WILLIAM NIEHAUS V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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NOT TO BE PUBLLSILEV OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNA TED "NOT TO BE
PUBLISHED. " PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF
CIT1IL PR OCEDURE PR OHUL GA TED BY THE
SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION
IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CIIED OR USED AS A UTHORITYIN ANY OTHER
CASE INANY COURT OF THIS STA TE.
RENDERED : NOVEMBER 22, 2006
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
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2005-SC-000363-MR
WILLIAM NIEHAUS
V.
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APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM McCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE R . JEFFREY HINES, JUDGE
NO. 03-CR-00325
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
William Niehaus, Appellant, was convicted of first degree manslaughter,
first degree possession of a controlled substance (cocaine), tampering with physical
evidence, unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, and use/possession of drug
paraphernalia . He was sentenced to twenty (20) years for manslaughter, and to two
and a half years imprisonment each for tampering with physical evidence and first
degree possession of a controlled substance (cocaine) . These sentences were ordered
to be served consecutively, for a total of twenty-five (25) years . All other sentences
were ordered to be served concurrently with this twenty-five year sentence . Appellant
appeals from his convictions as a matter of right.'
1
Ky. Const . ยง 110(2)(b) .
-
The facts of this case are as follows. Appellant called Derrick Jones for
the purpose of meeting him to buy crack cocaine . Derrick Jones left a friend's house
and went to meet Appellant . Jones pulled up in front of Appellant's apartment and
honked twice . Appellant came out of his apartment, leaving the front door wide open,
and got into the car. The two men haggled over the price of the cocaine . Throughout
the encounter Jones had his left hand in his pocket and refused to take it out and show
Appellant the piece of cocaine he wanted to purchase. Appellant apparently thought
Jones was going to either rip him off or beat him up and take his money, as both had
happened to him before . Appellant stabbed Jones in the torso. Jones got out of the car
and Appellant got behind the wheel and drove away. Appellant abandoned the car
several blocks away. Emergency medical personnel transported Jones to the hospital
where he died shortly thereafter . Crack cocaine was found in the street where the car
had been stopped and in the car .
Police searched Appellant's open apartment and found a crack pipe and
learned Appellant's identity. He was arrested two days later. Detective Scott Aycock
questioned Appellant, who confessed to stabbing Jones when Jones took his hand out
of his pocket and his hand was empty . Appellant also admitted ownership of the crack
pipe and that he had driven the car to the Red Carpet Inn and abandoned it.
Based on the foregoing, a McCracken County grand jury indicted
Appellant on September 5, 2003, for murder (no mental state alleged) ; theft by unlawful
taking over $300 .00 for driving the car away from the scene; tampering with physical
evidence, when he discarded the knife and his bloody T-shirt; first degree possession of
a controlled substance, cocaine, based on the residue found in the crack pipe; and
possession of drug paraphernalia, first offense, based on the possession of the crack
pipe.
Media coverage about Derrick Jones' death was extensive . In the ten
days between Appellant's arrest and the day the case was presented to the grand jury,
there were six newspaper articles in the Paducah Sun, one of which showed a
photograph of Jones at his high school prom . By July 22, 2004, when Appellant moved
for a change of venue, there had already been thirteen newspaper articles about the
events surrounding Jones' death . Six articles focused on Jones' father, a minister in
Hopkinsville, who brought his ministry to Paducah after his son's death .
After a hearing supported by affidavits, the trial court denied the change of
venue motion because he knew people who didn't read the paper and didn't watch the
news, but agreed to revisit the issue during voir dire. Trial commenced on February 7,
2005, and the trial court denied Appellant's renewed motion to move the trial from
McCracken County. Following the guilty verdict, Appellant was sentenced as set forth
above .
Appellant first argues that he was denied his right to due process of law
and a fair trial when the trial court denied his motion to change venue from McCracken
County . This issue was preserved by Appellant's petition for change of venue .
As previously mentioned, there were several newspaper articles dealing
with the murder and events surrounding the murder . "Under either the due process
clause or KRS 452.210, a change of venue should be granted if it appears that the
2
defendant cannot have a fair trial in the county wherein the prosecution is pending ."
"The moving party must demonstrate that: 1) There has been prejudicial news
coverage, 2) It occurred prior to trial, and 3) The effect of such news coverage is
reasonably likely to prevent a fair trial ."3 Ordinarily, pretrial newspaper coverage of the
defendant, and the crime of which he is accused, does not entitle him to a change of
venue .4 "There must be evidence, other than, and independent of, newspaper articles,
showing that the condition of public sentiment in the county, and for that cause he
cannot have a fair trial in the county in which the prosecution is pending, or at that term
of court.
,5
Furthermore, the amount of pretrial publicity does not determine whether
venue should be changed. The sole question is whether public opinion is so aroused
as to preclude a fair trial .' The "mere fact that jurors may have heard, talked or read
about a case does not require a change of venue, absent a showing that there is a
reasonable likelihood that the accounts or descriptions of the investigation and judicial
proceedings have prejudiced the defendant . . . . Prejudice must be shown unless it may
clearly be implied in a given case from the totality of the circumstances .,,8 "The trial
court .has discretion in this determination and such will not lightly be disturbed ."9
During voir dire, Appellant's counsel asked the venire if they had read any
newspaper articles, viewed any television reports, or been subjected to any other
2 Bowling v. Commonwealth , 942 S.W.2d 293,298 (Ky. 1997) (citin Brewster v.
Commonwealth , 568 S.W.2d 232 (Ky. 1978)) .
Id. (citing Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S . 333, 86 S .Ct. 1507,16 L.E.2d 600 (1966)) .
4 Carsons v. Commonwealth, 47 S.W.2d 997, 1001 (Ky. 1931) .
5 _Id .
6 Kordenbrock v. Commonwealth, 700 S.W.2d 384 (Ky. 1985) .
Stopher v. Commonwealth , 57 S.W.3d 787, 795 (Ky. 2001).
8 Id. (citin Montgomery v. Commonwealth , 819 S.W.2d 713, 716 (Ky. 1991)) .
9 Bowling , 942 S.W.2d at 298. (citin Kordenbrock , 700 S.W.2d 384) .
publicity concerning this case. Only six panelists remembered any news coverage
surrounding this case . And, each of these six panelists said the news coverage had not
affected their impartiality, nor had the news coverage affected their ability to judge the
case fairly. One of these six panelists was dismissed later for cause on an unrelated
issue.
The voir dire reflects the correctness of the trial judge's ruling . Although
the publicity surrounding the trial may have been considered "extensive" based on the
number of news articles, it is apparent from the record that Appellant was tried by a fair
and impartial jury. The trial judge reviewed the publicity and found that it was not
enough to prejudice Appellant . As the trial judge is given great discretion in these
matters, we hold that he did not abuse that discretion .
Appellant next argues that he was substantially prejudiced and denied due
process of law and a fair trial when the prosecutor introduced evidence in the guilt
phase of the trial to arouse sympathy for the victim . Appellant concedes that this issue
is unpreserved, but asks the court to review the claim of error under our palpable error
standard .'o
Appellant argues reversible error occurred when, during the
Commonwealth's opening statement and closing argument, the jury was shown a
picture of victim Jones at his high school prom . Appellant also argues reversible error
occurred when the Commonwealth's first witness, Melissa McHaney, cried during her
testimony. Lastly, Appellant argues reversible error occurred when the Commonwealth
'o RCr 1 0 .26.
made several statements describing the factual brutality of the killing . Appellant
characterizes these unpreserved allegations of error as "victim impact evidence ."
Appellant did not object when Jones' picture was shown to the jury during
the opening argument. Appellant did not object, or ask for a recess, during Melissa
McHaney's testimony. Appellant did not object to the Commonwealth's factual
description of the brutal killing during its closing argument.
RCr 10.26, the palpable error standard, states as follows:
A palpable error which affects the substantial rights of a
party may be considered by the court on motion for a new
trial or by an appellate court on appeal, even though
insufficiently raised or preserved for review, and appropriate
relief may be granted upon a determination that manifest
injustice has resulted from the error.
We have reviewed the record, and find no palpable error . The instances
Appellant complains of amount to little more than creative advocacy. The picture of the
victim was used to put a face on the man who was murdered .
"[W]e find no error in
bringing to the attention of the jury that the victim was a living person, more than just a
nameless void left somewhere on the face of the community.""
Furthermore, the fact that a witness, who lost a friend at the hands of
Appellant, cried during her testimony is no basis for palpable error relief. Emotions are
often strong in homicide cases, and we cannot say that palpable error occurred when a
witness lost her composure while she testified .
Finally, the facts of this case were brutal, and the Commonwealth had
every right to so inform the jury. A watered-down version of the facts of the crime is not
required . The jury was entitled to hear the facts as they were.
11
McQueen v. Commonwealth, 669 S .W.2d 519, 524 (Ky. 1984).
For the foregoing reasons we affirm the conviction of Appellant .
Lambert, C.J ., and Graves, McAnulty, Minton, Roach, Scott, and
Wintersheimer, JJ ., concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Euva D. May
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
Suite 302, 100 Fair Oaks Lane'
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Gregory D . Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Room 118, Capitol Building
Frankfort, KY 40601
David W. Barr
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
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