DILLARD HOSKINS V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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NOT TO BE PUBLISh~EDOPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE
PUBLISHED." PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE PROHULGATED BY THE
SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION
IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS A UTHORITYINANY OTHER
CASE INANY COURT OF THIS STATE.
RENDERED : JUNE 15, 2006
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
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2005-SC-0300-MR
DILLARD HOSKINS
V
BAT
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BELL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES L. BOWLING, JR ., JUDGE
04-CR-175
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
Appellant, Dillard Hoskins, was convicted by a Bell Circuit Court jury of two
counts of trafficking in a controlled substance in the first-degree, KRS 218A .1412, and
two counts of trafficking in a controlled substance in the second-degree, KRS
218A .1413. He was sentenced to a total of twenty-five years imprisonment and appeals
to this Court as a matter of right, Ky. Const. ยง 110(2)(b), asserting one claim of
reversible error, viz: the trial court's suppression of evidence that the informant who
participated in the controlled drug "buys" from Appellant had been accused of stealing
from a post office and that the Bell County Sheriffs Department had "covered it up ."
Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm.
Between November 7 and December 10, 2003, Appellant engaged in four
controlled drug transactions at his residence in Bell County, Kentucky, with April Jones,
a confidential informant working for the Sell County Sheriffs Department . During each
transaction, Appellant sold Jones between three and ten tablets of either Percocet or
Lorcet-both pharmaceutical pain medications .' Jones surreptitiously audiotaped the
first three transactions and the sheriffs department surreptitiously videotaped the fourth
transaction .
On the morning of trial, the Commonwealth moved in limine to exclude any
mention by defense counsel of a theft from a post office alleged to have been
perpetrated by Jones and covered up by the sheriffs department . KRE 103(d). The
prosecutor stated that this allegation first came to light during a defense counsel's
opening statement in the prosecution of another drug-trafficking case in which Jones
was also the confidential informant . Although the trial court had ultimately suppressed
the evidence in the previous case, the prosecutor sought to ensure that the allegation
was not mentioned again in this case. The trial court sustained the motion, stating that
he remembered it from the last trial and that it "had no place . . . ." The record contains
no other information about this alleged evidence .
Appellant neither moved to introduce this evidence nor expressed an intention to
do so prior to the Commonwealth's motion in limine . Defense counsel did not object
when the Commonwealth made its motion or when the judge made .his ruling . In fact,
defense counsel said nothing during the approximately one-minute "hearing ." On
appeal, Appellant argues that he would have used this evidence to impeach Jones's
credibility as a witness . Unfortunately, he did not so inform the trial court either in
response to the motion in limine or during cross-examination of Jones. KRE 103(a)(2) .
KRE 608(b) provides :
' Percocet contains oxycodone, a Schedule II controlled substance, KRS 218A .070, and
Lorcet contains hydrocodone, a Schedule III controlled substance, KRS 218A.090 .
-2-
Specific instances of conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or
supporting the witness' credibility. . . . may not be proved by extrinsic
evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of
truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the
witness (1) concerning the witness' character for truthfulness or
untruthfulness . . . . No specific instance of conduct of a witness may be
the subject of inquiry under this provision unless the cross-examiner has a
factual basis for the subiect matter of his inquiry.
(Emphasis added .) We do not know why the trial judge suppressed this evidence at the
previous trial, and he stated no reason for suppressing it at this trial other than that he
had suppressed it at the previous trial. Appellant has shown no factual basis for the
allegations of theft and cover-up either at trial or on appeal. We are unable to conclude
that the trial court abused its discretion in suppressing evidence that Appellant never
indicated an intent to introduce or explained how or why it was admissible .
In any event, it is hard to imagine how an attack on Jones's credibility would have
changed the outcome of the case when Appellant is seen on videotape during one
transaction withdrawing the contraband from a bag and handing it to Jones, and he is
heard on the audiotapes engaging in three additional transactions with Jones. Although
part of Appellant's defense at trial was that a third party, Christy Saylor (now deceased),
was the seller, the images and sounds from the recordings introduced at trial show
otherwise .
Furthermore, the Commonwealth elicited testimony from Jones on direct
examination that she was a convicted felon and that she was currently on felony
probation . Jones also testified that she was paid $50.00 by the sheriffs department for
her participation in each of the four controlled drug buys, but that she had not been
made any other promises regarding other offenses or pending charges. She also
admitted on cross-examination that she had told her mother and Appellant's sister that
she did not sell any drugs to Appellant . Thus, the jury was presented with substantial
evidence tending to impeach Jones's credibility. It is hard to imagine how additional
impeachment would undermine the inherent veracity of the audiotape and videotape
recordings that capture Appellant conducting drug transactions with Jones. Thus, if any
error had occurred we would deem it harmless . RCr 9.24; Abernathy v.
Commonwealth , 439 S .W.2d 949, 952 (Ky. 1969) ("[I]f upon a consideration of the
whole case this court does not believe there is a substantial possibility that the result
would have been any different, the irregularity will be held nonprejudicial ."), overruled on
other grounds by Blake v. Commonwealth , 646 S .W .2d 718 (Ky. 1983).
Accordingly, the judgment of convictions and the sentences imposed by the Bell
Circuit Court are AFFIRMED .
All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Randall L. Wheeler
Assistant Public Advocate
Suite 302
100 Fair Oaks Lane
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General
State Capitol
Frankfort, KY 40601
George G. Seelig
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
Office of the Attorney General
Suite 200
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601
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