crime scene, and concluded that they were different
shoes. This conclusion was based on his finding that Appellant's shoes
appeared to be size 11 and the shoeprints appeared to be from size 9 112 shoes.
As the circuit court noted, however, upon reviewing the actual shoes, which
were size 101/2, it was clear that at least one of the "expert's" claims was simply
incorrect. Thus, it is unlikely that the expert-backed theory would have been
any more successful than the lay-person one described above.
This Court also concludes that Appellant's counsel's failure to obtain an
expert while in the middle of trying this case simply was not ineffective
assistance . Appellant did not notify his attorney about the shoe until the
middle of trial. Appellant alone knew about the shoes and he failed to tell his
attorneys about them at a reasonable time . Competent counsel is not required
to read a client's mind or to radically alter her presentation of the case midtrial when the Appellant brings up extremely weak evidence out of the blue.
Appellant attempts to sidestep this fact by noting that his "feet were always
with him," implying that his attorneys should have known from the beginning
1 Appellant notes in his brief that the shoe evidence would have been buttressed
by evidence that the DNA of two people other than Appellant and the male victim were
found under the female victim's nails . This fact, however, was not discussed in the
RCr 11 .42 motion. Nor, however, would it have been sufficient to create prejudice in
light of the presence of Appellant's blood on the victim's thigh .
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that his feet could not have left the shoe prints at the scene of the crime . The
problem with this is that the RCr 11 .42 motion includes no factual allegations
about the size of Appellant's feet. While this may seem a small point, an RCr
11 .42 movant is required to state specifically the facts in support of his claims
in order to be successful. Additionally, as Appellant's 11 .42 motion admitted
in the argument immediately preceding the one about the expert, "No expert
testimony would be required for the jurors to compare the shoes with the shoe
prints at the scene. A layperson could determine this fact." This is
tantamount to a concession that lack of an expert was not ineffective
assistance .
E. Testimony of Kathy Wheeler
Appellant also claims that his trial counsel was deficient for failing to call
his cousin Kathy Wheeler as a witness . When Appellant testified at trial, the
Commonwealth implied that his current version of events was a recent
fabrication, since he had changed his story multiple times . In his RCr 11 .42
motion, Appellant claims that his cousin could have rehabilitated him by
testifying that his testimony was consistent with what he told her the night of
the murders, specifically that he saw her the night of the murders and told her
that he had "run into a nightmare of a situation ." This, however, is the extent
of what Appellant claims he told his cousin, and thus would have been the
extent of any rehabilitative testimony she could have given.
The circuit court held that such testimony would have been inadmissible
because KRE 801A(a)(2) does not apply to self-serving statements by criminal
defendants . It is not clear that this view is correct, since the Rule applies to
13
"witnesses," a category that a testifying defendant clearly falls under. However,
that legal issue need not be resolved now given the limited extent of the
testimony that Appellant claims his cousin could have given . The only specific
factual claim Appellant's RCr 11 .42 motion makes about what she could have
testified to is that he told her he came upon "a nightmare situation." The
statement is vague and not clearly rehabilitative . Appellant's broader claim
that his cousin's testimony would have been rehabilitative, without further
explanation, is not specific enough to support his claim . Appellant claims in
his brief that this was enough at least to get an evidentiary hearing, but for an
RCr 11 .42 motion to require such a hearing, it must specifically state sufficient
facts that support the legal claim. Stanford v. Commonwealth, 854 S .W .2d 742,
748 (Ky. 1993) . The single statement that Appellant came upon a nightmare
situation alone, especially when weighed against the multiple different stories
he told to police, is simply not enough . It does not create a reasonable
probability that the result of the trial would have been different . There simply
was no prejudice from trial counsel's failure to call Wheeler as a witness.
F. Shannon Calloway's Death
Shannon Calloway discovered the victims' bodies and was one of the
people who confronted Appellant just before his arrest. Appellant claimed at
trial that Calloway was actually the killer, making him an alleged alternative
perpetrator or "aaltperp." However, at the time of trial, Calloway was dead, and
neither Appellant's counsel nor the Commonwealth introduced evidence of this
fact at trial, and Calloway, obviously, did not testify. Yet, during closing
arguments, in response to the aaltperp theory, the Commonwealth stated, "It's
14
kind of difficult in the middle of trial to stand up and run out and find people
that the defense wants to get up and start pointing fingers at." Defense
counsel objected on the grounds that Calloway was dead, and the court told
the prosecutor not to dwell on it. During deliberations, the jury submitted a
question asking, "So much talk about Shannon Calloway & Adrian Alston .
Why have they not appeared as witnesses?"
Appellant now claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
introduce evidence that Calloway was dead . While it is clear that the jury was
curious about Calloway and knowledge of his death would have explained his
failure to testify, there is no reason to think that such evidence would have had
a chance, much less a reasonable probability, of changing the outcome at trial .
The problem is that no evidence other than Appellant's own finger-pointing tied
Calloway to the murders . Defense counsel's failure to show that Calloway was
dead did not prejudice Appellant.
G. Latex Gloves
Appellant claimed that the man he allegedly encountered in the victims'
apartment was wearing latex gloves. A small piece of latex was found in the
female victim's mouth. That piece of latex was never tested. Appellant now
claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for not having the latex tested for
DNA or to determine the type of latex for comparison purposes . He also claims
that his counsel should have retained an expert to investigate the piece of
latex.
Admittedly, "'[a]n attorney has a duty to conduct a reasonable
investigation, including an investigation of the defendant's background, for
15
possible mitigating evidence .' Hodge v. Commonwealth, 68 S .W.3d 338, 344
(Ky. 2001) (quoting Porter v. Sin leg_
14 RM 554, 557 (11th Cir . 1994)) .
However, "[a] reasonable investigation is not an investigation that the best
criminal defense lawyer in the world, blessed not only with unlimited time and
resources, but also with the benefit of hindsight, would conduct. The
investigation must be reasonable under all the circumstances ." Haight y,.
Commonwealth, 41 S .W.3d 436, 446 (Ky. 2001.) (citations omitted) . However,
in making such a claim, Appellant "must establish how he was prejudiced by
the alleged failure of counsel. In claiming that the defense was deficient, the
accused must establish that the performance by the attorney was objectively
unreasonable and how the alleged error prejudiced his defense." Hodge .
Commonwealth, 116 S.W .3d 463, 470-71 (Ky. 2003) .
Appellant fails to demonstrate how tests on the glove or an expert would
have helped him . Instead, he simply says that test could have revealed
exculpatory evidence to corroborate his story, either by showing that the latex
came from a glove or by showing DNA from a different person. As this Court
has noted, however, "[a] claim that certain facts might be true, in essence an
admission that Appellant does not know whether the claim is true, cannot be
the basis for RCr 11 .42 relief." Mills v. Commonwealth, 170 S .W.3d 310,
328 (Ky. 2005) . Such a claim is purely speculative and is insufficient to
warrant RCr 11 .42 relief. Id . at 325 .
H. Furlough Testimony
During the penalty phase, Appellant's counsel presented testimony
concerning Appellant's good behavior during a previous period of incarceration,
16
including the fact that he had been allowed on two furloughs . Counsel later
produced testimony from a former Probation and Parole employee that
furloughs were no longer available for murder convictions under 501 KAR
6:020 in an attempt to show that Appellant could not pose a danger outside the
prison in the future. On cross-examination, the witness testified that persons
convicted of murder had been granted furloughs in the pas, that the furlough
policy had since been changed, and that the policy could change in the future .
Appellant raises ea number of claims related to this testimony.
1. Direct Errors
Appellant argues that the furlough testimony constituted direct error in
two ways: (1) that it presented false information to the jury to consider during
sentencing ; and (2) that the testimony violated Kentucky law because it is not
listed in KRS 532 .025 and 532 .055 as evidence that may be introduced during
a capital sentencing phase.
These claims, however, are not appropriate ones for an RCr 11 .42
proceeding. If Appellant wanted to challenge the evidence presented at trial, he
should have done so in his direct appeal, not by means of an RCr 11 .42
motion . "It is not the purpose of RCr 11 .42 to permit a convicted defendant to
retry issues which could and should have been raised in the original
proceeding . . . ." Thacker v. Commonwealth, 476 S .W.2d 838, 839 (Ky. 1972) ;
see also Mills v . Commonwealth, 170 S .W.3d 310, 326 (Ky. 2005) ("[A]n RCr
11 .42 motion is limited to issues that were not and could no be raised on
direct appeal." (emphasis added)) .
Appellant argues that this Court should nevertheless consider his claims
under the palpable error rule, RCr 10 .26. The issues that Appellant raises,
however, are trial errors, and as such the palpable error rule would only be
applicable to the issues now raised if they were presented or discovered in the
course of a direct appeal. The palpable rule is not a vehicle for circumventing
the standard appellate process in order to bring stale claims in a collateral
attack such as this one. Such issues will only be addressed in the course of an
RCr 11 .42 motion when and to the extent necessary to resolve proper collateral
attack claims .
2. Effectiveness of Appellate Counsel
Presumably anticipating the Court's dismissal of the substantive issues
he raises, Appellant also claims that appellate counsel on his direct appeal was
ineffective for having failed to raise these furlough issues . Appellant
acknowledges that this Court has declared that "ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel is not a cognizable issue in this jurisdiction," Lewis v.
Commonwealth, 42 S.W.3d 605, 614 (Ky. 2001), but also correctly notes that
federal courts have recognized a right to effective counsel on the initial appeal
that is implicated by appellate counsel's failure to submit a brief on the merits .
See Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259 (2000); Evitts v . Lucy, 469 U.S . 387 (1985) .
Unlike in Smith and Evitts, a brief on the merits was filed in this case .
The more than two dozen issues raised therein were resolved by this Court in
the direct appeal. We have previously rejected such ineffective assistance of
counsel claims, distinguishing those situations in which a merits brief is filed
from those in which no brief is filed . See Hicks v. Commonwealth, 825 S.W.2d
18
280, 281 (Ky. 1992) ("We think there is a substantial difference in the situation
of a convicted defendant for whom no appeal was even taken or one whose
appeal was dismissed solely due to neglect of counsel and the situation of a
defendant whose appeal was completely processed and the judgment affirmed.
In the first case, there was never any consideration of the merits of any
substantive issue by the appellate court. In the latter case, the appellate court
has considered and decided the merits of the appeal . We will not examine anew
an appeal reviewed, considered and decided by this Court.") ; Harper v.
Commonwealth, 978 S.W.2d 311, 318 (Ky. 1998) (applying Hicks). That
Appellant's current counsel, with the benefit of hindsight, now perceives
different or additional issues that could have been raised does not mean the
assistance of counsel that Appellant received on his direct appeal was
ineffective .
3. Effectiveness of Trial Counsel in Raising Furlough
Appellant claims this trial counsel was ineffective for raising the furlough
issue at all. He claims that there was no reason to bring the issue up at trial.
Obviously the furlough evidence was part of trial counsel's strategy: part of an
attempt to demonstrate that Appellant had been such a model prisoner during
his previous incarceration that he received two furloughs, followed by an
attempt to demonstrate no possibility of future dangerousness . That the
Commonwealth was able to undercut this strategy to some extent does not
make his counsel's performance deficient . It was still a purely strategic choice.
Appellant's own RCr 11 .42 motion even says, "It was a good plan in theory ." As
this Court has previously noted, "It is not the function of this Court to usurp or
19
second guess counsel's trial strategy."
624 (Ky. 2000) ; see
Baze v. Commonwealth, 23 .W.3d 619,
also Hodge v. Commonwealth, 116 S .W.3d 463, 473 (Ky .
2003) ("Trial strategy will not be second guessed in an RCr 11 .42 proceeding.") .
Hindsight as to the effectiveness of a given strategy alone cannot render a
strategy unreasonable after the fact. The strategy employed by Appellant's trial
counsel was not unreasonable or incompetent, and is not grounds for relief.
4. Failure to Object to Cross-Examination of Probation and Parole
Employee
Appellant also claims his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object
to the Commonwealth's cross-examination about the possibility of a future
change in furlough policy. This, of course, assumes that the testimony was in
error and that such an objection would or should have been successful, which
requires to some extent that Appellant's direct claim of error regarding this
testimony be addressed .
First, Appellant claims the testimony presented false information to the
jury. As a basis for this claim, Appellant states that the testimony was false
because furlough would never been available to him given that his crime was
murder . Appellant then argues rather creatively that the Commonwealth's
implication that he might receive a future furlough amounted to jury
nullification since it implied that any sentence of life without parole might be
undercut by Corrections . He also argues that any such decision granting him
furlough would violate separation of powers because only the General Assembly
may classify crimes and set penalties. These arguments, however, ignore the
fact that KRS 439.600 grants to Corrections the discretionary power to grant
20
furloughs, without limiting them to non-murder convicts . The limitations on
furloughs are adopted by Corrections via administrative regulations, currently
found at 501 KAR 6:020, and would not constitute a separation-of-powers
violation. Thus, insofar as the testimony implied that the furlough policy could
change in the future, it was not incorrect.
The contention that the testimony violated Kentucky law because it is
not listed in KRS 532 .025 and 532 .055 as evidence that may be introduced
during a capital sentencing phase is also incorrect. Appellant's counsel
introduced the furlough testimony in mitigation . Any reasonable mitigation
evidence is allowed under KRS 532 .025, which includes a non-exclusive list of
possible mitigating factors. In turn, the prosecutor is allowed to challenge a
defendant's mitigation evidence . Woodall v. Commonwealth, 63 S .W.3d 104,
125 (Ky. 2001) . The cross-examination of the Probation and Parole employee
thus was not improper .
Given that the cross-examination was not erroneous, Appellant's counsel
was not ineffective for failing to object to it.
I. Failure to Object to Religious Questions and Peremptory Challenges
Appellant also claims his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to
the Commonwealth's voir dire questions about juror's religious views and use
of that information in exercising peremptory challenges . The religion questions
were approved by this Court on Appellant's direct appeal, see Wheeler, 121
S .W.3d at 179, and thus cannot serve as the basis of an ineffective assistance
of counsel claim.
To the extent that Appellant is raising a new issue, namely that counsel
should have objected to the use of the information in the prosecution's
peremptory challenges as Ea violation of Batson v, Kentucky , 476 U .S. 79
(1986), and its progeny, it is clear that Appellant's allegations fall short of both
showing deficient performance and prejudice. Appellant has not made specific
enough factual allegations, consisting as they do in this instance only of the
claim the numerous jurors were dismissed for their religious beliefs. Yet, as
the circuit court noted, those jurors were actually dismissed because of their
discomfort with the death penalty. That their discomfort was born out of their
religious beliefs does not make the strikes discriminatory as they were based
on the jurors' stated views about the death penalty and their ability to consider
it as a possible penalty. Absent discrimination, intentional or otherwise, the
strikes could not rise to the level of a violation of Batson . 2 With no error, it was
also not ineffective assistance to fail to raise such a challenge.
J. Cumulative Error
Finally, Appellant claims that the cumulative effect of the errors alleged
in his RCr 11 .42 motion merit setting aside his convictions and sentences .
There was no cumulative error in this case sufficient to require setting aside
Appellant's sentence.
2 It is also not even clear that Batson applies to challenges based on religion .
See Davis v. Minnesota, 511 U.S . 1115 (1994). Though the Court denied certiorari in
that case, Justice Ginsburg filed an opinion concurring in the denial and noting that
religious affiliation is not as readily evident as race or gender and inquiry into a juror's
religious beliefs is often limited and can be prejudicial. Justice Thomas, joined by
Justice Scalia, filed a dissenting opinion arguing that Batson should be extended to
religious affiliation.
22
Ill . Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Jefferson Circuit Court's Order denying
Appellant's RCr 11 .42 motion is affirmed.
Minton, C .J . ; Cunningham, Noble, Schroder, Scott and Venters, JJ .,
concur. Abramson, J., not sitting.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
David Hare Harshaw, III
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
207 Parker Drive, Suite 1
LaGrange, Kentucky 40031
Meggan E. Smith
Department of Public Advocacy
207 Parker Drive, Suite 1
LaGrange, Kentucky 40031
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Jack Conway
Attorney General
David Wayne Barr
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Attorney General
Office of Criminal Appeals
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601-8204
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