ROY E. WHITE V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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2006-SC-000598-MR
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ROY E . WHITE
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PAMELA R . GOODWINE, JUDGE
NO. 06-CR-00073
V.
APPELLEE
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
This is a matter of right appeal from a judgment in which appellant was
convicted of, among other offenses, First-Degree Trafficking in a Controlled Substance
and for being a Persistent Felony Offender (PFO I). Appellant's sole argument is that
the convictions on Trafficking and the PFO I should be reversed because the trial court
exceeded the limits of RCr 9.57 and RCr 9.74 in its interactions and communications
with the jury after it announced that it was deadlocked . Appellant failed to preserve the
alleged errors relating to these interactions and communications, and we adjudge that
none of alleged errors rise to the level of palpable error. Hence, we affirm.
_
On November 30, 2005, Appellant, Roy White, was arrested as a result of
a traffic stop in which a police canine alerted to the driver's side of the car, yielding a
bag of drug paraphernalia - a set of digital scales with what appeared to be cocaine
residue and a box of plastic sandwich baggies. After being transported to the Fayette
County Detention Center, White attempted to discard 7.4 grams of crack cocaine into a
trash bin in the booking area . A large amount of cash ($1,709) and a cell phone were
also found on White's person.
White was thereafter indicted for Trafficking In a Controlled Substance in
the First Degree, Promoting Contraband in the First Degree, Possession of Drug
Paraphernalia, Failure to or Improper Signal, and PFO I . A jury trial was held on June
20 and 21, 2006 . After four and a half hours of deliberations, a RCr 9 .57(1) charge and
certain communications with the court, which we will recount and discuss below, White
was found guilty of Trafficking In a Controlled Substance in the First Degree,
Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, Failure to or Improper Signal, and PFO I. The jury
recommended a sentence of ten (10) years on the Trafficking conviction, enhanced to
twenty (20) years for the PFO I, twelve (12) months and days served in lieu of a $500
fine on the Possession of Drug Paraphernalia conviction, and days served in lieu of a
$200 fine on the Failure to Signal conviction . The trial court sentenced White in keeping
with the jury's recommendation for a total of twenty (20) years . This appeal by White
followed .
The jury began its deliberations in this case at around 7 :30 p.m. After
about three hours, the
jury sent a note out to the trial court that read,
"Decision reached
on 3 charges. One charge hung - what do we do?" The following is a transcript of what
then occurred :
Judge : Okay, I've got to find my Allen charge . Come up.
[The two attorneys for the Commonwealth and defense
counsel approach the bench.] The note was, [shows the
note to the attorneys] but they don't say what three; they just
say three. And the standard Allen charge that I use is the
five-step thing that, you know, in order to return a verdict you
shall [inaudible], yada yada yada. And then sometimes they
want me to ask them where they are without revealing who it
is, just talk to the foreperson and say, you know I ask them
what kind of, whether they're five to six, five to seven or one
to eleven, and whether additional deliberations would result
in any . . .
Defense counsel: That's the question I like .
Commonwealth # 1 : That's fine .
Defense counsel : Yeah, I mean . .
Commonwealth # 1 : Right now?
Defense counsel: Pretty much always . Because I think it gets to the
point, you know, why send them back after an Allen charge if they already
know there's no way.
Commonwealth #1 : Yeah absolutely.
Defense counsel : And I can tell you, they've been arguing in there.
Judge: You know, so, if they say "if you send us back there, we're going
to kill each other" . . .
Commonwealth #1 : That's fine.
Commonwealth #2: What happens [inaudible]?
Judge: They stay out, yeah .
Commonwealth #1 : Then, I guess they have to decide whether or not to .
Defense counsel : Who knows what it is.
Commonwealth #1 : Yeah, I don't know which one it is.
Defense counsel: Maybe they found him guilty on the signal .
Judge : On the what?
Defense counsel : On the signal .
Commonwealth #2: I think that's a "gimme ."
Judge : You never know. They may be like, we'll give you this one if you
give us that one .
Commonwealth #1 : We're just like, my gosh people, it's not a Murder
case .
Judge : It could be the contraband .
Commonwealth #1 : Yeah.
Defense counsel : Yeah, it could be .
Commonwealth #1 : It could be, yeah `cause that just . . .
Judge: They could have found him on the other one . It could be the
contraband charge. But I'll give them this charge, and then I'll say, "Mr.
Foreperson, what count are you hung on?" And then, "would any further
deliberations help? Can you tell me just generally, is it five to seven, six to
six, or . . .
Commonwealth #1 : That's fine .
Defense counsel : Yeah well, can you, do you ask the foreman that at the
bench, or do you ask all the jurors, because sometimes I feel that puts
pressure on if there's a lone holdout or something like that.
Commonwealth #2: Sure.
Commonwealth #1 : That makes sense .
Judge : Do you want me to ask the foreperson at the bench?
Defense counsel : If you do, I would ask that you do it at the bench as
opposed to in front of all . . .
Judge: First, I'll ask if he believes additional deliberations would help the
stalemate . And if he says "no," then I'll ask him to approach and say,
"Why do you feel that way? What's the number division?" And then, they
didn't respond to my note about whether they wanted to come back
tomorrow, so maybe they just. . .
Commonwealth #2: They're here for the long haul .
Judge: Maybe they just feel like there's no point.
Commonwealth #1 : Yeah, there could be, very well .
Judge: Okay, so I'll bring them back. Would you tell the jury I need to
bring them out?
[The jury is then brought out .]
Judge : Attorneys waive the call of the jury?
Commonwealth #1 and #2/Defense counsel : Yes, your honor .
Judge: You may be seated. Who's my foreperson?
Foreperson : Me.
Judge : Sir, I have received a note that said the jury had reached a
decision on three of the charges . One charge was hung, and you asked,
"What do we do?" By law, I am required to instruct you all as follows: In
order to return a verdict, each juror must agree thereto . Jurors have a
duty to consult with one another and to deliberate with a view toward
reaching an agreement if it can be done without violence to individual
judgment. Each juror must decide the case in their own mind, but only
after an impartial consideration of the evidence with the other jurors. In
the course of deliberations, a juror should not hesitate to reexamine their
own views and change an opinion if the juror is convinced it is erroneous.
And, no juror should surrender their honest conviction as to the weight of
effect on the evidence solely because of the opinion of the other jurors, or
for the mere purpose of returning a verdict . The three charges upon which
you've reached a verdict will stand . My question to you, sir, is do you
believe that further deliberations on this count on which you have not
reached a verdict would be fruitful?
Foreperson : At present, no. But, there's a question I want to ask, but if I
ask the question, then I may put a different light on it. That's why I don't
want to ask it openly .
Judge: Okay, you may approach the bench, with counsel .
Foreperson : Okay, alright.
[Foreperson approaches the bench with the three attorneys .]
Judge : Can you tell us what charge you're hung on?
Foreperson : As far as Trafficking . We can't agree . .
Judge: Count one.
Foreperson : We can't agree on that, and the reason being that we can't
on it is because no one has proven to us or showed us where he is
trafficking at, even though we understand about the scales and everything
else . My question is this, and I see, I don't want to throw a different light
on this by asking this question . I don't want to cause any problems by
asking. You told us not to consider the sentencing, okay, and we're trying
not to do that. My question to you all is this, who would be the people that
would enact the sentence?
Judge : Well, let me ask you this . You said that you all were hung on the
Trafficking?
Foreperson : Yes.
Judge: On count one . There's another alternative to count one.
Foreperson : Okay, but that's what we are coming into a problem about,
with the B and the C. I've got nine people that want to go with the
Trafficking, and there's three people that don't want to go with it. And the
reason why. . .
Judge: The three that don't want to go with the Trafficking don't want to
find Possession either?
Foreperson : They understand about the Possession . I'm just saying that,
we accept that. We accept that, okay.
Judge : Okay. Okay.
Foreperson : It just wasn't proven to us beyond a reasonable doubt about
the Trafficking, okay. And I guess the thing that's got us hung up and
really bogged down is that we're looking at amounts, okay, as far as
Trafficking .
Judge : In terms of the. . .
Foreperson: Of how much, you see. And that's, I think, where the sticking
point is . So, what may be able to be done with this is this: if we're going
to sentence this guy, then maybe we can come to a consensus on that
Trafficking issue, you see. You see, like I say I don't want to put a
different light on it . . .
Judge : You can't convict him based on sentencing . You have to base
your decision on guilt or innocence based on the evidence .
Foreperson : Right. That's what's in there.
Judge: If you, If you're indicating to the court that you all do not believe
that they've proven their case beyond a reasonable doubt, then you're
indicating to the, and it's nine to three, based on what you're saying, and
that's nine to convict and three not to convict . . .
Commonwealth #1 : For Trafficking.
Judge: For Trafficking.
Foreperson: For Trafficking, and Trafficking only. That's where we're
hung up at .
Judge: And my question to you is do you believe that further deliberations
would convince the other three of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt?
Foreperson : I've got two "maybes" and one I know ain't. And I'm telling
you what's real. This guy ain't [inaudible] . . . I have one that won't. Two
will be . . . we presented enough arguments where they have doubt now,
amongst ourself .
Commonwealth # 1 [addressing the Foeperson] : So, if there isn't a
consensus for Trafficking, do you feel that the group can come to a
consensus be it on Possession or on not guilty on that charge, or is it all
just . .
Foreperson : There's not going to be a "not guilty ." That's not going to
happen . That's not going to happen .
Defense counsel : So, it sounds like that's resolved .
Foreperson : Okay.
Judge : Can there be a consensus on Possession?
Foreperson : That's . . . I don't know . I just don't know .
Defense counsel: Just that there's . . .[Inaudible] not going to be not
guilty .
Foreperson : No, because we can't say it's not guilty because it's been
proven enough to us.
Defense Counsel : Everybody agrees?
Foreperson: To where he is guilty of some of it, that he is guilty; but the
part that is . . . I come back to my first premise, that is Trafficking . That's
what we hung about.
Defense counsel [addressing the foreperson] : May I ask, is there
agreement on the lesser-included, which is the Possession?
Foreperson : I got a headache .
Defense counsel : It may just be no. The answer may just be no .
Foreperson : Say it again .
Defense counsel : Is there a consensus on Possession?
Foreperson : I believe so, `cause like I say, the only one we have is the
Trafficking . Everything else we've come to an agreement on .
Judge : So everybody agrees that he possessed it. There's just not a
consensus whether he did it with intent?
Foreperson : Right, with the Trafficking .
Judge: To traffic?
Foreperson : Right.
Commonwealth #1 : I was going to say Judge, it seems like there could be
some consensus reached on the charge . The Commonwealth requests . .
.sorry . . . that they go back and try if it seems that there can be
consensus on one of the options .
Judge: One of the options .
Defense counsel : If they can't all agree on Trafficking, but they all can
agree on Possession, then that matter is resolved .
Judge: And maybe he needs to explain that to them . But I didn't get an
answer back from my question to you all .
Foreperson : They don't want to go out of here all night.
Judge : They what?
Foreperson: They want to come back tomorrow, one or the other. They
want to try to get out of here . But maybe after this I may have to send you
another note .
Judge: That's fine. We're here until you tell us that you can't stand, that
you can't stand it anymore . So, based on what you've told us, then go
back and, I'm going to send you all back as a group, and you deliberate
until you need to send me another note .
Foreperson: Okay.
Judge: And then we'll act on that note .
Foreperson : Okay, okay, alright.
Judge : And, just for the record, you know I've never taken an Allen
charge that far, but I didn't know what else to do, and I mean, I think he
was pretty candid.
Defense counsel : I think he was, and we're all working to reach a
resolution .
Commonwealth #1 : It seems like they can reach a resolution, but maybe
they just didn't understand their options .
Judge : Okay, okay, let me send them back . Okay, ladies
and gentlemen of the jury, after that brief discussion with
your foreperson, I'm going to send you all back to the jury
room and he and you all can discuss this further. And I
instructed him that I'll wait to hear, if he needs to write
another note or if you need to inquire further then feel free to
do that, but hopefully that information has been helpful.
Okay. We'll continue in recess.
After one and a half hours of further deliberations, the jury came back with
a verdict finding White guilty of First-Degree Trafficking in a Controlled Substance,
rejecting the lesser-included offense of First-Degree Possession of a Controlled
Substance . White contends that the trial court's interactions and communications with
the jury and its foreperson during its deliberations, as evidenced above, warrant a
reversal on the First-Degree Trafficking and PFO I convictions .
RCr 9.57 sets out Kentucky's charge for deadlocked juries pursuant to Allen v. United
States, 164 U .S. 492, 17 S. Ct. 154, 41 L. Ed. 528 (1896):
(1) If a jury reports to a court that is unable to reach a
verdict and the court determines further deliberations
may be useful, the court shall not give any instruction
regarding the desirability of reaching a verdict other than
one which contains only the following elements:
(a) in order to return a verdict, each juror must agree
to that verdict;
(b) jurors have a duty to consult with one another and
to deliberate with a view to reaching an
agreement, if it can be done without violence to
individual judgment;
(c) each juror must decide the case, but only after an
impartial consideration of the evidence with the
other jurors ;
(d) in the course of deliberations, a juror should not
hesitate to reexamine his or her own views and
change his or her opinion if convinced it is
erroneous ; and
(e) no juror should surrender his or her honest
conviction as to the weight or effect of the
evidence solely because of the opinion of other
jurors, or for the mere purpose of returning a
verdict.
(2) The Court shall not poll the jury before a verdict is
returned .
White concentrates most of his argument on his allegation that the trial
court violated RCr 9 .57(2) when it inquired of the foreperson how the jurors were
divided numerically on the deadlocked charge . However, that is not what happened .
Although the court did express an intent to inquire about the breakdown of the jurors, it
was the foreperson who volunteered this information to the court. We also note that
defense counsel expressed no objection to this information being shared with the court.
- 1 0-
And defense counsel did not object when the court stated that it intended to ask the
foreperson about the breakdown of jurors on the deadlocked charge. Defense counsel
only asked that the information be revealed by the foreperson outside the hearing of the
other jurors, which it was, so as to not put any pressure on the holdout jurors.
Violations of RCr 9 .57 always result in error, but are subject to a harmless
error analysis . Mills v. Commonwealth , 996 S .W .2d 473 (Ky.1999) . But because
defense counsel raised no objection and expressed no complaint at any time about how
the hung jury was handled in this case as required by RCr 9 .22, we will review the
alleged errors pursuant to RCr 10.26 for palpable error. Under RCr 10.26, "an error is
reversible only if a manifest injustice has resulted from the error." Martin v.
Commonwealth , 207 S.W.3d 1, 3 (Ky. 2006) (quoting Graves v. Commonwealth , 17
S.W .3d 858, 864 (Ky. 2000)) . "To discover manifest injustice, a reviewing court must
plumb the depths of the proceeding . . . to determine whether the defect in the
proceeding was shocking or jurisprudentially intolerable ." Id. at 4.
White cites to Brasfield v. United States , 272 U.S . 448, 449, 47 S . Ct . 135,
136, 71 L. Ed. 345 (1926), wherein the practice of inquiring into the numerical
breakdown of hung juries was condemned by United States Supreme Court because "in
general its tendency is coercive ." However, the Court thereafter clarified that its holding
in Brasfield was "an exercise of this court's supervisory powers", rather than one
grounded in constitutional due process or any other constitutional provision . Lowenfield
v. Phelps , 484 U.S . 231, 108 S. Ct. 546, 98 L. Ed. 2d 568, 578 (1988). Because the
numerical division of the jury was not elicited by the Court in the present case and was
revealed outside the hearing of the other jurors, we do not see how its revelation could
be deemed coercive . If error, it does not rise to the level of palpable error.
White also claims it was error for the court to give the RCr 9 .57(1) charge
before confirming that further deliberations would be useful . In Williams v.
Commonwealth , 147 S.W.3d 1 (Ky. 2004), cert . denied, 544 U .S. 986,125 S. Ct. 1859,
161 L. Ed. 2d 745 (2005), before giving the RCr 9.57(1) charge, the court inquired of the
deadlocked jury whether further deliberations would be helpful, and the jury replied that
it would not. The court nevertheless gave the RCr 9.57(1) charge and sent the jury
back to continue deliberations . Williams argued the court coerced a verdict by giving a
RCr 9.57(1) charge to the jury after being informed that further deliberations would not
be useful and by requiring the jury to continue deliberations. This Court adjudged that
"[n]o error, palpable or otherwise, occurred ." Id . at 9.
We conclude that it was permissible for the trial court to read
RCr 9.57, considering that the jury had only deliberated
about two hours when the foreperson informed the trial court
that further deliberations would not be helpful. Furthermore,
any possibility of coercion was vitiated by the trial court's
instruction to the jurors that they should not relinquish honest
convictions for the mere purpose of obtaining a verdict .
Commonwealth v. Mitchell, Ky., 943 S.W.2d 625 (1997) .
In the case at bar, the jurors had been deliberating only three hours on the
four charges when it announced it was hung. The court inquired of the jury whether
further deliberations would be useful immediately after reading the RCr 9.57(1) charge .
The foreperson responded that at present no further deliberations would be helpful, but
then qualified his response with his request to ask the question that spawned the
ensuing discussion at the bench. Given the foreperson's equivocal response to the
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question and the discussion before the bench that followed, which we shall address
below, we deem it was not error for the court to send the jury back for further
deliberations . And, although the court should have made the determination whether
further deliberations would be useful before giving the RCr 9.57(1) charge, such was not
palpable error here.
White also asserts that the court's and counsels' direct communications
with the foreperson at the bench constituted palpable error. Specifically, White faults
the court for speaking individually to the foreperson out of the hearing of the jury, for
allowing the three attorneys to speak directly to the foreperson, and for suggesting that
the majority of jurors on the Trafficking charge could convince the minority in favor of
the lesser-included offense of First-Degree Possession .
From our review of the verbal exchange between the court, the attorneys,
and the foreperson at the bench, the court did not suggest that the majority of jurors for
the Trafficking conviction might be able to convince the three holdouts . In attempting to
establish whether further deliberations would be useful, the court simply asked the
foreperson if he thought further deliberations might be able to convince the others of
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. When the foreperson first stated the jurors were hung
on the Trafficking charge, the court reminded the foreperson of the alternative to the
Trafficking charge, the First-Degree Possession instruction. After the foreperson stated
that there was one juror who was not going to convict on the Trafficking charge and two
"maybes", the court asked if it was possible for the jurors to agree on the lesserincluded charge of Possession . Only after the foreperson indicated that the jurors were
in agreement on Possession and made it clear that "[t]here's not going to be a `not
guilty"' verdict did the court send the jurors back for further deliberations.
The court's comments here were clearly outside the limits of RCr 9 .57.
"When such error occurs, the focus on appeal is whether the comment itself was
coercive ." Mills v. Commonwealth , 996 S.W.2d 473, 493 (Ky. 1999) . The test of
whether a court's comments are coercive to a jury "look[s] at the language of the
statement or instruction itself to determine whether it actually forced an agreement or
whether it merely forced deliberations resulting in an agreement ." Commonwealth v.
Mitchell , 943 S .W .2d 625, 628 (Ky. 1997) . From our review of the court's statements to
the foreperson, there was no coercive element to the statements . Although the court
reminded the foreperson of the lesser-included offense instruction and asked if there
could be a consensus on the Possession charge (which the foreperson indicated they
were in agreement on), the court allowed that the jury may need to send it another note
in the event they were still hung. And the one and a half hours of deliberations that
followed also suggest that the jury was not "`dynamited' by the trial judge's remark[s] ."
Id. As observed above, we certainly do not see that the court was in any way
pressuring the jurors to reach an agreement on Trafficking . Accordingly, there was no
palpable error.
As for the court allowing the attorneys to speak directly with the
foreperson during this exchange, we note that Appellant's brief does not point to any
specific remark made by counsel to the foreperson as being objectionable or improperly
influencing the jury. While the better practice would be for attorneys to direct their
comments and questions to the court, we cannot say any palpable error resulted from
these communications in this case.
White also raises the issue of RCr 9 .74 relative to the exchange at the
bench between the court, attorneys, and foreperson, outside the hearing of the rest of
the jurors. RCr 9.74 provides :
No information requested by the jury or any juror after the
jury has retired for deliberations shall be given except in
open court in the presence of the defendant . . . and the
entire jury, and in the presence of or after the reasonable
notice to counsel for the parties .
We agree that the communications during this bench conference were not
in keeping with RCr 9.74 because they were conducted outside the hearing of the other
jurors and were not restated by the court within the hearing of the other jurors. See
Jump v. Commonwealth , 444 S.W.2d 723, 725 (Ky. 1969) (no violation of RCr 9.74
found where question asked by foreperson outside the hearing of the jury was restated
and answered by the court within the hearing of the entire jury) . However, we deem
that the error was waived by defense counsel's apparent assent to the bench
conference and failure to object, see Skaggs v. Commonwealth , 694 S.W.2d 672, 681
(Ky. 1985), reversed on other rounds, Skaggs v. Park, 235 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 2000)
(reversed as to the penalty phase only on habeas petition), and did not constitute
palpable error. As there was nothing said during the exchange which could be
construed to encourage or coerce a verdict on the Trafficking charge, there was no
manifest injustice .
Finally, White complains about a note that was written to the jurors by the
court that does not appear to be in the record. Our review of the trial reveals that it was
-15-
simply a note, apparently delivered to the jury prior to their announcement of the
deadlock, asking whether the jurors wanted to break for the evening or continue
deliberating . There was no error relative to this note . See Mills, 996 S .W .2d at 493.
The judgment of the Fayette Circuit Court is affirmed .
All sitting . Lambert, C.J ., and Cunningham, Scott, and Schroder, JJ .,
concur . McAnulty, J., concurs by separate opinion in which Minton and Noble, JJ, join.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Trevor W. Wells
Miller & Wells, PLLC
300 East Main Street, Suite 360
Lexington, KY 40507
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General
Michael Harned
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
6
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RENDERED : MAY 24, 2007
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
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mtfurkV
2006-SC-000598-MR
ROY E. WHITE
V
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PAMELA R. GOODWINE, JUDGE
NO. 06-CR-00073
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
CONCURRING OPINION BY JUSTICE McANULTY
Defense counsel rolled the dice by acquiescing in the bench conference which
was clearly an evisceration of both RCr 9 .74 and RCr 9.57. Although I agree that error
was assented to by defense counsel, and therefore support the majority opinion, I write
separately to underscore the two rules implicated .
Both rules uphold the long standing rule that juries should deliberate as a body
of 12 people. No judge, no lawyer participates in that process.
In this case, I believe the trial judge's extended discussion with the jury
foreperson regarding the possibilities of either (1) "turning" holdout jurors or (2) jurors
agreeing to a unanimous verdict on a lesser-included offense violated both RCr 9.74
and RCr 9 .57. Although I recognize that it is permissible for a judge to give verbal
instructions to the jury when they do not understand the written instructions, in
responding to jury questions the court should neither ask nor answer any questions that
go beyond the scope of that which RCr 9.74 permits . Similarly, I acknowledge that it is
a judge's duty to determine whether further deliberations would be helpful, but the
colloquy in this case went too far, placing the trial judge in the position of the "thirteenth
juror."
Tactically, given the tenor of discussion with the foreperson (conviction on the
lesser-included offense), it made perfect sense in this case for defense counsel to not
object to the inquiry at the bench . Accordingly, this case is not the appropriate case to
find palpable error. However, trial judges should not view this type of colloquy as either
appropriate or permissible under either RCr 9 .74 or RCr 9.57 .
Minton and Noble, J.J., join.
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