CHRISTOPHER RAY V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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J MPORTANT NOTIC"'IE
NOT TO BETUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNA TED "NOT TO BE
PUBLISHED." PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF
CI VIL PROCEDURE PR OMUL GA TED BY THE
SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION
IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SMALL NOTBE
CITED OR USED AS A UTHORITYINANY OTHER
CASE INANY COURT OF THIS STATE.
RENDERED : SEPTEMBER 21, 2006
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
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APPELLANT
CHRISTOPHER RAY
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PAMELA GOODWINE, JUDGE
INDICTMENT NO. 02-CR-01183-1
V
APPELLEE
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
Affirminq
A jury of the Fayette Circuit Court convicted Appellant, Christopher David Ray, of
Murder and Robbery in the First Degree. For these crimes, Appellant was sentenced to
a total of sixty years imprisonment . Appellant now appeals to this Court as a matter of
right. Ky. Const. § 110(2)(b) . For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm Appellant's
convictions .
On August 25, 2001, Appellant robbed and shot Marvin Fair. Being critically
wounded, Fair was rushed to the hospital and immediately placed on artificial life
support . Fair was diagnosed after several days as having no meaningful chance of
recovery . Based upon this medical opinion, Fair's family agreed to withdraw the
mechanical support systems that were maintaining Fair's circulation and respiration .
Fair died shortly thereafter.
Appellant was convicted by jury of the crimes set forth above . Appellant now
appeals to this Court alleging that the trial court erred in denying Appellant's motion for
directed verdict on the charge of murder. We disagree and thus affirm Appellant's
convictions .
Appellant's sole argument on appeal is that there was insufficient evidence for a
reasonable jury to conclude that Fair's death was caused by the gunshot wounds
inflicted by Appellant . A directed verdict is appropriate in any given case if, as a matter
of law, the evidence is insufficient "to induce a reasonable juror to believe beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty." Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S .W.2d
186, 187 (Ky. 1991).
In order to be found guilty of murder, the jury must find that the defendant caused
the death of another human being . KRS § 507 .020, see also , Robertson v.
Commonwealth , 82 S.W.3d 832, 835 (Ky. 2002) (sufficient evidence existed to submit
charge of manslaughter to jury where defendant resisted arrest by unlawfully fleeing
from police officer and the police officer subsequently fell to his death while pursuing the
defendant) . KRS § 501 .060 defines conduct as being the cause of a particular result
"when it is an antecedent without which the result in question would not have occurred ."
The commentary to KRS § 501 .060 explains that any antecedent which "constitute[s] a
`substantial factor' in bringing about the result in issue" is a legal cause of that result . Id.
In this case, it is undisputed that Appellant's conduct was the sole and primary
factor in bringing about the failure of Fair's basic physiological functions and thus his
placement onto artificial life support. Appellant claims nonetheless that the Fair family's
decision to withdraw the artificial life support was an intervening cause of Fair's death
which relieved him of any causal liability therefor . We find this proposition to be
completely without merit.
First, it is important to note that Appellant does not claim that the Fair family's
decision was in anyway inappropriate or unlawful . Rather, Appellant simply maintains
that if the Fair family had not withdrawn the artificial life support, there is some miniscule
chance' that Fair may not have died. As it has been held by almost all, if not all, other
jurisdictions that have been presented with this question, the lawful decision to withdraw
artificial life support from a loved one is simply not an independent, intervening cause of
death sufficient to relieve one of causal liability, since people have a right to refuse the
artificial maintenance of their essential physiological systems . See , e.g_, State v.
Pelham , 824 A.2d 1082, 1090-91 (N .J . 2003) (holding that removal of life support is not
an independent, intervening cause of death and citing to numerous jurisdictions that
have held similarly); Carrigg v. State, 696 N .E.2d 392, 396 (Ind. App . 1998) ("In order
for an intervening cause to break the chain of criminal responsibility, the intervening
cause must be so extraordinary that it would be unfair to hold the defendant responsible
for the actual result."); State v. Yates , 824 P.2d 519, 523 (Wash . App . 1992) ("When life
support is removed, the cause of death is not the removal, but whatever agency
generated the need for the life support in the first instance ."); see also , State v.
Cunningham, 474 S .E .2d 772, 783 (N.C. 1996) ; Trepal v. State , 621 So.2d 1361, 1366
(Fla . 1993); State v. Meints , 322 N.W.2d 809, 813-14 (Neb . 1982).
Second, Appellant's infliction of gunshot wounds into Fair's head and abdomen
would still be a legally sufficient cause of Fair's death even if removal from life support
' Fair's treating physician testified that he anticipated a 90% mortality rate from the
nature of Fair's brain injury and a 10% possibility that Fair could exist for some time in a
deep vegetative coma .
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were considered an intervening cause . The comments to KRS § 501 .060 state that an
intervening cause of death is not sufficient to relieve one of causal liability if "the harm or
injury resulting from the [intervening cause] is deemed to have been reasonably
foreseeable by the first actor ." Id . In this case, the acts of being placed on and then
lawfully removed from artificial life support systems are reasonably foreseeable results
of being shot in the head and abdomen by a .38 caliber revolver . Accordingly, there
was sufficient evidence in this case for the jury to conclude that Appellant's acts legally
caused Fair's death .
The judgment of the Fayette Circuit Court is affirmed .
Lambert, C .J., Graves, McAnulty, Minton, Roach, and Scott, J.J., concur.
Wintersheimer, J ., concurs in result only.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Shelly R. Fears
Assistant Public Advocate
Department for Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302
Frankfort, KY 40601
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General
George G . Seelig
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601
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