LADONNA LUSE V. ROBERT W. GAREY, D.M.D., ET AL.
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NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGN, TED "NOT TO BE
PUBLISHED," PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF
CIVIL PR OCEDURE PROMULGATED BY THE
SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION
IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
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CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE.
RENDERED : December 21, 2006
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
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2006-SC-000239-WC
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LADONNA LUSE
V.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
2005-CA-001214-WC
WORKERS' COMPENSATION NO. 04-WC-354
ROBERT W . GAREY, D .M.D;
KINNEY E . SLAUGHTER, D.M .D. ;
KATHY R. SLAUGHTER, D .M .D . ;
HONORABLE MARCEL SMITH,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) determined that the claimant sustained a
cumulative trauma injury to several parts of her body but dismissed her entire claim as
being barred by the statute of limitations. Convinced that the claim for some of the hip
and leg complaints may have been timely, the Workers' Compensation Board (Board)
vacated that portion of the decision and directed the ALJ to analyze the evidence on
remand under Special Fund v. Clark, 998 S.W .2d 487 (Ky. 1999). The Board affirmed
regarding the upper body complaints, rejecting the claimant's argument that the ALJ
may have misunderstood the evidence and the law when finding that no impairment
remained compensable . The Court of Appeals affirmed, but the claimant continues to
assert that the decision to dismiss the entire upper body portion of the claim should be
vacated and remanded for further consideration . Convinced that the decision was
supported by the evidence and was not the product of a misunderstanding, we affirm .
The claimant worked as a dental hygienist, dividing her time among three
dentists' offices. Although she was able to sit much of the time, she had to assume
awkward positions in order to perform her work. In 1996, she began to experience neck
pain. In 1999, she also began to experience back pain that she attributed to scooting
around in a chair with casters that stuck when working at Dr. Garey's office . At that
time, she began treatment for neck, shoulder, and upper mid-back pain with Dr. Estes,
a chiropractor . On a patient information form, she indicated that she sought treatment
for a work-related injury . She testified that when she informed Dr. Estes of her
suspicion, he agreed. She then reported the matter to her employers and requested
that the casters be repaired and certain ergonomic changes be made.
On five or six occasions from October through December, 2001, she sought
treatment with Dr. Rommelman for neck and shoulder pain that he thought was
myofascial in nature. She returned in October, 2003, again complaining of neck and
shoulder pain. Notes from March 24, 2004, refer to right hip and lower extremity
complaints . Shortly thereafter, Dr. Rommelman diagnosed right piriformis syndrome .
Having found the claimant to be at maximum medical improvement (MMI) in July, 2004,
he assigned a 9% whole-body impairment, attributing a 6% impairment to the upper
body conditions and a 3% impairment to the piriformis syndrome.
When deposed, Dr. Rommelman attributed the claimant's upper extremity pain
and sensory deficit to myofascial pain causing a thoracic outlet syndrome and her lower
extremity pain to a piriformis syndrome with resulting sciatic compression. He stated
that his findings were supported by objective medical testing and were reproducible .
Questioned about when he first treated the low back and right lower extremity
complaints, Dr. Rommelman testified, "it looks like the first time she brought that to my
attention was in March of 2004 ."
The claimant quit working on August 14, 2003, and later testified that she did so
because her symptoms became so severe that she was unable to hold her instruments .
She filed an application for benefits on February 20, 2004. She later testified that her
neck, right arm, shoulder, and low back symptoms worsened gradually from 1997 until
she quit working . She estimated that about 75% of her symptoms developed within the
two-year period before she quit working .
Relying on Dr. Rommelman, the AU determined that the claimant "suffered a
physical injury as defined by the Act." The AU concluded, however, that her entire
claim was time-barred because it was not filed within two years after Dr. Estes
confirmed her suspicion that her that her injury was work-related . In a petition for
reconsideration, the claimant requested compensation under Special Fund v . Clark,
supra, for the portion of her claim that arose within two years before she filed it. The
AU denied the petition, after which the claimant appealed.
The Board agreed that the impairment Dr. Rommelman attributed to the upper
body symptoms was barred by limitations but determined that the AU failed to make
sufficient findings regarding the impairment he attributed to right piriformis syndrome.
In support of the first conclusion, the Board pointed to the claimant's testimony
that, in 1999, Dr. Estes agreed with her supposition that work-related cumulative trauma
caused her low back condition and her neck, shoulder, and right upper extremity
symptoms . It also pointed to Dr. Rommelman's statement that the 6% impairment
rating for the neck, shoulder, and upper extremity symptoms would probably have been
the same in 2001 .
Turning to the second conclusion, the Board explained that the ALJ's findings
were insufficient under Special Fund v. Clark, supra, and its progeny regarding the
impairment due to piriformis syndrome. It reasoned that Dr. Rommelman first
mentioned right hip and leg radiculopathy in early 2004, that he attributed a 3%
impairment to the condition, and that he testified that his conclusions regarding the
condition were based on objective medical evidence. Noting that such evidence could
represent a worsening of the work-related, repetitive low back condition, the Board
found that the ALJ's explanation for dismissing the claim was inadequate as it did not
specifically address the hip and leg complaints . Therefore, it vacated the dismissal of
that portion of the claim and remanded for additional findings .
As an initial matter, Dr. Garey argues that the Board's and the Court of Appeals'
decisions were not final and appealable because they did not terminate the action,
decide the matter litigated by the parties, or determine some rights in such a manner as
to divest the Board of power. As authority for this argument, he relies on CR 54.01 and
King Coal Company v. King, 940 S.W.2d 510 (Ky. App. 1997) (an action that is
remanded for a disposition that would not terminate the action is not final and
appealable under CR 54.01). His reliance is misplaced .
This court determined in Davis v. Island Creek Coal Co ., 969 S .W .2d 712, 713
(Ky. 1998), that the "final and appealable" analysis found in CR 54 applies to the orders
of a trial level court. Noting that the Board has had appellate jurisdiction since the 1987
Act, the Davis court determined that the rule "has no application to the Board's orders"
and overruled Stewart v. Lawson , 689 S.W.2d 21 (Ky. 1985), to the extent that it held
otherwise. Because the Board's order set aside Davis's award and permitted the ALJ to
divest him of the award on remand, the court concluded that it was final and appealable
although it did not finally dispose of the claim .
In the present case, the Board's order to vacate the dismissal of the portion of
the claim regarding hip and back complaints was final and appealable under Davis v.
Island Creek Coal Co . , supra , because it permitted the ALJ to enter an award in the
claimant's favor on remand (i .e., to divest the employers of their previous victory on that
issue) . Contrary to Dr. Garey's assertion, this appeal is not "a strategic pre-emptive
strike against the ALJ" because it does not concern that portion of the claim. Because
his arguments do not require us to address the matter further, we will not.
Special Fund v. Clark, supra, stands for the principle that although part of a
gradual injury claim may be time-barred, harmful changes attributable to trauma
incurred within two years before a claim is filed remain compensable . In denying the
claimant's petition for reconsideration, the ALJ stated, in pertinent part, as follows :
Plaintiff asks for part of her claim to be found compensable
as having arisen within two years of the date she filed her
claim . However, Dr. Rommelman wasn't able to attribute
any of the 9% impairment he assessed within that two years
that would have enabled me to find it compensable . I could
not find any impairment to have arisen within the two years
prior to February 20, 2004. Therefore, I had to dismiss the
claim in its entirety .
Seizing on this language, the claimant asserts that the ALJ felt compelled to dismiss the
entire upper body claim despite the favorable evidence and also asserts that the
evidence permitted an award. She points to her own testimony that 75% of her
symptoms developed in the two-year period before she filed her claim. She also points
to Dr. Rommelman's testimony that she did not reach MMI until June or July, 2004, and
that it was medically reasonable to accept her testimony that her condition had
worsened up until August, 2003, when she quit working. Finally, she points to
testimony by the employers' expert, Dr. Baker, that she had not reached MMI in 2004.
Although a worker's testimony is competent evidence of her physical condition
and ability to perform various activities at various points in time, only a medical expert is
competent to testify regarding the extent of AMA impairment and its cause. A fair
reading of Dr. Rommelman's testimony is that he did not conclude that the claimant was
at MMI until June or July of 2004 . He acknowledged that her condition was no different
than it had been when he first saw her in October, 2001, but noted that that could only
be determined with hindsight. The employers' expert, Dr. Baker, diagnosed rotator cuff
tendonitis but stated that it would not have been caused by work as a dental hygienist.
He also stated that although the claimant was not at MMI, there was no AMA
impairment for the condition.
Although she appeals, the claimant has failed to show that there was substantial
evidence that part of her upper body impairment was caused by trauma incurred within
the two-year period before she filed her claim. The finding that none of the upper body
impairment remained compensable was supported by Dr. Rommelman's testimony and
was properly affirmed on appeal. Under such circumstances, the ALJ's statements
imply a conclusion that was based on the evidence and the law rather than a
misunderstanding.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed .
Lambert, C.J ., and Graves, Minton, Noble, Scott, and Wintersheimer, J.J .,
concur. McAnulty, J ., not sitting .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT,
LADONNA LUSE:
Craig Houseman
109 South Fourth Street
P .O. Box 1196
Puducah, KY 42002-1196
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE,
ROBERT W. GAREY, D.M .D:
James G . Fogle
Denis S . Kline
Ferred & Fogle, PLLC
203 Speed Building
333 Guthrie Green
Louisville, KY 40202
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEES,
KINNEY E. SLAUGHTER, D.M.D AND
KATHY R. SLAUGHTER, D.M.D:
R. Christion Hutson
Whitlow, Roberts, Houston & Straub, PLLC
P.O. Box 995
Puducah, KY 42002-0995
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