MICHAEL LEWIS TAYLOR V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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2005-SC-000119-MR
MICHAEL LEWIS TAYLOR
V.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MCCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE R. JEFFREY HINES, JUDGE
03-CR-00315
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
I. INTRODUCTION
Appellant, Michael Lewis Taylor, was convicted by jury in the McCracken
Circuit Court for the murder of Connie Morgan and was sentenced to twenty-five
years imprisonment . Appellant now appeals his conviction and sentence as a
matter of right pursuant to Ky. Const. § 110(2)(b), alleging the trial court
committed several errors, viz. (1) that the trial court improperly refused to
consider Appellant a victim of domestic violence and thus erred in refusing to
exempt Appellant from the requirement that he serve at least 85% of his
sentence pursuant to KRS 439.3401 ; (2) that the trial court erred when it limited
Appellant's direct examination of a witness when it excluded testimonial evidence
as irrelevant; (3) that Appellant was entitled to a directed verdict due to
insufficiency of the evidence; and (4) that Appellant was denied the right to a fair
and impartial jury due to allegations that two jurors were sleeping during the trial.
For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm Appellant's conviction and sentence.
II . FACTS
Appellant, Michael Lewis Taylor, and the victim, Connie Morgan, had a
very tumultuous relationship . Appellant had been married for twenty-five years to
his now ex-wife, Sharon Taylor, and had several affairs throughout their
marriage . One of these affairs involved Morgan . Appellant, a truck driver, met
Morgan while on a trip in May 2002, when her then boyfriend tried to talk
Appellant into having sex with her for $40 . Appellant declined, but offered
Morgan a ride with him to Florida as she wanted to get away from her boyfriend .
Several weeks later, Appellant and Morgan began seeing each other exclusively
until her death .
Appellant characterizes Morgan's behavior as bizarre and has noted in his
brief that Morgan had mental problems. A medical examiner who testified at the
trial described "hesitation marks" on her arms, the product of attempted suicide .
Appellant also described the troubled childhood led by Morgan . She was raised
in foster care where she claims she killed her foster father . Morgan also
allegedly killed a woman in South Carolina .
Appellant's relationship with Morgan appears to have gone sour when she
prevented him from contacting his children. Morgan screened Appellant's phone
calls and hid his phone from him on occasion . Morgan also told Appellant that if
he left her, she would kill him and his family . Further, Appellant tells of one
particular event in which he awoke to find that Morgan had bound his hands
together and cut off his hair. She then proceeded to stab him in the chest and
buttocks, causing Appellant to pass out from the blood loss. Appellant, however,
says he still was very much in love with her, and even tried to get her to see a
psychologist . It was after this suggestion that Morgan appears to have
overdosed on pills . Appellant called 9-1-1, and Morgan recovered . A doctor
wanted to institutionalize Morgan, but she was released to Appellant's care
instead.
On several occasions, others witnessed Morgan's bizarre behavior. For
example, after the couple returned from North Carolina where Morgan procured
the CDL license of another female truck driver, Eva Chappell, Morgan became
intoxicated and ran around naked in an RV park . That evening ended when
Morgan attempted to hit a police officer with a metal rod and was subsequently
arrested for disorderly conduct. Appellant attempted to leave Morgan after this
episode, but when Morgan injured her leg, Appellant decided to stay. Appellant
testified that Morgan only exhibited this bizarre behavior when she was
intoxicated .
.
On August 3, 2003, several witnesses, who later testified at trial, observed
Morgan run screaming from an RV in which she and Appellant were living at the
time . The witnesses described Morgan as wearing only a bathrobe . The
witnesses recount that Morgan fell on the ground once outside the RV and that
she was bleeding from a wound on her face . Morgan screamed to the witnesses :
"Please help me, don't let him kill me!" One witness, Doris Gillam, called 9-1-1 .
Appellant then emerged from the RV and slowly picked up Morgan and carried
her into the RV as Morgan screamed again "Please don't let him kill me." Gillarn
testified that she asked Appellant what he doing and where he was taking
Morgan. Appellant did not respond . The witnesses then described the RV as
rocking back and forth . Another witness, Eddie Grueber, saw the door of the RV
open and described what appeared to be Morgan's arm or hand hanging out of
the open doorway, with Appellant squatting over her. Appellant then exited the
RV, but went back inside when he heard the sirens of approaching police.
When police arrived, they found Appellant out of breath with blood on his
arms and ears . He told McCracken County Sheriff's Deputy Jessie Riddle that
Morgan was dead . Morgan had no pulse and her face was covered with a
bloody towel . Appellant confessed to Deputy David Knight that he stabbed
Morgan in the throat, but that he did so out of self-defense . According to
Appellant, he awoke to find Morgan on top of him with a knife to his chest. A
struggle ensued. Appellant was stabbed in the sternum and abdomen, and
Morgan sustained a stab wound to the eye, which is when she ran out of the RV.
Appellant testified that he did not remember anything after this point.
Dr. Deirdre Schluckebier testified that the knife used to kill Morgan went
through her lower jaw and into the base of her brain, and that Morgan lost a
significant amount of blood . Dr. Schluckebier also testified that Morgan had
defensive wounds on her hands as well as several other knife wounds on her
neck and face. Further, the doctor testified that on the day she was killed,
Morgan had no alcohol or drugs in her system
Appellant was indicted by the McCracken County Grand Jury on
September 5, 2003, and was subsequently convicted of murder and sentenced to
twenty-five years imprisonment on January 21, 2005.
Ill. ANALYSIS
A. Domestic Violence Exemption
In Appellant's first assignment of error, he alleges the trial court's ruling
that he was not a victim of domestic violence was in error. KRS 439.3401(3)
provides that violent offenders, defined in KRS 439.3401(1), "convicted of a
capital offense or Class A felony with a sentence of a term of years or Class B
felony who is a violent offender shall not be released on probation or parole until
he has served at least eighty-five percent (85%) of the sentence imposed ." KRS
439 .3401(5) in turn provides that "[t]his section shall not apply to a person who
has been determined by a court to have been a victim of domestic violence or
abuse pursuant to KRS 533.060 with regard to the offenses involving the death
of the victim or serious physical injury to the victim ." Thus a trial court must make
a factual determination that the Appellant was a victim of domestic abuse before
the exemption is effective .
In Commonwealth v. Anderson, 934 S .W.2d 276, 278 (Ky. 1996), we held
that KRS 439.3401(4)' "requires that the evidence believed by the fact-finder be
sufficient that the defendant was more likely than not to have been a victim of
domestic violence ." In applying the preponderance of the evidence standard to
evidentiary determinations under this statute, we noted as follows :
KRS 533 .060(1) specifies that the trial judge shall conduct a
hearing and make findings. It has long been held that the trier of
fact has the right to believe the evidence presented by one litigant
in preference to another. King v. McMillan , 293 Ky. 399, 169
S .W .2d 10 (1943). The trier of fact may believe any witness in
whole or in part. Webb Transfer Lines, Inc. v. Taylor , 439 S .W.2d
88, 95 (Ky. 1968) . The trier of fact may take into consideration all
Now KRS 439 .3401(5) .
the circumstances of the case, including the credibility of the
witness. Hayes v. Hayes , 357 S.W.2d 863, 866 (Ky . 1962) .
Anderson, 934 S .W.2d at 278. Under the clearly erroneous standard of review,
we upheld the trial court's ruling that Anderson was not a victim of domestic
violence .
In Springer v. Commonwealth , 998 S .W.2d 439, 457 (Ky. 1999), we held
that
the exemption from the probation or conditional discharge
restrictions in KRS 533.060(1) applies whether the domestic
violence and abuse occurred previous to the offense or at the time
the offense was committed ; but the exemption from the parole
restrictions in KRS 439 .3401 applies only if the domestic violence
and abuse was "involved" in the offense .
Thus, we interpreted KRS 439.3401 to require a connection between the
underlying offense and the domestic violence .
We reaffirmed this position in Commonwealth v. Vincent , 70 S .W.3d 422,
425 (Ky. 2002), wherein we noted that the General Assembly amended KRS
439.3401(2) and (3) after our decision in S rp inger, supra, so that the stricter
"involved" requirement applies to probation as well as parole eligibility for violent
offenders . We opined that in doing so, it appeared the General Assembly
adopted our interpretation that the domestic violence must be "involved" in the
underlying offense regarding the probation requirement as well as parole
eligibility found in the statute . In that case, we ultimately held that "a prior history
of domestic violence between a violent crime victim and the criminal defendant
who perpetrated the violent offense does not, in and of itself, make the defendant
eligible for the parole exemption of KRS 439.3401(5) ." Id . The defendant in
Vincent offered no evidence to connect the shooting death of her husband to the
history of domestic violence between her and her husband. We read the phrase
"with regard to the offenses involving death of the victim or serious physical injury
to the victim," contained in KRS 439 .3401(5), to require "some connection or
relationship between the domestic violence suffered by the defendant and the
underlying offense committed by the defendant." Id. at 424.
At his sentencing, Appellant played various portions of a videotape of the
trial testimony back to the court in an effort to meet his burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that he was a victim of domestic violence .
Appellant first played the testimony of Dr. David West, a general surgeon who
treated Appellant the day of the murder, who testified that Appellant received two
stab wounds, one to the chest and one to the abdomen . Next, Appellant played
the testimony of Don Vessels, owner of the Fern Creek Campground where
Morgan and Appellant stayed several weeks before the murder . His testimony
tended to show that Morgan was violent and aggressive and that she had a
tendency to use knives in a threatening manner. Appellant then played the
testimony of Deborah Hodges. Hodges had accompanied Morgan and Appellant
on a "team drive" in which she spent several days with the couple as they made
a trucking trip. Hodges testified that on one occasion Morgan, who had been
drinking, pulled a knife on Appellant, who was lying on his back. From her
testimony, it appears that Morgan was fighting with Appellant and kept him on his
back for forty-five minutes while brandishing a knife the entire time. Hodges also
stated that Morgan threatened her with the knife that same evening . Appellant
then played the testimony of Dr. Henry Davis, a psychologist who was hired by
the Appellant days before his original trial date to conduct a psychological
interview . Dr. Davis opined that Appellant was a victim of domestic violence
based on the results of several personality tests and from the interview with
Appellant . Appellant also told Dr. Davis that Morgan only became violent after
they had been drinking . Finally, Appellant played portions of his trial testimony in
which he talked about Morgan's violent nature and prior attacks .
The trial judge declined to find that the exemption of KRS 439 .3401(5)
applied to Appellant and found that, while the relationship between Morgan and
Appellant involved violence, he "had a problem" with the connection of that
violence to the crime . The trial judge based his decision on the fact that
Appellant, being much larger than Morgan, could not have feared Morgan and
could not have been a victim of domestic violence during the incidents Appellant
described. The court thus chose to disbelieve the testimony offered by
Appellant, instead finding other testimony more persuasive, especially that of the
witnesses at the campground on the day of the murder . The court stated that
. "[Morgan] is out there crying, saying you're going to kill her and you . . .
remember a lot of the other violence, but you don't seem to remember that." The
court found that Appellant killed Morgan in a "blind passionate rage of anger over
whatever." Thus the trial court did not find a connection between the domestic
violence and the murder.
In applying the rationale of S rin er and Vincent to the case at bar, we are
not persuaded to find that the trial court's ruling was clearly erroneous . As fact
finder in this situation, the trial judge could believe any witness over another and
could consider the credibility of each witness on whether or not domestic
violence was "involved" in Morgan's death. Ample evidence showed that Morgan
sustained several defensive wounds to her hands and that immediately prior to
her death, several witnesses observed Morgan pleading for help and screaming
that Appellant would kill her. Dr. Tracey Corey, Chief Medical Examiner,
testifying on behalf of the Commonwealth, stated that it was not unusual for an
assailant in sharp-force injury situations to have some wounds due to the nature
of such an attack . Appellant presented evidence, his own testimony and that of
two other witnesses, to show that Morgan was violent and that Appellant was a
victim of domestic violence at her hands . The trial court, however, determined
from all of the evidence that Appellant was not a victim of domestic violence at
the time of Morgan's murder .
Furthermore, we are not inclined to reconsider our previous holding in
Vincent , to wit that there must be some connection between the underlying
offense and the domestic violence . Appellant has presented no compelling
reasons for the reversal of our decision in Vincent. The ruling of the trial court is
thus affirmed .
B. Exclusion of Witness Testimony
In his second assignment of error, Appellant alleges that the trial court
abused its discretion in limiting his direct examination of a witness . Specifically,
Appellant called Sharon Taylor, his ex-wife, to testify . During direct examination,
defense counsel asked Ms . Taylor about an incident in which she confronted
Appellant and Morgan in a local Wal-Mart . According to her testimony, when she
approached Appellant, he pretended not to know her.2 Ms . Taylor had been
2 Appellant explained during his testimony that he acted this way in order to
protect his ex-wife from Morgan because he was afraid of what Morgan would do
to her.
attempting to locate Appellant for some time in order to serve divorce papers on
him, and her confrontation of Appellant in the store was the first contact she had
had with him in several months. Ms. Taylor stated that four weeks after this
confrontation, she received a phone call from Morgan. Taylor testified that she
could not understand Morgan very well, and when defense counsel asked her
what Morgan said to her, the Commonwealth objected on ground that what
Morgan told Ms . Taylor was not admissible unless relevant to an issue in the
case . Defense counsel countered that the statement was relevant to show
Morgan's violent nature .
The trial court subsequently called Ms. Taylor to the bench to determine
the relevancy of her testimony concerning Morgan's statements . According to
Ms. Taylor, Morgan wanted to meet her some place, but when it became
apparent Ms. Taylor was not going to meet with her, Morgan made a derogatory
statement and hung up. Ms. Taylor told the trial judge she did not feel
threatened by-Morgan's statements and that Morgan did not make any threats
during the phone call . The trial judge sustained the objection .
The admissibility of such evidence is initially governed by KRE 401 and
KRE 403. KRE 401 defines relevant evidence as "evidence having any tendency
to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of
the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence ."
"Relevance is established by any showing of probativeness, however slight ."
Sgringer v. Commonwealth , 998 S .W.2d 439, 449 (Ky. 1999) . Federal Rule of
Evidence 401, identical to KRE 401, has been described as follows : "Implicit in
[the definition for rule 401] are two distinct requirements : (1) the evidence must
- 1 0-
tend to prove the matter sought to be proved ; and (2) the matter sought to be
proved must be one that is of consequence to the determination of the action ."
United States v. Waldrip , 981 F.2d 799, 806 (5th Cir. 1993) . Despite the rule's
inclusionary thrust, if these two requirements are not met by the introduction of
the evidence, exclusion of the evidence is the only logical result.
KRE 403 provides that "[a]Ithough relevant, evidence may be excluded if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence ." Professor Lawson
instructs that determinations of admissibility made under KRE 403 are comprised
of three essential components :
(1) an assessment of the probative value of the evidence whose
admission is being challenged ; (2) an assessment of the impact of
the specified undesirable consequences likely to flow from its
admission ("undue prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading
the jury. . . . undue delay, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence") ; and (3) a determination of whether the product of the
second component (undesirable effects from admission)
substantially outweighs the product of the first component
(probative worth of the evidence) .
Robert G . Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook , § 2 .10[3] (4th ed.
2003) (citing Partin v. Commonwealth , 918 S.W .2d 219, 222 (Ky. 1996)) .
This Court's review of a trial court's ruling excluding evidence under KRE
401 and 403 is limited to determining whether the ruling was an abuse of
discretion. See Partin v. Commownealth , 918 S .W.2d 219, 222 (Ky. 1996) ;
Sanborn v. Commonwealth , 754 S.W.2d 534 (KY. 1988) . Important to this
inquiry is Ms . Taylor's concession that she did not feel threatened by Morgan
during the phone conversation and the fact that Morgan made no threats to her
over the phone. It is thus unclear how this particular part of Ms. Taylor's
testimony could be relevant to show that Morgan was abusive toward Appellant .
Even if relevant, this portion of Ms. Taylor's testimony was merely cumulative of
other testimony offered to show that Morgan was not only abusive, but also
hostile in certain situations . In terms of the components described by Professor
Lawson, the second prong (undesirable effect of the admission of the evidence)
has substantially outweighed the first prong (probative value) . The trial court did
not abuse its discretion in excluding this portion of the testimony. Thus the trial
court's ruling in finding the evidence inadmissible will not be disturbed and is
affirmed .
C. Denial of Appellant's Motion for Directed Verdict of Acquittal
In his third assignment of error, Appellant alleges that the trial court's
denial of his motion for directed verdict of acquittal for the murder charge was in
error. Appellant urges this Court to find that he was entitled to a directed verdict
of acquittal on the murder charge because he was privileged to act in selfprotection, or, in the alternative, he was entitled to conviction under second
degree manslaughter "because his belief was wanton" or conviction under
reckless homicide "because his belief was reckless ."
The standard of review of these matters on direct appeal is, "if under the
evidence as a whole, it would be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find guilt, only
then the defendant is entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal ." Commonwealth
v. Benham , 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Ky. 1991) . Stated differently, the standard "is
whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution,
any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
- 1 2-
beyond a reasonable doubt ." Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S . 307, 319, 99 S.Ct .
2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed .2d 560 (1979) . The trial court, in ruling on motions for
directed verdict, is required to assume that all the evidence presented by the
Commonwealth is, in fact, true, "leaving questions of weight and credibility to the
jury." Baker v. Commonwealth , 973 S.W.2d 54, 55 (Ky . 1998) (citation omitted) .
Furthermore, the trial court must "consider not only the actual evidence, but also
`must draw all fair and reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the
Commonwealth."' Lawson v. Commonwealth , 53 S.W .3d 534, 548 (Ky. 2001)
(emphasis in original) (citation omitted) .
The Commonwealth argues, and we agree, that the evidence of
Appellant's guilt in the murder of Morgan, when taken in the light most favorable
to the Commonwealth and drawing all fair and reasonable inferences, was
overwhelming . Several witnesses observed Morgan flee from the RV, wearing
nothing but a bathrobe, bleeding from a wound on her face, and screaming for
help. These same witnesses then observed the Appellant calmly exit the RV,
pick Morgan up, and, without muttering a word, carry her back into the RV, which
then began to rock violently . The next time these witnesses saw Morgan, she lay
in front of the RV door with Appellant hovering over her.
Further, medical evidence presented at trial described the brutal death
suffered by Morgan at the hands of Appellant . Dr. Schluckebier testified that the
knife used to kill Morgan was still lodged deep into her vertebrae as the handle
protruded from beneath her jaw. Dr. Corey, Chief Medical Examiner, also
testified for the Commonwealth that the evidence she examined was consistent
with a struggle occurring and was consistent with the victim never having sole
possession of the knife .
We find that it was not clearly unreasonable for the jury to have found
Appellant guilty of murder . Ample evidence, taken in the light most favorable to
the Commonwealth, was presented such that a reasonable jury could have found
guilt on the charge of murder. Thus we affirm the trial court's denial of
Appellant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal on the charge of murder.
D. Alleged Denial of a Fair Trial
In his final assignment of error, Appellant alleges that he was denied a fair
trial because two jurors were alleged to have been sleeping during the trial.
Appellant did not raise this issue to the trial court's attention until the reading of
the instructions to the jury.
When brought to the court's attention, Appellant
requested that the judge either excuse the two jurors or call them into his
chambers and question them. The trial judge did the latter. One juror stated she
had a skin condition, which caused her eyes. to hurt so she closed them often.
The other juror said he was not asleep and had heard all the evidence . Because
the jurors had been sworn, the judge took them at their word . Appellant
accepted that ruling and asked for no further relief.
Appellant now urges this Court to find that, despite having his request
fulfilled by the trial court, he was nonetheless denied his right to a fair trial. The
Commonwealth contends that Appellant has affirmatively waived his right to
address this issue on appeal since the trial court did as Appellant requested. We
note that Appellant concedes he "technically" received the relief he requested;
however, Appellant states the issue is partially preserved. We know of no rule
which allows an issue to be partially preserved - an issue is either preserved or it
is not. Appellant asked the trial court to either excuse the jurors or question
them. The trial court questioned them, and, taking them at their word, allowed
them to continue to sit throughout the remainder of the trial . We can find no error
in this ruling . Furthermore, Appellant has waived any right to appeal this issue as
he received the relief requested. However, we point out that Appellant's defense
counsel in this case waited until the jury instructions had been read before
bringing the issue to the attention of the trial judge . Although the issue is
unpreserved, we note several cases involving sleeping jurors.
In Shrout v. Commonwealth, 226 Ky. 660, 11 S.W.2d 726, 727 (Ky. 1928),
this Court stated that "[t]he appellant could not sit by and see the juror sleeping,
without asking the court to arouse him from his slumbers, and then complain
about it after the trial was over . Besides, the juror stated that he listened with his
eyes closed ." We found no error in that case.
Similarly, in Young v. Commonwealth , 50 S.W.3d 148 (Ky. 2001), we
found no error where the court questioned a juror who had allegedly been
sleeping in the defendant's murder trial. The juror stated she had a medical
condition, which caused her to close her eyes, but she insisted she had heard
everything that happened during the trial . The defendant motioned for a mistrial,
which the court overruled . We held it was not error to overrule the motion for a
mistrial.
IV. CONCLUSION
Finding no error in the trial court's ruling with respect to Appellant's
alleged errors, we affirm Appellant's conviction and sentence for the murder of
Connie Morgan .
All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Shannon Dupree
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Ste. 302.
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
Kenneth W. Riggs
Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
Office of Criminal Appeals
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
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