RALPH STEPHENS BAZE, JR., V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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Lm- POR ~'~1NT NOTICE
NOT TO BE PUBLISHEDOPINION
THIS OPINION ISDESIGNATED "NOT TO BE
PUBLISHED." PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF
CIVIL PR OCED URE PROHUL GA TED BY THE
SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION
IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS A UTHORITYINANY OTHER
CASE INANY COURT OF THIS STA TE.
,Suprmr d1outi of A
RENDERED : MAY 18, 2006
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
2005-SC-0415-MR and 2005-SC-4
RALPH STEPHENS BAZE, JR.
V
APPEAL FROM ROWAN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM B. MAINS, JUDGE
1993-CR-00001
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
The two appeals in this case have been consolidated for the purpose of this
Opinion . Case No. 2005-SC-0415 is an appeal from an order of the Rowan Circuit
Judge denying Baze a motion to reopen an RCr 11 .42 proceeding. It contends that
Kentucky law and the Federal Constitution provide for the right to effective assistance
for post-conviction counsel in death penalty cases. Supreme Court No. 2005-SC-420 is
also an appeal from an order of the Rowan Circuit Judge denying Baze relief from
judgment pursuant to CR 60.02 on the grounds that new evidence has not been raised
within a reasonable time, is not of an extraordinary nature and could have been raised
in the original RCr 11 .42 action . Both orders were issued on April 26, 2005.
Baze was convicted of the murder of a sheriff and his deputy . He was
sentenced to death and that sentence was affirmed on direct appeal . Baze v.
Commonwealth , 965 S.W.2d 817 (Ky. 1997). We then denied relief in his first RCr
11 .42 action . Baze v. Commonwealth, 23 S .W .3d 619 (Ky. 2000). This case combines
a second RCr 11 .42 based appeal along with a CR 60.02 action. In addition, a panel of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Court on June 9, 2004, denied a
Federal habeas corpus petition in Baze v. Parker, 371 F .3d 310 (6 t' Cir. 2004), in a very
comprehensive opinion. The petition for rehearing was denied in August 2004 en banc.
An additional CR 60.02 action is currently being rendered today . (2005-SC-0889-MR)
Baze asks this Court to reverse the trial judge's denial of the requested RCr 11 .42 and
CR 60.02 relief. We decline to do so and affirm.
Counsel for Baze argues that the statutory right to post-conviction counsel in
Kentucky in capital cases creates a state law right to the effective assistance of postconviction counsel and a corresponding federal right under the VIII and XIV
amendments to the United States Constitution and that Baze suffered from physical
and sexual abuse in his childhood as well as from brain injuries and frequent suicide
attempts which the jury nor any court has heard as mitigating evidence . In 2005-SC420, counsel for Baze contends that the circuit judge abused his discretion by denying
the motion as untimely; that the reasons for relief are extraordinary ; that RCr 60.02 is
the only avenue for relief; that new evidence presented requires relief from the death
sentence and that Baze suffered from a variety of physical and sexually abusive
childhood problems, as well as brain injuries, and frequent suicide attempts . For
purposes of this Opinion, we will treat these arguments as being consolidated .
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The trial judge denied relief from the RCr 11 .42 request without a hearing, finding
a lack of timeliness . Based on an analysis of foreign case law, the trial judge then
rejected the contention that counsel from a previous post conviction relief motion was
ineffective finding there was no right to effective assistance of counsel in post
conviction proceedings . See generally Stokes v. State, 146 S.W.3d 56 (Tn . 2004) We
examine the combined requests for relief for any abuse of discretion or determination of
error . See Gross v. Commonwealth , 648 S .W .2d 853 (1983).
The trial judge also denied relief from a CR 60.02 request on procedural grounds
without a hearing . We are required to review that portion of the claim de novo to
determine whether the action was filed in a timely manner and to decide whether the
issues could have been raised in a prior RCr 11 .42 motion or whether the additional
mitigation evidence reaches the extraordinary nature required by CR 60.02.
II . SUCCESSIVE POST-CONVICTION RELIEF MOTIONS
This Court previously affirmed a denial of RCr 11 .42 relief in Baze v.
Commonwealth , 23 S.W.3d 619 (Ky. 2000). We are now asked to review a requested
reopening or in the alternative, a second, RCr 11 .42. Whether styled as a reopening or
initiated as a new action, it is plainly an attempt to secure a "second bite at the apple" .
See Alvey v. Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d 858 (Ky. 1983) .
.
RCr 11 .42 requires that "all issues that could reasonably have been presented"
shall be combined in a single motion. Successive RCr 11 .42 requests should not be
considered . Crick v. Commonwealth , 550 S .W.2d 534 (Ky. 1977). The rules do not
allow relief for any issue that could have been raised or should have been raised in
previous actions. See Copeland v. Commonwealth , 415 S.W.2d 842 (1967).
Ill . RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE COUNSEL
KRS 31 .110 provides a limited right to counsel for post conviction proceedings .
Baze had appointed counsel but again claims ineffective assistance because of a
failure to present what seems to be absolutely every shred of possible mitigation
evidence .
We need not address the issue of a state right to effective post conviction
counsel . See Murray v. Giarratano , 492 U.S . 1 (1989) . A detailed review of the
additional mitigation evidence and the trial court orders presents nothing causing us to
determine there was any abuse of discretion or any error significant enough to warrant
a reversal of the original conviction and sentence.
IV. PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS
Any issues which could have been presented in an initial RCr 11 .42 motion may
not be raised in a later post conviction proceeding . Crick v. Commonwealth , 550
S.W.2d 534 (Ky. 1977). The motion "shall state all grounds for holding the sentence
invalid of which the movant has knowledge ." RCr 11 .42.
A case is not the case of any individual counsel . To suggest that simply securing
new counsel should cause us to ignore prior filings or toll time requirements is
unacceptable . Baze had the opportunity to present as much evidence as he desired at
trial . If trial counsel failed to present that evidence through ineffective assistance, Baze
had the opportunity to present it with an RCr 11 .42 motion. To now present that
evidence in the guise of a successive RCr 11 .42 motion or CR 60 .02 proceeding is
beyond the scope of reasonable consideration . Gross v. Commonwealth , 648 S .W.2d
853 (1983).
RCr 11 .42 includes a general time provision of three years. Should the facts of
the claim be unknown to the movant or they could not have been ascertained by the
exercise of due diligence, the deadline for filing is lengthened to three years after the
event establishing one of those exceptions occurs. RCr 11 .42(10). A careful review of
the additional mitigation evidence provided by Baze shows that neither exception would
apply. The evidence has quite simply, been brought forward too late. It is
understandable that any party may not agree with the result of any trial. It should also
be understandable that some finality must be present in the process . The trial judge
reviewed the motion and the additional mitigation evidence and found it did not meet
the time requirements of RCr 11 .42 . After our own review, we agree . There was no
abuse of discretion and there was no error.
In the CR 60.02 portion of this matter, Baze argues that the trial judge again
abused his discretion by dismissing the actions based on procedural rules. A one year
time limit is imposed for newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not
have been discovered previously. CR 60 .02 . Extraordinary circumstances are granted
a reasonable amount of time . See Gross v. Commonwealth , 648 S .W.2d 853 (Ky.
1983). The rule is not meant to allow yet another opportunity to repeat a prior argument
that was unsuccessful in a preceding attack on the judgment. Only issues that cannot
be raised in other proceedings are appropriate . See McQueen v. Commonwealth , 948
S.W .2d 415 (Ky. 1997) .
The trial judge did not abuse his discretion when dismissing the motion on
procedural grounds alone . There was no error. Those procedural deficiencies alone
require us to affirm. We have reviewed the additional mitigation evidence in detail and
find it all could have been included in a previous post conviction request . Any attempt
to now bring this information forward is not timely .
V. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE AND MITIGATION EVIDENCE
Both the RCr 11 .42 and the CR 60.02 motions seek to show that failure of
counsel to present the included additional mitigation evidence was ineffective
assistance of counsel that would require a reversal of the original conviction and
sentence. We have exhaustively reviewed the entire record of these arguments and
fully examined
the supplied affidavits, records, letters, reports, and other materials .
There are over thirty exhibits between the two motions, with some duplication of
information and most of which encompass multiple pages of information .
This sentence requires a heightened reliability . Atkins v. Virginia , 536 U.S . 304
(2002) . Even though we agree that dismissal on procedural grounds was appropriate,
ultimately, the result would not have been different if that additional mitigation
information had been made available to the jury. Moore v. Commonwealth , 983
S. W.2d 479 (Ky. 1998) . The failure to present this evidence until now was not error of
such a substantial nature that there is any reasonable probability that Baze would have
received a different verdict or sentence. Strickland v. Washington , 466 U .S . 668
(1984) .
The allegations of error do not rise to a level requiring us to reverse . The
additional mitigation evidence about his life, physical and mental problems, personality
and family background do not compel us to substitute our judgment for that of the jury,
trial counsel, appellate counsel or even future appellate counsel.
There was no violation of either the VIII or XIV Amendments to the United States
Constitution and there was no due process violation of either the state or federal
constitutional requirement .
The decision of the circuit judge is affirmed .
Scott, J., not sitting. All others concur .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Susan Jackson Balliet
Assistant Public Advocate
David M. Barron
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
Suite 302, 100 Fair Oaks Lane
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE :
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
David A. Smith
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
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