CAMERON DION DANIELS V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IMPORTANT NOTICE
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED."
PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C),
THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER
CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE; HOWEVER,
UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS,
RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR
CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED
OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE
BEFORE THE COURT. OPINIONS CITED FOR CONSIDERATION
BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED
DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A COPY OF THE
ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG WITH THE
DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO THE
ACTION.
RENDERED : FEBRUARY 22, 2007
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
'Sixprems Courf of
2006-SC-000130-MR
CAMERON DION DANIELS
V.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT
HON . GREGORY M . BARTLETT, JUDGE
INDICTMENT NO. 05-CR-00220-001
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
Affirminq
A jury of the Kenton Circuit Court convicted Appellant, Cameron Dion
Daniels, of complicity to robbery in the first degree and of being a persistent
felony offender in the first degree . For these crimes, Appellant was sentenced to
twenty years' imprisonment. Appellant now appeals to this Court as a matter of
right . Ky. Const. ยง 110(2)(b) . For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm
Appellant's convictions .
At approximately 2 :00 a .m . on January 7, 2005, Covington Police Officer
Brian Kane happened upon a robbery in progress . Officer Kane saw three men
robbing two victims on the street. One of the victims testified that guns were
pointed at both him and his friend .
When Officer Kane approached the scene, the robbers ran away. Officer
Kane testified that he heard shots fired as they fled. Shortly thereafter, he
recognized one of the robbers, Ishmael Powell, walking down the street .
Appellant and another co-defendant, Kareem Derkson, were soon found hiding
nearby . Upon viewing Appellant and Derkson, Officer Kane recognized them as
being the other two robbers. Appellant was also identified by victim, Donald
Dixon, who testified that he recognized Appellant as the person who pointed a
gun at his friend during the robbery . Finally, co-defendant Kareem Derkson
testified that Appellant was involved in the robbery.
Appellant presented an alibi defense at trial . The jury nonetheless
convicted Appellant of complicity to robbery in the first degree and of being a
persistent felony offender in the first degree . Appellant now appeals to this
Court, alleging errors which he claims entitle him to a new trial . For the reasons
set forth herein, we affirm Appellant's convictions and sentence .
Appellant first alleges that the trial court erred when it failed to grant his
motion for a directed verdict. A directed verdict shall not be granted "[i]f the
evidence is sufficient to induce a reasonable juror to believe beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty . . . ." Commonwealth v. Benham,
816 S .W.2d 186,187 (Ky. 1991) .
Appellant argues that he should have been granted a directed verdict
because there are several weaknesses in victim, Donald Dixon's, testimony .
First, Dixon testified at trial that he recognized Appellant from the neighborhood,
however, he told police nothing of this the night of the robbery. Second,
Appellant alleges that Dixon could not have gotten a good look at him since
Dixon testified that he saw Appellant from his peripheral vision as a gun was
being pointed at him by one of the co-defendants . Appellant further questions
the credibility of co-defendant Derkson . Derkson received a plea agreement for
his testimony and his testimony was inconsistent with some of the testimony
offered by Dixon and Officer Kane.
It is well-established that questions of credibility are reserved for the jury's
consideration . See Id. Appellant had ample opportunity to address and expose
the weaknesses identified above, and to present alibi witnesses in his own
defense . Although Appellant may not agree with the credibility determinations
made by the jury, there was clearly enough evidence to support its verdict . A
directed verdict was not warranted in this case .
Appellant next argues that he was prejudiced by the trial court's refusal to
either (1) sever his trial from that of co-defendant Powell's ; or (2) bar from the
jury's consideration of certain threats and a bribe made by Powell. "A reviewing
court will not reverse a conviction for failure to grant separate trials unless it is
clearly convinced that prejudice occurred and that the likelihood of prejudice was
so clearly demonstrated to the trial judge as to make his failure to grant [a]
severance an abuse of discretion." Wilson v. Commonwealth, 836 S .W .2d 872,
887 (Ky. 1992) (overruled on other grounds by St. Clair v. Roark, 10 S.W.3d 482
(Ky. 1999)).
Appellant first contends that he was prejudiced by the joint trial because
the evidence against Powell was more substantial than the evidence against him .
Generally, "a defendant must show that antagonism prevented a jury from being
able to separate and treat distinctively evidence that is relevant to each particular
defendant at trial and that the antagonism between codefendants will mislead or
confuse the jury." Id. Although there may have been more evidence which
specifically implicated Powell, there was nothing about this evidence or the
defense offered by Powell which was antagonistic or inconsistent with Appellant's
alibi defense. In light of this record, we find no abuse of discretion by the trial
court for failure to grant separate trials.
Appellant further claims that certain statements made by Powell should
have been redacted because they violated his Confrontation rights . At trial,
Derkson testified that following his plea of guilty, co-defendant Powell threatened
to kill his mother and rape his sister. Victim, Donald Dixon, testified that Powell
offered him a $5,000 bribe not to show up for court. Appellant claims that these
statements should be construed as a confession which implicates him since
"[a]ssociation with Powell's threats was inevitable given that both men sat on the
defendants' side of the courtroom." See Bruton v. United States, 391 U .S. 123,
88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968) (admission of a nontestifying
codefendant's confession
is unconstitutional
if it expressly incriminates the
defendant) . We disagree .
Appellant cites no case law which holds or even suggests that threats or
bribes made by a co-defendant may be considered a confession which is subject
to the confines of Bruton, supra. Furthermore, there was absolutely nothing in
Powell's statements which implicated or even mentioned Appellant. Cf.
Richardson v. Marsh , 481 U .S. 200, 210, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 1709, 95 L.Ed.2d 176
(1987) ("the Confrontation Clause is not violated by the admission of a
nontestifying codefendant's confession with a proper limiting instruction when, as
here, the confession is redacted to eliminate not only the defendant's name, but
any reference to his or her existence") . Accordingly, we find no violation of
Appellant's Confrontation rights .
For the reasons set forth herein, the judgment and sentence of the Kenton
Circuit Court is affirmed .
All concur.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Lisa Bridges Clare
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
Suite 302, 100 Fair Oaks Lane
Frankfort, KY 40601
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Gregory D . Stumbo
Attorney General
Gregory C. Fuchs
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.