RICHARD ALLEN GEARY V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED : FEBRUARY 22, 2007
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2005-SC-000296MR
RICHARD ALLEN GEARY
V
APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM UNION CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE C. RENE' WILLIAMS, JUDGE
NO. 04-CR-00036
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
Appellant, Richard Allen Geary, was convicted of conspiracy to theft of
anhydrous ammonia with intent to manufacture methamphetamine' and of being a
second degree persistent felony offender. Appellant was sentenced to twenty (20)
years imprisonment, and he appeals to this Court as a matter of right. Appellant raises
two claims of error: (1) that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress ; and
(2) that the trial court improperly refused to grant his motion for a directed verdict.
Finding no merit to these claims, we affirm Appellant's convictions .
On March 11, 2005, Appellant (along with one of his co-defendants,
Timothy Burden) filed a motion to suppress all evidence seized upon the argument that
' KRS 506 .040 and KRS 514.030, a class C felony.
2 KRS 532.080 .
3 Ky. Const. § 110(2)(b) .
the "stop" was not justified under Terry v. Ohio." The trial court held a suppression
hearing on March 14, 2005, and denied the motion at the conclusion of the hearing .
The deputy sheriff, Jason Thomas, the arresting officer in this case, was the only
witness who testified at the hearing . The following facts are taken from the officer's
testimony at the suppression hearing .
On February 19, 2004, at 1 :40 in the morning, Deputy Thomas observed a
car parked outside of Doug's Tanning World in Waverly, Kentucky. Due to a rash of
burglaries in the area and the fact that the business itself had been burglarized multiple
times in the past several years, the officer decided to pull into the parking lot in an effort
to identify anyone at the closed business . Although he pulled in behind the car, he did
not block it in, but instead left 15 to 20 feet between the two cars.
When Deputy Thomas pulled into the parking lot Appellant was out of the
parked car, apparently getting a soft-drink at a soft-drink machine . The officer asked
Appellant if he were getting a Coke to which Appellant answered in the affirmative .
According to Deputy Thomas, Appellant seemed overly nervous while talking to him and
Appellant returned to the car.
Deputy Thomas decided to approach the car. As soon as he got near the
car, he could smell propane . Timothy Burden (Burden), the driver of the car, told the
officer that they were coming from Evansville and going to Madisonville . This raised
Deputy Thomas's suspicions because he did not think it made sense for them to be
going through Union County if they were headed to Madisonville . Deputy Thomas said,
4 392 U .S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed .2d 889 (1968).
"You're kind of taking the long route, aren't you?", to which Burden replied, "Yeah, I
guess so." The officer noticed that Burden was so nervous that he was shaking .
Deputy Thomas explained to Burden that he was identifying anyone at
closed businesses due to burglaries in the area. The officer asked the men if they had
any burglary tools with them, such as pliers . Although they said they did not, Deputy
Thomas could see a pair of channel-lock pliers laying in the backseat next to another
passenger, Jerry Oakley .
Deputy Thomas checked Burden's driver's license, and the check
revealed no problems. The officer then asked the other passenger, Oakley, for his
identification and discovered that the name and date of birth Oakley gave were false.
After Deputy Thomas explained that it was a crime to lie to an officer, Oakley gave the
correct information .
Oakley was asked to get out of the car. While patting him down for
weapons the officer found a walkie-talkie in Oakley's pocket. After instructing Oakley to
sit cross-legged, facing the highway, Deputy Thomas called for backup. Appellant was
then removed from the car. Deputy Thomas found a walkie-talkie and a torch lighter on
Appellant . According to the officer walkie-talkies are commonly used during the theft of
anhydrous ammonia, because they enable the persons stealing the anhydrous
ammonia to communicate with each other . Torch lighters are also used to heat pipes to
smoke methamphetamine.
After getting Burden out of the car, Deputy Thomas asked Burden if there
were any more burglary tools in the car. When Burden said there were not, Deputy
Thomas asked for permission to look into the trunk and Burden consented . Inside the
trunk Ahe officer found a propane tank with a loosened valve, an air tank with a
discolored brass valve, and a garden hose with a plastic fitting taped to it. Deputy
Thomas believed that the items found were going to be used for the theft of anhydrous
ammonia. The valve that would have normally been on the air tank was replaced with a
brass valve that had turned to a bluish-green color. According to the officer, only
exposure to anhydrous ammonia would cause the valve to discolor in this way.
Additionally, the plastic fitting taped to the garden hose would fit an anhydrous tank,
allowing a person to extract anhydrous ammonia. Deputy Thomas had seen the same
set-up just two days earlier on an anhydrous tank at a location 1 .1 miles away from
where the officer found Appellant and his colleagues. Inside the car, Deputy Thomas
also found a large green duffle bag, and he testified that the green duffle bag would
make it easier to carry the propane tank.
After arresting Burden, Oakley, and Appellant, Deputy Thomas told the
men that he knew there was a place with anhydrous ammonia only 1 .1 miles away from
Doug's Tanning World and that he would be checking the location . He explained to
them that he wanted to know if anyone was there in order to make sure no one got hurt.
Oakley responded "No, we haven't got any, yet." This led Deputy Thomas to believe
that the men had planned to steal anhydrous ammonia, but had not yet done so.
After the suppression hearing testimony, the trial court found that Deputy
Thomas had noticed the men in a rural area at 1 :40 a.m . in a place that had been
burglarized several times . In addition, the men had a pair of pliers in the car. The trial
court found that the officer had reasonable suspicion and overruled Appellant's motion
to suppress the evidence.
After a one day trial which occurred on March 28, 2005, Appellant was
found guilty of criminal conspiracy to theft of anhydrous ammonia with intent to
manufacture methamphetamine . Appellant was further found guilty of being a second
degree persistent felony offender and his sentence was fixed at twenty (20) years .
A. Motion to Suppress
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section Ten
of the Kentucky Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures . Appellant
claims his constitutional rights were violated when the trial court denied his motion to
suppress the evidence which flowed from the search and seizure of Burden's vehicle
and Oakley's property .
Normally a warrant must be obtained prior to any search and seizure .
However, the United States Supreme Court has ruled that a police officer may stop and
frisk a suspect, even absent probable cause, where the police officer has a reasonable
suspicion that "criminal activity may be afoot."5 Such encounters are a limited exception
to the warrant requirement, and allow the police officer to perform a brief investigatory
stop in circumstances where he has a reasonable articulable suspicion that a crime may
be taking place .
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that terms such as
"articulable reasons" and "founded suspicion" are not self-defining and as a result fall
short of providing "clear guidance dispositive of the myriad factual situations that arise ."'
Because of these reasons, the totality of the circumstances test must be used and the
5 _Id . at 30 .
6 Williams v. Commonwealth, 147 S.W.3d 1 (Ky. 2004).
U.S . v. Cortez, 449 U .S. 411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690, 695, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981).
officer must have a "particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular
person stopped of criminal activity" based on the whole picture .$
In denying Appellant's motion to suppress, the Circuit Court concluded
that the totality of the circumstances justified the investigatory stop made by Deputy
Thomas. Appellant was found outside of a closed business at 1 :40 a.m . Not only had
there been numerous burglaries in the area, the particular business had been
burglarized on multiple occasions. Although location alone is not enough to support a
reasonable suspicion, the fact that the stop occurred in a high crime area is among one
of the relevant considerations in deciding whether the stop was justified .9
Deputy Thomas testified that when the encounter occurred Appellant
appeared overly nervous. After approaching the parked car, Deputy Thomas could
smell propane . When he asked Burden if they had any burglary tools such as pliers he
was told that they did not. However, Deputy Thomas saw a pair of pliers in the backset
of the car which contradicted that statement. These facts, taken as a whole, gave a
reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. It is important to
remember that `°the officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual' is engaged
in an unlawful enterprise ; `the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the
circumstances would be warranted in his belief' that the suspect is breaking, or is about
to break, the law." 1°
The time and location of the stop, along with the behavior of Appellant and
the presence of the pliers abundantly warranted Deputy Thomas's suspicion . His
8 _Id . at 417-18 .
9 Illinois v. Wardlow , 528 U .S. 119,120 S.Ct. 673,145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000).
1°
Williams , 147 S .W .3d at 5 ( citinc Ter(y, 392 U.S. at 27).
actions were based on a reasonable articulable suspicion and, therefore, the motion to
suppress was correctly denied .
B. Motion for a Directed Verdict
Appellant's next claim is that the trial court erred by not granting his
motion for a directed verdict. Appellant argues that the evidence, taken as a whole, was
insufficient to support his conviction . A person is guilty of theft by unlawful taking when
he unlawfully:
(a) Takes or exercise control over movable
property of another with intent to deprive him thereof; or
(b) Obtains immovable property of another or
any interest therein with intent to benefit himself or another
not entitled thereto."
Moreover, when the property is anhydrous ammonia and the theft is
accompanied by an intent to manufacture methamphetamine, it constitutes a Class B
felony for the first offense . ' 2 When a person agrees with another to engage in conduct
constituting a crime, such as theft of anhydrous ammonia, or aids another in the
planning or commission of such crime or in an attempt or solicitation to commit such
crime with the intent of promoting or facilitating that crime, he is guilty of criminal
conspiracy . '3
According to Appellant, nothing in the evidence linked him to an
agreement to steal anhydrous ammonia or an intent to manufacture methamphetamine,
and, as a result, the trial court should have granted a directed verdict .
" KRS 514.030(1).
12
KRS 514 .030(2)(b).
13
KRS 506 .040.
The trial court is authorized to direct a verdict for the defendant if the
prosecution produces no more than a mere scintilla of evidence. 14 In Commonwealth v.
Ben ham15 we clarified the directed verdict rule as follows :
On motion for directed verdict, the trial court must draw all
fair and reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of
the Commonwealth . If the evidence is sufficient to induce a
reasonable juror to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant is guilty, a directed verdict should not be
given. For the purpose of ruling on the motion, the trial court
must assume that the evidence for the Commonwealth is
true, but reserving to the jury questions as to the credibility
and weight to be given such testimony .
"On appellate review, the test of a directed verdict is, if under the evidence as a whole, it
would be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find guilt."16
After hearing the evidence presented in this case, the trial judge correctly
determined that it was sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to find guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt . The evidence showed that Appellant and Oakley had walkie-talkies
on them, and in the trunk Deputy Thomas found an air tank, a propane tank, and a
garden hose with a plastic fitting taped to it. All of these are items commonly used
during the theft of anhydrous ammonia. Although both Oakley and Burden testified that
Appellant did not know anything about the items found in the car, their testimony
conflicted as to where Appellant was located when the tanks and hose were loaded into
the car . There was also testimony that Oakley stated "No, we haven't got any, yet," in
reference to stealing anhydrous ammonia at the site located 1 .1 miles away . This
suggests an agreement among all participants . This was sufficient evidence to support
14
Commonwealth v. Sawhill, 660 S.W.2d 3 (Ky. 1983) .
816 S .W.2d 186 (Ky. 1991) .
16 1d . at 187.
15
a reasonable jury in finding Appellant guilty of conspiracy to theft of anhydrous ammonia
with intent to manufacture methamphetamine .
As we have previously stated, conspiracy may be and is often proven by
circumstantial evidence . Though each factual circumstance by itself may not be
sufficient, when all are considered as a whole, a reasonable inference of a conspiracy
arises . The ultimate conclusion is for the jury." As a result, the trial court correctly
denied Appellant's motion for a directed verdict.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Union Circuit Court is
affirmed .
Lambert, CJ, and Cunningham, McAnulty, Minton, Noble, and Scott, JJ.,
concur . Schroder, J ., files a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.
17
Canada v. Commonwealth, 136 S .W .2d 1061, 1065 (Ky. 1940) .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Lisa Bridges Clare
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
Suite 302, 100 Fair Oaks Lane'
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Room 118, Capitol Building
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
Susan Roncarti Lenz
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
P-E13RuARY 22, 2007
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
RENDERED :
ulavMt d1ourf Jaf ~Rftfurhv
2005-SC-000296-MR
RICHARD ALLEN GEARY
V.
APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM UNION CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE C. RENE' WILLIAMS, JUDGE
NO . 04-CR-00036
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION BY JUSTICE SCHRODER
CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART
Appellant raises two claims of error: that the trial court improperly denied
his motion to suppress ; and that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a
directed verdict of acquittal . I concur with the majority in its conclusion that the
trial court correctly denied Appellant's motion to suppress . However, I cannot
agree that there was no error in denying the motion for a directed verdict on the
conspiracy to commit theft of anhydrous ammonia .
I suspect Richard Allen Geary was preparing to steal anhydrous ammonia,
and I have no doubt he was probably going to try that evening/morning .
Suspicions and probabilities are not sufficient to convict someone of conspiracy .
I agree that the officer exercised good judgment in investigating the situation the
evening he questioned the Appellant . The tools and equipment discovered by
the officer gave the Appellant the ability to commit such a theft, and may even
constitute another crime by the mere possession of such paraphernalia, but there
was simply no evidence of an agreement on the requisite intent to commit a
specific act of theft here. KRS 506.040(1) ; KRS 514.030.
The conspiracy theory selects a building 1 .1 miles away from the
Appellant as a target. Maybe the Appellant was heading there . Maybe Appellant
was heading somewhere else. Maybe Appellant had already done his business
elsewhere and was on his way home . We only have the officer's suspicions, not
evidence of the intent to commit a theft. If the officer had observed the Appellant
in close proximity to the intended target, or had evidence of a planned theft, I
could agree with the majority. As the record in this case is devoid of such
circumstantial or direct evidence, I believe the trial court should have directed a
verdict of acquittal to the charged crime.
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