EMORY HUDSON V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
AS MODIFIED : OCTOBER 19, 2006
RENDERED : MAY 18, 2006
TO BE PUBLISHED
,$uprerar Courf of
2005-SC-0120-MR
EMORY HUDSON
V.
Z~AT[ED
L
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MONTGOMERY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM B. MAINS, JUDGE
04-CR-174
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
On January 18, 2005, a Montgomery Circuit Court jury convicted Appellant,
Emory Hudson, of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol ("DUI"),
fourth offense, KRS 189A .010(1), (5)(d), (11)(d), a class D Felony, and of being a
persistent felony offender in the first degree, KRS 532 .080(3). The trial court sentenced
Appellant to twenty years in prison, pursuant to the jury's recommendation . He appeals
to this Court as a matter of right, Ky. Const. ยง 110(2)(b), asserting the following claims
of error: (1) the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on alcohol intoxication ; and (2) the
trial court's refusal to grant a continuance . Finding no error, we affirm.
FACTS
On June 21, 2004, while operating his police cruiser westbound on Old
Owingsville Road, Mt. Sterling police officer Greg Ball observed an eastbound white
Dodge Intrepid drift across the center line, forcing Ball and another westbound motorist
to swerve off the road to avoid a head-on collision . Although Ball testified at trial that he
could not positively identify Appellant as the driver of the adverse vehicle, he saw only
one person in the car. Ball immediately reversed direction, activated his emergency
equipment, and pursued the vehicle. Ball testified that as he approached the Dodge, it
turned into an apartment complex parking lot and momentarily disappeared from view.
Ball followed and regained sight of the vehicle as it pulled into a parking space and
came to rest.
Ball testified that he approached the Dodge to find Appellant alone in the vehicle,
seated in the driver's seat with the engine running, the radio blaring, and a forty-ounce
beer bottle sitting on the passenger-side floorboard. Upon inquiry, Appellant admitted to
having consumed three or four forty-ounce containers of beer that day. In Officer Ball's
opinion, Appellant was too unstable to be safely subjected to a field sobriety test. Thus,
Ball took Appellant to a nearby hospital for a blood-alcohol test which ultimately
revealed Appellant to have a blood alcohol concentration of 0.30 grams/100 millilitersnearly four times the legal limit . The Dodge was owned by Pam Moore, Appellant's
girlfriend .
Appellant's account of the events differed from Officer Ball's. At trial, Appellant
conceded that he was intoxicated but claimed that another (non-testifying) person had
actually driven Appellant to the apartment complex so that Appellant could borrow some
money from his grandmother in order to purchase more beer. According to Appellant,
the two arrived at the apartment complex, at which point Appellant entered his
grandmother's apartment to use the restroom . He returned to the car after several
minutes to find the driver missing. Appellant decided to look inside the Dodge for a
cigarette to smoke while he "worked up the nerve" to ask his grandmother to loan him
the beer money. Just as he sat down in the driver's seat, he noticed Officer Ball's police
cruiser come to a halt behind the Dodge .
The only eyewitness testimony offered by the Commonwealth was that of Officer
Ball . Appellant presented three witnesses in his defense, including himself . Ray Nester,
Appellant's uncle, testified that Appellant and several other persons had been at
Nester's residence earlier that same day, drinking beer and socializing . However,
because he was inside the house with the blinds closed, napping, while the others were
socializing on the porch, Nester could not say exactly who was present or when
Appellant (or anyone else) arrived or departed . Appellant's grandmother testified that
Appellant entered her apartment at the time in question, used the restroom, hugged her
and briefly exchanged pleasantries, then stated his intention to return and exited. She
testified that Appellant appeared sober and did not smell of alcohol .
I. JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Appellant argues that he was unduly prejudiced by the trial court's refusal to
instruct the jury on alcohol intoxication, KRS 222.202(1), as a defense to the charge of
operating a motor vehicle with an alcohol concentration of or above 0 .08, KRS
189A.01 0(1)(a), or operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, KRS
189A.010(1)(b) .
"It shall be the duty of the court to instruct the jury in writing on the law of the
case . . . ." RCr 9.54(1). Under this rule, "[t]he jury instructions must be complete and
the defendant has a right to have every issue of fact raised by the evidence and
material to his defense submitted to the jury on proper instructions ." Haves v.
3
Commonwealth , 870 S.W.2d 786, 788 (Ky. 1993) (emphasis added) . Appellant
conceded that he was intoxicated when he encountered Officer Ball. His "defense" was
that a third party, not he, was operating the motor vehicle, and the only offense that he
committed was alcohol intoxication-because he was intoxicated in a public place, but
not operating a motor vehicle . As such, Appellant asserts that an instruction on alcohol
intoxication was required because that instruction raised an "issue of fact . . . material to
his defense," id., and, thus, mandated an instruction on the issue .
"A defendant is entitled to an instruction on any lawful defense which he has.
Although a lesser included offense is not a defense within the technical meaning of
those terms as used in the penal code, it is, in fact and principle, a defense against the
higher charge ." Slaven v. Commonwealth , 962 S.W.2d 845, 856 (Ky. 1997) (citations
omitted) . KRS 505.020(2) establishes whether a charge is a lesser-included offense.
Perry v. Commonwealth , 839 S.W .2d 268, 272 (Ky. 1992) ; Hart v. Commonwealth , 768
S.W.2d 552, 553 (Ky. App . 1989). Under KRS 505.020(2), "[a] defendant may be
convicted of an offense that is included in any offense with which he is formally charged.
An offense is so included when: (a) It is established by proof of the same or less than
all the facts required to establish the commission of the offense charged . . . ."
(Emphasis added.) See also Wombles v. Commonwealth , 831 S .W.2d 172,175-76 (Ky.
1992); Turpin v. Commonwealth , 780 S .W.2d 619, 622 (Ky. 1989), overruled on other
grounds by Thomas v. Commonwealth , 864 S.W.2d 252, 260 (Ky. 1993) . As the trial
court properly stated, alcohol intoxication is not a lesser included offense of DUI
because each requires proof of an element that the other does not. Commonwealth v.
Burge , 947 S.W .2d 805, 811 (Ky. 1996).
4
KRS 222 .202 states, inter alia :
(1)
A person is guilty of alcohol intoxication when he appears in a
public place manifestly under the influence of alcohol to the degree
that he may endanger himself or other persons or property, or
unreasonably annoy persons in his vicinity .
KRS 189A .010(1) provides in pertinent part:
A person shall not operate or be in physical control of a motor vehicle
anywhere in the state:
(a)
Having an alcohol concentration of 0 .08 or more as measured by a
scientifically reliable test or tests of a sample of the person's breath
or blood taken within two (2) hours of cessation of operation or
physical control of a motor vehicle;
(b)
While under the influence of alcohol; . . . .
Each offense requires proof of at least one element that the other does not, i.e. , being
manifestly intoxicated in public' to the degree that the suspect or others may be
endangered (for alcohol intoxication); and being in operation of a motor vehicle while
having an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or while under the influence of alcohol (for
DU
1) .2
As such, neither is a lesser-included offense of the other. "[I]f the lesser offense
requires proof of a fact not required to prove the greater offense, then the lesser offense
' KRS 189A .010(1) prohibits operating a motor vehicle under the influence of
intoxicants on private property; proof that a violation occurred in public is not required .
Lynch v. Commonwealth , 902 S.W.2d 813, 815 (Ky. 1995) (phrase "anywhere in the
state" in statute includes private driveway).
2 In actuality, the two offenses share no common elements: DUI under KRS
189A .010(1) requires only an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or a finding that a driver is
merely "under the influence of alcohol," whereas alcohol intoxication requires proof that
a defendant is "manifestly under the influence of alcohol to the degree that . . . ... See
Harris v. City of Tulsa, 589 P .2d 1082, 1086 (Okla . Crim . App. 1979) ("In order to
convict an accused charged with 'operating a motor vehicle . . . while under the
influence of intoxicating liquor' it is not required that the jury find that the accused was
intoxicated or drunk, but only that such driver be 'under the influence of intoxicating
liquor . . . .") (quotations omitted) .
is not included in the greater offense, but is simply a separate, uncharged offense ."
Colwell v. Commonwealth , 37 S.W.3d 721, 726 (Ky. 2000); Commonwealth v. Day, 983
S.W.2d 505, 509 (Ky. 1999) . See also Harris v. City of Tulsa , 589 P.2d 1082, 1085-86
(Okla. Crim. App . 1979) (holding instruction for public intoxication not required as
lesser-included offense in prosecution for DUI). Therefore, Appellant was not entitled to
an instruction on alcohol intoxication on the premise that it is a lesser-included offense .
Appellant next asserts that he was entitled to an instruction on alcohol
intoxication because, though not a lesser-included offense, it is a "lesser" offense that
served as a defense to the DUI charge in that a finding of guilt of the former would
preclude a finding of guilt of the latter. That, of course, is incorrect. If alcohol intoxication
is not a lesser included offense of DUI, then, if properly charged, the jury could find guilt
of both . Bulge, 947 S .W .2d at 811 . Further, the fact that the evidence would support a
guilty verdict on a lesser uncharged offense does not entitle a defendant to an
instruction on that offense . Kotila v. Commonwealth , 114 S .W.3d 226, 242 n.3 (Ky.
2003), overruled on other grounds by Matheney v. Commonwealth , 191 S.W .3d 599 (Ky.
2006).
Appellant relies exclusively on Taylor v. Commonwealth , 995 S.W.2d 355 (Ky.
1999), Sanbom v. Commonwealth, 754 S.W .2d 534 (Ky. 1988), and Mishler v.
Commonwealth , 556 S.W .2d 676 (Ky. 1977), for the proposition that a requested
instruction is required for "each theory of the case supported by the testimony to any
extent ," Appellant's Brief, at 6, regardless of whether it is a lesser-included offense of
the crime charged .
Taylor and Mishler are clearly inapposite, as both involve the erroneous refusal
to instruct the jury on a defendant's statutory defenses to the charged crimes, no matter
how improbable under the facts. Taylor, 995 S.W.2d at 361 (finding error when trial
court refused to instruct jury on statutory justification of duress, KRS 501 .090, despite
paucity of supporting evidence); Mishler, 556 S.W.2d at 679-80 (finding error when trial
court refused to instruct on defense of intoxication, KRS 501 .080, because, if found, it
would negate requisite culpable mental state). See also Ha ey s v. Commonwealth , 870
S .W.2d 786, 788-89 (Ky. 1993) (error to refuse instruction on self-defense or protection
of others, KRS 503.050, .070); Commonwealth v. Sanders, 685 S.W.2d 557, 558-59 (Ky.
1985) (discussing when instruction on intoxication defense is required); Lawson v.
Commonwealth , 309 Ky. 458, 218 S .W.2d 41, 42 (1949) (self-defense); Nall v.
Commonwealth, 280 Ky. 700, 271 S.W. 1059 (1925) (common law defense of coercion) .
However, Appellant's claim does not involve an instruction on a legal "defense" or
"justification" under the penal code . Thus reliance on Mishler and Taylor is misplaced .
Although Sanborn does contain language suggesting an instruction on a
separate, uncharged, but "lesser" offense is required whenever the evidence could
conceivably support the charge, 754 S.W.2d at 550, we note that Sanborn is a plurality
opinion3 of limited precedential value. "[A] minority opinion has no binding precedential
value . . . [and] if a majority of the court agreed on a decision in the case, but less than a
majority could agree on the reasoning for that decision, the decision has no stare
only.
3 Three justices concurred in the opinion, and two justices concurred in result
decisis effect." Fu-gate v. Commonwealth , 62 S .W.3d 15,19 (Ky. 2001) (quoting Ware v.
Commonwealth , 47 S .W.3d 333, 335 (Ky. 2001)).
"Where there is no room for any possible theory except that he is -guilty . . . or he
is innocent , there is no reason for the court to instruct on lesser offenses . . . ...
Commonwealth v. Wolford , 4 S .W.3d 534, 538-39 (Ky. 1999) (emphasis added) . An
instruction on a separate, uncharged, but "lesser' crime-in other words, an alternative
theory of the crime-is required only when a guilty verdict as to the alternative crime
would amount to a defense to the charged crime, i .e., when being guilty of both crimes
is mutually exclusive . This is a subtle distinction that the broad language in Sanborn
does not necessarily make .
Even in that case, however, the defendant's proposed
instructions were for offenses that would have excluded the charged offenses . As such,
we depart from Sanborn to the extent that it requires alternate theory instructions as to
uncharged crimes whenever the evidence suggests the existence of such crimes. To
do otherwise would allow a criminal appellant to seek reversal of his conviction simply
because the trial court failed to instruct as to all the criminal acts he may have
committed, regardless of whether the other uncharged crimes have any bearing on guilt
as to the charged crimes.
As applied to this case, it is clear that Appellant was not entitled to the instruction .
Appellant was either guilty of DUI or he was not guilty . The fact that he could
additionally have been indicted and convicted of alcohol intoxication for the same
incident does not change this analysis . The two charges were not mutually exclusive .
Thus, the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on alcohol intoxication .
11. CONTINUANCE
Appellant asserts that it was reversible error for the trial court to deny his motion
for a continuance, filed on January 5, 2005, thirteen days prior to trial. "[T]he granting of
a continuance is within the sound discretion of the trial court and a conviction will not be
reversed for failure to grant a continuance unless that discretion has been plainly
abused and manifest injustice has resulted ." Taylor v. Commonwealth , 545 S.W.2d 76,
77 (Ky. 1976); see also Williams v. Commonwealth, 644 S .W.2d 335, 336-37 (Ky. 1982).
Whether a continuance is warranted in a particular case depends upon the particular
facts and circumstances of that case. Snod-grass v. Commonwealth , 814 S .W.2d 579,
581 (Ky. 1991), overruled on other -grounds by Lawson v. Commonwealth , 53 S.W.3d
534 (Ky. 2001).
In exercising its discretion, a trial court considers the following factors:
length of delay ; previous continuances; inconvenience to litigants,
witnesses, counsel and the court; whether the delay is purposeful or is
caused by the accused ; availability of other competent counsel ;
complexity of the case ; and whether denying the continuance will lead to
identifiable prejudice .
Snodgrass , 814 S.W.2d at 581 . Although no previous continuances were requested or
granted, Appellant did not file his motion for a continuance until one day after the "report
date" by which all such motions were required to be filed . Additionally, the case was
not complex: the Commonwealth called three witnesses, the arresting officer and two
witnesses who testified for the sole purpose of laying the foundation for introducing
4 At Appellant's arraignment on September 27, 2004, the trial court issued an
order that stated, inter alia , "After the report date [January 4, 2005], the Court will not . . .
continue any cases except for good cause." Appellant filed his motion to continue on
January 5, 2005 .
9
Appellant's blood-alcohol test result ; Appellant called three witnesses, his uncle, his
grandmother, and himself.
Moreover, Appellant has failed to identify any prejudice resulting from the denial
of his motion. Although he claims that more time was needed to investigate the case,
prepare a defense, and "requesto additional experts . . . as well as pursueo suppression
issues," he failed to comply with the requirements of RCr 9.04 (requiring affidavit
showing materiality of evidence or expected witness testimony if continuance granted)
or to suggest with any detail how the substantial evidence against him might be
mitigated by an alternate theory were he granted a continuance . Denials of criminal
defendants' motions for a continuance for failure to comply with the procedural
requirements of RCr 9 .04, including the required showing of prejudice, have uniformly
been upheld on appeal. E.g., Harris v. Commonwealth , 869 S.W.2d 32, 33-34 (Ky. 1993)
(defendant failed to show prejudice where defense counsel withdrew five days prior to
trial, no grounds stated in support of RCr 9.04 motion, new counsel received complete
file, discovery complete, and no additional witnesses to subpoena) ; Estep v.
Commonwealth, 663 S .W.2d 213, 216 (Ky. 1983) (though absent witness identified,
expected testimony as set forth in affidavit would be cumulative, thus no prejudice) ;
Sussman v. Commonwealth , 610 S .W .2d 608, 612-13 (Ky. 1980) (where requested bill
of particulars was provided orally three days prior to trial, and seventeen months after
motion therefor, defendant was still required to submit affidavit under RCr 9.04);
Cornwell v . Commonwealth, 523 S.W .2d 224, 227-28 (Ky. 1975) (defendant filed proper
affidavit stating expected testimony of absent witness who had testified at two prior trials,
but failed to ensure that issued subpoena was actually served on prospective witness) ;
10
Baqbv v. Commonwealth , 424 S.W.2d 119,121 (Ky. 1968) ('Without an affidavit
revealing facts which show to us that the trial court abused its discretion we will not
declare that an error was committed ."); Whalen v. Commonwealth, 891 S.W.2d 86, 88
(Ky. App. 1995) (defendant failed to disclose testimony absent witness would provide),
overruled on other grounds by Moore v. Commonwealth , 990 S .W .2d 618 (Ky. 1999).
Cf. Taylor v. Commonwealth , 545 S .W.2d 76, 77 (Ky. 1976) (though denial of
continuance was improper in rape case where defense counsel was appointed one day
before trial, reversal not required because evidence of guilt was overwhelming, thus
prejudice not shown).
In the case sub iudice, the affidavit filed with Appellant's untimely RCr 9.04
motion failed to disclose the materiality of the witnesses or evidence that could be
presented if the motion were granted; thus no prejudice was shown . As such, the trial
court's decision was not "arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal
principles," Commonwealth v. English , 993 S .W .2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999), and thus no
abuse of discretion occurred .
Accordingly, the judgment of the Montgomery Circuit Court is AFFIRMED .
All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Damon L. Preston
Department of Public Advocacy
Suite 302
100 Fair Oaks Lane
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General
Room 118
State Capitol
Frankfort, KY 40601
Clint Evans Watson
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
,iupreme Courf of itufurhV
2005-SC-0120-MR
EMORY HUDSON
V.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MONTGOMERY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM B . MAINS, JUDGE
04-CR-174
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR REHEARING OR MODIFICATION
AND
MODIFYING OPINION ON THE COURT'S OWN MOTION
The petition for rehearing and alternative motion for modification filed by
appellant, Emory Hudson, is hereby DENIED.
On the Court's own motion, this Court hereby modifies the published opinion
rendered on May 18, 2006 through the deletion and addition of language on pages 1, 5,
6, 7 and 8 of that opinion . Due to pagination, the attached published opinion substitutes
in full for the previously rendered opinion . Said modification does not affect the holding .
Lambert, C.J . ; Graves, McAnulty, Minton, Roach and Wintersheimer, JJ., concur.
Scott, J., concurs in result only.
Entered : October 19, 2006 .
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.