MICHAEL A. CUNDIFF V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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MICHAEL A. CUNDIFF
V.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MEADE CIRCUIT COURT
HON. SAM H. MONARCH, JUDGE
INDICTMENT NO . 04-CR-00111
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
This is an appeal from a judgment entered by the Meade Circuit Court on
December 13, 2004, sentencing the Appellant, Michael Cundiff, to twenty (20)
years for manufacturing methamphetamine (meth) and five (5) years for
possession of drug paraphernalia with sentences to run consecutively for a total
of twenty-five (25) years .' The Appellant appeals to this Court as a matter of
right pursuant to Ky. Const. §110(2)(b) .
The Appellant argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the trial
court abused its discretion by; 1) limiting evidence that supported the Appellant's
alternate perpetrator defense, 2) forcing the Appellant to stipulate to his
residence, 3) admonishing the jury incorrectly, and 4) allowing the admission of
' The jury found the Appellant to be a persistent felony offender in the second
degree, enhancing his sentence.
prejudicial evidence . He moves this Court to reverse the trial court's rulings and
remand for a new trial.
FACTS
4n May 15, 2004, State Trooper Matt Johnson (Trooper Johnson)
investigated a burglary at the Hardin County residence of Angela Cannon,
(Angela), where a safe that contained firearms was stolen . The burglary was
photographed by surveillance equipment in her home . Angela's nephew, Kevin
Cannon, (Kevin), told Angela that the Appellant was responsible for the burglary .
Angela then called the police .
Before the police arrived, however, Angela reviewed the surveillance
photos of the burglary . She then told the police that the Appellant was not one of
the two men in the photos because he was a larger person than the ones
portrayed . Also, she thought she knew the two men in the photos. She told the
officers that Kevin was lying about the Appellant's involvement in the burglary
because he hated the Appellant .
Trooper Johnson then talked to Kevin . After talking with Kevin, Trooper
Johnson and Detective Jason Propes went to the Appellant's residence to
conduct a "knock and talk" regarding the burglary. The residence was
unoccupied when the officers arrived. Even though it was being leased by the
Appellant, he and his wife, Nicole, had been living temporarily with Nicole's
2 Angela had recently kicked Kevin out of her home and he was not living there
during the burglary.
3 Trooper Johnson was not available for trial due to his obligations to the United
States army in Iraq . Thus, there is no information as to what Kevin told Trooper
Johnson that led him to the Appellant's residence.
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mother due to complications with Nicole's pregnancy . Their two dogs, however,
were still there.
At the house, the officers noted a bag of garbage in the driveway by the
road . It stood separate from five other bags which were on the porch . The police
searched the bag and found items that could be used for manufacturing meth.
They found a plastic two-liter bottle with a hole and a plastic hose inside, five
empty Heet bottles, empty ether cans with holes in the bottom, six empty
pseudoephedrine boxes, a mason jar ring, twin empty lithium battery packs, and
batteries that had been torn apart. An April phone bill with the Appellant's name
on it was also found in the bag.
Based upon this evidence found, the officers obtained a search warrant for
the Appellant's residence . While conducting the search, the officers found more
items usable for manufacturing meth, such as a meth manufacturer's catalog,
multiple boxes of pseudephederine, scales, and a bank card issued to the
Appellant . A safe was also found in the residence that had several personal
items belonging to the Appellant. Thereafter, an arrest warrant was issued for
the Appellant . On September 20, 2004, the Appellant was indicted by the Meade
County Grand Jury on charges of manufacturing methamphetamine, possession
of drug paraphernalia, second offense, and being a persistent felony offender in
the second degree .
Trial began on December 10, 2004, with the Appellant asserting an
alternate perpetrator defense . The defense was that Kevin hated the Appellant
so much that he planted the meth lab and paraphernalia at the Appellant's
residence, burglarized Angela's home, and used the burglary as a pretext to
direct the police to the Appellant's residence, knowing, as he and Nicole were not
living there, the meth lab and paraphernalia would be discovered .
Thus throughout the questioning of witnesses, the Appellant asked
questions concerning the burglary, and the search of his residence, to emphasize
that Kevin used the burglary to lure the police to his residence where the meth
evidence had been planted . The trial court allowed the Appellant to support his
alternative perpetrator theory by showing motive and opportunity . Thus, the
Appellant was allowed to show that Kevin told the police where the Appellant
lived, that Kevin hated the Appellant, along with other relevant evidence of a set
up. However, the court controlled this, ruling that the search and seizure at the
Appellant's residence was legal - and thus, its legality should not be questioned
as it would only serve to confuse the jury.
Then, during cross-examination of Detective Propes, the Appellant asked
about the burglary investigation at the Appellant's residence, insinuating an
illegal search. The Commonwealth then objected and the court sustained the
objection, again noting that the trial had nothing to do with the burglary (at
Angela's house) in Hardin County. In fact, during the trial, the court gave four
admonitions to the jury; that the search was legal and the incident in Hardin
County was not an issue in this case . All were in response to questions raising
the suspicion of an illegal search .
4 The trial court gave the following admonition about the burglary and the search
and seizure : ". . . The existing law in the United States is that a person has no
expectation to privacy to garbage set out on the side of the road for pick up. The
officer acted properly when he picked up that garbage, nobody's rights were
violated, the court has previously ruled that the officer acted properly . A search
warrant was issued by Judge Miller. That search warrant is the authority that the
officers used to search the residence. The court has ruled that that search
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At the Appellant's request, Kevin was also brought to Meade County from
the Hardin County jails.5 In an in-chambers hearing, Kevin testified he lived with
Angela until mid-May, but thereafter, was homeless until he was re-incarcerated .
He readily agreed that he and the Appellant were enemies . In fact, he stated "I
hate [Appellant's] guts. I want him to die slow. That's all I got to say. ,6 However,
he denied any involvement in planting the meth lab and paraphernalia at the
Appellant's residence.
Kevin was also questioned by the Appellant's counsel regarding letters he
had sent to Nicole . He acknowledged he had written the letters. One stated, "tell
[Appellant] I said eat a dick and tell Curtis I can't wait till he gets to meet the
hogs." Appellant asserted that these letters were not discovered (even though
they were written to Nicole) until the night before trial. However, the trial court
refused to allow the letters into evidence due to reciprocal discovery violations .
Nevertheless, the trial court kept Kevin in Meade County so he would be
available for the defense. It ruled, however, that if the Appellant called Kevin as
a witness, the Commonwealth could call two rebuttal witnesses that had seen
and overheard Kevin, on his way out of the courtroom, wink and tell Nicole he
warrant was proper. So to that extent, the officer did everything he was
supposed to do. There has been reference to a burglary prior to this in Hardin
County Kentucky. The Appellant is not on trial for that. That case has nothing to
do with what we are doing today. Mr. Cundiff is on trial for allegedly
manufacturing meth in Meade County Kentucky on May 17, 2004. That's the
only issue we're trying. We're not trying anything that may or may not have
happened in Hardin County."
5 Kevin had been incarcerated from August 28, 2003 to April 26, 2004 and was
put back in jail in June 1, 2004.
6 About a year prior to this incident, Nicole was pregnant with Kevin's baby and it
ended in a miscarriage, causing some animosity between the Appellant and
Kevin .
was going to send her boy home to her.' The Appellant did not call Kevin as a
witness.
Angela also testified in chambers by avowal . She testified she told
Trooper Johnson about the burglary and then he went to talk to Kevin . In
addition, she told Trooper Johnson that Kevin had supposedly seen the Appellant
in her yard before, and suggested that it was the Appellant who burglarized her
home. She also said that in her opinion neither of the men in the pictures were
the Appellant . She acknowledged that Kevin disliked the Appellant because he
and Nicole had previously dated and he was still in love with her. Hence, she
believed that Kevin had set the Appellant up because he was adamant about the
Appellant being the one who burglarized her home. She did admit that Kevin
never told her he was going to set the Appellant up and she had no evidence of a
set up. While she did not name anyone specifically, she stated she also heard
"rumors" that Kevin had been trying to sell the guns that were stolen from her
safe.
When Angela was asked why Trooper Johnson went to the Appellant's
residence after talking to Kevin, she said she did not know because she did not
talk to police after they talked to Kevin, but she believed Kevin sent them there.
She noted that she barely knew the Appellant and did not know anything about a
set up or have any evidence of a set up. She ended by stating, "I don't know
anything, I barely know Moe.8" The trial court then ruled her testimony irrelevant
The two witnesses were courthouse employees that verified to the judge that
they witnessed this occurrence .
8 Moe was the Appellant's nickname .
6
and inadmissible because she had no first hand knowledge of any evidence to
offer and anything she did have was speculative .
The Appellant's wife, Nicole, was called as a witness at trial and testified
that Kevin hated the Appellant because she had gotten pregnant by Kevin the
year before, but lost the baby. She testified that the Appellant and Kevin had
trouble before and that Kevin had told her he would eventually "get" the
Appellant . She admitted that the residence was being leased by them, but
denied they had been to the residence since they moved to her mother's at the
beginning of May. The search occurred on May 15t". Still, she admitted to going
to the residence with the Appellant to check on their dogs.
She also noted that the residence was easy to get into because they only
had twist locks on the doors . When asked how she explained the items that
were found in the residence, she stated she believed they were set up.
However, when the Appellant asked her who she thought set her up, the trial
court intervened and conducted a hearing in chambers. After the hearing, the
trial court sustained objections to her testimony about a possible set up because
she had no personal knowledge about a set up.
At the close of the trial, the jury found the Appellant guilty of manufacturing
meth and possession of drug paraphernalia, second offense . The jury also found
that the Appellant was a persistent felony offender in the second degree and
recommended a sentence of twenty years for manufacturing meth and five years
for possession of drug paraphernalia, to run consecutively for a total of twenty
five years. The court sentenced the Appellant accordingly .
ARGUMENT AND ANALYSIS
I . Limitation of evidence .
The Appellant argues he was denied a fair trial when the court limited his
evidence in support of his alternate perpetrator theory .
a. Evidence of the search and seizure
The Appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion by limiting
evidence of the burglary at Angela's residence . However, after reviewing the
record, the limitation was not on the burglary, but on the legality of the search
and seizure at the Appellant's home. Each time the search was questioned, the
trial court admonished the jury that the search was legal and the garbage bag
was correctly seized and searched.
In chambers, the Appellant argued that the questioning of the witnesses
concerning the burglary was necessary to support his alternative perpetrator
defense . He argued the questioning would show that the basis for the affidavit
and search warrant of his residence was based upon Angela telling Trooper
Johnson that it was the Appellant who burglarized her home. The trial court
reminded the Appellant that it did not want the legality of the search and seizure
at the Appellant's residence questioned, but that he could expand on his theory
and show motive and opportunity for someone else to commit the crime and set
him up. The court noted there was a fine line between the separate issues, but,
the Appellant needed to be careful not to open the door to other crimes evidence
which would be prejudicial to him- 9 However, the Appellant was allowed to put
forth evidence that tended to show motive and opportunity for a set up.
KRE 401 states that evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence . KRE 403
provides in pertinent part that although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury. (Emphasis added) . See Burchett
v. Commonwealth, 98 S.W.3d 492 (Ky. 2003); Partin v. Commonwealth , 918
S.W.2d 219 (Ky. 1996).
"It is within the sound discretion of the trial judge to determine whether the
probative value of evidence is outweighed by its possible prejudicial effect and to
admit or exclude it accordingly." King v. Grecco, 111 S.W.3d 877, 885 (Ky. App.
2002)(citing Rake v. Commonwealth , 450 S.W.2d 527 (Ky. 1970)) .
"A trial
judge's decision with respect to relevancy of evidence under KRE 401 and 403 is
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard ." Love v. Commonwealth , 55
S.W.3d 816, 822 (Ky. 2001) . The test for abuse of discretion is whether "the trial
judge's decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair or unsupported by sound
legal principles." Woodard v. Commonwealth , 147 S.W.3d 63, 67 (Ky. 2004) .
Limiting the introduction of immaterial and irrelevant evidence regarding
the search at the Appellant's residence was proper and was not an abuse of
discretion. The trial court properly kept unnecessary evidence from causing
9 The trial court warned the Appellant that any detailed discussion of the burglary
could possibly open the door to evidence of other crimes of the Appellant and
how the officers knew of him and any possible history with the Appellant which
would otherwise be a violation of KRS 404(b).
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confusion to the jury. The legality of the search was an issue of law which was
properly decided within the discretion of the court.
b. Testimony of Angela and Nicole
The Appellant also argues that the trial court abused its discretion by
limiting the testimony of Angela and Nicole .
Angela testified by avowal in chambers mainly about the burglary and
what she told Trooper Johnson . She testified that after she talked to Trooper
Johnson, he went to talk to Kevin . Although she stated she believed Kevin sent
the officers to the Appellant's residence, she had no personal knowledge of this,
as she did not talk to police after they talked to Kevin . Thus, she did not know
what made the officers decide to take their investigation to the Appellant's
residence. She also testified that Kevin disliked the Appellant because he and
Nicole had previously dated and he was still in love with her. She said Kevin was
adamant about the Appellant being the one who burglarized her home, and
therefore, she believed Kevin set the Appellant up. However, Kevin never told
her he was going to set the Appellant up and she admitted she had no evidence
of a set up. She also admitted she barely knew the Appellant and did not know
anything about a set up or have any evidence of a set up. When she was
excused, she told the court, "I don't know anything, I barely know Moe ."
The trial court then ruled that her testimony was irrelevant and
inadmissible because she had no admissible evidence to offer, other than
Kevin's dislike for the Appellant, which was already established through other
testimony .
Nicole did testify at trial . She testified that since she and the Appellant
had moved to her mother's at the beginning of May, they had only been to the
residence to care for their dogs . In addition, she testified that the residence was
easy to get into with a credit card because there were only twist locks on the
doors, and so, she believed they had been set up. She further told the jury that
Kevin told her that he would eventually "get" the Appellant . However, when she
was asked specifically who she thought had set them up, the trial court
conducted a hearing in chambers . After the hearing, the trial court found that her
testimony about a possible set up was inadmissible because she had no
personal knowledge about a set up. Therefore, she could not testify as to who
she thought set them up.
"Evidence is not automatically admissible simply because it tends to show
that someone else committed the offense ." Bealy v. Commonwealth, 125
S.W.3d 196, 208 (Ky. 2004)(citing Commonwealth v. Maddox, 955 S .W .2d718,
721) . A trial court may infringe upon the defendant's right to pursue, an
alternative perpetrator theory, if the evidence is `°unsupported,' 'speculat[ive],'
and `far-fetched"' causing the jury to be confused or misled. Id. at 207 . There is
no error in excluding avowal testimony that would have been entirely speculative
and could only confuse or mislead the jury. Cf. Beaty v. Commonwealth , 125
S .W.3d 196 (Ky. 2004).
Neither Angela nor Nicole had any personal knowledge of Kevin actually
setting the Appellant up. Both of them merely stated that they believed he would
set the Appellant up and that he did not like the Appellant .
Angela had no testimony that was relevant to this case, only speculative
assertions . Furthermore, the trial court would have allowed Angela to testify that
Kevin did not like the Appellant, but, it would have been cumulative . Her belief
that Kevin set up the Appellant, however, was speculative and not based upon
personal knowledge . Therefore, the trial court correctly excluded it at trial .
Nor did the trial court hinder the Appellant in his right to a fair defense by
limiting speculative testimony as to who may have set the Appellant up . It
allowed Nicole to testify that Kevin said he would eventually get the Appellant
and that she believed they had been set up. Even though, she admitted she had
no personal knowledge of a set up or who would have set the Appellant up.
Thus, the disallowance of testimony, which was speculative or based on
hearsay, was proper and was not an abuse of discretion .
c. Letters from Kevin to Nicole
At the end of the first day of trial, the Appellant proffered letters written by
Kevin to Nicole that spoke of the dislike Kevin had for the Appellant . However,
the letters had not been given to the Commonwealth as the Appellant claimed
not to have found them until the night before. The trial court then denied
admission on the grounds of a violation of reciprocal discovery. We agree.
RCr. 7.24 (9) states : "If at any time during the course of the proceedings it
is brought to the attention of the court that a party has failed to comply with this
rule or an order issued pursuant thereto, the court may direct such party to permit
the discovery or inspection of materials not previously disclosed, grant a
continuance, or prohibit the party from introducing in evidence the material not
disclosed, or it may enter such other order as may be just under the
circumstances ." (Emphasis added) .
Thus, the letters from Kevin to Nicole, ostensibly acquired after trial
began, were properly disallowed due to the violation of reciprocal discovery .
Moreover, Nicole testified that Kevin hated the Appellant and had threatened to
"get" him. Thus, the letters were cumulative at best.
All in all, the trial court carefully and thoroughly considered the evidence
introduced by, and proffered by, the Appellant . The trial court's limitation on the
admission of evidence was not arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. Woodard , 147
S.W.3d at 67 . Therefore, limiting the admission of speculative evidence that
would have misled the jury was not an abuse of the trial court's discretion .
Bea ,125 S.W.3d at 208.
II . Probation officer's testimonv
The Appellant next argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it
forced the Appellant to stipulate that 9200 Highway 60 was his residence .
Nicole and her mother testified that she and the Appellant were not living
at 9200 Highway 60 at the time the officers found the meth lab due to
complications with her pregnancy through two witnesses. To rebut this evidence,
the Commonwealth was going to call the Appellant's probation officer, Mr.
Barnes, to testify to the Appellant's address as being 9200 Highway 60 . The
Appellant argued that allowing Mr. Barnes to testify was prejudicial to his case
because the jury would know that the Appellant was on probation . In connection
therewith, the trial court offered the Appellant a stipulation on the evidence so it
would not show that the Appellant was on probation . The trial court noted that
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the Appellant's main argument was that he had no access or control over the
residence, and therefore, unless he stipulated to the residence, Mr. Barnes would
be allowed to testify . The Appellant then accepted the stipulation .
The admission of rebuttal evidence is largely a matter within the discretion
of the trial court . Stopher v Commonwealth , 57 S.W.3d 787, 799 (Ky. 2001) . As
stated previously, "[the test for abuse of discretion is whether "the trial judge's
decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair or unsupported by sound legal
principles." Woodard, 147 S.W.3d at 67 .
Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. It gave the Appellant a
choice to stipulate to his residence address or to allow Mr. Barnes to testify . The
Appellant, thus, had the chance to avoid any prejudice he felt would be placed
upon him if Mr. Barnes testified . Just as the Appellant was certainly entitled to
offer the evidence he was not living there temporarily, the Commonwealth was
entitled to offer evidence in rebuttal. Therefore, the trial court's offer and ruling
was appropriate .
III. Admonitions to the jury
The Appellant next argues the trial court denied his due process right to a
fair trial when it gave admonitions to the jury about the legality of the search and
seizure of the garbage bag found at his home .
At trial, Appellant offered testimony attempting to show that Kevin told the
police to go to the Appellant's home because he had planted the meth evidence
there . During cross-examination, the Appellant asked questions which alluded to
the search of the Appellant's residence . However, each time the Appellant's
questions delved into a possible illegal search issue, the trial court admonished
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the jury the search and seizure was legal and that the incidentally connected
burglary was not an issue in the case. The Appellant argues that these
admonitions improperly directed the jury how it was to consider the evidence
presented, thereby invading the province of the jury. This argument is without
merit .
"[A] trial judge should be cautious and guarded at all times in the use of
his words in the presence of the jury to the end that they will not affect the finding
of the jury." Miller v. Commonwealth , 240 Ky. 355, 42 S.W.2d 523, 524 (Ky.
1931). The justification for this is that "comments by a trial judge which may
reflect upon the credibility of a witness or tend to indicate the court's view of the
quality or weight of the evidence are considered improper." Chism v. Lampach
352 S .W.2d 191, 194 (Ky. 1961) . However, "[w]hen evidence is admitted for the
purpose of proving intent, etc. . . . it becomes the duty of the court to admonish
the jury the purpose for which . . . [it was] admitted ." Alexander v.
Commonwealth , 369 S .W.2d 110, 111-2 (Ky. 1963) .
The trial court's admonitions did not reflect upon the credibility of any of
the witnesses at trial. Its admonitions did not indicate a view of the weight of the
evidence. Even though the evidence was relevant to the Appellant's defense,
the trial court had a right and obligation to advise the jury as to how to view the
evidence so as to avoid confusion of the real issues in the case. In this respect,
the trial court did allow questions regarding the circumstances concerning the
search of the garbage bag found at the Appellant's residence, but admonished
the jury only when the questions could lead to possible misconceptions about the
legality of the search . There was no abuse of discretion .
IV. Letter from the Appellant's Attorney
At trial, the Commonwealth introduced a letter from the Appellant's
attorney, found in the Appellant's residence at 9200 Highway 60, in order to show
the Appellant was in possession and control of the residence . The Appellant
objected and argued that the letter was prejudicial because it came from his
attorney . He now argues that the prejudicial nature of the evidence outweighed
its evidentiary value to prove facts at issue, and therefore, the trial court abused
its discretion .
A conviction for manufacturing meth under part two of KRS 218A.1432
requires proof that the Appellant possessed either the chemicals or equipment
for the manufacture of meth . Constructive possession has long been a concept
applied to offenses described in the Controlled Substances Act. See William S .
Cooper, Kentucky Instructions to Juries §9.10B, Vol . 1 (1998 Cumulative
Supplement) . We have stated that in the context of KRS Chapter 218, the term
possession need not always be actual physical possession and that a defendant
may be shown to have had constructive possession by establishing that the
contraband involved was subject to his dominion and control . Rupard v.
Commonwealth, 475 S.W .2d 473, 475 (Ky. 1973) .
The letter was pertinent to rebut the Appellant's defense that he was not
living at, and had no possession or control of, the residence where the officers
found the meth lab. Moreover, the Commonwealth was only allowed to introduce
the heading of the letter, showing that it was addressed to the Appellant at the
9200 address, not the substantive parts. Allowing the address label of this letter
to be shown to the jury did not unduly prejudice the Appellant. Notably, the trial
court carefully limited the nature of the correspondence .
Thus, the trial court, again, did not abuse its discretion.
CONCLUSION
From the foregoing, it is our opinion that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in its rulings .
Accordingly, the Appellant's judgment of conviction is affirmed .
Lambert, C .J . ; Graves, Roach, Scott and Wintersheimer, JJ ., concur.
McAnulty and Minton, JJ ., concur in result only .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT
Shannon Dupree
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE
Gregory D Stumbo
Attorney General
Gregory C. Fuchs
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Criminal Appeals
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601-8204
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