KENTUCKY EMPLOYERS' MUTUAL INSURANCE V. LODESTAR ENGERGY, INC., ET AL.
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IMPORTANT NOTICE
NOT TO BE PUBLISH OPINION
ED
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNA TED "NOT TO BE
PUBLISHED. " PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF
CIVIL PR OCED URE PR OMUL GA TED BY THE
SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION
IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOTBE
CITED OR USED AS A UTHORITYINANY OTHER
CASE INANY COURT OF THIS STA TE.
RENDERED : December 21, 2006
AS CORRECTED : January 9, 2007
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
(gourf of ~Arttfurkg
2006-SC-0095-WC
NINA BLACKBURN, INDIVIDUALLY AND
AND AS EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE OF
GARY BLACKBURN, DECEASED
LESLIE DWAYNE BLACKBURN,
DEPENDENT CHILD OVER THE AGE OF
18 INCAPABLE OF SELF SUPPORT
V.
APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
2004-CA-1652-WC
WORKERS' COMPENSATION NO. 01-WC-72911
LODESTAR ENERGY, INC. ;
KENTUCKY EMPLOYERS' MUTUAL INSURANCE ;
UNINSURED EMPLOYERS' FUND;
HON. KEVIN KING, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE;
AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
AND
APPELLEES
2006-SC-0228-WC
KENTUCKY EMPLOYERS' MUTUAL INSURANCE
V.
APPELLANTS
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
2004-CA-1687-WC
WORKERS' COMPENSATION NO. 01-WC-72911
LODESTAR ENERGY, INC .;
ESTATE OF GARY BLACKBURN ;
UNINSURED EMPLOYERS' FUND;
HON . KEVIN KING, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW JUDGE ; AND WORKERS'
COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
The Workers' Compensation Board and the Court of Appeals have affirmed an
Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ's) findings that KRS 342 .750(1)(b) entitled Gary
Blackburn's widow and dependent adult son to death benefits totaling 60% of the
state's average weekly wage ; that KRS 342 .165(1) authorized their compensation to be
enhanced by 30% because Lodestar's intentional safety violation caused Blackburn's
death; and that KRS 342.375 required Kentucky Employers Mutual Insurance (KEMI) to
pay the 30% enhancement to the claimants despite a contractual term to the contrary.
Appealing, the claimants assert that the ALJ should have awarded death
benefits under KRS 342 .750(3) or (4), which they assert entitle them to receive either
the state's average weekly wage or 75% of the state's average weekly wage. KEMI
asserts that it is not liable for the 30% enhancement . It argues that the enhancement is
a penalty or a form of punitive damages and that KRS 342 .165(1) is unconstitutional
because it denies employers due process, violates the contracts clause, and denies
employers equal protection . In the alternative, KEMI argues that if the statute is not
punitive, Apex Mining v. Blankenship , 918 S .W.2d 225 (Ky. 1995), must be overruled .
Because KRS 342.750(3) limits the deceased worker's average weekly wage for
the purposes of KRS 342 .750 to the state's average weekly wage, we have concluded
that the weekly benefits awarded are correct and affirm in that regard . Having also
concluded that KEMI is directly responsible to the claimants for Lodestar's workers'
compensation liability; that the 30% enhancement is not a penalty ; and that KRS
342 .165(1) is constitutional, we affirm in that regard as well. Because KRS 342.165(1)
implicitly creates an exception to KRS 342 .730(1)(a) by increasing "the compensation
for which the employer would otherwise have been liable under [Chapter 342]," we are
not convinced that Apex Mining v. Blankenship , supra , must be overruled .
On October 3, 2001, Gary Blackburn's employer asked him to drive a fuel truck
carrying approximately 3,000 gallons of fuel into a strip mining pit. Known as the "Hell
Hole," the pit could only be entered by descending a steep slope. Blackburn began the
descent and was found approximately 1,600 feet down the slope, lying by the road,
fatally injured . An ALJ later found that he lost control of the truck and jumped from it.
An investigation by the United States Department of Labor, Mine Safety and Health
Administration (MSHA) revealed maintenance defects that resulted in a severely
reduced braking capacity in all six of the fuel truck's brakes. Evidence also established
that management knew that the brakes were inadequate to stop the vehicle on a road
as steep as that into the pit. As a consequence, MSHA issued citations regarding the
brakes.
Lodestar covered its workers' compensation liability at the time of the accident
with KEMI . The insurance policy specified that Lodestar was responsible for any
payments KEMI made on its behalf that exceeded benefits regularly provided by
workers' compensation law, including payments resulting from any serious or willful
misconduct by Lodestar or from its failure to comply with a health or safety law or
regulation. The policy specifically excluded coverage for bodily injury that Lodestar
intentionally caused or aggravated and for fines or penalties imposed on Lodestar for
violating state or federal law.
Blackburn's widow (both individually and as the executrix of Gary's estate) and
his dependent adult son sought death benefits under KRS 342.750 and a 30%
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enhancement under KRS 342.165(1) based on the employer's intentional safety
violation . The claimants and Lodestar reached a partial settlement that was approved
on June 26, 2003. They agreed that the average weekly wage at the time of injury was
$946.28; that the beneficiaries would receive a total of $530.07 per week in death
benefits ; but that questions regarding the 30% enhancement would be adjudicated by
an ALJ .
On September 24, 2003, Lodestar moved to amend the settlement agreement to
permit the ALJ to determine the amount of weekly benefits. The motion indicated that
there had been an error in calculating the amount of the benefit . The claimants
maintained that the figure contained in the agreement was correct and that the
agreement could not be amended. However, they acknowledged the ALJ's authority to
correct a mistake in the benefit rate. In an order entered on February 4, 2004, the ALJ
found that the correct weekly death benefit was $318.04 ($238.53 for Nina and $79.51
for her son). The claimants petitioned for reconsideration, but no relief was granted .
After considering the evidence under KRS 342 .165(1), the ALJ determined that
Blackburn's death resulted from Lodestar's intentional violation of a specific safety
statute or regulation and that Lodestar knew of the statute or regulation . Therefore,
KRS 342.165(1) entitled the claimants to a 30% increase in compensation . The ALJ
determined that KEMI was responsible to the claimants for the 30% increase because
KRS 342 .375 requires every workers' compensation insurance policy to cover an
employer's entire liability for compensation and KRS 342.165(1) specifically provides for
increased "compensation ."
As we explained in Floyd County Board of Education v. Ratliff, 955 S.W.2d 921,
925 (Ky. 1997), the court's function is to interpret statutes according to their plain
meaning and the legislature's intent . KRS 342.750 provides, in pertinent part, as
follows :
If the injury causes death, income benefits shall be payable
in the amount and to or for the benefit of the persons
following, subject to the maximum limits specified in
subsections (3) and (4) of this section :
(1)(a) if there is a widow or widower and no children of the
deceased, to such widow or widower 50 percent of the
average weekly wage of the deceased, during widowhood or
widowerhood .
(b) To the widow or widower, if there is a child or children
living with the widow or widower, 45 percent of the average
weekly wage of the deceased, or 40 percent, if such child is
not or such children are not living with a widow or widower,
and in addition thereto, 15 percent for each child . Where
there are more than two (2) such children, the indemnity
benefits payable on account of such children shall be
divided among such children, share and share alike.
(f) To each parent, if actually dependent, 25 percent.
(g) To the brothers, sisters, grandparents, and
grandchildren, if actually dependent, 25 percent to each
such dependent. If there should be more than one (1) of
such dependents, the total income benefits payable on
account of such dependents shall be divided share and
share alike.
(3) For the purposes of this section, the average weekly
wage of the employee shall be taken as not more than the
average weekly wage of the state as determined in KRS
342.740 . In no case shall the aggregate weekly income
benefits payable to all beneficiaries under this section
exceed the maximum income benefit that was or would have
been payable for total disability to the deceased, including
benefits to his dependents .
(4) The maximum weekly income benefits payable for all
beneficiaries in case of death shall not exceed 75 percent of
the average weekly wage of the deceased as calculated
under KRS 342 .140, subject to the maximum limits in
subsection (3) above .
KRS 342.730(1)(a) provides an injured worker with a total disability benefit of 66
2/3% of the worker's average weekly wage but limits the maximum benefit to the state's
average weekly wage, which in this case was $530 .07. Because Blackburn's average
weekly wage would have resulted in a total disability benefit that exceeded $530 .07,
KRS 342 .730(1)(a) limited his total disability rate to $530 .07.
As the claimants construe KRS 342 .750, subsection (1)(b) would entitle them to
$567 .77 per week (60% of Blackburn's average weekly wage, i .e . , 60% of $946 .28), but
subsection (3) limits their benefits to Blackburn's total disability rate of $530 .07. Their
argument is based on the apparent misconception that the first sentence of subsection
(3) is inapplicable when calculating benefits under subsection (1). Yet, the sentence
clearly limits the deceased worker's average weekly wage "for the purposes of this
section" (i .e . , for the purposes of KRS Chapter 342, section 750) to the state's average
weekly wage . Therefore, the AU did not err in calculating their benefits under KRS
342 .750(1)(b) as being 60% of the state's average weekly wage rather than 60% of
Blackburn's average weekly wage. Had there been additional dependents eligible for
benefits under KRS 342 .750(1)(b), (f), and/or (g), the second sentence of subsection
(3) would have limited the aggregate of all of the dependents' benefits to Blackburn's
total disability rate . Because he was relatively well-paid, subsection (3) limits the
aggregate of all dependents' benefits to the state's average weekly wage . Had his
average weekly wage been low enough to have entitled him to a benefit that was less
than the state's average weekly wage, his dependents would have been limited to an
amount that was less than the state's average weekly wage .
The claimants' alternate argument is also misplaced. They assert that KRS
342.750(4) permits them to receive no less than 75% of the state's average weekly
wage (i.e . , to receive $397 .55). Yet, subsection (4) clearly imposes another cap on
weekly benefits rather than placing a floor beneath them . It limits "[t]he maximum
weekly income benefits payable for all beneficiaries" to 75% of the deceased worker's
average weekly wage "subject to the limits in subsection (3)." Because Blackburn was
relatively well-paid, subsection (3) limits his average weekly wage for the purposes of
KRS 342.750 to the state's average weekly wage. Therefore, the maximum weekly
income benefits payable for all beneficiaries is 75% of the state's average weekly wage .
KEMI raises four grounds for reversal : 1 .) that it is only liable for compensation
under its policy with the employer and that the 30% enhancement is a penalty; 2 .) that
KRS 342.165(1) violates its due process rights under the United States Constitution by
permitting punitive damages to be imposed without judicial review; 3.) that the Court of
Appeals has construed KRS 342.375 in a manner than violates the contracts clause of
the United States Constitution ; and 4.) that the 2000 version of KRS 342.165(1) violates
the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution by penalizing the safety
violations of employers more than those of workers.
This court has addressed the first three grounds to some extent previously. In
AIG/AIU Insurance Company v. South Akers Mining Company, LLC, 192 S .W.3d 687,
689 (Ky. 2006), the court rejected arguments that an increase or decrease in
compensation under KRS 342.165(1) is a penalty or the legislative equivalent of
punitive damages . The court noted that Chapter 342 involves a series of trade-offs for
both parties . It provides medical benefits and benefits to replace part of an injured
worker's lost wages without regard to fault. Likewise, it relieves an employer of liability
for pain, suffering, and punitive damages even in instances where its intentional safety
violation causes the accident and injury . The court reasoned that KRS 342.165(1)
gives employers and workers a financial incentive to comply with safety provisions
"without thwarting the very purpose of the Act by subjecting them to the potentially
disastrous consequences of removing claims involving intentional violations from its
coverage." Id . at 689 . Characterizing the use of the word "penalty" in Apex Mining v.
Blankenship , supra , Whittaker v. McClure , 891 S.W.2d 80 (Ky. 1995), and Ernst
Simpson Construction Co. v. Conn, 625 S.W.2d 850, 851 (Ky. 1981), as being a
metaphor, the court determined that KRS 342.165(1) compensates the party that
receives more or pays less for the effects of the opponent's intentional misconduct.
Relying, in part on our decision in AIGIAIU Insurance Company v. South Akers Mining
Company, supra, we determined in Realty Improvement v. Reaey, 194 S.W.3d 818 (Ky.
2006), that benefits awarded under KRS 342.750(6) are a form of income benefits and
that they are subject to enhancement under KRS 342.165(1).
KEMI argues that if the increase in compensation under KRS 342 .165(1) is not a
penalty, Apex Mining v. Blankenship , supra , must be overruled . It reasons that the
court was only able to conclude that the increased benefit was not an income benefit
and subject to the cap imposed by KRS 342.730(1)(a) by characterizing it as a penalty .
We disagree .
The Blankenship court noted that KRS 342.730(1)(a) limits income benefits, not
compensation . Characterizing benefits awarded under KRS 342 .165(1) as being a
penalty rather than income benefits, the court held that a worker may receive an
income benefit for total disability as well as an increase in compensation under KRS
342 .165(1). The fact remains, however, that the applicable version of KRS 342 .165(1)
created an implicit exception to KRS 342 .730(1)(a) by stating that "the compensation
for which the employer would otherwise have been liable under this chapter shall be
increased fifteen percent (15%) in the amount of each payment." The present version
does the same except that the increase is 30% . We conclude, therefore, that although
the increase or decrease in benefits is not a penalty, the Blankenship court's holding
was correct and need not be disturbed .
This court rejected an argument based on the contracts clause in AIG/AIU
Insurance Company v. South Akers Mining Company, supra , noting that KRS
342 .340(1), KRS 342.365, and KRS 342 .375 evince a public policy requiring an
employer's liability for workers' compensation benefits to be secured . Article I, Section
10, Clause 1 of the United States Constitution provides that "no state shall . . . pass any
bill of attainder, ex post facto law or law impairing the obligation of contracts ." In Long
Sault Development Co . v. Call, 242 U.S . 272 ; 37 S.Ct . 79; 61 L .Ed . 294 (1916), the
United States Supreme Court explained that the contracts clause is directed against the
impairment of contracts by subsequently-enacted laws or constitutions .
Because KEMI acknowledges that its contract with Lodestar became effective
after KRS 342 .375 was enacted, it is clear that the statute did not impair it. KRS
342 .375 requires every policy or contract of insurance to cover an employer's entire
liability for compensation ; therefore, KEMI must pay the increased compensation to the
claimant despite a contractual term absolving it from such liability . The ALJ noted
specifically in this case that the decision imposing liability on KEMI did not address
whether KEMI had a civil cause of action against Lodestar and expressed the belief that
an ALJ lacked jurisdiction to decide that question . KEMI complains that even if a civil
action were available, it would be unable to collect any judgment due to Lodestar's
-9-
bankruptcy . However, the existence or lack of an effective civil remedy for KEMI is
immaterial under KRS 342 .375. Its purpose is to protect injured workers .
KEMI's final argument is that the 2000 version of KRS 342 .165(1) violates the
Equal Protection clause of the United States Constitution because an employer's
intentional safety violation results in a 30% increase in compensation, but a worker's
intentional safety violation results in only a 15% decrease in compensation . We
disagree .
As we explained in Wynn v. (bold , 969 S .W .2d 695 (Ky. 1998), Steven Lee
Enterprises v. Varney, 36 S.W .3d 391 (Ky. 2000), and McDowell v. Jackson Energy
RECC , 84 S .W.3d 71 (Ky. 2002), workers' compensation legislation concerns economic
policy and social welfare. Where no suspect classification is involved, a statue
complies with due process and equal protection requirements if it is rationally related to
a legitimate state objective, i .e. , if there is a rational basis for any perceived
discrimination . Because statutes are presumed to be constitutional, the burden is on
the party attacking a statute to show that it has no conceivable rational basis .
Workers are responsible for their own conduct but have little or no control over
the work they are required to perform, the environment in which they must perform it, or
the equipment that they must use. Yet, it is they who experience the physical and
mental consequences of a workplace accident and they who experience the financial
consequences of receiving limited income benefits for a decrease the ability to earn a
living . Acknowledging that reality, KRS 338.031 provides :
(1) Each employer :
(a) Shall furnish to each of his employees employment and
a place of employment which are free from recognized
hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or
-1 0-
serious physical harm to his employees;
(b) Shall comply with occupational safety and health
standards promulgated under this chapter.
(2) Each employee shall comply with occupational safety
and health standards and all rules, regulations, and orders
issued pursuant to this chapter which are applicable to his
own actions and conduct.
Consistent with KRS 338 .031, KRS 342 .165(1) encourages workers and
employers to follow safety statutes and regulations by providing a financial incentive for
them to do so. Employers who comply are liable for lower workers' compensation
benefits than if they do not. Workers who comply will receive greater benefits than if
they do not.
There are numerous reasonable explanations for why the legislature gave
employers a greater financial incentive to comply with safety statutes and regulations
than it gave workers. For example, the legislature may have reasoned that employers
require a greater financial incentive to comply due to their greater financial resources.
The legislature may have considered that an employer's compliance is likely to have
broader consequences than a worker's because employers control the work that is
performed, the environment in which it is performed, and the equipment with which it is
performed . Therefore, an employers compliance with safety provisions is more likely
than that of an individual worker to reduce the number of workplace accidents, the
number of workers who are injured, and the seriousness of the injuries . The legislature
may have also considered that employers are likely to weigh the sometimes substantial
costs of complying with safety provisions against the benefits of doing so . Having
determined that it was neither illogical nor irrational for the legislature to provide
different financial incentives to employers and workers, we also conclude that KRS
342 .165(1) constitutional .
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed .
All concur.
COUNSEL FOR BLACKBURN:
Michael Fleet Johnson
Clark & Johnson
P . O. Box 1529
Pikeville, KY 41502
COUNSEL FOR LODESTAR ENERGY, INC. :
Stanley S. Dawson
Fulton & Devlin
2000 Warrington Way, Suite 165
Louisville, KY 40222
COUNSEL FOR AFL-CIO, AMICUS CURIAE:
Mark C. Webster
Karl Truman Law Office
131 East Court Avenue, Suite 300
Jeffersonville, IN 47130
COUNSEL FOR KENTUCKY EMPLOYERS' MUTUAL INSURANCE :
Thomas L. Ferreri
Ferreri & Fogle, PLLC
333 Guthrie Green
203 Speed Building
Louisville, KY 40202
COUNSEL FOR UNINSURED EMPLOYERS' FUND:
Elizabeth A. Myerscough
Office of Attorney General
Uninsured Employers' Fund Branch
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601
Dana C. Stinson
Office of Attorney General
Uninsured Employers' Fund Branch
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601
,Suprtmr Courf of ~irufurhv
2006-SC-0095-WC
NINA BLACKBURN, INDIVIDUALLY AND
AS EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE OF
GARY BLACKBURN, DECEASED
LESLIE DWAYNE BLACKBURN,
DEPENDENT CHILD OVER THE AGE OF
18 INCPABLE OF SELF SUPPORT
V.
APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
2004-CA-1652-WC
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD NO . 01-WC-72911
LODESTAR ENERGY, INC . ;
KENTUCKY EMPLOYERS' MUTUAL INSURANCE ;
UNINSURED EMPLOYERS' FUND ;
HON. KEVIN KING, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE;
AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
AND
APPELLANT
APPELLEES
2006-SC-0228-WC
KENTUCKY EMPLOYERS' MUTUAL INSURANCE
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
2004-CA-1687-WC
WORKERS' COMPENSATION NO. 01-WC-72911
LODESTAR ENERGY, INC. ;
EASTATE OF GARY BLACKBURN ;
UNINSURED EMPLOYERS' FUND;
HON . KEVIN KING, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW JUDGE ; AND WORKERS'
COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
ORDER
On the Court's own motion, the Opinion of the Court rendered in the abovestyled matter on December 21, 2006, is hereby corrected by the substitution of a new
page one, hereto attached, in lieu of page one of the Opinion as originally rendered .
Said correction does not affect the holding of the Opinion, but is made only to correct a
typographical error in the rendition date .
Entered : January 9, 2007.
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