DOUG WILLIAMS V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IMPORTANT NOTICE
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINIONIS DESIGNA TED "NOT TO BE
PUBLISHED. " PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF
CIVIL PROCED URE PROMULGA TED B Y THE
SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION
IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS A UTHORITY INANY OTHER
CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE.
RENDERED : APRIL 20, 2006
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
6*llytPritE
Caurf of
2004-SC-001133-MR
DOUG WILLIAMS
V.
7
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BOYLE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DARREN W. PECKLER, JUDGE
NO. 02-CR-00060
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
I . Introduction
Appellant, Doug Williams, was convicted on November 18, 2004, in the
Boyle Circuit Court for first degree assault and second degree persistent felony
offender . Appellant was sentenced to twenty years imprisonment, which was
enhanced to twenty-five years based on the conviction of second degree
persistent felony offender. Appellant now appeals to this Court pursuant to Ky.
Const. § 110(2)(b), alleging three claims of error, viz. (1) that the trial court erred
in its admission of incriminating statements made by a non-testifying codefendant warranting a reversal, (2) that the trial court committed palpable error
in admitting "investigative hearsay" despite Appellant's failure to preserve the
issue for appellate review, and (3) that the trial court improperly considered a
felony conviction for which Appellant served no time in prison in the conviction for
second degree persistent felony offender . Having reviewed the record, we affirm
the conviction and sentence .
11 . Facts
On the night of January 29, 2002, Appellant, Steven Durham, and Galen
Eisenbeis' arrived at the home of the victim, David Gorley, to discuss his firing of
Durham from a minor repair job to Gorley's home . Gorley had been dissatisfied
with Durham's performance and informed Durham that he would no longer be
required to finish the job of installing windows at Gorley's house. Durham was
angered by Gorley's actions, and Gorley testified that Durham had told him on
the phone that "You can't run me off a job ."
According to testimony elicited at trial, there were other incidents that also
soured the relationship between Gorley and Appellant . In particular, Appellant
was angry that Glenda Dinsmore, Gorley's girlfriend, had told Appellant's sister
that Appellant and his mother were attempting to obtain custody of a child
parented by Dinsmore's niece and Durham . Appellant telephoned Gorley about
the situation . That same night, someone cut the brake line and valve stem on
Dinsmore's car as it was parked in the driveway at Gorley's house .
Testimony from James Wilburn, Jr., revealed that about 5 :30 p.m . on
January 29, 2002, Durham and he had a conversation in Appellant's presence .
Durham and Appellant (and two other men Wilburn did not know) stopped and
spoke with Wilburn for a while at Wilburn's residence . During their conversation,
Wilburn mentioned that he needed to go to Gorley's store, and then Durham
' A fourth man, Greg Smith, also accompanied the three men to Gorley's house
that evening . However, Smith has not been implicated in the crime and has not
been indicted .
responded, "Piss on David Gorley." Wilburn also stated that Durham hated "the
son of a bitch" and that Durham said if Gorley fooled with him, he'd shoot him.
When the men arrived at Gorley's home, Gorley told Durham to leave.
Gorley testified that he saw a gun in Appellant's hand so he retreated into his
bedroom to get his own gun. Upon returning, he found Durham and Eisenbeis in
his kitchen, where Durham was holding Gorley's girlfriend, Glenda Dinsmore, by
the arms after she had tried to call 911 . When Gorley asked Durham what he
was doing, Durham released Dinsmore, and Gorley again told Durham to leave .
After Durham and Gorley exchanged words, the men finally left the Gorley
residence.
Later that evening, Appellant drove Eisenbeis and Durham back toward
Gorley's home, parking the truck at the foot of Gorley Road . Eisenbeis testified
that, as Appellant exited the vehicle, he saw a pistol in his waistband.
Gorley, suspecting the men might return, went to retrieve a deer rifle . As
he was loading the weapon, he was shot in the back through a window. The
weapon was never recovered by police .
Appellant was arrested around 4:00 a .m. on January 30, 2004. During an
audiotaped interview, Appellant admitted being at Gorley's house, but denied
having a pistol . Appellant claimed that the argument erupted because Durham
thought Gorley had stolen Durham's marijuana, and Appellant claimed that
Gorley had "put out a hit" on him and Durham . Appellant later admitted to having
a .22 caliber pistol in his hand while he and the other men were at Gorley's
residence on the evening of the alleged crime. However, he never admitted to
shooting Gorley.
Kentucky State Police also arrested Durham upon suspicion of
involvement in Gorley's shooting . A search of Durham's vehicle uncovered a .22
caliber handgun, marijuana, and a set of scales . Durham told police he had not
been at Gorley's house that night. He later recanted his story and admitted to
having been at Gorley's house, but told police he and Gorley had an argument
over a satellite dish. Durham was subsequently indicted for first degree assault,
prompting his refusal to testify at Appellant's trial . However, a jury of the Boyle
Circuit Court acquitted Durham of the charges on September 20, 2005.
Eisenbeis was indicted for first degree assault. However, as the result of
a plea agreement, Eisenbeis testified against Appellant in exchange for a
diversion for five years .
During Appellant's trial, several prosecution witnesses testified that
Appellant shot Gorley that evening. 2
Eisenbeis testified that when he asked Appellant what was going on,
Appellant replied, "I popped David. He's a dead man ." He also said he waited
for over an hour in Appellant's truck on the night of the shooting . Eisenbeis
testified that when Appellant returned to the truck, he no longer had the pistol
with him, and his clothes were wet and muddy . According to Eisenbeis, the gun
was buried somewhere in an adjacent county. However, when Eisenbeis
testified that Durham told him Appellant had shot Gorley, Appellant objected and
2 Most of Appellant's assignments of error involve the admission of testimony
involving hearsay statements made by Durham to several witnesses. Durham
invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, thus prompting
the prosecution to attempt to have the jury hear his statements through other
witnesses .
moved for a mistrial . The trial *judge sustained the objection, denied the motion
for a mistrial, and admonished the jury to disregard Eisenbeis' statement.
Det. Owens testified that Durham told him, during an interview following
his arrest, that Williams was not with him and Eisenbeis when they went to
Gorley's residence . Appellant objected on the ground of inadmissible
"investigative hearsay." However, because Det. Owens received contradictory
statements during his investigation, such as Eisenbeis' statement that Appellant
was at Gorley's home, the trial court overruled the objection.
Det. Owens also testified regarding statements made to him by Kentucky
State Trooper Eric Taylor. Trooper Taylor told Owens that the gunshot wound
sustained by Gorley was from a large caliber weapon and that the .22 caliber
revolver taken from Durham's truck had not been fired (i .e. was "clean") . Det.
Owens further testified that a bullet fragment taken from Gorley's hand was not in
a condition to determine either its caliber or from what weapon it had been fired .
Appellant failed to object and thus failed to preserve this issue for appeal.
James Wilburn testified that Durham, in Appellants presence, told him he
hated Gorley and that "if [Gorley] fooled with him, he'd shoot him ." Appellant
again objected on grounds of hearsay, which the trial court overruled, finding the
testimony showed Durham's state of mind and knowledge.
Several witnesses testified that Appellant went to the home of his sister,
Delena Smith, some time after Gorley was shot . Delena heard over a radio
scanner that police were looking for Appellant, Durham, and Eisenbeis. When
she asked Appellant what was going on, Appellant told her that she should not
worry about Durham (her son) and that Durham was "not involved in what had
went down ." Delena also inquired about her gun. Appellant told her that he "took
care of it."
Bea Shelton, who was also at Delena's home, testified she told Appellant
and Delena that they could come to her house for coffee . Shelton testified that
Appellant's clothes were muddy and wet when he arrived at Delena's house and
that Delena had said to Appellant, "I pray to God. I pray to God that he don't die.
Doug, do you think he's dead?" According to Shelton, Appellant responded,
"Yes, he's a dead man." Shelton asked Appellant if he really thought he killed
Gorley, and he replied, "I've deer hunted too much . He's a dead man ." Shelton
also stated that Appellant also told her and Delena that he thought Gorley had
been shot in the heart.
Finally, the trial court allowed Appellant's prior felony conviction to be used
as a basis for his conviction of persistent felony offender although he did not
actually serve any time in prison .
The jury returned a guilty verdict on November 18, 2004. Appellant was .
sentenced on November 29, 2004, to a total of twenty-five years imprisonment.
This appeal followed .
Ill. Analysis
A. Admission of a non-testifying co-defendant's statements.
1 . Trial Court committed harmless error in admitting testimony
involving a non-testifying co-defendant's inculpatory statements .
During Eisenbeis' testimony on behalf of the prosecution, he was asked
whether Durham made any statements to him when he picked Durham up on the
road after the latter flagged him down. Eisenbeis replied that Durham told him
Appellant shot Gorley . Appellant immediately objected and moved for a mistrial,
-6-
to which the prosecution responded that it did not know Eisenbeis would respond
to that question in such a way. The trial court sustained the objection, denied the
motion for a mistrial, and admonished the jury to disregard Eisenbeis' statement.
Appellant argues that the trial court committed reversible error in admitting
the statement and thus violated Appellant's Sixth Amendment right to confront
witnesses against him . In Bruton v. United States , 391 U.S . 123, 135-37, 88
S.Ct. 1620, 1627-28, 20 L.Ed .2d 476 (1968), the United States Supreme Court
held that a defendant's right to confront witnesses against him under the Sixth
Amendment is violated when a non-testifying codefendant's statements
inculpating defendant are admitted at trial. The defendants in Bruton were tried
in a joint trial where the statements of one co-defendant were found to unduly
prejudice the other defendant. The United States Supreme Court found the
abrogation of the defendant's right to confront the witness warranted reversal .
Despite the admonition given by the trial court, Appellant argues that
Bruton , supra, is applicable, and that the admonition does not cure the damaging
nature of the hearsay statement. We find Appellant's argument compelling, as
Bruton certainly is applicable in this particular instance, despite the fact that
Bruton involved a joint trial of the defendants .3 The non-testimonial statement
was made by a non-testifying co-defendant and inculpates the defendant.
3 On this issue, we note our decision in Terry v. Commonwealth , 153 S.W.3d
794, 801 (Ky. 2005), wherein we stated :
The only distinction between Bruton and the case sub judice is that
this was not a joint trial. However, Bruton's concern in that regard
related primarily to the fact that the statement was admissible
against the declarant codefendant but not against the other
codefendant. The issue was whether the jury could properly
consider it against the declarant but disregard it with respect to his
codefendant. Here, there is no question that the statement was
The Court in Bruton ultimately held that
the introduction of [the non-testifying co-defendant's] confession
posed a substantial threat to petitioner's right to confront the
witnesses against him, and this is a hazard we cannot ignore .
Despite the concededly clear instructions to the jury to disregard
[the non-testifying co-defendant's] inadmissible hearsay evidence
inculpating petitioner, in the context of a joint trial we cannot accept
limiting instructions as an adequate substitute for petitioner's
constitutional right of cross-examination. The effect is the same as
if there had been no instruction at all.
Id . at 137, 88 S.Ct. at 1628 .
Subsequent cases, however, have distinguished Bruton 's holding . Most
significantly, in Harrington v. California , 395 U .S . 250, 254, 89 S.Ct. 1726, 1728,
23 L.Ed.2d 284 (1969), the Supreme Court held, under the harmless error
analysis announced in Chagman v. California , 386 U .S . 18, 87 S .Ct . 824, 17
L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), the admission of a non-testifying co-defendant's statements
were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and did not warrant reversal of
Harrington's conviction because the wrongfully admitted evidence was
cumulative, and proof of the defendant's guilt was overwhelming.
Despite Appellant's argument that every situation such as this warrants
automatic reversal, the United States Supreme Court has held otherwise . In
Delaware v. Van Arsdell, 475 U.S . 673, 682, 106 S .Ct. 1431, 1437, 89 L.Ed .2d
674 (1986), the Court stated as follows:
In Harrington v. California , [395 U .S . 250, 254, 89 S.Ct. 1726,
1728-29, 23 L.Ed.2d 284 (1969),] . . . we expressly rejected the
claim that the admission into evidence of a statement made by a
inadmissible against Appellant, who is in the same position in this
case as was the declarant's codefendant in Bruton . . . . We
perceive no significant distinction between the prejudice attending
the use of a nontestifying codefendant's hearsay statements to
inculpate a codefendant in a joint trial, as in Bruton, or in a separate
trial . . . .
nontestifying codefendant, in violation of Bruton v. United States,
supra , can never be harmless. Harrington , which we have
expressly reaffirmed on more than one occasion, see , e .g .,
Schneble v. Florida , [405 U.S . 427, 92 S .Ct. 1056, 31 L .2d 340
.Ed
(1972)]; Brown v. United States , 411 U .S. 223, 93 S .Ct. 1565, 36
L.Ed .2d 208 (1973), demonstrates that the denial of the opportunity
to cross-examine an adverse witness does not fit within the limited
category of constitutional errors that are deemed prejudicial in
every case .
Most significant in this respect is the testimony of Bea Shelton and Galen
Eisenbeis . Shelton testified that when she asked Appellant if he really thought
he killed Gorley, Appellant replied, "I've deer hunted too much. He's a dead
man ." Shelton also testified that Appellant told his sister, Delena Smith, during
the same conversation that Gorley was shot in the heart. Eisenbeis also testified
that when Appellant returned to the truck that night, he told Eisenbeis that he
"popped David" and that Gorley was "a dead man ." The improperly admitted
statement was thus cumulative of other properly admitted evidence .
Although we find Bruton applicable in this situation, we are not persuaded
to .reverse Appellant's conviction. Appellant is correct in asserting that his Sixth
Amendment right to confront Durham was abrogated when Durham's statements
inculpating Appellant were given by a third party, Eisenbeis . However, this
statement was merely cumulative of other properly admitted evidence regarding
Appellant's guilt in the commission of the crime, and thus any error in its
admission was harmless . Appellant's argument regarding the admonition may
be correct ; however, having found the inadmissible statement to be cumulative
and harmless, we decline to address whether the admonition in this case was
futile.
2. Trial Court committed harmless error in admitting non-testifying codefendant's testimonial statement.
The prosecution questioned Det. Owens as to whether Durham had
denied that Appellant was with him and Eisenbeis when they visited Gorley's
residence . Appellant objected on hearsay grounds, arguing the statements were
improper "investigative hearsay." The trial court overruled the objection, finding
that these statements aided Det. Owens in his investigation and prompted him to
take certain steps.
In his brief, Appellant argues that the admission of this statement was
unnecessary because Det. Owens testified that he arrested Appellant based only
on Eisenbeis' statement that Appellant was at Gorley's house that evening with
him and Durham . Appellant characterizes the prosecution's use of this hearsay
statement as a subterfuge to suggest that Durham was actually covering for
Appellant because of Appellant's involvement in the crime . We find the trial court
erred in admitting these statements as no hearsay exception can be applied to
allow their admission and because the statements were testimonial in nature and
Appellant had no opportunity to cross-examine Durham . However, we find the
error to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as Appellant was not prejudiced
by the admission of the statement.
This Court held in Sanborn v. Commownealth , 754 S.W .2d 534, 541 (Ky.
1988), that "hearsay is no less hearsay because a police officer supplies the
evidence . . . . [T]here is no separate rule, as such, which is an investigative
hearsay exception to the hearsay rule ." At issue in Sanborn was the
prosecution's "extensive use of testimony from three different police officers
repeating what was told to them by persons whom they interviewed during the
course of their investigation, offered under the guise of a so-called `investigative
-10-
hearsay' exception to the hearsay rule ." Id .
Quoting Lawson's Kentucky
Evidence Law Handbook , § 8 .00 (2d ed . 1984), we distinguished "investigative
hearsay" from the verbal act doctrine, stating "'[a]n extrajudicial statement has a
proper nonhearsay use when its utterance (not its substance) is a part of the
issues of the case ."' Id . We further noted that `°[a verbal act] is not hearsay
evidence ; it is not admitted for the purpose of proving the truth of what was said,
but for the purpose of describing the relevant details of what took place."' Id.
(quoting Preston v. Commonwealth , 406 S .W .2d 398, 401 (Ky. 1966)) . We
ultimately held that
[t]he rule is that a police officer may testify about information
furnished to him only where it tends to explain the action that was
taken by the police officer as a result of this information and the
taking of that action is an issue in the case . Such information is
then admissible, not to prove the facts told to the police officer, but
only to prove why the police officer then acted as he did . It is
admissible only if there is an issue about the police officer's action.
Id . (emphasis in original) . In essence, it goes to a "state of mind" in issue .
We note that Det. Owens' actions in arresting Appellant were not an issue
in this case . However, more important in this appeal is the testimonial nature of
Durham's statements to Det. Owens . In Crawford v. Washington , 541 U.S. 36,
54, 124 S .Ct 1354, 1365, 158 L. Ed .2d 177 (2004), the United States Supreme
Court held that a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation is violated
where out-of-court testimonial statements are offered against him "unless [the
witness] was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity
for cross-examination ." The Court declined to delineate exactly what constitutes
"testimonial," though it provided some guidance. The Court stated that the term
"testimonial" applies "at a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing,
before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police interrogations ." Id . at 68,
124 S.Ct. at 1374 .
We have addressed the issue of what constitutes a "testimonial" statement
in the context of Crawford. In Bray v. Commonwealth , 177 S.W.3d 741, 745 (Ky.
2005), we opined that "Crawford endorsed the view that statements were
testimonial if, e.g., they `were made under circumstances which would lead an
objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement[s] would be available
for use at a later trial."' (quoting Crawford, 541 U .S. at 52, 124 S .Ct. at 1364) . In
finding Bray's spontaneous statements, made to her sister, to be nontestimonial,
we cited similar results from sister states. Most relevant to our analysis here is
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals' holding in United States v. Manfre , 368 F.3d
832, 838 n.1 (8th Cir. 2004), where the court held that statements "made to loved
ones or acquaintances . . . are not the kind of memorialized, judicial-processcreated evidence of which Crawford speaks" and are thus nontestimonial .
Statements have also been held nontestimonial where "[n]o government official
was present . . . [and] [t]he statements were made spontaneously to co-workers ."
People v. Butler, 127 Cal .App.4th 49, 25 Cal.Rptr .3d 154,161-62 (2005). Even
statements made to police have been held nontestimonial where the statements
"did not result from structured questioning ." People v. Coleman , 16 A .D .3d 254,
791 N .Y.S.2d 112,113-14 (N.Y.App.Div. 2005).
However, Durham's statements to Det. Owens are not the type of
statements to which the rationale of Crawford is applicable as they do not
inculpate Appellant. Similarly, Durham's statements made to Eisenbeis, were not
the kind of statements, which, when made, would lead him to reasonably believe
- 12-
they would be later used at trial, i.e. testimonial, thus Crawford is likewise
inapplicable . Thus Appellant's reliance on Crawford is misplaced.
Finally, we reiterate that there is no "investigative hearsay" exception to
the hearsay rules . As Det. Owens' actions in arresting Appellant were not an
issue in this case, the verbal act doctrine has no applicability . However, any
alleged hearsay violation in the admittance of these particular statements was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt . Durham's statement to Det. Owens that
Appellant was not with him and Eisenbeis that night does not inculpate Appellant,
as the statement only goes to show whether or not Appellant went with Durham
and Eisenbeis to Gorley's, not whether Appellant committed the crime . Thus,
Bruton, supra, is not applicable in this instance, nor is Crawford, as these were
not inculpatory statements . Moreover, when Appellant took the stand, he
admitted to having been at Gorley's house along with Durham, Eisenbeis, and
Greg Smith, on the night of the crime . Durham's statements given through Det.
Owens' testimony were contradicted by Appellant's own testimony . If anything,
Det. Owens' testimony regarding Durham's statements might have actually
worked to exculpate Appellant by removing him from the scene of the crime had
Appellant not testified to the contrary . If any party should have objected to the
admission of this statements, it should have been the Commonwealth, not
Appellant . Regardless, the admission of Durham's testimonial statements by
way of Det. Owens was harmless error, as the outcome of the trial would have
been the same despite the error.
3. Trial Court did not err in admitting statement of non-testifying codefendant where the statement showed declarant's state of mind
and was not inculpatory.
- 1 3-
Appellant also argues that the trial court committed reversible error in
admitting Durham's out of court statements through the testimony of James
Wilburn . The prosecution began to question Wilburn concerning Durham's
statements made to him in Appellant's presence, and Appellant objected on
hearsay grounds . After the prosecution informed the trial judge of the substance
of Wilburn's testimony in this respect, the trial judge overruled the objection and
ruled that Wilburn's testimony went to Durham's then existing state of mind .
Specifically, Wilburn testified that, after stating he needed to go Gorley's store,
Durham responded by saying "Piss on David Gorley." Wilburn also stated that
Durham told him he "hated the son of a bitch, and if [Gorley] fooled with him, he'd
shoot him ."
Appellant again cites Bruton for the proposition that a non-testifying codefendant's statements incriminating the defendant cannot be admitted against
the defendant where there has been no prior opportunity to cross-examine the
declarant concerning the statement. We find the argument unpersuasive as
Bruton is inapplicable in this situation . Bruton, supra, applies only to statements
which tend to incriminate or inculpate the defendant. In this case, Durham's
statements actually inculpate or incriminate himself, not Appellant .
We find the trial court's ruling to be correct, as KRE 803 excludes such
statements from the hearsay rules. Durham's statements, through Wilburn's
testimony, show his then existing state of mind or emotion concerning his
unrepentant feelings toward Gorley. It is inconceivable how Durham's state of
mind might be transposed to Appellant, rendering them inculpatory in the
process .
- 1 4-
B. Trial Court's admission of hearsay statements from Det. Owens'
testimony was not preserved for appellate review ; no manifest
injustice resulted .
During the trial, the prosecution presented evidence through the testimony
of Det. Owens that was arguably hearsay in nature . Specifically, Det. Owens
testified that the wound sustained by the victim was from a large caliber weapon,
that the bullet fragment taken from the victim's hand was too small to determine
the caliber of the weapon used, and that Durham's .22 caliber revolver was
"clean," i.e. it had not been fired. Appellant, however, failed to object to the
admissibility of this testimony or otherwise preserve these issues for appellate
review. Nonetheless, Appellant argues that the palpable error standard of RCr
10 .26 applies and that his conviction should be reversed as a result.
RCr 10.26 provides that an unpreserved issue may be considered on
appeal where (1) error resulted, (2) the error affects the substantial rights of a
party, and (3) manifest injustice has resulted from the error. See Schoenbachler
v. Commonwealth , 95 S.W.3d 830, 836 (Ky. 2003) . We now address each
instance of error alleged by Appellant .
In the first instance, Det. Owens was permitted to testify concerning the
size of the wound sustained by the victim, Gorley. Appellant contends that Det.
Owens testified as to what he was told by Trooper Eric Taylor, who in turn was
told that the gunshot wound was from a large caliber weapon . Interestingly, the
victim, David Gorley, was the first witness to testify in the prosecution's case-inchief and was the first to identify photographs of the wound in his back. These
photographs were subsequently published to the jury. Thus, the jury was
apprised of the size of the wound prior to Det. Owens' testimony .
- 1 5-
In no event, however, did any witness testify as to the caliber of weapon
used, but rather testimony revealed only that the wound was from a large caliber
weapon, which was obvious from the photographs. Appellant argues that this
improperly admitted hearsay specifically ruled out Durham as the shooter,
leaving only the Appellant, Williams, as the guilty party. Although it would have
been the better course to have the individual who relayed the information to
Trooper Taylor concerning the size of the wound to testify, the jury could see for
itself that the wound was large and must have resulted from a large caliber
weapon . Furthermore, Eisenbeis testified that the gun he saw in Appellant's
waistband was a large caliber weapon . It could hardly be surmised that the
admission of Det. Owens' testimony in any way resulted in manifest injustice,
regardless of the hearsay issue, as Det. Owens' testimony was cumulative of
what the jury had been told by Gorley and had seen for itself from the
photographs properly authenticated by Gorley.
In the second instance, Det. Owens testified that the bullet fragment taken
from Gorley's hand was too small to confirm the caliber of weapon used in the
commission of the crime . The prosecution contends that a proper foundation
was laid concerning this evidence and that Det. Owens, in his experience as a
Kentucky State Police Detective, was qualified to testify that bullet fragments
were insufficient to produce precise results in ballistics examinations . We agree.
While Det. Owens may not have been a "ballistics expert," it is well within
his purview and expertise to testify that bullet fragments were insufficient to test.
Furthermore, we are not inclined to find that the testimony in any way resulted in
manifest injustice to Appellant as the evidence was inconclusive, and thus the
- 1 6-
jury could draw no inferences concerning the bullet fragment. Other ample
testimony provided evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant was
guilty .
Finally, Det. Owens testified that the .22 caliber revolver found in
Durham's vehicle upon his arrest was "clean," i .e . it had not been fired. The
prosecution contends that Appellant failed to object to Det. Owens testimony as a
matter of trial strategy in that the prosecution could have simply recalled
Kentucky State Trooper Taylor to testify to the same thing . While it was error to
allow Det. Owens to testify to evidence that was relayed to him by Trooper
Taylor, we again are not inclined to find this resulted in manifest injustice as the
final result would not have differed .
The outcome of the trial would have been the same had Det. Owens not
testified to any of the issues for which Appellant alleges error in this instance .
Finding no palpable or substantial error in the admission of the hearsay
evidence, we affirm appellant's conviction .
C. Trial Court did not err in considering Appellant's prior felony
conviction ; probation serves as "institutional rehabilitation" for
purposes of KRS 532 .080.
Appellant finally urges this court to reverse his conviction for second
degree persistent felony offender ("PFO") as provided in KRS 532 .080(2)(c)(2) .
Finding no error in the trial court's application of the statute to Appellant, we
affirm Appellant's conviction for second degree persistent felony offender .
Appellant argues that the trial court improperly considered a prior felony
conviction for which Appellant was placed on probation and served no time in
prison . Citing the 1974 Commentary to KRS 532.080, Appellant mistakenly
- 1 7-
assumes that trial courts may not consider probation in determining second
degree PFO status . As originally enacted, KRS 532.080 did not contain
language suggesting that probation could be used in determining PFO status .
See 1974 Ky. Acts Ch. 406, § 280. The 1974 Commentary provided with the
statute suggests that probation was not a consideration in PFO status at the time
of the statute's enactment . However, KRS 532.080 has been amended several
times since its enactment in 1974.
Most significantly, when the General Assembly amended the statute in an
Extraordinary Session in 1976, it added the provision which provided the trial
court's basis for the second degree PFO charge in this case. Following the
amendment, the statute provided that
[A] previous felony conviction is a conviction of a felony in this state
or conviction of a crime in any other jurisdiction provided . . . [t]hat
the offender . . . [w]as on probation or parole from the previous
felony conviction at the time of commission of the felony for which
he now stands convicted.
1976 Ky . Acts (Extra. Sess .) Ch. 14, § 474 ; KRS 532 .080(2)(c)(2) (emphasis
added) . This portion of the statute has changed very little since the amendment
in 1976 . Thus, the 1974 Commentary is of no help in this situation as the statute
has been changed substantially since its original enactment .
We addressed this issue in Combs v. Commonwealth , 652 S .W.2d 859,
861-62 (Ky. 1983), wherein we found that
[t]he 1974 commentary to the criminal code makes it plain that the
intent of the persistent felony offender statute was to restrict its
application to persons who have been previously exposed to an
institutional rehabilitative effort . . . . The persistent felony offender
statute has been amended since its enactment in 1974. Nothing in
the amendments, however, indicates any legislative intent to
repudiate the 1974 commentary. . . . The amendment retained the
-18-
concept of not regarding an individual as a persistent offender
unless he has been exposed to some rehabilitative effort.
A second amendment now no longer requires actual imprisonment
in the definition of conviction . A probated sentence now comes
within the definition of a conviction, whereas under the 1974 Act it
did not . K .R .S. 532.080(2)(c)(2) and 532 .080(3)(c)(2) . This
amendment recognizes that probation of a sentence is subject to
the supervision of a probation officer and the court and that
probation is in itself, an effort toward rehabilitation . A person who
has previously been convicted of a felony and probated may now
be convicted as a persistent felony offender for the commission of a
subsequent felony.
(Emphasis added) .
Finding no error in the trial court's application of KRS 532 .080, we
affirm the trial court's ruling with respect to the conviction for second
degree persistent felony offender .
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we affirm Appellant's conviction for first
degree assault and his subsequent conviction for second degree persistent
felony offender .
Cooper, Graves, Roach, Scott and Wintersheimer, JJ ., concur.
Johnstone, J ., concurs in result only. Lambert, C .J., dissents .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Randall L. Wheeler
Assistant Public Advocate
Dept. of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Gregory D. Stumbo,
Attorney General of Kentucky
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
Perry T. Ryan
Assistant Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.